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"Doctrine and Speculation in Schleiennacher's Glaubenslehre'' 
Ph.D.1991 
Friedrich Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre is a work dedicated to the autarky 
of Christian dogmatic theology. Schleiermacher, we are told, establishes the 
independence of religion: he secures its life free from the constraints of 
metaphysics and morality by planting its roots in "feeling" or more exactly 
in "immediate self-consciousness". The guiding principle of the Glaubenslehre 
is to secure its borders against the incursion of alien, illicit speculation, 
theological as well as philosophical. This ambition is doomed to failure, as 
is demonstrated with reference to: Schleiermacher's Open Letters, theology's 
anterior disciplines (which provide the lemmata of the Introduction), the 
Introduction to the Glaubenslehre itself and the work's conclusion. The 
Glaubenslehre describes itself as a "system" of Christian doctrine. As such the 
beginning and the end must form a coherent whole, and the movement 
between piety and its interpretation must in principle be reversible. It is not 
self-evident that either of these conditions has been ~et. 
G.W.F. Hegel understood Schleiermacher's theology to be repre-
sentative of the "unfulfilled" Enlightenment: Schleiermacher demands that 
modern faith find its slot in a divided consciousness, subjective and objec-
tive, religious and speculative, theological and philosophical. According to 
Schleiermacher, it should be possible to run both forms of consciousness. on 
parallel tracks indefinitely, without their falling into ruinous conflict. The 
perspective of this dissertation is more adequately captured by F.C. Baur's 
contention that the subjective standpoint of Schleiermacher's Religionsphilo-
sophie must convert itself into the objective standpoint of the Hegelian 
philosophy of religion. 
We follow public opinion in nineteenth-century Berlin, in believing 
that the conflict between Hegel and Schleiermacher can be made to shed 
light on both their systems: 
Philosophen denken dunkel, aber schimpfen sehr deutlich. 
Dissertation presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in the University of Durham 
(Faculty of Arts, Department of Theology) 
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Philosophie ... Sie wird haufig fur ein formelles, inhaltleeres Wissen 
gehalten, und es fehlt sehr an der Einsicht, daiS, was auch dem Inhalte 
nach in irgendeiner Kenntnis und Wissenschaft Wahrheit ist, diesen 
Namen allein dann verdienen kann, wenn es von der Philosophie 
erzeugt worden; daiS die andem Wissenschaften, sie mogen es mit 
Rasonnieren, ohne die Philosophie, versuchen, soviel sie wollen, ohne 
sie nicht Leben, Geist, Wahrheit in ihnen zu haben vermogen. 
G.W.F. Hegel, Phiinomenologie des Geistes, 1807. 
Vorrede, §67. 
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Preface 
The primary text under consideration in this dissertation is the second edition of Schleiermacher's The Christian Faith (identified as Glauben-
slehre2). I have employed the 1928 translation of this second edition 
throughout, and I have indicated by means of footnotes any deviations from 
the English text which was edited by H.R. Mackintosh and J.S. Stewart. 
I have undertaken to provide one standard orthography for the English 
and German cited in this dissertation. I have transliterated all archaic 
nineteenth-century German spelling into modern German usage (where this 
has been practicable, and with the rigid exception of the titles of all books 
and articles), and I have adopted standard English spellings for all quota-
tions taken from American sources. 
The endeavour has been to produce a fluid, unbroken and clear body 
of text. Consequently the details have been relegated to the footnotes, which 
the reader should employ as an interpretative commentary on the main 
argument. Had I attempted to incorporate this detail into the mainstream of 
my argument, the text would have become unreadable; had I neglected the 
comprehensive detail provided by the footnotes, the scholarship upon 
which this dissertation rests would have remained obscure. 
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I. 
Schleier-
macher's 
Glllubenslehre: 
Its Title 
Introduction: 
Text and Context 
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) became the first Dean of the Fa-culty of Theology at the newly-founded University of Berlin in Septem-
ber 1810.1 His subsequent academic work at the University decisively 
affected the future study of Protestant Christian theology. The text which 
gives the most comprehensive statement of this quite monumental change 
in the methods and character of Protestant German dogmatic theology is 
Schleiermacher's famous The Christian Faith, a two-volume work which 
appeared in two editions in Schleiermacher' s lifetime (1821 I 22 and 
1830/31). 
The full title of these volumes (which is not even alluded to in the 
English translation of 1928!) needs to be given its due, if Schleiermacher's 
purpose is firmly to be grasped. The complete title actually reads-The 
Christian Faith: Represented according to the Principles of the Protestant Church 
in their lnterconnection.2 Schleiermacher's lengthy title (which still gives a 
very good sense of the content therein) has been supplanted in all popular 
and scholarly discussion by the designation Glaubenslehre, a term Schleier-
macher himself used in referring to this epoch-making theological publica-
tion. Glaubenslehre is neither a word that Schleiermacher coined, nor is it 
properly speaking the title of any book; Glaubenslehre is first and foremost a 
theological method, a way of doing theology, of which Schleiermacher' s The 
Christian Faith may justly be considered the paradigmatic manifestation. 
This dissertation-which will have as one of its fundamentai tasks the 
careful dissection of this concept-follows the whole German theological 
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tradition in keeping Glaubenslehre as the rubric which denotes Schleier-
macher's most significant scholarly legacy, both in the general sense of his 
dogmatic method and in the particular sense of his two-volume The Christian 
Faith. (I have not inclined to the practice of translating Glaubenslehre by the 
ugly phrase "faith-doctrine"? which is un-English both in expression and 
content.) 
Schleiermacher inherited the term Glaubenslehre both from Pietism and 
eighteenth-century theology. In 1688 the famous pietist Philipp Jakob 
Spener published a collection of sermons under the title Evangelische 
Glaubens-Lehre, a phrase then adopted to identify a three-volume dogmatic 
treatise published in Halle in the years 1759/60.4 What Schleiermacher 
sensed in this new terminology, and then developed further and more 
systematically than any of his forebears, was a complete re-orientation of 
the theological task. If, formerly, the intended subject of any dogmatic 
theology was clearly to be the absolute subject, God, his nature and his 
attributes, then, in Glaubenslehre, the initial subject (at any rate) was, by 
contrast, the Christian faith itself. Glaubenslehre, "the doctrine of faith", arises 
from the reflection upon faith, and the special achievement of Schleier-
macher's Glaubenslehre is that in it this reflection is systematically prepared 
and ordered.5 
Of course, the systematic ordering and presentation of Christian dog-
matics was not something Schleiermacher either single-handedly recovered 
or invented. But the unique qualities of Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre do 
emerge in the proposition that his dogmatics offer a self-representation of the 
Christian faith,6 which is achieved with the "help" of the conceptual lan-
guage of theoretical reflection and disciplined scholarship. The auxiliary 
status of this conceptual language is the sine qua non for the integrity of 
Schleiermacher' s theological method. Glaubenslehre is supposed to be the 
"analysis of Christian piety"/ not its systematic substitution or transforma-
tion. Where the primary character of the faith and the ancillary character of 
the systematic language are not stricti y adhered to, there we confront the 
2 
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danger-again and again-that the conceptual formulation will replace or 
displace the very piety which it was originally meant to clarify. 
Schleiermacher went to enormous lengths to guard the borders of his 
Christian Glaubenslehre against the possibility of such a "speculative" usur-
pation. By focusing decidedly on "the realm of inner experience", Schleier-
macher hoped to ensure that "nothing alien" would be able to "creep" into 
the body of his theological exposition. How far this will take us away from 
what had hitherto been assumed to be the theological task becomes apparent 
in §30.2, where Schleiermacher declares "the description of human states" to 
be "the fundamental dogmatic form".8 What kind of theologia (in the sense 
of a doctrine of God) such a dogmatic source can possibly yield remains to 
be seen. 
II. It had been Schleiermacher's intention to dedicate the first edition of his 
The Dedication Glaubenslehre to the venerable German philosopher and man of letters, 
to Jacobi -
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. This dedication was forestalled by the philo-
sopher's death on March 10, 1819, some two years prior to the publication 
of the first volume of Schleiermacher's magnum opus. Schleiermacher had 
hoped to confer this honour upon Jacobi both in recognition of the philo-
sopher's enormous formative influence, and as a means of furthering their 
more recent correspondence and philosophical conversations. Schleier-
macher's letters reveal that he was already familiar with Jacobi's writings as 
a student at Halle-over thirty years earlier;9 and it was through Jacobi's 
important On the Doctrine of Spinoza (1st edition, 1785) that Schleiermacher 
made the initial acquaintance of another lifelong philosophical influence.10 
How appropriate it would have been for the author of the Glaubenslehre 
to have dedicated his representation of the Christian faith to the German 
thinker who has come to be known as the Glaubensphilosoph.11 Jacobi was 
awarded this epithet for his vigorous presentation of the irreducibility and 
necessity of faith. Jacobi's treatment of faith as an aspect of feeling ( Gefiihl)-
independent of the constraints of the human understanding-brings him in 
obvious alignment with one of Schleiermacher's most cherished principles. 
3 
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Another major point of agreement between them would have been Jacobi's 
deep suspicion of any system of thought which sought to be complete just 
in itself.12 As early as 1789, Schleiermacher had informed his father of his 
constitutional aversion to "system-mania"-which certainly remained an 
ingredient of his intellectual make-up throughout his lifetime. In the same 
communication to his father, Schleiermacher added this fateful assertion: 
I do not believe that I shall ever bring things to a fully developed system, 
so that every question one can raise can be answered decisively and in 
connection with all the rest of my knowledge.13 
We shall want to consider the degree to which this youthful prediction is 
actually reflected in Schleiermacher's mature, scholarly output. 
Schleiermacher would not have drawn much comfort from the fact that 
G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) also detected a great affinity between Jacobi's 
philosophy and the anonymous(!) publication which secured Schleier-
macher' s reputation-On Religion: Speeches to the Cultured among its Despisers 
(1st edition, 1799).14 In an early study, Faith and Knowledge (1802), Hegel 
claimed to find in Jacobi's philosophy an approach towards the "subjective 
beauty of Protestantism", an approach raised "to a higher power" by the 
anonymous publication of the "Speeches on Religion".15 Hegel's identifica-
tion of Jacobi and Schleiermacher in this way has been labelled an estimation 
of "considerable insensitivity"}6 but Schleiermacher shows himself aware 
of Hegel's opinion in a letter written in October 1803. There Schleiermacher 
acknowledges that Jacobi's mantle has been conferred upon him, and that 
his Speeches supposedly elaborate and "exponentially" extend Jacobi's phil-
osophy. He wonders why Jacobi has not responded to this conflation of their 
views, and he hopes that Jacobi has not been stung by the injustice of the 
charge.17 
Whatever the merits or shortcomings of Hegel's analysis in this essay 
at the beginning of his career, there is an uncanny intuition in seeing 
Schleiermacher as the enlarger and extender of the master's philosophical 
principles. Schleiermacher's reverence for Jacobi is well attested.18 and yet 
the proposed dedication of the Glaubenslehre was not simply intended as an 
act of homage. The dedication was to serve as a small reminder of their 
4 
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relationship, but it was also meant to further a discussion they had been 
having both in correspondence and in a personal meeting. Schleiermacher 
had hoped that his Glaubenslehre might bring to light-to the best of his 
ability-"Jacobi's real relation to Christianity".19 
How the publication of Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre might possibly 
clarify Jacobi's "relation to Christianity" is rehearsed in a famous letter 
Schleiermacher wrote to Jacobi on March 30, 1818. The occasion for this letter 
was some private remarks which Jacobi had in the first instance directed 
towards another German philosopher, K.L. Reinhold of Kiel. A copy of this 
communication was in time passed along to Schleiermacher}0 and to say 
that Schleiermacher found Jacobi's remarks a little insufficient and rash 
would be rather to understate the case. According to Jacobi's pithy analysis, 
we are presented with a series of stark and ineluctable alternatives-be-
tween which there can be no possible mediation, and beyond which there 
exists no third term. The Pillars of Hercules which confront each other in 
pure antagonism are: paganism and Christianity, philosophy and Catholi-
cism, pantheism (Naturvergotterung) and anthropomorphism, shaky philos-
ophical Christianity and the concrete, historical original upon which it preys. 
Summing up this unhappy dichotomy, Jacobi declares himself a pagan in 
his understanding, but a Christian with his whole heart (mit dem ganzen 
Gemilte); and Jacobi represents himself as swimming between two currents, 
two bodies of water, which for him can never unite.21 
For Schleiermacher this divided consciousness, this bifurcation of the 
human personality, is quite simply intolerable. To concede such a schism as 
the inescapable condition of modem life is to surrender any hope of a truly 
intellectual relation to one's Christian faith-and that is precisely the quand-
ary which Jacobi's letter exposes. 
A decade later, when Schleiermacher was preparing his public for the 
second edition of his Glaubenslehre, he penned a sentence which once again 
threw up this very Jacobian antinomy; he asked his readers the famous 
rhetorical question, "Must the knot of history so unravel that Christianity 
becomes identified with barbarism and science [Wissenschaftl with unbe-
5 
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lief?"22 It was Schleiermacher's unswerving conviction that there could be a 
disciplined presentation of the Christian faith, which would not bring it into 
immediate, ruinous conflict with free, secular inquiry.23 Even more signifi-
cantly, it would be the explicit task of such a dogmatic theology to show that 
Christian piety is not simply maintained in opposition to, or in spite of, 
whatever secular research might uncover, whether in reference to the natu-
ral world or the character of Christian origins. For Jacobi (on the basis of 
what he sent to Reinhold) no such possibility appears to be envisaged. But 
for many of those who were able to read Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre, it 
has been Schleiermacher's supreme genius to demonstrate how "it is still 
possible to be both devout and intellectually honest".24 
Jacobi's list of irreconcilable alternatives represents the Scylla and 
Charybdis which the Glaubenslehre will have to negotiate, if it is to succeed 
in carrying us beyond Jacobi's quite impossible position. Inasmuch as Jacobi 
gives such a concise account of the dilemma in which the "cultured" belit:ver 
finds himself caught, Schleiermacher's intended dedication of his great 
dogmatic work is not just a courteous nod in the direction of a revered 
philosopher, but it must be seen as takin~ up the challenge which Jacobi's 
letter lays down. The German critic Emanuel Hirsch extends our theme in 
praising the skill with which Schleiermacher manages to find "the narrow 
way" between sceptical atheism and mythical orthodoxy,25 those same bleak 
alternatives we find in Jacobi's testament to Reinhold. 
Schleiermacher's preliminary answer to Jacobi's perplexity can be 
found in the letter which he wrote to the philosopher in the year before 
Jacobi's death. Schleiermacher rejects the notion that a pagan understanding 
can coexist with a Christian feeling-a Christianity of the heart-because 
the understanding can do no more than interpret or translate the feeling that 
it already finds present. Schleiermacher says explicitly in this letter that 
"dogmatics" is nothing other than the interpretation (Dolmetschung) of the 
religious feeling by the reflective activity of the understanding, and as a 
consequence a pagan interpretation, or exegesis, of a Christian feeiing wouid 
be a contradiction in terms.26 
6 
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Schleiermacher has chosen his words carefully. Not only is this word 
Dolmetschung used to describe the general appropriation of Christian piety 
by the understanding, but it also acts as the clue to the abiding authority of 
the Christian New Testament scriptures. In Schleiermacher's account, the 
Bible is the original and originative "interpretation" of Christian feeling, so 
firmly established that one is always driven to understand the New Testa-
ment better and develop it further. 27 The sense which Schleiermacher wishes 
to convey by his repeated use of "Dolmetschung" is illuminated when we 
consider Schleiermacher's trenchant definition of this term some five years 
earlier. 
In 1813 Schleiermacher had delivered a lecture to the Royal Academy 
of Sciences in Berlin on the problems which confront anyone who has ever 
tried to translate a text from one language into another. This lecture "on the 
different methods of translation" draws a crucial distinction between the 
activities of interpretation and translation, between Dolmetschen and iiber-
setzen. The former, Schleiermacher describes as a "mechanical" business,28 
because interpreters are employed in the fields of tourism, diplomacy, 
commerce and natural science, where everyone speaks "the same language", 
even if we continue to use different words. "Translation" by contrast is more 
complex; there is no assumption here of an easy fit between the literary, 
historical and philosophical conventions and concepts of any two developed 
languages, and the problem is always how to make the moods and ideas of 
one culture intelligible to another-without gross distortion. Whereas. the 
techniques of "interpretation" can be refined to the point of the "simulta-
neous translation", iibersetzen (translation proper) is always an unending 
task, a continuing effort to build a bridge between essentially incommensur-
able cultures and the forms of expression which they adopt. 
In light of this fundamental distinction, which Schleiermacher' s lecture 
actually builds into the German language,29 we can presume that Schleier-
macher has adopted the terminology of "Dolmetschen" in his response to 
- ~ • • • - - ,. '" • ~ ,. • - • • 0 II r ,...,, * I 0 r. 1 • jacobi with some care. unoerstanomg- s mterpretanun ur LilriSLlan 1.€e1mg, 
like the original "interpretation" offered in the New Testament, implies a 
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close "fit" between original experience and reflected description, between 
the "religiosity" of feeling and the "religion" of the understanding.30 What 
Schleiermacher appears to be suggesting is that when the understanding 
reflects upon the piety it already finds at hand, there can occur something 
like the "simultaneous translation" which we find at international conferen-
ces or at the United Nations: apparently there can be a transposition of 
Christian piety into a higher register or a new key without distortion and 
without remainder. 
Here we have come to the crucial point. Schleierrnacher's dogmatics, 
his Glaubenslehre, is supposed to be the "interpretation" of Christian piety, 
not its translation; philosophical "translations" of the Christian faith exist in 
sufficient numbers. Schleierrnacher set out to provide the Protestant German 
Churches with dogmatic propositions understood as not more and not less 
than "logically ordered reflection upon the immediate utterances of the 
religious self-consciousness".31 In stressing that this reflection remains a 
Dolmetschung, Schleiermacher signals that his dogmatic procedure is to be 
free of those alien speculative and philosophical concepts which would 
necessarily translate Christian piety into a philosophical language, divorced 
from Christian origins. Schleiermacher explicitly repudiates this form of 
philosophical translation. In the Postscript to §16 of his Glaubenslehre, he 
claims: 
The Protestant Church in particular is unanimous in feeling that the 
distinctive form of its dogmatic propositions does not depend on any 
form or school of philosophy, and has not proceeded at all from a 
speculative interest, but simply from the interest of satisfying the 
immediate self-consciousness solely through the means ordained by 
Christ, in their genuine and uncorrupted form.32 
If Christian dogmatic theology is understood according to these criteria, 
then Schleierrnacher may be right to argue that there is no inherent conflict 
between piety and understanding, between head and heart. The reflection 
upon faith takes place entirely within the realm of faith, and the under-
standing here operative produces a religion or theology "within the limits 
of piety alone".33 
8 
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There seems no escaping the conclusion here that Christian piety like 
Holy Scripture is sui ipsius interpres: Christian piety is its own interpreter. 
Luther had wanted the Bible, the Word of God, "to be sovereign-inter-
preted neither by his own spirit nor by anyone else's", but understood 
through itself and according to its own spirit.34 This same sovereignty is 
what Schleiermacher now hopes to commandeer for the Christian self-con-
sciousness. Christian piety must be shown capable of generating out of itself 
the concepts, categories and language which theology needs to analyse it. 
Indeed in his hermeneutical manuscripts Schleiermacher actually refers to 
Christianity's power of formulating new conceptual language: these new 
concepts are said to have arisen from the distinctive Christian stimulation 
of the affections.35 Alongside the New Testament, the various Christian 
creeds and confessions are evidences of that self-interpreting Christian piety 
upon which the theologian in turn reflects. It is this self-interpreting capacity 
which frees Christianity from falling subject to alien speculative ideas and 
philosophical categories. And just because Christian piety is self-interpre-
ting, Schleiermacher' s Glaubenslehre-"logically ordered reflection" upon the 
Protestant piety of nineteenth-century German-speaking peoples-is a dis-
cipline which can proceed without "speculative aids".36 
Schleiermacher's letter to Jacobi has provided us with a useful introduction 
to the dogmatic method that his Glaubenslehre will employ: dogmatic theo-
logy is the "interpretation" of Christian feeling by the reflective under-
standing. But as this letter is being addressed to a philosopher, it is hardly 
surprising that Schleiermacher now opens up the discussion to include a 
more general consideration of how theology and philosophy might be 
related. Schleiermacher announces that, like Jacobi, he too is a philosopher 
with respect to his understanding, and this admission brings with it a 
significant new complication. While within the realm of religion, under-
standing and piety need not fall into ruinous conflict-the one becomes the 
means of interpreting and clarifying the other-surely it is impossible to 
maintain that the only function of the philosophical understanding is the 
9 
Introduction 
Text and Context 
pious interpretation of Christian feeling or Christian self-consciousness. The 
real issue raised by Jacobi's communication still remains: the potential 
conflict between secular philosophical understanding and the Christian 
religion (now duly interpreted). 
The significance of Schleiermacher' s response to Jacobi here emerges 
with greater clarity. We have chosen Schleiermacher's famous letter as a 
useful place to "take our bearings"37 before entering into an analysis of the 
Glaubenslehre proper, not least because Schleiermacher had hoped through 
the publication of his dogmatics to throw some light on "Jacobi's real relation 
to Christianity". The letter then serves as a tool in establishing Schleier-
macher' s dogmatic intentions; but equally the interpretation of the letter can 
give the first indication of how a critic intends to treat Schleiermacher 
subsequently. Richard Crouter, for instance, warns (before beginning his 
own interpretation) that "personal" correspondence cannot be accorded the 
same weight as more formal material.38 This caveat has a slightly hollow 
ring, when we remember how many essential Schleiermacher texts have 
been reconstructed after his death from his manuscripts and fragmentary 
notes. Further, this letter cannot be regarded as ordinary correspondence, 
for in it Schleiermacher challenges, in detail, the opinions of a man whom 
he holds in the highest esteem. The fact is that the letter, and especially the 
images it employs, have entered into the Schleiermacher literature quite 
irreversibly. 
The most important reference to Schleiermacher' s letter in recent years 
comes from Gerhard Ebeling. He contended that the way in which Schleier-
macher relates theology and philosophy is the key issue (das Kernproblem) in 
the interpretation of his thought. In support of this claim Ebeling then cites 
(from the letter) the celebrated ellipse which Schleiermacher proposes to 
draw around the dual foci of his existence.39 The controversy arises when 
we try to establish precisely what these foci represent. 
One school of thought would have us restrict the use of this focal 
imagery to the immediate context of the letter. According to this analy!;i!;, 
the primary polarity within Christian consciousness is between "deep relig-
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ious feeling (GefUhl)" and "keenness of intellect (Verstand)".40 There is no 
requirement to see this polarity as in any way destructive of the Christian 
life, since within the sphere of religion, the one can clarify and enhance the 
other. Indeed, Schleiermacher' s letter goes on to envisage a kind of "galvanic 
operation, in the feeling of understanding and in the understanding of 
feeling", which he describes as "the innermost life of the humanspirit".41 The 
argument is that the understanding, and the piety it interprets, can live 
harmoniously; they are able to work together, while yet remaining distinct. 
This attractive picture is shattered when we recall that Schleiermacher 
is still addressing his remarks to a philosopher. Perhaps Jacobi was pleased 
to learn that the critical intellect could offer such distinguished service in the 
cause of piety-but it can hardly be suggested that this account exhausts 
what Schleiermacher means by being a "philosopher" with respect to the 
understanding. The striking thing about Schleiermacher's use of this meta-
phor of the ellipse is that he concludes its discussion with the statement that 
his philosophy and his dogmatics, then, "are firmly determined not to 
contradict each other".42 Obviously, there is more at issue here than the 
limited discussion of how the understanding can be of assistance to piety. 
Ebeling is perfectly justified in identifying the foci of Schleiermacher's 
ellipse as his theology and his philosophy, for these are two sides of 
Schleiermacher' s personality which he sought "to attune" right until the very 
end of his lifetime. 
Our interpretation of Schleiermacher's letter is limited in scope -and 
purpose. We are using this piece of correspondence both as a convenient 
introduction to the Glaubenslehre and to the central question of this disserta-
tion, viz. the relation of philosophy to theology within Schleiermacher's 
dogmatics. Nonetheless, it is difficult to reconcile what we wish to emphas-
ize about Schleiermacher's letter with some of what we read in his ablest 
interpreters. So, for instance, Hans-Joachim Birkner argues that not only 
Schleiermacher's image of the ellipse, but indeed the whole letter, is really 
about the relation of understanding to feeling. Since the relationship of 
philosophy to dogmatics is not really the subject under discussion, the only 
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thing that can be taken from the letter in this regard is Schleiermacher' s 
statement that for him his theology and his philosophy will always attempt 
to remain free from contradiction, while simultaneously they will constantly 
seek a viable rapprochement.43 If this is "all" that may legitimately be taken 
from the letter on this matter, it is not hard to see why in the relation of 
philosophy to theology Ebeling discovers the quintessential Schleiermache-
rian ellipse. Like the foci of an ellipse, Schleiermacher's theology and phil-
osophy are two centres of his thought, which are neither permitted to pull 
further apart, nor are they ever to collapse into each other. Their relation is 
one of distinct, harmonious separation. 
Brian Gerrish's discussion of this letter is in some ways more troubling. 
He too wishes to underscore that the letter (used as an introduction to the 
Glaubenslehre) is about the "dialectical" operation that obtains between Chris-
tian feeling and the critical interpretation of it by the understanding. Yet, 
when Gerrish refers us to Schleiermacher's effort "to attune the two sides of 
his personality" in this operation, he gives no indication that this "attuning" 
is what Schleiermacher intends for the relation of his philosophy to his 
dogmatics.44 That these two sides of Schleiermacher's personality also 
require their reconciliation, Gerrish is happy to acknowledge in other con-
texts. So, for instance, he first drew my attention to one of Schleiermacher's 
most extraordinary pronouncements-words recorded by his wife as he lay 
dying in February 1834. According to her report, Schleiermacher is supposed 
to have called out, "I must think the most profound speculative thoughts, 
and they are for me identical with the innermost religious feelings." With 
characteristic humour Gerrish observes that these words were uttered while 
Schleiermacher was "under the sedative effects of opium"; but then he adds, 
"the sentiment was not out of keeping with the principles and practices of 
his life."45 There is evidence here that Schleiermacher struggled to maintain 
these two sides of his personality (i.e., deep religious feeling and speculative 
profundity4~ throughout his life. That Gerrish does not see this as an issue 
in Schleiermacher's letter i:o Jacobi has a direct bearing, in my opinion, on 
his interpretation of Schleiermacher' s Glaubenslehre. This dissertation will 
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take the position that the polarity in Schleiermacher's intellect must make 
an inevitable appearance in his greatest scholarly work. 
That this polarity cannot be avoided is a topic actually discussed in 
§28.3 of the Glaubenslehre itself. There Schleiermacher makes the revealing 
acknowledgement that 
the same members of the Christian communion then, through whom 
alone the scientific form of the Glaubenslehre arises and subsists, are also 
those in whom the speculative consciousness is awakened. Now just as 
this is the highest objective function of the human spirit, so pious 
self-consciousness is on the other hand the highest subjective func-
tion.47 
In Schleiermacher these two functions of the human spirit (the subjective 
and the objective) have apparently been developed to a very high degree. 
Nonetheless, Schleiermacher maintains that his Glaubenslehre has been con-
structed in such a way as to leave hardly any opening through which 
philosophical speculation can "force its way" into the body of his dogmatic 
theology.48 In view of the intimate relation between speculative conscious-
ness and the drive for a scientific (wissenschaftlich) treatment of Christian 
doctrine, which has been sketched above, Schleiermacher' s assurance on this 
matter cannot be taken at face value. 
IV. It is through his letter to Jacobi that three grand images become part of the 
The Galvanic way in which Schleiermacher is discussed by his critics. One of these images 
Column 
is adopted by Schleiermacher directly from Jacobi's initial communication 
to Reinhold. This is Jacobi's suggestion that he is swimming between two 
currents, two bodies of water which, for him, can never merge. The two 
currents represent Jacobi's pagan understanding and Christian heart 
(Gemiit)-while he is being "buoyed up" by the one, he is being "pulled 
under" by the other.49 Schleiermacher both accepts and rejects the appropri-
ateness of this image. On the one hand, Schleiermacher says that these two 
currents cannot merge for him either-and that he is satisfied that they 
should remain separate; but then on the other hand, Schleiermacher also 
wants to speak of establishing an "equilibrium" between these great bodies 
of water, and in order to bring out his sense here, as Brian Gerrish rightly 
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says, Schleiermacher now "changes the metaphor".50 While these two great 
principles (understanding and feeling) remain "side by side", they also 
"make contact", and in that contact, they create what Schleiermacher calls a 
"galvanic pile". 
What Schleiermacher labels as a "galvanic pile" is properly a reference 
to the scientific discovery made public in 1800 by Alessandro Volta of the 
means of constructing an electrical battery-the first source of continuous 
electrical current. A confusion occurs because Volta actually constructed the 
battery on the basis of principles directly in opposition to the theories of L. 
Galvani. What Volta discovered was that two dissimilar metals (e.g., zinc 
and silver) could, if combined with some fluid (acting as a conducting agent), 
generate electricity continuously. This battery was known as a "pile" or 
column, because such combinations of the two metals were stacked on top 
of one another, always with a moistened pad between each pair of the two 
different metals. The height of the column determined the strength of the 
current. 51 
If Schleiermacher's image here is to be taken seriously, then what he is 
proposing is that understanding and feeling, coming into contact with one 
another, are both discrete and continuous. On the one hand, they remain 
separate elements, but on the other hand, they can be united and, in their 
co-operation, produce a new living energy, which Schleiermacher calls "the 
innermost life of the spirit". Here we see precisely where Schleiermacher 
accepts the conditions imposed by Jacobi and where he wants to go beyond 
them. What he accepts fundamentally is the notion of the two spheres or two 
"poles" (another description used in Schleiermacher's letter)-these two 
poles representing, for want of a better way of putting the matter, the broad 
realms of understanding and feeling. What Schleiermacher does not accept 
is that these two realms, the objective and subjective functions of the human 
spirit, must persist in an antagonistic relation, so that the truth of the one 
can only be achieved at the expense of the other. 
Here we see why Schleiermacher' s image of the ellip~e, a geometrical 
figure with two "centres", assumes a dominant position in the literature 
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about Schleiermacher. The advantage of this image is that it is able to support 
the conception of harmonious bipolarity. Indeed, the elliptical figure was a 
favourite image of German Romanticism, nowhere more clearly evident 
than in the "Philosophical Fragments" of Friedrich Schlegel, who exercised 
a considerable, early influence upon Schleiermacher. For Schlegel both life 
and philosophy can respectively be described as ellipses with two centres. 52 
Schleiermacher adopts from Jacobi the essential duality of under-
standing and feeling but does not accept as readily the notion that these two 
realms need to be in intrinsic opposition. The beauty of the elliptical image 
becomes evident: the two elements, each with its own centre, must be in 
perfect balance and harmony if the ellipse is to be constructed. The ellipse 
itself reveals the equivalence and equilibrium of the two foci around which 
it is constructed. The transformation of Jacobi's initial metaphor of the two 
currents, unable to merge, into the images of the galvanic pile and the 
geometrical ellipse shows that Schleiermacher is prepared to accept the 
duality, but not the division which Jacobi's position implies. In the galvanic 
pile the two dissimilar elements create a new force; in the ellipse, the 
independence and unity of two separate but equal principles are perfectly 
maintained. 
Yet the disputed point remains: what are these two "centres", how are 
the two foci of this ellipse best described? At one level, it is true that 
Schleiermacher affirms the harmonious relationship of understanding and 
feeling within "the sphere of religion",53 but then again this letter is_ ad-
dressed to a philosopher and it does allow that philosophy is the under-
standing's own independent and original activity.54 The independence of 
this activity consists in more than simply enabling piety to understand itself. 
As was stated above (p. 11), Schleiermacher's reference to the ellipse con-
cludes with the assertion that his philosophy and his dogmatics are "firmly 
determined not to contradict each other"; for Schleiermacher this means that 
both must remain open-ended.55 They may come to approach each other 
asytnptotically, but they cannot collapse into each other. Human existence 
is described, by Schleiermacher, as an "oscillation"56 between the poles or 
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centres of one's life. The image of the ellipse is favoured because of the 
tension between the foci around which the ellipse is drawn: the metaphor is 
dynamic and not static. Our argument is that the fundamental polarity in 
this letter, in Schleiermacher's life, in the age of German Romanticism and 
Idealism is not that between understanding and feeling within the realm of 
religion, butratherthatitis the polarity of religion and philosophy,of feeling 
and speculation. If our judgment is right, then we shall expect to find 
significant evidence of this polarity in Schleiermacher's greatest completed 
work, his Glaubenslehre. In fact, the question we shall want to put to Schleier-
macher may be stated as follows: what kind of "galvanic operation" can 
occur between speculation and theology? That is, we wish to inquire how 
philosophy and theology can be combined-without contradiction-in a 
single human life and in a particular historical period. 
We follow Schleiermacher's own principles in undertaking this "ana-
lysis" of his personality. In a contribution to the final volume of Atheniium 
edited by the Schlegel brothers, Schleiermacher describes a process in which 
the constituent parts of an individual are separated "chemically", in order 
that "the inner principle of their combination, the most profound mystery 
of individuality" may be uncovered. To use Schleiermacher's own words, 
we wish to "reconstruct" his intellectual personality "in an artificial way".57 
We find our motive in the knowledge that Schleiermacher's account of the 
relation of religion and philosophy is a great deal more subtle than Jacobi's. 
We may wish to treat with great care Richard Crouter's statement that 
Schleiermacher "sees himself as the proper heir (though also the reviser) of 
a 'philosophy of faith'".58 Yet, as the image of the ellipse directly confirms, 
there is to be in Schleiermacher' s thought some genuine reciprocity between 
the dogmatic and the speculative, between religion and philosophy. In 
Schleiermacher's lecture notes from his first university appointment at 
Halle, we discover that Schleiermacher did consider the possibility of reci-
procal relations between philosophy and religion, in which each is advanced 
through the other.59 Friedrich Schlegel appears to follow a similar line of 
thought; but, not surprisingly, for him the dominant pair are poetry and 
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philosophy. These are said to "penetrate each other ever more intimately".60 
Schleiermacher's initial approach cannot be identical with Schlegel's, and 
yet it seems right in this dissertation to ask in what respect theology and 
speculation, religion and philosophy can be understood in terms of this 
reciprocity (Wechselseitigkeit), in terms of this mutual interpenetration.61 
We have been trying to set the stage for our critical reading of Schleier-
macher' s Glaubenslehre by establishing the mood or the tone of the work. We 
have already alluded to both the title and the subtitle of this work The 
Christian Faith (p. 1), which offer a significant hint of what the text intends 
to treat, and how it intends to go about it. Then we justified our use of the 
term Glaubenslehre in referring to this theological treatise, both because we 
were following Schleiermacher' s own practice and because this too offered 
some insight into the actual subject-matter being considered. From there, we 
moved to explore why the philosopher Jacobi (der Glaubensphilosoph) was to 
be honoured by the publication of Schleiermacher' s greatest work, and how 
this Glaubenslehre might bring to light Jacobi's "real relation to Christianity" 
(p. 5). 
This scrupulous preparation of our reading brings us into step with 
the exacting practice of contemporary literary criticism. Gerard Genette 
stresses the contribution which title, subtitle, preface, afterword, quotation, 
etc., can bring to the proper analysis of the text under consideration. He 
refers to these as "signaux accessoires",62 which the true interpreter ignores 
at his peril. A substantial criticism must be levelled against the authoritative 
English translation of the Glaubenslehrein this regard. Not only (as indicated) 
have the translators ignored the text's informative subtitle, but they have 
also chosen to overlook the Latin quotations from Anselm which appeared 
on the title-pages of both editions published in Schleiermacher's lifetime. No 
reference is made to these quotations anywhere in the English translation. 
The use of Anselm as a kind of mast-head for the reading of the 
Glaubenslehre is in fact highly ambiguous. The famous phrase "credo ut 
intelligam" presumably expresses the priority of actual Christian belief for 
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this kind of Christian dogmatics. The second quotation, taken from Anselm's 
De fide trinitatis, seems to bring into focus the place of personal experience 
for the new dogmatic method being pursued. This is suggested in the 
experietur and expertus of the quotation.63 Indeed, it seems to imply that 
without the experience, there will be no understanding. Now the irony is 
that the source of the first quotation (the Proslogion) is the home of the 
infamous ontological argument, a form of argument than which nothing 
more alien to Schleiermacher' s method can be conceived. Proofs for the 
existence of God are anathema to Schleiermacher's whole enterprise.64 The 
second quotation from De fide trinitatis offers its own ironic comment on the 
disputed question of the actual relevance of a trinitarian understanding of 
God for concrete Christian piety. Schleiermacher will certainly suggest at 
the end of his Glaubenslehre that the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity is 
not an "immediate utterance concerning the Christian self-consciousness, 
but only a combination of several such utterances" (§170. Proposition).65 
Indeed, the eternal distinctions upon which the doctrine was thought to 
depend could never appear in the pious self-consciousness (§170.2). There is 
a strong hint here that the traditional doctrine of the Trinity depends on the 
dreaded incursion of" alien" speculation (§ 170. Postscript)! Schleiermacher' s 
manifestly lukewarm treatment of this doctrine at the conclusion of his 
Glaubenslehre has led to repeated charges that, far from being the keystone 
(§ 170.1) it claims to represent, the doctrine of the Trinity with which Schleier-
macher concludes is in fact nothing more than an appendix in the literal 
sense-superfluous.66 
The constant shadow of Schleiermacher' s great dogmatic exposition is 
the spectre of the Hegelian philosophy, and especially the Hegelian philo-
sophy of religion-which was being worked out in repeated lecture series 
contemporaneously with the first publication of Schleiermacher' s Glaubens-
lehre and its revision in the second edition. It must not be left unstated that 
Hegel also cites Anselm in Latin in the Introduction to his lectures of 1827. 
Here Anseim's authority is invoked to expose the negligence of those who 
do not seek to understand what it is they believe.67 Hegel's distinct advant-
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age over Schleiermacher here is that he is known to have significantly more 
sympathy for the scholastic theology than his great rival. It would not be an 
exaggeration to say that Schleiermacher almost finds the scholastic approach 
absurd.68 Hegel, by way of contrast, finds the scholastic method most 
congenial, for as he asserts: 
Scholastic philosophy is identical with theology; theology is philo-
sophy, and philosophy is theology .... These great men-Anselm, 
Abelard, etc.-built up theology out of philosophy.69 
Inevitably it seems, even by Schleiermacher's casual appropriation of An-
selm, we are led back into the core of our investigation: the precise relation 
of philosophy to theology within Schleiermacher's dogmatics. 
Excursus: Schleiermacher's lectures on church history offer a fascinating com-
Lectures on mentary on the quotations from Anselm which ornament the title-page 
Church History of his Glaubenslehre. These lectures were first delivered in the academic 
year 1821/22, the very year of the publication of his first edition of The 
Christian Faith?0 All our favourite Schleiermacher themes make their 
appearance in the course of his relatively short treatment of Anselm's 
Christian scholasticism. So we learn to distinguish medieval philos-
ophy and theology by assessing the relation of the scholastic writing 
to the interests and needs of the Christian Church. If a work (e.g., the 
Proslogion) is judged non-ecclesiastical in origin, it falls on the philos-
ophical side; whereas Anselm's Cur Deus Homo, by way of contrast, is 
properly theological-it refers everything back to its ecclesiastical 
roots. Nonetheless, Schleiermacher also acknowledges the artificiality 
of such a distinction: in Anselm, philosophy and "positive" Christianity 
are completely one, and the engine driving the whole scholastic enter-
prise-philosophical and theological-is speculation. But Schleier-
macher adds an important proviso: the theological speculation, while 
ignoring the Bible, is grounded in faith (Glaube) and inner experience. 
This, of course, makes it more palatable! 
The neglect, even the decline, of proper Biblical interpretation is 
one of the two major criticisms that Schleiermacher will level against 
the medieval theologians. They restricted their exegesis to the Vulgate 
translation, they had little Greek, even less Hebrew, and they were 
unable to develop their interpretations beyond what could be dis-
covered in the commentaries of the Latin Fathers. The other enormous 
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deficiency of scholastic theology, according to Schleiermacher, is that 
it never found a systematic method which enabled it to move signifi-
cantly beyond the isolated treatment of specific questions and topics, 
so that the whole had more the character of an aggregate than a genuine 
system. 
Schleiermacher makes specific mention of the quotations from 
Anselm which appear at the beginning of his Glaubenslehre. Anselm is 
honoured because for him faith and experience, understood as orig-
inal, inner experience, have the priority-indeed Anselm makes be-
lieving a condition of understanding,71very much in accordance with 
Schleiermacher's own principles. Anselm is praised for not reversing 
the proper order (as the philosophers are wont to do): he does not make 
his faith dependent on his knowing (yvoxn9-his faith is not subordi-
nated to his theology, his theology is an expression of his faith. 
There is an end of praise, however, when we come to Anselm's 
treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity. Here the priority of the inner 
experience is violated; "the law of thought" is made to precede the inner 
experience, and Schleiermacher concludes rather darkly: "It is not 
possible to bring the essence of Christianity, the inner experience, into 
the form of thought. "72 Whether this stricture is to be understood only 
as a comment on Anselm, and medieval scholasticism more generally, 
or whether it has a far wider application, is a question this dissertation 
has undertaken to explore. 
Schleiermacher's journey to the mature position he adopts in the 
Glaubenslehre is not without dangerous flirtations along the way. His 
first opportunity to lecture on dogmatic theology at the University of 
Halle in 1804/5 is characterized by Schleiermacher as teaching the 
listeners to discover the idea beneath the concept (Begriff)73-whatever 
this may mean, it certainly exposes a youthful enthusiasm for philO:. 
sophical vocabulary. For his lectures on "Christliche Glaubenslehre" 
offered at Halle during the following academic year (1805 I 6), Schleier-
macher expresses the hope that he will be able to help those studying 
under him to have a clear perception of the relation of "speculation and 
piety"?4 And finally in the year before the founding of the University 
of Berlin, Schleiermacher offered lectures on Christian theology, not 
intended exclusively for "theologians", because this course of lectures 
was also designed to provide his listeners with a "speculative critique" 
of its subject-matter?5 We cannot therefore assume that Schleier-
macher always maintained consistently the distinction between dog-
matics and philosophy (or speculation) that defines his mature work, 
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and in part his harsh criticism of some scholastic excesses might be 
understood as the repudiation of his own earlier lofty assessment of 
the prestige of speculation. 
VI. In §1.2 of his Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher discusses the help which an 
TheTaskofthe introduction can offer the discriminating reader. He explains that asuccess-
Giaubenslehre 
ful reading may be achieved if the reader is already acquainted with the 
method the work will pursue and the order in which the topics will be 
treated. Likewise, our discussion of Schleiermacher will proceed most per-
suasively if we indicate clearly from the outset what our reading of Schleier-
macher is intended to demonstrate. At some point every reader of the 
Glaubenslehre must make a decision as to what the work is finally about. 
Following Schleiermacher's own explicit injunctions, we declare that the 
integrity of the Glaubenslehre stands or falls with the determination whether 
philosophical speculation-supposed! y alien to religious self-consciousness 
and the dogmatic method which seeks to grasp that consciousness-has 
been excluded from the "account" of Christian "religious affections"76 with 
which the Glaubenslehre presents its readers. 
Schleiermacher' s vigorous repudiation of all alien philosophizing in 
his systematic representation of Christian doctrine has the effect of rather 
(over)emphasizing what we are asked to believe is extrinsic to the work in 
any case. Schleiermacher draws our attention, so to speak, to the potential 
"fly in the ointment": the more vigorous the denial, the more certain we can 
be that there is something worth investigating. His manful assertion in §28.3 
that "there scarcely remains any point at which speculation could force its 
way into the Glaubenslehre" is simply too good to be true.77 
It is one of the great insights of the Hegelian dialectic that we are bound 
together in one movement of thought with our bitterest enemies. In fact, the 
very act of eliminating a point of view, or completely repudiating an 
opponent's argument, has the (paradoxical) effect of highlighting the very 
thing we wish to discount. So the uncompromising opposition to theological 
speculation actually forces the reader to consider what it is precisely that 
needs to be eliminated. In order to do away with speculation within dog-
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matic theology, we need to identify our adversary very closely. Schleier-
macher himself forces us to define this speculative tendency, so that we may 
the more successfully contrast it with the legitimate "scientific" exposition 
of the Christian faith, which is the proper task of the Christian theologian. 
As one very sympathetic Schleiermacher commentator has written: 
"Schleierrnacher knows full well that a rejection of metaphysics is itself a 
strange and inconsistent form of metaphysics."78 This strangeness and 
inconsistency is the very thing we want to examine. 
The Hegelian discourse makes such a procedure central: we find 
ourselves in ·a dialectical relationship with our adversary the moment we 
engage him in combat; and the more determined the opposition, the more 
firmly the opponents become identified in and through each other. It will be 
our contention that in his Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher forgets"the com-
munity that binds opposite ideas together"; he has suffered a certain astig-
matism in advancing his case so firmly-he has lost sight of the "power 
which is working in him" and his greatest adversary alike?9 
It is very difficult to overlook the fact that from 1818, Hegel and 
Schleiermacher were colleagues and rivals at the University of Berlin-while 
Schleiermacher continued to hold the chair in theology, Hegel was invited 
in that year to occupy the chair in philosophy (which had been held by 
Fichte). So Schleiermacher's lectures in Christian dogmatic theology, or 
Glaubenslehre, in 1818/19, 1820/21, 1821, 1823/24, 1825, 1827/28 and 1830 
may be regarded as running in tandem with Hegel's lectures on the philos-
ophy of religion given in 1821, 1824, 1827 and 1831.80 Hegel was certainly 
familiar with the first edition of Schleiermacher' s Glaubenslehre, and there is 
some suggestion that his initial decision to lecture on the philosophy of 
religion may have been provoked by the imminent publication of Schleier-
macher's first volume in June 1821.81 Schleiermacher's acquaintance with 
Hegel's writings is less clear-although he was only too well aware of the 
savage criticism of him in Hegel's Introduction to Hinrichs' Religionsphiloso-
- Q'l phie, v~ and furthermore he had an avid Hegelian as a coileague (Marheineke} 
in the faculty of theology and in the pulpit of the Dreifaltigkeitskirche. While 
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there is no evidence that Schleierrnacher had a detailed knowledge of 
Hegel's publications, there will be no danger in asserting that Hegel's 
lectures on the philosophy of religion represent the pinnacle of that style of 
speculative theology, which Schleiermacher would have regarded as the 
ruination of proper Christian dogmatics. 
The essence of the dispute between these two great teachers is most 
readily accessible in their vastly differing appraisals of the fruits of scholas-
ticism. In Hegel's infamous Introduction to the above-mentioned work by 
Hinrichs, as always, he praises the scholastic theology of the Middle Ages. 
For Hegel this theology has proved itself as a 
science which developed religion on the side of thought and reason and 
endeavoured to grasp the deepest teachings of the revealed religion in 
thought.83 
As we might expect, Schleierrnacher' s assessment is by no means as 
enthusiastic. For him the real harvest of the Middle Ages is the so-called 
"double truth" which rent the University of Paris in the 1270s. The heretical 
position that seemed to be emerging from the Faculty of Arts was the notion 
of a revealed truth which might not be a truth for unaided human reason, 
or a theological proposition which might not be true for philosophy. The 
inverse could as easily apply, and all aspects of this teaching were formally 
condemned in 1277.84 Schleiermacher refers explicitly to this distinctive 
medieval conundrum in the Postscript to §16. There he distances his dog-
matic method from the medieval "confusion" of speculation and dogma, 
which results from the unhealthy blending of the scholastic "conglomerate-
philosophy" with the language of the Christian religion. In Schleierrnacher' s 
dogmatic theology, liberated from this unholy mixture, it will not be possible 
to ask the "strange question" (wunderliche Frage), "whether the same pro-
position can be true in philosophy and false in Christian theology,and vice 
versa." Despite Schleiermacher' s total lack of sympathy for this medieval 
attempt in the Faculty of Arts to free philosophy from the strictures of the 
revealed (and therefore certain) i.ruths of theology, We shall want to return 
to this question of the "double truth" in our appropriation ofSchleiermacher. 
Notoriously, Schleierrnacher is the man who sought to be "speculative" in 
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his philosophy, while "positive" in his theology;85 what he achieved thereby 
was the authoritative introduction of a "double method" (if not a "double 
truth"), which he would require of the modern intellect, if religious proposi-
tions were to be taken seriously, and on their own terms.86 
Whatever the faults of medieval scholasticism, the waning Middle 
Ages-corrupted as they were by theological speculation-nonetheless kept 
hold of that dialectical unity which "lies beneath all opposition". We have 
another instructive account of this whole conflict in Canto X of Dante's 
Paradiso. There, in the heaven of the Sun, Dante is introduced to the circle of 
the wise men by Thomas Aquinas, who did his utmost while in Paris to 
quash the heresy of the "double truth". Appropriately, next to him on his 
right, is his great teacher and master, Albertus Magnus; Thomas continues 
to introduce the twelve members who make up this circle, including Peter 
Lombard, Solomon, Boethius and Bede, until his introductions are com-
pleted in announcing the "eternal light" of Siger of Brabant, the circle's last 
member. This is the same Siger "who, lecturing down in Straw Street, 
hammered home invidious truths, as logic taught him to. "87 Straw Street is 
where Siger, as a Master of Arts, addressed his Parisian students, and he is 
one of the chief targets of the condemnations issued by the Bishop of Paris 
in 1277. His "invidious" teaching was that of the "double truth", which is 
wholly incompatible with Thomas' Summa in which nature is perfected by 
grace. Thomas never slackened in his opposition to Siger's repugnant doc-
trine. 
Dante's insertion of Siger in this circle of the doctors of the church is 
therefore all the more remarkable and, because Siger is the last of the 
theologians to be introduced, it becomes clear that he closes the circle on 
Thomas' left, a circle which began with Albertus Magnus on Thomas' right. 
What are we to make of this? Only that Dante understood the eternal 
significance of the earthly conflict between Siger and Thomas: that there was 
a fundamental unity underlying their opposition, that the teachings of each 
could only fully be understood in contrast with that of the other, that their 
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intractable opposition at the University of Paris was an earthly expression 
of a more fundamental, ideal harmony. 
Obviously, we have introduced this passage from The Divine Comedy 
to illustrate something of the opposition between Hegel and Schleiermacher. 
If Siger's primary motivation was to find a new freedom for philosophy 
released from the confines imposed by sacra doctrina, then mutatis mutandis, 
Schleiermacher's central motive could be characterized as the attempt to 
discover a freedom for theology released from the domination of speculative 
reason.88 In searching for this independent theological territory (theology's 
"eigener Grund und Boden"-Postscript to §16), Schleiermacher inevitably 
distorts and exaggerates. In passionately establishing this autonomy for 
Christian doctrine, he forgets or overlooks the unity which binds him tightly 
together with his greatest foe. If Hegel's lectures in Berlin can be understood 
as a kind of refutation of Schleiermacher' s "invidious truths", then we know 
that Hegel's philosophy of religion was also a response to what he judged to 
be the future course of Protestant German theology. 
There are modern critics who tell us that we are perfectly justified in 
reading Hegel and Schleiermacher "side by side" in this way. The effect of 
this parallel reading89 will be to show how and why Schleiermacher has 
overstated his case in his search for a non-speculative, fully, "positive" 
dogmatic theology; our task in this dissertation will be to concentrate on the 
exaggeration in Schleiermacher's argument. The "cunning of reason" will 
use our endeavours to bring out Schleiermacher's lasting significance. For 
the truth is that by our careful criticism of his theology, we shall make 
manifest, paradoxically, what it is in Schleiermacher's achievement, that 
must be taken into account by every subsequent, comprehensive theological 
thinker. 
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1968. p. 142. (English Translation by J. Wallhausser, Schleiermacher: Life and Thought. 
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973. p. 99.) 
2. Der Christliche Glaube: Nach den Grundstitzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammen-
hange Dargestellt. 
i) This work will be cited in the following editions: 
a) The 1st edition: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (hereafter KGA) Volume 
I/7,Parts i and ii; Der Christliche Glaube (1821/22) , edited by 
Hermann Peiter. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980 (hereafter 
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by H.R. Mackintosh and J.S. Stewart. Edinburgh: T.& T. Clark, 
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unless otherwise indicated. 
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''Protestant". The translation "Evangelical" can only be misleading. 
Schleiermacher makes clear in the Prefaces to both editions of The 
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The Edwin Mellen Press, 1988. 
4 Reinhard Slenczka; "Glaube VI" in Theologische Realenzyklopiidie (hereafter TRE), 
Volume XIII. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984. pp. 318 -365; here pp. 334 and 337. 
5. "im Zusamrnenhange dargestellt": See, for instance, Gerhard Sauter, "Dogmatik I" in 
TRE, Volume IX, 1982. pp. 41-77; here p. 42. 
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6. "Die Theologie ist daher die Selbstdarstellung des christlichen Glaubens mit Hilfe der 
Begrifflichkeit wissenschaftlichen Denkens." So Martin Redeker in the Introduction 
to Glaubenslehre2., p. xxii. 
7. "die Analyse der christlichen Fr6mmigkeit"(§30.3). 
8. " ... so ist klar, daG Beschreibungen menschlicher Gemiitszustiinde dieses Inhaltes 
nur aus dem Gebiet der innern Erfahrung hergenommen werden konnen, und daG 
sich also unter dieser Form nichts Fremdes in die christliche Glaubenslehre einsch-
leichen kann ... Daher miissen wir die Beschreibung menschlicher Zustande fiir die 
dogmatische Grundform erklaren ... " (§30.2). 
9. Letter: Schleiermacher to his father; August 14,1787. KGA, Volume V /1; Briefwechsel 
1774-1796,edited by A. Arndt and W. Virmond. Berlin: WalterdeGruyter, 1985. Brief 
80, pp. 91-93. 
10. See Hermann Mulert, "Schleiermacher iiber Spinoza und Jacobi" in Chronicon Spino-
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12. The useful entry "Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich" in Volume III of the 3rd ed. of Die Religion 
in Geschichte und Gegenwart (hereafter RGG) by W. Wieland speaks of a philosophy 
"die glaubt, sich in sich selbst vollenden zu konnen". (RGG, Vol. III, cols. 508-509. 
Edited by Kurt Galling, Tiibingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1959.) 
13. Translation by Albert L. Blackwell, op. cit., p. 60. Letter: Schleiermacher to his father; 
December 23, 1789. KGA, Volume V /1, Brief 131, pp. 182-186, here p. 183: ''Noch 
weiter aber bin ich immer von der Systemsucht entfernt gewesen .... lch glaube nicht, 
daG ich es jemals bis zu einem vollig ausgebildeten System bringen werde, so daG ich 
alle Fragen, die man aufwerfen kann, entscheidend und im Zusammenhang mit aller 
meiner iibrigen Erkenntnis wiirde beantworten konnen ... " Please note his use of the 
word "Zusammenhang" as denoting a characteristic of systematic thought. 
14. iiber die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Veriichtern. This work will be cited 
in the following editions: 
a) The 1st edition (1799): KGA, Volume l/2; Schriften aus der Berliner Zeit 
1796-1799, edited by Gunter Meckenstock. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
1984. pp. 189-326. 
b) All editions of this work are available in the critical volume: Friedrich 
Schleiermacher' s Reden Ueber die Religion edited by G.C. Bernhard Piinjer. 
Braunschweig: C.A. Schwetschke und Sohn, 1879. 
c) The English translation of the 3rd ed.: On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured 
Despisers translated by John Oman. New York: Harper & Row, 1958. 
Oman's translation of the title does not convey its literal sense. For the 
sake of convenience, this work will be referred to as Schleiermacher' s 
Speeches on Religion. 
15. G.W.F. Hegel, Glauben und Wissen, edited by Hans Brockard and Hartmut Buchner. 
Volume III of Jenaer Kritischer Schriften ( Philosophische Bibliothek-hereafter PhB-Vol-
ume 319c). Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1986. " ... das Prinzip des Jacobischen 
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(p. 96). See also Faith and Knowledge, translated by Walter Cerf and H.S. Harris. 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977. 
16. So Albert L. Blackwell, op. cit., p. 164. 
17. Letter: Schleiermacher to Karl Gustav von Brinkmann; October 19,1803. A us Schleier-
macher' s Leben: In Briefen (hereafter Briefe), Volume IV, edited by Wilhelm Dilthey and 
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Ludwig Jonas. Berlin: WalterdeGruyter, 1974 (2nded.). pp. 78-81;herep.80: " ... mich 
seinen Fortsetzer und Potenzierer genannt haben ... seine Philosophie fortgesetzt auf 
mich hinfiihre ... " 
18. Ibid.: "ich gestehe es, da ich Jacobi sehr Iiebe"; see also Schleiermacher's dedication 
of the 3rd ed. of his Speeches (1821) to K.G. von Brinkmann in Piinjer, op. cit., p. :xii: " . 
. . schmerzte es mich tief, daB ich es dem nicht mehr senden konnte, mit dem ich 
zuletzt viel dariiber gesprochen, ich meine F.H. Jacobi, dem wir beide so vieles 
verdanken und mehr gewiB als wir wissen." 
19. Letter: Schleiermacher to Berthold Georg Niebuhr, March 28,1819. Schleiermacherals 
Mensch: Sein Wirken, Familien- und Freundesbriefe 1804 bis 1834, edited by H. Meisner. 
Gotha: Leopold Klotz Verlag, 1923. pp. 296-297; here p. 297: "Mir warder Gedanke 
gekommen und ziemlich fest geworden, ihm [Jacobi] meine Dogmatik, an der ich 
jetzt schreibe, zuzueignen, dadurch unserm Verhaltnis ein kleines Denkmal zu setzen 
und zugleich nach meinem Vermogen Jacobis eigentliches Verhaltnis zum Christen-
tum ins Licht zu stellen." 
20. See Albert L. Blackwell, op. cit., pp. 163-164; and Hans-Joachim Birkner, Theologie und 
Philosophie: Einfiihrung in Probleme der Schleiermacher-Interpretation. Munich: Chr. 
Kaiser Verlag, 1974. p. 34. 
21. Letter: F.H. Jacobi to Karl Leonhard Reinhold. Briefe, Volume II, 2nd ed. Berlin: Walter 
de Gruyter, 1974. p. 349: "Durchaus ein Heide mit dem Verstande, mit dem ganzen 
Gemiite ein Christ, schwimme ich zwischen zwei Wassem, die sich mir nicht ver-
einigen wollen ... " The translation "two currents" was suggested by Albert L. 
Blackwell, op. cit., p. 163. 
22. "Dr. Schleiermacheriiber seine Glaubenslehre, an Dr. Lucke": Zwei Sendschreiben. This 
work will be cited in the following editions: 
a) The critical edition of the text provided in KGA, Volume 1/10: Theolo-
gisch-dogmatische Abhandlungen und Gelegenheitsschriften, edited by H.-F. 
Traulsen and Martin Ohst. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990 (hereafter 
Lucke). pp. 307-394. 
b) On the Glaubenslehre: Two Letters to Dr. Lucke, translated by James Duke 
and Francis Fiorenza. Chico, California: Scholars Press, 1981. 
"SoUder Knoten der Geschichte so auseinander gehen? das Christentum mit der 
Barbarei, und die Wissenschaft mit dem Unglauben?" (Lucke, p. 347; English transla-
tion, p. 61.) The translation of the German word 'Wissenschaft" poses a perennial 
difficulty. In the context of this quotation Gerhard Spiegler suggests "culture" as the 
appropriate translation for "Wissenschaft". See his The Eternal Covenant: Schleier-
macher's Experiment in Cultural Theology. New York: Harper & Row, 1967. p. 17. We 
shall postpone our own discussion of this vexing term until we come to consider in 
what sense Schleiermacher understood his Glaubenslehre to be a Wissenschaft 
(Glaubenslehrtn&2, §1). 
23. " ... der nach allen Seiten freigelassenen, unabhiingig fiir sich arbeitenden wissens-
chaftlichen Forschung .. . "(Lucke, p. 351.) 
24. See the Preface to Brian A. Gerrish, A Prince of the Church: Schleiermacher and the 
Beginnings of Modern Theology. London: SCM Press, 1984. p. xiii. 
25. Emanuel Hirsch, Geschichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie: Im Zusammenhang mit 
den allgemeinen Bewegungen des europaischen Denkens, Volume V. Giitersloh: Gerd 
Mohn, 1968 (4th ed.). p. 316: "Schmal ist der Weg, der zwischen skeptischem Atheis-
mus und mythischer Orthodoxie uns Heutigen gelassen ist, und wenige sinds, die 
ihn finden." 
26. The definitive edition of Schleiermacher' s letter to Jacobi of March 30, 1818, has been 
provided by Martin Cordes, "Der Brief Schleiermachers an Jacobi: Ein Beitrag zu 
seiner Entstehung und Oberlieferung" in Zeitschrift fiir Theologie und Kirche (hereafter 
ZThK>, Volume 68, 1971. pp. 195-212. The letter itself can be found on pp. 208-211: " ... 
28 
1 ntroauctlon 
Text and Context 
was wir zum Unterschiede davon Religion nennen, was aber immer mehr oder 
weniger Dogmatik ist, das ist nur die durch Reflexion entstandene Dolmetschung 
des Verstandes tiber das Geftihl." (p. 208.) 
27. "Die Bibel ist die urspriingliche Dolmetschung des christlichen Gefiihls und eben 
deswegen so feststehend, daB sie nur immer besser verstanden und entwickelt 
werden darf." (Cordes, op. cit., p. 209.) 
28. Schleiermacher's lecture "Ueber die verschiedenen Methoden des Uebersezens" was 
read on June 24, 1813 and can be found in Friedrich Schleiermacher' s siimmtliche Werke 
(hereafter SW), Volume III/2. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1838. pp. 207-245. " ... fast nur ein 
mechanisches Geschaft ... " (p. 211.) An English translation is available in Andre 
Lefevere, Translating Literature: The German Tradition from Luther to Rosenzweig. Assen, 
the Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1977. pp. 67-89. 
29. See George Steiner, After Babel: Aspects of l.J.mguage and Translation. Oxford University 
Press, 1975. pp. 251-252. In Friedmar Apel, Literarische Ubersetzung, we are told that 
Schleiermacher' s lecture is perhaps the most-discussed essay in the whole history of 
translation theory. (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1983. p. 56.) 
30. "Die Religiositat ist die Sache des Geftihls; was wir zum Unterschiede davon Religion 
nennen ... " (Cordes, op. cit., p. 208; cf. n. 26.) 
31. " ... aus der logisch geordneten Reflexion auf die unmittelbaren Aussagen der 
frommen SelbstbewufStseins entsprungen sind ... " (§16. Postscript.) 
32. " ... Befriedigung des unmittelbaren SelbstbewufStseins allein mittelst der echten und 
unverfalschten Stiftung Christi ... " (§ 16. Postscript.) 
33. Cf. the essay by Brian A. Gerrish, "Theology within the Limits of Piety Alone: 
Schleiermacher and Calvin's Notion of God" in The Old Protestantism and the New: 
Essays on the Reformation Heritage. Edinburgh: T.&T. Oark, 1982. pp. 196-207. 
34. Luther's view of Holy Scripture as "sui ips ius interpres" can be found in Volume 7 of 
the Weimar edition (hereafter WA) of his complete works: "Assertio omnium articu-
lorum M. Lutheri per Bullam Leonis X. novissimam damnatorum" (1520) in D. Martin 
Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Weimar: Hermann BOhlaus Nachfolger, 1897 
(1st ed.); Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1966 (2nd ed.), pp. 94-151; 
here p. 97, line 23. See alsop. 98, line 40 top. 99, line 2: " ... sed solam scripturam 
regnare, nee earn meo spiritu aut ullorum hominum interpretari, sed per seipsam et 
suo spiritu intelligi volo." I have consulted the translation of this passage by Brian A. 
Gerrish found in his article "Doctor Martin Luther: Subjectivity and Doctrine in the 
Lutheran Reformation" in Seven-Headed Luther, edited by Peter Newman Brooks. 
Oxford: Oarendon Press, 1983. pp. 1-24; here p.15. See also Gerrish's article "The 
Word of God and the Words of Scripture: Luther and Calvin on Biblical Authority" 
in The Old Protestantism and the New, op. cit., pp. 51-68, especially p. 57. 
35. " ... die neue Begriffsbildende Kraft des Christentums ... die neuen B[egriff]e gingen 
a us der eigenttimlichen Gemtitserregung hervor." Friedrich Schleiermacher, Herme-
neutik, 2nd ed., edited by Heinz Kimmerle. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1974. p. 79. James 
Duke and Jack Forstman have provided an English translation: Hermeneutics: The 
Handwritten Manuscripts. Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1977; seep. 104. 
36. " ... ohne spekulative Htilfsmittel" (§50.1). 
37. So far I am in complete agreement with Brian A. Gerrish: "Friedrich Schleiermacher" 
in Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West, Volume I, edited by N. Smart, J. 
Clayton, P. Sherry and S.T. Katz. Cambridge University Press, 1985. pp. 123-156; here 
p.124. 
38. Fichard Crouter, "Hegel and Schleiermacher at Berlin: A Many-Sided Debate" in 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Volume48, 1980. pp. 19-43; here p. 26. 
39. Gerhard Ebeling, "Theologie und Philo sophie, II. Historisch" in Volume VI of the 3rd 
ed. of RGG, 1962. cols. 789-819; here cols. 813-814. Ebeling cites Schleiermacher's 
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statement: "die beiden Brennpunkte meiner eigenen Ellipse" (see Cordes, op. cit., p. 
209). 
40. So Brian A. Gerrish, "Friedrich Schleierrnacher", op. cit., p. 125. Gerrish in tum cites 
the lecture "Schleiermacher" by A.E. Biedermann in Ausgewiihlte Vortriige und Auf-
siitze, edited by J. Kradolfer. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1885. pp. 186-210; here p. 190. 
41. See Cordes, op. cit., p. 210. 
42. "Meine Philosophie also und meine Dogrnatik sind fest entschlossen sich nicht zu 
widersprechen ... "(Cordes, op. cit., p. 209.) 
43. Hans-Joachim Birkner, op. cit., p. 36: "Uber das Verhliltnis von Philosophie und 
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44. Brian A. Gerrish, "Friedrich Schleiermacher", op. cit., p. 125. In Schleiermacher' s letter 
to Jacobi we read: "Meine Philosophie also und meine Dogrnatik ... so lange ich 
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mehr angenahert." (My italics; Cordes, op. cit., p. 209.) 
45. Briefe, Volume II, pp. 510-513 contains his widow's account of Schleiermacher's last 
days; here pp. 511-512: " ... ich muG die tiefsten spekulativen Gedanken denken und 
die sind mir vollig eins mit den innigsten religiosen Empfindungen." 
46. This is the contrast that Gerrish (following Biedermann- see n. 40) suggests cannot 
be found in "Schleiermacher's response to Jacobi" ("Friedrich Schleiermacher", op. 
cit., p. 125). 
47. "Dieselbigen Glieder der christlichen Gemeinschaft narnlich, durch welche allein die 
wissenschaftliche Form der Glaubenslehre entsteht und besteht, sind auch die, in 
denen das spekulative BewuBtsein erwacht ist. Wie nun dieses die hochste objektive 
Funktion des menschlichen Geistes ist, das frornrne SelbstbewuBtsein aber die hoch-
ste subjektive ... " (§28.3). In view of the central importance of this quotation for the 
development of my thesis, I have translated more literally here than the Mackin-
tosh/Stewart text-in particular I want to draw the reader's attention to Schleier-
macher' s use of the word Glaubenslehrein this context; this is obscured if Glaubenslehre 
is translated as "Dogmatics" (Cf, p. 122). Usually I render "frornrnes SelbstbewuBt-
sein" as "pious" rather than "religious" self-consciousness. 
48. · " ... kaurn ein Ort iibrig bleibt, durch welchen die Spekulation sich in die Glaubens-
lehre eindrangen konnte." (§28.3). 
49. Briefe, Volume II, p. 349; I follow the translation suggested by Albert L. Blackwell, op. 
cit., p. 163. 
50. Brian A. Gerrish, "Friedrich Schleiermacher", op. cit., p. 125. 
51. Ina footnote to his article "Hegel and Schleiermacher at Berlin: A Many-Sided Debate" 
(op. cit., p. 41), Richard Crouter informs us: "The image of electricity generated from 
a galvanic pile was fresh in Schleiermacher's day, the procedure having been in-
vented around the time of his birth by the Italian anatomist Luigi Galvani." In fact, 
Galvani had advanced a theory concerning "animal electricity", which Volta showed 
was actually the result of the "mutual contact of metals of different kinds". These are 
Volta's words cited by Alexander Mauro, ''The Role of the Voltaic Pile in the 
Galvani-Volta Controversy concerning Animal vs. Metallic Electricity" in Journal of 
the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, Volume 24, 1969. pp. 140-150; here p. 149. 
Schleiermacher was born in 1768. See also Dietrich von Engelhardt, Hegel und die 
Chemie: Studie zur Philosophie und Wissenschaft der Natur um 1800. Wiesbaden: Guido 
Pressler Verlag, 1976. p. 73. The entries under "Galvanic" in The Oxford English 
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Dictionary (hereafter OED), Volume IV, p. G33 (Oxford: Oarendon Press, 1933) and 
"Galvani, Luigi" in Dictionary of Scientific Biography, VolumeS, pp. 267-269 (New York: 
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The Word 
Chapter One: 
The Definition of Speculation 
For speculation turns not to itself 
Till it hath travell'd and is mirror'd there 
Where it may see itself. 
William Shakespeare, 
Troilus and Cress ida 
Act III, iii 
The red thread 1 which will guide us through the labyrinth of Schleier-macher's Glaubenslehre-from our entry into a theological discipline 
which "pertains solely to the Christian Church" (§2. Proposition) to our exit 
with a (preliminary) doctrine of the Trinity finally secured against the 
"infiltration of speculative elements" (§172.3)2-is Schleiermacher's implac-
able opposition to anything that smacks of "speculation" within a connected, 
ordered presentation of the current doctrine to be found in the Christian 
(Protestant) Church, that is, the doctrine "just now" applicable.3 It is the 
cardinal principle of Schleiermacher's "zusammenhangende Darstellung", 
of his coherent representation of Protestant doctrine, that it be realized 
without "speculative aids" (§50.1), without recourse to alien philosophical 
concepts (the "philosophemes" of the Postscript to §170), whose origin 
cannot be traced to the pious self-consciousness that Christian dogmatics 
has undertaken to explicate. But if we are to eliminate the enemy, we must 
identify him first; and so we need to proceed with our definition of this 
strange concept of "speculation", a concept which, as our title indicates, 
expresses the deep tidal pull underlying the whole of this dissertation. 
"To speculate" (Latin: speculan) means literally-in its root sense-"to 
spy out, watch, examine, observe". From this basic meaning it is easy to 
adopt the transferred senses of "to speculate" as "to consider, examine, or 
reflect upon with close attention; to contemplate; to theorize upon ... ,.4 While 
these acquired senses of the infinitive are listed as equivalent, they will in 
the history of the use of thi:; word tend to fly in opposite directions. Thus, 
while "pure speculation" might quite happily-in terms of the etymology of 
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this word-indicate the highest form of contemplative activity (Greek: 
8Eropta), in common parlance "pure speculation",like "idle speculation" and 
"mere speculation", suggests a wholly abstract, unreal, futile flight of fancy 
which has lost track of the concrete data of human existence. "To theorize"-
this infinitive has a Greek etymology again suggesting vision and contem-
plation-is at best a derivative activity at one remove from the certain facts 
of ordinary life. Following this usage, we may say of Schleiermacher's 
Glaubenslehre that it theorizes upon or reflects upon the concrete expressions 
of actual Christian faith for the benefit of the government of (in this case) the 
Protestant German Church. Dogmatics is thus described as a "positive 
science", it is a theoretical undertaking with a practical aim, i.e., the "cohesive 
leadership of the Christian Church".5 Indeed, Schleiermacher will go so far 
as to lump the academic discipline of theology with law and medicine as 
"positive faculties", whose "need to establish an indispensable praxis secure-
ly on theory"6 would seem to shut out the speculative, purely theoretical, 
pursuit of the knowledge of God, for its own sake alone, as an alien, non-
ecclesiastical, and essentially abstract diversion. 
Excursus: It is difficult to avoid a comparison here with the modern academic 
practice of distinguishing "pure" from "applied" scientific research. The 
former, it might be suggested, is conducted without reference to 
possible practical results, the latter is, by contrast, specifically assessed 
by its ability to aid industry in the solution of contemporary technical . 
problems. Of course, the theoretical study of natural science, the 
"speculative" side of this pursuit, while not necessarily investigated 
with any specific, technical problem in view, cannot fail in the end, 
however long it takes, to produce results which will have a practical 
application. 
A useful illustration of this dynamic has been offered in a recent 
statement issued by the House of Bishops of the General Synod of the 
Church of England. The "positive" inclinations of this august body 
representing the English "Kirchenregiment" cannot be doubted. In-
deed, this report on "The Natlrre of Christian Belief" is itself an emi-
nently practical response to a controversy which had been raging in 
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the English Church for two years before the statement was published. 
The statemene declares (§67) that 
Bishops thus have a twofold task. They are to 'guard, expound 
and teach' the faith as they have received it. They are also to be 
'apostolic pioneers'. 
If this is to be taken seriously, then it would seem that this 
"Kirchenregiment", at any rate, regards "informed and legitimate 
speculation" (§28) as an integral part of its task of "presenting the 
treasures of faith in a contemporary way". Dr. Robert Runde (the then 
Archbishop of Canterbury) declared that the House of Bishops had no 
desire to exclude "doctrinal explorers" from amongst their number8-
while such explorers "search for idioms which will touch and persuade 
each of many different audiences ... " (§68). 
This Report reflects (unconscious! y) the very concerns at the heart 
of Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre, i.e., the "presenting of the treasures 
of faith in a contemporary way"-an acknowledged "pioneering" ac-
tivity. Whether this pioneering work can be tackled without recourse 
to speculation remains to be seen. 
Speculation has another related root meaning in the Latin word for 
mirror, speculum. Perhaps this usage will be most familiar from St. Paul's 
First Epistle to the Corinthians-"now we see through a glass, darkly". The 
"glass" to which St. Paul is referring is actually a looking-glass, a mirror 
(Greek: E0'01ttpov, Latin: speculum). The problem with ancient mirrors (and 
Corinth was famous for their production)9 was that they were not made of 
glass at all; the desired effect was achieved by highly polished metal. As a 
consequence, the reflection these mirrors offered was only a poor copy of 
the original: as St. Paul says, in aenigmate, that is darkly, in a riddle. In this 
famous passage (1 Corinthians 13:12), the sense of vision is preserved by the 
videmus (Greek: ~A.E1to~), and yet the vision obtained in the speculum, in 
the mirror, is flawed and conceals as much as it reveals. From here our 
evaluation of the "speculative" vision can move in two directions. We can 
accept the popular assessment of the speculative activity as abstract, unreal, 
obscure, enigmatic-a meddling in things beyond our understanding, a 
purely theoretical pursuit, liberally assisted by a fertile imagination! Or, 
conversely, we can follow a great Western philosophical tradition which 
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treats the human mind as a kind of mirror, a "glassy essence",10 a speculum 
in which the whole of reality can be reflected and comprehended. Appro-
priately, St. Anselm leads the way: in his Monologion, the mind is described 
as a speculum in which it is enabled to see the image of that "supreme being", 
which it cannot see "face to face". Furthermore he argues that it is in 
self-examination that the mind comes to a knowledge of this "supreme 
being"; in self-neglect the mind falls away from the contemplation of that 
highest being it seeks to apprehend (ab eius speculatione descendit). 11 This 
notion-that the mind in reflecting upon itself is rewarded with a speculatio 
of the divine reality-again makes Schleiermacher' s perception of Anselm 
as a precursor to the theological method of the Glaubenslehre highly ambigu-
ous. 
The vocabulary of "speculation" is inextricably bound up with this 
image of reflection in a mirror; the power of this imagery is easily explained. 
Suppose we were to conjure up the picture of a castle reflected in a lake,12 
the surface of the lake would then throw back or "bend back" the impression 
of the castle that it received: for any observer present, there would now be 
the duplication of what is, in essence, one reality. The challenge for the 
observer is to discover the truth behind the appearance, to uncover the unity 
of what appears as divided before him. This picture accords very well with 
the central "speculative" idea of a unity which precedes or underlies all 
distinction and difference. Indeed, "speculative" thinkers will go so far as to 
claim that the very idea of "difference" is literally unintelligible, unless one 
has (at least) an implicit idea of the identity, which alone gives the talk of 
"difference" any substance. For Hegel, the speculative thinker par excellence, 
the very endeavour to think "difference as difference" is to be driven by a 
pre-emptive logic to acknowledge an identity which underlies and is the 
basis for all the "differences" that we commonly take for granted.13 
The other attraction of the language of "reflection" has already been 
indicated by Anselm: it is the mind turned back upon itself in self- reflection 
that has unique access to the highest reality. This self-reflection implies a 
confidence that the mind can be equally the mirror of nature,14 and the 
mirror of the eternal, divine truths-in discovering itself, the mind is thus 
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able to discover the whole of reality. This notion of the universality of mind 
can be traced back to Aristotle's teaching that the soul is "in a way" every-
thing that exists.15 The "speculative" philosophy cannot rest until the sense 
of this "in a certain way" (mo9 has been made explicit. For in taking hold of 
its own limitations, the "speculative" mind is no longer simply subject to 
them. This preliminary summary is offered to give the reader some impress-
ion of the strange power of the Hegelian philosophy. Hans-Georg Gadamer 
calls this Hegel's "Reflexionsphilosophie" and concedes that it has no 
"Archimedean point" from which it can be "toppled": no position is available 
which is not drawn into the motion of consciousness coming to itself through 
reflection.16 
The other great Western assessment of speculation, its via negativa so 
to speak, receives authoritative status for Protestant theology in Luther's 
robust denunciation of the speculative hubris of the medieval schoolmen. 
Far from being an aid to piety, as the medieval theologians vainly imagined, 
speculation is "a stumbling block" to be shunned like the plague. In a 
polemical work published in 1521, Luther offers a young man the advice 
that he "avoid scholastic philosophy and theology like the very death of his 
soul".17 Speculation is quite simply of the essence of medieval theology, and 
this had been the case from the writings of Boethius onwards. For Boethius, 
theology is understood as a speculative discipline, and he first explicitly 
identified the Latin philosophia speculativa with the Greek eeropux. 18 The 
medieval speculatio offers a conception of the knowledge of God as a kind of 
vision, and Peter Lombard is even able to describe "the speculation of the 
theologians" (theologorum speculatio) as "studious and modest"}9 a point of 
view Luther is unable to endorse! In Luther's writings "speculation" has 
acquired a wholly negative sense, it is just another expression of man's 
apparently limitless capacity for self-deception and sinful pride. Following 
an ironic tradition that reaches back into antiquity, Luther describes the one 
who speculates "concerning the divine majesty", as one whose life is lived 
snatching at "clouds". In other words, the wages of speculation-where they 
do not demand a headlong rush into the abyss-offer only the nebulous 
conclusions to be obtained when our feet are no longer firmly planted on 
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the ground.20 But there is related to this ridicule of "cloudy" speculation the 
serious charge of the sin of curiositas, the source of Eve's fateful difficulties. 21 
The idle attempt to conjecture about things beyond our ken is also thorough-
ly condemned in the writings of John Calvin, the other great doctor of the 
Reformation.22 
Schleiermacher's Protestant dogmatics are firmly rooted in this aspect 
of the Reformation heritage. In a work which explicitly bans philosophical 
and theological speculation, the subject-matter is confined to the actual 
contents of the present state of pious (Protestant) self-consciousness. In this 
dogmatic undertaking there will not be any "higher guesswork" about the 
divine nature which extends beyond the strict limits of what is given and 
known to the Christian piety then obtaining in German Protestantism. 
This attractive summary, while true to the spirit of Schleiermacher's 
Glaubenslehre, as usual, tells only half the story. We need to recognize that 
Schleiermacher's ban on speculation in his dogmatics does not imply any 
reluctance to engage in "speculation" in other aspects of his intellectmil 
activity. Most strikingly, when we begin the reading of his Glaubenslehre, we 
are immediately made aware of "concepts" derived from a speculative 
science called Ethik (§2.2 is the first mention), a discipline characteristic of 
Schleiermacher's thought, upon which he laboured throughout his lifetime. 
In refusing to tum his back on speculation ("the highest objective function 
of the human spirit"---§28.3), Schleiermacher was, of course, fully a creature 
of his time. The first decades of the nineteenth century in Germany were ~n 
every sense as "speculative" as the high point of scholastic speculation in the 
Paris of the 1270s. How "speculation" was understood by Schleiermacher's 
philosophical contemporaries (especially in Berlin) will be our next line of 
inquiry. 
As one might expect, the place to begin is with some attempt to outline 
Kant's critical use of this term. This is not so very easy, since definitions 
appear in a variety of works, and the word "speculative" can have the 
restricted application of serving as a synonym for "theoretical",23 Neverthe-
less, in a handbook for his lectures on logic (published under his authority 
in 1800), Kant offers the clear explanation, that a knowledge of the universal 
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in abstracto is speculative knowledge, whereas a knowledge of the universal 
in concreto is common knowledge; therefore "philosophical knowledge is the 
speculative knowledge of reason".24 Speculation might then be regarded as 
a legitimate aspect of philosophical procedure. But a discussion of the same 
phenomenon in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (B 662-663) is to be discovered 
in a section with the inauspicious heading: "Critique of all Theology based 
upon Speculative Principles of Reason".25 Here Kant identifies "theoretical 
knowledge" as speculative "if it concerns an object, or those concepts of an 
object, which cannot be reached in any experience." Kant's conclusion is that 
all attempts to employ reason in theology in any merely speculative 
manner are altogether fruitless and by their very nature null and void 
... (B 664). 
Schleiermacher's opposition to speculation in his dogmatics is significantly 
informed by this Kantian "Critique of all Theology ... "; Schleiermacher's 
explicit intention is to provide a systematic elaboration of what he discovers 
in concrete Christian piety. Theological notions "which cannot be reached 
in any experience" are said to have been banished from the theological 
method of his Glaubenslehre. In his Critique of Practical Reason, Kant alludes 
to "the restriction of speculative folly"-Schleiermacher's dogmatics intend 
to comply. 
In the same section of the Critique of Practical Reason from which the 
above quotation was taken,26 Kant alludes to the impossibility of simply 
placing speculative and practical reason side by side. The practical must 
always have the greater authority, "because every interest is ultimately 
practical, even that of speculative reason"; where this higher authority of 
practical reason is not recognized and where the speculative reason is not 
subordinated, "a conflict of reason with itself would arise". I draw attention 
to these highly fecund remarks by Kant--of which no complete interpreta-
tion can be offered here-because of the profound echo that they carry into 
Schleiermacher' s thinking. Nothing could be more central to Schleier-
macher's enterprise in the Glaubenslehre than avoiding a division in what he 
calls "das Wesen des Menschen" (§28.3: man's essence), where this division 
may be threatened by a conflict between the objective and subjective func-
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tions of the human spirit, viz. speculation and pious self-consciousness. 
Schleiermacher's solution to this problem of the potential competition be-
tween speculation and piety is to give each its unique sphere, without 
subordinating one to the other. 
As early as 1799 in the first edition of his Speeches on Religion, Schleier-
macher was showing a marked reluctance to engage in this subordination 
of one kind of reason to another. He holds out for some kind of "parallelism 
between the theoretical and the practical", between what he here calls 
"Metaphysik und Moral".27 To these Schleiermacher wants us to add a 
"necessary and indispensable" third term, which he identifies in this first 
edition as "Religion".28 However, it is of considerable interest to note that 
Schleiermacher challenges the reader with the proposition that unity in this 
whole ("die Einheit in diesem Ganzen") is only possible on the basis of what 
is "the highest in philosophy", namely religion. If the theoretical and practi-
cal reason are understood as "two different but opposed concepts", then they 
must find their unity in a higher principle, to which they both belong. This 
principle can only be religion.29 
While this is no more than an aside in a diffuse and complicated 
argument in the Second Speech of this first edition, there are once again 
considerable points of contact with Hegel's nascent "philosophy of spirit". 
As Richard Kroner has pointed out, Schleiermacher' s discussion of "two 
different but opposed concepts" places special emphasis on the word "but" 
(aber). In this phrase, aber is given the crucial task of indicating that the 
concepts of the theoretical and practical reason are not only different, but 
also opposed, which is to say that they are also related: their dialectical 
opposition provides them with the opportunity of being united under the 
higher concept of religion.30 
There are grounds for believing that in the years immediately follow-
ing this first edition of the Speeches on Religion, Hegel not only approved of 
the method employed above, but also adopted the conclusion. In unpub-
lished manuscripts from the very first years of the nh1eteenth cenlury, Hegel 
was proposing to show the conclusion of his systematic endeavours in the 
concept of religion: after the "idea" central to his philosophy had found its 
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elucidation in logic, nature and ethical life, it would return to "the primitive 
simplicity" of its beginning, in religion. This makes for a striking parallel: 
while Hegel's concept of religion here offers "the resumption of the whole 
into one" ,31 Schleiermacher' s concept of religion above could offer the whole 
of reason its "unity". Borrowing Schleiermacher's own phrase, we are en-
deavouring to see Schleiermacher and Hegel as "two different but opposed" 
thinkers. It will be imperative in everything that follows to bear in mind 
Schleiermacher's strong sense of this phrase: "different but opposed" means 
that in their opposition, Hegel and Schleiermacher are also related. Their 
unity must, therefore, be as much our subject-matter as their opposition. 
II If the danger inherent in theological speculation is the invention of doctrines 
Hegel's Usage inaccessible to any "experience", then the zenith of this speculative divorce 
from "reality" is commonly located in the Hegelian philosophy. How re-
markable for our argument that precisely this philosophy was being formu-
lated contemporaneously with Schleiermacher's dogmatics! A position 
more alien to the principles of the Glaubenslehre can hardly be imagined. As 
early as 1807, with the publication of his Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel was 
declaring that God could only be grasped in pure speculative knowing, and 
that this speculative knowledge is nothing other than the knowledge avail-
able to the revealed religion, i.e., Christianity.32 Hegel never swerved in his 
allegiance to the necessity for speculation in Christian theology. In his 
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (the authoritative statement of the 
system as a whole), Hegel reaffirms the centrality of speculation for a 
Christian knowledge of God: thoroughgoing speculation is required in 
order to grasp God as spirit in thought (§564).33 The challenge to Schleier-
macher's position is now complete! 
Any passing acquaintance with the literature on Hegel will confirm 
that the words "speculation" and "speculative" are liberally sprinkled into 
any text or discussion. Given the nearly total imprecision in the use of this 
word, it is pleasant to discover that Hegel himself defines the term "specu-
lation" in a manner that we can easily reproduce. So in the Introduction to 
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his Science of Logic, first published in 1812, Hegel says that the speculative 
consists in the grasp of unity in difference-in grasping the unity with 
ourselves of what is set over against us, in grasping "the positive within the 
negative".34 In his Philosophical Encyclopedia-notes used to educate young 
men in philosophy at the Niimberg Gymnasium(!)-Hegel defines the 
speculative or "the rational" as that which discovers the unity of concepts 
(Begriffe) in their opposition and grasps "the positive in their dissolution and 
transition" (1808).35 In 1812 Hegel sent an outline on the teaching of the 
philosophical curriculum to his friend and patron F.I. Niethammer, a civil 
servant with responsibility for school reform in Bavaria. In this "personal 
assessment" (Privatgutachten) Hegel writes that the properly speculative is 
the knowledge of opposites (of what is opposed) in their unity, or to say the 
same thing, the knowledge that opposites are in principle truly one.36 From 
this variety of sources, it may be demonstrated that Hegel sustains a consist-
ent usage of the term "speculative", which from these definitions emerges as 
the highest form of "thought". In his notes on Logic produced for students 
atthe Gymnasium (181 0 I 11), Hegel defines thought or thinking (das Den ken) 
as "the apprehension and bringing together of the manifold into unity".37 
Speculation, therefore, represents the highest form of thinking, because it 
brings intounitynotonlywhatis diverse (manifold), but indeed those things 
which stand in opposition, those things which appear to exclude each other. 
Hegel's dialectical method finds its foundation in the statement that 
"an out-and-out Other simply does not exist" for mind or spirit (Geist)}8 
Speculation is that activity of mind, which in grasping the unity of opposites, 
enables us to see for ourselves the truth of this crucial proposition which can 
be found in the Addition to §377 of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences. In emphasizing the "speculative" character of this dialectic,39 
Hegel's philosophy of religion makes the epithet "dialectical theology" 
unintelligible when applied to some twentieth century forms of thought.40 
The most extraordinary feat of the Hegelian philosophy from the point 
of view of this dissertation is the way in which speculation and Christianity 
are intimately connected. For Hegel the Christian revelation is in essence 
already speculative, in the sense defined above. As Hegel understands the 
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incarnation (die Menschwerdung Gottes), it can be nothing other than the 
concrete discovery of that unity in difference which is also the task set for 
speculation. In the Christian religion the difference to be grasped is actually 
allowed to proceed to its full term in the death of the God who has become 
a man. For Hegel's philosophy the mark of the life of Spirit (Geist) is that it 
does not "shun" death, but rather that it "endures death and in death 
maintains its being".41 In such an understanding of the Christian dispensa-
tion, Jesus literally shows us the way in the life of Spirit, and Hegel is able 
to tell his students at the Numberg Gymnasium that Christ's pain, the pain 
of the Son of God, reveals "the depth" of the unity of the divine and human 
nature in life and suffering.42 
While it is mostly assumed that-in accordance with Kant's defini-
tion-speculative knowledge is abstract, where common knowledge is con-
crete, Hegel turns the tables on this common assumption: he argues that the 
concrete truth of the indissoluble unity of God and man can only be convinc-
ingly proclaimed, if Christianity maintains its speculative rigour. Only 
"thoroughgoing speculation" is able to grasp the supreme content of what 
he calls "the absolute religion": speculation avoids a one- sided explication 
of the unity of God and man, just because it simultaneously declares the 
difference, without which the discussion of "unity" becomes incoherent.43 
Ironically, the same reversal may be applied to a popular account of 
the relative merits of Hegel's" abstract" philosophy when it is compared with 
Schleiermacher's supposedly "positive", concrete theology. What is said to 
make Schleiermacher's theology positive (or concrete) is that it renders in 
systematic form the actual Christian piety it discovers to hand-and further-
more, this analysis is undertaken for a practical end, i.e., to serve the needs 
of the Church.44 It might then come as a surprise to discover that in this 
concrete, positive analysis of Christian piety, Christ's passion has no syste-
matic place or function.45 By contrast, Hegel's "abstract" philosophy of 
religion can find the meaning of Christianity in nothing else: "in living 
suffering'.46 is "the depth" of the union of God with man alone revealed. 
Hegel does not now avoid his own most offensive conclusion: if the 
content of Christian revelation is really "speculative", then Christian wor-
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ship (Andacht) is in principle already a form of speculation, even if this is 
unconscious. Hegel tells his students at Niimberg that the "main function" 
(Hauptbestimmung) of religion 
is to raise the individual to the thought of God, to brinp him into union 
with God and to assure the individual of that union.4 
As the "thought of God" requires speculation if we are to grasp, at one and 
the same time, the unity and difference of God and man (the profoundest 
mystery of the Christian religion), then we know in what sense to under-
stand Hegel's declaration that philosophy is as much "divine service" (Got-
tesdienst) as religion is.48 Philosophical speculation offers the religious 
consciousness the thought of God in a form which does justice to the 
religious content: God and man united in their distinction. 
III. Schleiermacher's use of the word "speculative" does not lend itself to a 
Schlei.ermacher's single, absolute definition. In most cases, it probably indicates nothing more 
Usage 
exact than a "higher" form of knowledge; "speculation" may then be used as 
asynonymforphilosophy,ormorespecificallyforthatbranchofphilosophy 
commonly called metaphysics.49 Depending upon the context in which it 
appears, speculation may be something actively to be embraced or strenu-
ously to be avoided. Likewise, "speculation" may be a term of opprobrium 
or the one thing needful. As we are already aware, there is in Schleier-
macher's thought a constant recognition that religion and philosophy have 
the task of developing one another reciprocally (p. 16). So, in his program-
matic work on universities in a German situation (published in 1808 in 
anticipation of the founding of the University of Berlin), Schleiermacher 
pens a sentence which should dispel any lingering doubts about the 
necessity for this present study. There he defines "speculation" as "pure 
philosophy", which concerns itself with the unity and the interconnection of 
all knowledge (Erkenntnisse), and with the nature of knowing (Natur des 
Erkennens) itself. And then Schleiermacher adds the fateful assertion that 
there cannot be any capacity for scientific development without the "specu-
lative spirit".50 
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This sentiment is perfectly consistent with the view of objective and 
subjective consciousness which Schleiermacher articulates in his Glaubens-
lehre (§28.3); it is also of a piece with his discussion of "philosophical 
theology" in §67 of his theological encyclopedia, the so-called Brief Outline 
of the Study of Theology (2nd edition). Here we are informed that each person's 
philosophical theology contains within it the principles of that person's 
"whole theological way of thinking".51 It follows that philosophical theology, 
a discipline with an avowedly theological aim, must require theological 
work to be bound together with that "speculative spirit", without which 
there can be "no outstanding progress in any discipline".52 
This reciprocity between speculation and religious consciousness is 
particularly emphasized in the elucidations which Schleiermacher tacks 
onto the First Speech of the 1821 edition of his Speeches on Religion. In these 
"Explanations" appended to the text, Schleiermacher claims to hold ami-
nority view in advocating a "deeper speculative formation" (Ausbildung) 
amongst spiritual leaders (No.1). Schleiermacher's second addition to this 
First Speech discusses the speculative "impulse" (Drang) or drive "to annihi-
late anthropomorphism in the conception of the Highest Being"; and he 
suggests that this "impulse" is "clearly expressed in the writings of the 
profoundest Christian teachers". We need hardly add that Schleiermacher 
experienced the same "impulse" to a high degree.53 The sixth addition seeks 
to avoid talk of primacy in the relation of piety and "scientific speculation"; 
Schleiermacher' s characteristic view of their proper relation is that "the more 
closely they are conjoined the more both advance".54 
All these elucidations prepared for the third edition of 1821 are bal-
anced by the vital first addition to the Second Speech, which makes it clear 
that the Christian religion is not to be confused with "the highest knowledge" 
or "metaphysical speculation". The ideas which emanate from speculation 
have their origin in a different part ( Ort) of the soul from the "representation" 
(Vorstellung) which is appropriate to the religious consciousness. 55 To main-
tain this entire series of additions is to display the fulcrwn of Schleier-
macher's intellectual personality. H we could discover "the inner principle 
of their combination", we would expose "the deepest mystery" of his indi-
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viduality. This vocabulary which dates from 1800 (cf. p. 16) is applied by 
Schleiermacher in a letter written to his friend Brinkmann in 1803. Here 
Fichte is criticized for his rigid separation of philosophy from life, which 
yields only "a great, one-sided virtuoso". The humanity, it seems, is missing. 
In this letter, Schleiermacher follows Friedrich Schlegel in suggesting that 
poetry is the appropriate contrary to "rigorous philosophy" (die strenge 
Philosophie), and he asks what we shall call that indisputable higher entity, 
which binds both together. Schleiermacher's typical concern is that both 
sides be fully acknowledged, and he locates "the unity of life" or "the living 
personality" in seeking "to overcome" this antithesis, even if such a goal can 
never be fully realized. 56 
From this letter we are able to glean another formulation of Schleier-
macher's own most fundamental tenet: the unity of his "living" intellectual 
personality depends upon a recognition of the strict separation of philos-
ophy from theology, yet each must be given its due and allowed to advance 
with the help of the other, if a "one-sided virtuosity" is to be avoided. This 
explains why in his own life, Schleiermacher set out to separate the religious 
consciousness from the confusions of metaphysical speculation, while un-
flinchingly developing the philosophical side of his academic work. One 
always works to overcome the opposition between them, while recognizing 
that their final reconciliation is something which forever eludes our grasp. 
Here, I suspect, we have put our finger on Schleiermacher's continuing 
attractiveness for contemporary thought: he rigorously refuses any claim to 
finality; he does not expect to bring the relationship between philosophy and 
theology "to completion", even while he strives "to overcome" the dichotomy 
between them. 
One must suppose that Schleiermacher would have had severe reser-
vations about the scholastic precept, "distinguish in order to unite".57 And 
yet there is hardly another phrase which could so neatly encapsulate the 
inner dynamic we discover at the core of Schleiermacher' s intellectual 
endeavours. The uncompromising segregation of religious consciousness 
from philosophy has the inevitable effect of highlighting how much they 
have in common. They are sharply distinguished in order to avoid a facile 
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appropriation (or misappropriation) of the one by the other. Nonetheless 
they are also known to express two aspects of one and the same human spirit, 
and it is when both are pursued simultaneously, that the most remarkable 
developments in "Wissenschaft" can be expected to occur. If philosophy and 
theology are so distinguished as to be rendered incapable of interfering with 
one another, they are by the same token rendered incapable of assisting one 
another,58 and any notion of their "Wechselseitigkeit" (their reciprocity and 
interpenetration) would have to be abandoned. In his strictly theological 
stance Schleiermacher will declare that the difference between a philosoph-
icalstatementandadogmaticstatement"mustalwaysbepresupposed"(§16. 
Postscript: "immer vorausgesetzt werden muf5"). But such a "difference" 
must also be established, and it is here that Schleiermacher leaves his 
indelible mark on the Protestant theology of the German tradition. 
In the defence of the first edition of his Speeches on Religion, he wrote: 
My ultimate purpose has been to exhibit and establish, in the present 
storm of philosophical opinions, the independence of religion from 
every metaphysics. 59 
Twenty years later Schleiermacher introduces the injunction that the phil-
osophical and the dogmatic are not to be "mixed up" or blended as the 
governing idea (Grundgedanke) of the first edition of his Glaubenslehre (§2. 
Note b).60 A.D.C. Twesten, Schleiermacher's successor at the University of 
Berlin, felt that Schleiermacher had actually accomplished this separation; 
Twesten argued that his predecessor had so established 
the inherent and independent source of religion in the human disposi-
tion, and placed in so clear a light the original difference of philosophy 
and dogmatic theology 
that a sufficient guard against the encroachment of either into the territory 
of the other had been set in place.61 This dissertation aims to expose the 
precipitate character of Twesten' s judgement. 
Schleiermacher's firm commitment to the separation of dogmatic the-
ology from philosophy prompts us to ask about their relation. Certainly, we 
are permitted to ask a historical question about their "original difference" 
(ursprilngliche Verschiedenheit), since so many great theologians seem not to 
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have known about it. In the above-mentioned Postscript to §16 of the 
Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher maintains that in the first centuries of the 
Christian era there was no speculative influence on "the content of dogmatic 
propositions"-if "the quite unecclesiastical Gnostic schools" are discounted. 
However, by the scholastic period a "confusion" (Verwechselung) and "blend-
ing" (V ermischung) of the speculative with the dogmatic had become "prac-
tically unavoidable" (fast unvermeidlich). Schleiermacher' s lectures on church 
history repeat the refrain: the scholastic age is characterized by the "coin-
cidence" (das Einssein) of philosophy and theology. This unhappy marriage 
was dissolved after the Reformation, when "positive theology" was severed 
from philosophy.62 In the course of his discussion of Hugo of Rouen (died 
1164), Schleiermacher makes his central point with admirable precision: 
But the entanglement [with speculation] occurred everywhere in the 
higher theological learning, because that which philosophy was sup-
posed to be and remain (grounded on speculation) became confused 
with the theological (grounded on inner experience).63 
The question of the relation of philosophy and theology may then be 
raised for historical reasons, but a more compelling consideration (internal 
to the argument) makes the investigation imperative: if all forms of philo-
sophical speculation are to be banished from the theologian's stock-in-trade, 
the theologian must first equip himself with an adequate and precise ac-
quaintance of the potential hazard. In order to secure his theology against a 
"speculative incursion", the theologian must have an actual knowledge of 
the enemy he wishes to eliminate. Nor can the theologian expect philosophy 
to present him with a single, monolithic, universally valid, self-definition, 
since the discipline of philosophy is constantly changing in its under-
standing of itself, in just the same way as theology is continually redefining 
its methods and aims. For all we know, speculation is discovering ever more 
subtle ways of "forcing its way" (perhaps surreptitiously) into religious 
reflection. 
In this way the theologian, in asserting his independence from philo-
sophy, is actually establishing his dependence on the very same discipline. He 
must know what philosophy thinks it is and thinks it will become, if he is to 
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have any success in achieving his stated aim of disentangling theology from 
it. The separation of theology from philosophy keeps bringing us back to the 
question of their relation. 
The coherence of the human personality requires that we understand 
the unity between philosophy and theology, between speculation and relig-
ious consciousness, even while we are drawing the distinction. It is as if we 
are drawing a bow to its fullest extent: the force increases the further the bow 
is stretched, but go one inch beyond the limit and the bow "ceases to be 
stretched at all".64 So too the distinction between philosophy and theology 
can be advanced to its limit; but the distinction does have a limit, because 
the distinction drawn must always be able to account for the relation implied 
in the distinction. Any "distinction" incapable of directing us towards this 
implicit relation ceases, in fact, to be a distinction at all. The tensed bowstring 
goes slack. 
In just this sense the distinction of theology from philosophy is the 
disclosure of their relation to one another: they are defined against one 
another, and their assertion of independence is the exposure of their concrete 
dependence upon one another. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, 
that Schleiermacher's vision of a parallel development of philosophy and 
theology, separate but equal, is one we choose to embrace: what, apart from 
a profounder understanding of their unity, enables us to suppose it possible 
to harness these two in parallel formation? Why should they not rather pull 
in opposite directions, in light of their putative independence? Schleier-
macher bases their relation upon their distinction from one another, but the 
relation must be maintained both for "the unity of life" and the coherence of 
the argument. 
It is only because Schleiermacher has brought the conundrum of the 
relationship between philosophy and theology into such clear focus that 
Hegel's solution to this problem seems (to us) such a tiny speculative step: 
Hegel says in answer to Schleiermacher that philosophy and theology are 
both identical and distinct. H is t:he comprehension of their "speculative 
identity and non-identity'.65 which alone does justice to their distinction and 
relation, their differentiation and unity. Speculative thinking, Hegel tells us, 
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"consists solely in the fact that thought holds fast contradiction, and in it, its 
own self'.66 Here Hegel is asking us to engage in the highest speculative 
effort: he asks us to think the "unity of differentiatedness and non-differen-
tiatedness, or the identity of identity and non- identity".67 This is Hegel's 
so-called "speculative proposition",68 a proposition which requires us to see 
unity and difference as a single operation of mind. 
The identity of philosophy and religion is consistently upheld in the 
Hegelian corpus, but nowhere more vividly than in Hegel's Introduction to 
his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion of 1827. Here Hegel declares that 
philosophy and religion hold the same content "in common", as 
the object of religion, like that of philosophy, is the eternal truth, God 
and nothing but God and the explication of God. Philosophy is only 
explicating itself when it explicates religion, and when it explicates itself 
it is explicating religion. For the thinking spirit is what penetrates this 
object, the truth; it is thinking that enjoys the truth and purifies the 
subjective consciousness. Thus philosophy and religion coincide in one. 
In fact philosophy is itself the service of God [ Gottesdienst], as is religion. 
But each of them, religion as well as philosophy, is the service of God 
in a way peculiar to it ... 69 
This is a poignant passage, if read as a comment on the identity and 
difference of Hegel and Schleiermacher. The notion that philosophy and 
religion help "to explicate" each other is not so very far removed from some 
of Schleiermacher' s assertions of their "red prod ty". The notion that both are 
forms of "Gottesdienst" (properly "divine service" or even "worship") looks 
more offensive to the pious self-consciousness, even if similar sentiments 
were not unknown amongst the early Romantic school.70 But the real 
difficulty finds its seat in Hegel's conception of religion, and a fortiori of 
theology; Hegel obviously continues to function with an understanding of 
theology as a science which yields an actual knowledge of God and the 
divine life. If it makes any sense to describe Schleiermacher as "the Kant of 
Protestanttheology",71 then we may suppose that modem German theology 
will want to give a very different account of its endeavours and possibilities. 
Hegel's explanation of the distinction between philosophy and religion 
does not derive from a difference in content-the content is what philosophy 
and religion hold "in common". The basis for the distinction is the form under 
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which this content is held. In the religious life the truth is known under the 
form of "Vorstellung",72 which may be translated as "representation" or 
"figurative thought". The sense of this term "Vorstellung" is best captured, 
however, by the brilliant paraphrase "imaginative representation"?3 The 
criticism which a philosopher may level at this "imaginative representation" 
is that it has not yet attained the status of a purely conceptual language. In 
other words, "Vorstellung" is not able to render its content in the form which 
the highest truth requires. In Hegel's technical vocabulary, "Vorstellung" 
must be contrasted with "Begriff" (translated as "notion" or "concept"), the 
only sufficient expression of absolute, universal truth. 
In §573 of his Encyclopedia, Hegel alludes to the remarkable solidarity 
which obtains between philosophy and religion. Just as the content of 
religion is already "essentially speculative", so philosophy, in its turn, is 
"religious", in virtue of its speculative content. Yet everything in their 
relation (V erhtiltnis) hinges upon "the difference of the forms of speculative 
thought from the forms" of representation and reflective understanding?4 
What distinguishes religious representation from philosophical speculation 
is that the former operates somewhere between "immediate sensible intu-
ition" and "thought properly speaking"?5 Representation is then a form of 
thought, but one that has not yet managed to cast off the encumbrance of 
sensuous imagery. Hegel suggests that, because of this "entanglement" of 
sense with thought, "figurative thinking" is in a state of "constant unrest".76 
Representation will from this perspective be understood as an unresolved 
form of thinking: a thinking which will only find its truth in pure thought, 
or speculation. In the words of one commentator, representation is "a 
medium between sense and thought", between subjectivity and objectiv-
·ty77 1 . 
We offer here the baldest statement of the chasm which separates Hegel 
from Schleiermacher: for Hegel, religion is actually a mediating moment 
between subjective consciousness and the fully speculative self-comprehen-
sionoff~r~d by philosophy. ForSchleierma her,rd'gio t - td philoso hy are 
two modes of consciousness (subjective and objective) which can never be 
"mediated", even if the "unity" of the human personality demands that they 
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be reconciled in some way. For Hegel, as for Schleiermacher, there is a 
reciprocal "traffic" between religion and philosophy, between "Vorstellung" 
and "Begriff'?8 At the same time the increasing disclosure of the "specula-
tive" character of the religious content makes the speculative grasp of that 
content inevitable. 
Schleiermacher purports to find this speculative appropriation of re-
ligious truth utterly alien, but his own theological method is a kind of 
objective, scientific appropriation not so very dissimilar from Hegel's specu-
lation. In §3 of the first edition of his Glaubenslehre, he sketches the two 
moments by which pious Christian emotions (Erregungen) can be trans-
formed into a Glaubenslehre. 79 The first transformation is that these pious 
emotions are converted into doctrine (Lehre), and secondly the doctrines so 
adduced are arranged according to a definite order showing their intercon-
nection (Zusammenhang). However one may want to describe this "scientific" 
process, there occurs within it some movement from subjectivity to objec-
tivity, from the religious emotions to systematically ordered doctrines. It is 
equally significant that Schleiermacher is not averse to some "purifying" of 
the subjective consciousness80 along the way. To mention obvious examples, 
his account of the doctrine of miracles or the doctrine of the creation of the 
world is not simply a description of what he finds in the ordinary self-
consciousness: these doctrines must be "clarified" and "purified",81 so that, 
at the very least, they do not come into open conflict with the contemporary 
conclusions of natural science.82 The "impurities" which dogmatic theology 
may uncover in the pious self-consciousness must be excised to whatever 
extent possible.83 
Hegel suggests that "religion is the truth for all men" .84 By this he means 
that the Christian religion offers the highest speculative truth in a form 
which all men can grasp: it does not follow from this that religion offers the 
truth in a form to which all men can assent without qualification. Inasmuch 
as figurative and imaginative representation continues to adhere to this 
absolute, speculative content, there is always the possibility thai: accidental, 
historical accretions will be presented as belonging to the "essence" of the 
Christian religion. Hereby, a peripheral doctrine might be accorded a dig-
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nity, which a systematic and "scientific" treatment of Christianity would 
expose as unjustified. Once again, I suggest that Hegel and Schleiermacher 
have rather more in common than their public clashes might indicate. There 
is nothing for which Schleiermacher labours with greater conviction than a 
presentation of the Christian faith which will allow it to coexist with con-
temporary sciences (natural and historical) and philosophy. To this end, his 
theology must be formulated in the light of the current teachings of those 
disciplines: having taken these teachings into account, theology will then be 
able to demonstrate its (suppositional) independence from them. But this 
will be a costly business. As Schleiermacher himself puts it in the preparation 
for the second edition of his Glaubenslehre: 
For this reason, I can only anticipate that we must learn to do without 
what many are still accustomed to regard as inseparably bound to the 
essence ofChristianity.85 
Schleiermacher would be made very uneasy by our attempt to recon-
cile him with Hegel. He seeks to avoid the collapse of his theology into just 
another mode of speculation by establishing a distinction between religious 
or theological thinking and metaphysical or philosophical thinking.86 These 
forms of thinking are represented as being independent of one another. By 
contrast, we have been attempting to show that despite their vaunted 
independence, these forms of thinking actually influence one another; the 
more radical Hegelian challenge is how, as forms of thinking, philosophy 
and theology are in point of fact related to one another. 
Schleiermacher' s lasting contribution to the theology of our time is his 
attempt to present "a purely religious account of the Christian faith".87 This 
dissertation will be able to acknowledge the centrality of that aim in every-
thing Schleiermacher does theologically; further, we shall emphasize 
Schleiermacher' s consistency in seeking to realize this goal. However, the 
reader will by now be aware that we regard this "purely religious account 
of the Christian faith" as a fiction. And Schleiermacher's concern for a 
balance between the subjective and the objective consciousness is only the 
first indication of how this "purely religious account" will unravel. 
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IV. Schleiermacher regularly contrasts speculation with "Empirie", speculative 
spe~~tion und knowledge with empirical knowledge (Erkenntnis). The clearest summary 
Empme 
thatSchleiermacher offers of these different forms of knowledge is contained 
in the introduction to his lectures on Psychology.88 Basically, the difference 
between the empirical and the speculative boils down to a distinction 
between knowledge a posteriori and knowledge a priori. Hence, empirical 
knowledge presupposes a given, external reality, whereas speculative 
knowledge is purely inward and finds its origin in the act of thinking itself. 
In direct consequence, sciences can be designated as empirical or speculative 
in character. 
This general division of knowledge stricti y reflects the most fun dam en-
tal antithesis in all being and knowing: the antithesis between the real and 
the ideal. In his lectures on Dialektik, Schleiermacher describes these as two 
modes of being and suggests that they run in parallel formation ("parallel 
neben einander").89 Here he supports a more general opinion that the real 
and the ideal are as fundamental to our understanding of the world as the 
distinctions of body and soul, nature and reason.90 
From this "highest antithesis",91 the distinction of speculative and 
empirical knowledge proceeds quite naturally: whereas speculative know-
ledge is defined by its preoccupation with "das Sichgleichbleibende" (the 
unchanging), empirical knowledge attempts to grasp the world in a state of 
flux.92 Whereas the method appropriate to the former is deduction, empiri-
cal thinking (which begins with "the receptivity of sensuous intuition")93 
advances inductively from what is externally presented. Whereas specula-
tion is concerned with what abides, "Empirie" tries to comprehend the 
change and variety everywhere around us. 
These two forms of knowing are then subsumed by Schleiermacher 
under the forms of judgement (Urteil) and concept (Begriff) ,94 which proceed 
from opposite ends, so to speak. Only knowledge which proceeds from both 
directions at once, from the natural and from the spiritual,95 would be 
capable of grasping the totality of being.96 According to Schleiermacher, 
judgement and concept presuppose each other. 97 For neither form of know-
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ing is able to grasp the whole of reality. Just as it a principle of Schleier-
macher' s Glaubenslehre that speculation will never be able to deduce out of 
itself (out of the "spontaneity of reason"98), the positive, historical reality of 
faith,99 so "Empirie" will never be able to achieve the idea or concept, simply 
through its own effort.100 The two forms of knowing complement each 
other: together they offer the totality of knowing. Neither can replace the 
other, neither can be subsumed under the other. Empirical knowledge 
delivers the material, speculative knowledge offers the theoretical organiz-
ation. With the help of this antithesis, Schleiermacher is now able to intro-
duce his "critical method" ("eine wissenschaftliche Kri tik "), 101 which consists 
in the correct application of both forms of knowing at once. It will be 
Schleiermacher's contention that Christian dogmatic theology can only be 
properly served by a "scientific" method which employs both forms of 
knowing (the "higher" and the "lower")102 simultaneously. 
This highly theoretical account of the combination of speculation and 
"Empirie", gleaned from the Dialektik, comes to life right at the beginning of 
Schleiermacher' s Glaubenslehre (§2.2 of the second edition). There we are told 
that we must learn to unite a general concept of the institution "Church" with 
"a proper comprehension of the peculiarity of the Christian Church". Just as 
the general concept "Church" is not available to a purely empirical form of 
knowing- since it has no criteria by which to distinguish the contingent 
from the essential-just so the proper conception of the Christian Church is 
not available to "pure" science, since "no science can by means of mere ide~s 
reach and elicit what is individual"; there can be no "a priori constructions in 
the realm of history". The neatest statement of the proper combination of 
these two forms of knowing is offered in Schleiermacher's "philosophy of 
religion", where the endeavour is to maintain a sufficient "balance between 
the historical and the speculative".103 
Schleiermacher' s lectures on Aesthetics also offer an illustration of these 
two forms of knowing. Conforming to what has been sketched above, the 
lectures are divided into tv.ro major parts. The first part Schleiermacher labels 
as the "general speculative" portion of the lectures (allgemeiner spekulativer 
Teil); this part treats the arts in their identity. The second portion of the 
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lectures is called the "more empirical", because its brief is the representation 
of the individual art forms, and so it considers the arts in their difference 
from one another (Differenz der Kunst).104 It is no surprise to discover that 
the "speculative orientation" of the first part finds its fulfilment in the 
establishment of a "general concept of art" .105 According to Schleiermacher' s 
Dialektik}06 there are three fundamental forms of thinking and of speech: 
commercial (or practical) thinking, artistic thinking, and pure thinking. 
Commercial or practical speech has some external aim that it is trying to 
achieve-it is seeking to bring about some change in the relation of our 
environment to ourselves. Artistic thinking is particularly concerned with 
the subject, his moods and feelings. Pure thinking (i.e., speculation) is a 
thinking for the sake of knowledge alone;107 it remains within itself (in 
contrast to commercial thinking) and carries us up to what is universal and 
invariable108 (in contrast to artistic thinking, which continues to express the 
individuality of the artist). 
This account of the forms of human speech sets up an interesting 
problem: to which category does religious speech belong? In its evangelistic 
mode, religious speech certainly wants to effect a change in the world that 
surrounds it. As a manifestation of deepest inner feeling and piety, religious 
speech must belong to the artistic realm; but as an expression of eternal truth, 
only pure thinking or speech can be adequate. This problem is partially 
addressed in Schleiermacher's lectures on Aesthetics (the 1819 manuscript). 
Here Schleiermacher suggests that the permanence of religious feeling seeks 
to express itself in two fundamental forms: as dogmatic reflection and as 
religious art. The desire to express itself in dogmatic language nudges 
feeling in the direction of thought, because dogma is (in Schleiermacher's 
account) "thought about feeling"; 109 artistic representation is contrasted to 
this form of "objective thinking" because of its active spontaneity. Art and 
dogmatic reflection are relative opposites: the more religious teaching seeks 
. . h h fth . . t t' 110 systematic expression, t e greater t e retreat o e artiStic represen a Ion 
of religion. Schleiermacher chooses the scholastic period as an appropriate 
illustration of this inverse exchange between system and art! The fascinating 
possibility that Schleiermacher explores in this context is that religious 
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dogma should be conceived as a middle term (Mittelglied) between the 
profoundest art and philosophy properly speaking (i.e., pure philosophy). 
If we were to apply the same principles to the identification of religious 
dogma in the Glaubenslehre, we would have to regard dogma as a mediating 
term between "Empirie" and "Spekulation". 
In Schleiermacher's terminology, then, the word "speculation" does not in 
itself carry any negative connotation. On the contrary; it implies an upwards 
movement, an "ascent" on the part of reason.111 It is when this movement 
upwards is applied to dogmatic theology that all the problems arise. "Specu-
lation" is not necessarily a synonym for "obsessive abstraction", nor is it to 
be shunned as an unreal flight of fancy. However, if we can accept Schleier-
macher's fundamental division of the modes of being into real and ideal, 
and the corresponding forms of knowing into "Empirie" and "Spekulation", 
knowledge inductive and deductive, knowledge a posteriori and a priori, then 
in every case Christian dogmatic theology must fall on the side of the former. 
For Schleiermacher, "speculative theology" can be nothing but a mon-
strous hybrid, an inexcusable confusion of categories, a violation of the 
fundamental principles governing human knowledge. "Speculative theo-
logy" is the misguided attempt to turn knowledge a posteriori into knowledge 
a priori, to recast the real according to the categories of the ideal. And 
Schleiermacher is remarkably acute in his identification of what the conse-
quences of such a transformation might be. In his Open Letters to his frien~ 
Li.icke, with which he prepared the way for the publication of the second 
edition of his Glaubenslehre, he describes (in perfect conformity with what 
has been said above) the essence of speculative Christology; to wit, the 
sublime proposition 
that the divine and human natures are not at all separate, that the divine 
nature is the truth of human nature and that human nature is the reality 
of the divine ... 112 
The clarification of Schleiermacher' s use of the word "speculation" does 
raise a major question in the correct interpretation of this author. The more 
precise definitions we have discovered in his Dialektik and Aesthetics are in 
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a certain sense privileged sources. That is to say, they are found in texts not 
available to Schleiermacher's reading public, and they remained unpub-
lished in Schleiermacher' s lifetime. They cannot be essential for the under-
standing of his Glaubenslehre, unless we are to suppose that Schleiermacher 
made the interpretation of this work dependent upon unpublished lectures 
accessible only to those who had heard him as a teacher in Berlin (on 
non-theological topics). To make the interpretation of Schleiermacher's 
theology dependent on such "esoteric" teachings would be to tar Schleier-
macher with the same brush that he wishes to apply to the authors of the 
"sublime" doctrines of speculative theology.113 We have to assume that 
Schleiermacher's intended reader needed no more familiarity with the 
results of speculation than was generally available to the public of that time. 
In the above quotation from his Open Letters, Schleiermacher offers a terse 
summary of the possible (unacceptable) implications of speculation for 
Christian theology. 
It is one of the pleasant ironies of this stupendous chapter in the history 
of German philosophy and theology that, within the next generation, some 
theologians actually undertook the mediation between Hegel and Schleier-
macher, between philosophy and theology, which the genius of both men 
demands. Perhaps the most famous of these theologians was I.A. Dorner 
(1809-1884, also in due course Professor of Theology in Berlin), who was 
convinced of the necessity of that mutual interpenetration of Christian faith 
and idealist philosophy,114 which was anathema to Schleiermacher. Often 
these theologians were ranked under the rubric of V ermittlungstheologie, 
which, as one commentator has argued, would be an appropriate designa-
tion for all significant representatives of German theology in the nineteenth 
century: they all sought to establish a balance (Ausgleich) between Chris-
tianity and modern culture, between theological science and the contempor-
ary philosophy.115 It is particularly striking that in 1841 August Twesten, 
Schleiermacher's confidant and immediate successor at the University of 
Be lin, claimed to discover in Schleiermacher's lectures on Ethik an eq i al-
ent work to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit-however different these works 
might seem in terms of method and resul t.116 In the era following Hegel and 
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Schleiermacher, there is the heterodox desire on the part of theologians such 
as A.E. Biedermann (1819-1885, from 1850 Professor in Zurich) to be at one 
and the same time both "speculative" and "ecclesiastical"117-in Schleier-
macher's assessment, a simple contradiction in terms. 
This suggests intriguing possibilities: Hegel thought that church doc-
trine was already a form of speculation; Schleiermacher, while advocating 
both, wanted to keep philosophical speculation and church doctrine in 
separate compartments. If A. E. Biedermann sought to combine them again, 
then D.F. Strauss (1808-1874)-who was arguably neither "speculative" nor 
"ecclesiastical"-gave up any attempt to mediate between Hegelian philos-
ophy and Schleiermacherian theology, because he saw himself as transcend-
ing the inadequacies of both positions. After Hegel's death "speculation" fell 
into severe disrepute, and to this extent Schleiermacher's strictures appear 
to have been heeded. But the real gravediggers of the speculative theology 
are D.F. Strauss, Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872), and Seren Kierkegaard 
(1813-1855), all roughly contemporaneous, and all more or less developing 
their positions by passage through "the stream of fire" ("der Feuer-bach"), 
the "purgatory"118 of the speculative philosophy. In what follows we may 
limit our discussion to Friedrich Strauss, only because in his Life of Jesus (first 
published in two volumes in 1835/36) we have the most dramatic an-
nouncement of the obsolete condition of the theological endeavours of both 
Hegel and Schleiermacher. Friedrich Nietzsche wrote an "Untimely Medi-
tation" devoted to D.F. Strauss, which contains the apposite remark: "Wer 
einmal an der Hegelei und Schleiermacherei erkrankte, wird nie wieder 
ganz kuriert"-a passage I cite to show that the inability to hold Hegel and 
Schleiermacher apart is a disease characteristic of all those who are heirs to 
their joint legacy .119 
Strauss is particularly interesting, as he fell under the spell of both 
Schleiermacher and Hegel in turn; he studied Schleiermacher' s Glaubenslehre 
intensively in 1827/28 and then travelled to Berlin in 1831, just in time to 
learn of Hegel's dea~"l during the cholera epidemic~ironically, he learned 
this news during an appointment with Schleiermacher! From the start, 
Strauss perceived Schleiermacher's pride in having established an "ever last-
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ing peace treaty ... between philosophy and theology", which the next 
generation would come to judge as no more than "a precarious armistice", a 
kind of phoney war, a lull in the action before the real conflict broke out.120 
In his notorious masterpiece, Strauss had no doubts about his ability to reach 
beyond the shortcomings of Hegel's philosophy and Schleiermacher's the-
ology in a synthesis that he would establish at the expense of both. 
Bearing these remarks in mind, we turn to §146 of the unadulterated 
first edition of Strauss' Life of Jesus, which carries the heading "The specula-
tive Christology". This succinct account of the significance of speculation for 
Christian doctrine has the merit of confirming Schleiermacher's own state-
ment of the "sublime" speculative proposition, as this is put forward in his 
apologia to Lucke. First Strauss gives a summary of the life of Spirit, as this 
is understood by speculation: 
It is the essential characteristic of Spirit to remain identical with itself 
in the distinction of itself from itself, that is, to possess itself in others.121 
Having laid the groundwork, Strauss now draws the consequences for a 
speculative understanding of the Christian religion: 
The infinite spirit is real only when it discloses itself in finite spirits; as 
the finite spirit is true only when it merges itself in the infinite. The true 
and real existence of spirit, therefore, is neither in God by himself, nor 
in man by himself, but in the God-man; ... If God and man are in 
themselves one, and if religion is the developing consciousness of this 
unity: then must this unity be evident to man in religion, and become 
in him consciousness and reality.122 
Strauss also makes plain that, despite its reputation, the "speculative Chris-
tology" is surprisingly "concrete". The reality of the incarnation is discovered 
in the death of this "God-man". And speculation does not shirk from the 
violence of this death-an aspect of Christianity with which the more 
"ecclesiastical" Schleiermacher is distinctly uncomfortable.123 
In the introduction to this same section of his Life of Jesus (§ 146), Strauss 
incorporates a reference to Schelling's Christology; he informs us that in 
Schelling's understanding of the incarnation, the infinite "appears as a 
suffering God, subjected to the conditions of time" ("als ein leidender und 
den Verhaltnissen der Zeit unterworfener Gott erscheint").124 Strauss' foot-
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note in this section refers us to Schelling's Vorlesungen iiber die Methode des 
akademischen Studiums, in which the philosopher does make mention of "ein 
leidender ... der Zeit untergeordneter Gott" .125 But this exact phrase has an 
interesting history, for it may equally be a reference to the Latin inaugural 
dissertation presented by F.C. Baur (1792-1860), after he became Professor 
at the University of Tiibingen. This dissertation was originally published 
(while Strauss was studying in Tiibingen) under the title, Primae rationalismi 
et supranaturalismi historiae capita potiora (1827) and contained the charge that 
Schleiermacher too had distinguished the God who stands above all change 
from the God made subject to time(" ... a Schleiermachero a Deo tempori 
subjecto Deus omnis temporis mutatione superior distinguitur").126 This 
criticism irritated Schleiermacher, and he refers to it in the course of his Open 
Letters to Liicke. He rejects the claim: 
daB ich, 'von dem i.iber aile Veranderung erhabenen Gott den der Zeit 
unterworfenen Gott unterscheide' .127 
Commentators might argue that Baur's appropriation of Schelling's 
phrase is only to be expected: he proved incapable of reading Schleiermacher 
except with the spectacles which he borrowed from Schelling. In just this 
spirit, Carl Hester writes that Baur's 
early enthusiasm for The Christian Faith betrays rather a tendency to 
freight Schleiermacher's text with Schelling's meanings. Baur mis-
understood Schleiermacher from the beginning .... Baur's interpreta-
tion of Schleiermacher prior to 1830 reflects more confusion than 
insightP8 
Schleiermacher would not have quarrelled with Hester's assessment. Fur-
thermore, he objected to other criticisms from Baur' s inaugural dissertation, 
and he claimed himself unable to recognize the Schleiermacher with whom 
Baur and other critics from Tiibingen were engaged.129 The most serious 
charge which Baur makes in this early work, and which Schleiermacher also 
cites, is that 
there could be nothing in the historical part of the Glaubenslehre that was 
not already present in the ideal or philosophical part.130 
This observation, which Schleiermacher rejects out of hand, goes to the 
very heart of the method which Schleiermacher adopts in his Glaubenslehre. 
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Unfortunately, Baur saw no reason to revise his youthful impressions later 
in life. Indeed, in a volume of his Lectures on the History of Christian Doctrine, 
published posthumously in 1867, Baur continued to discuss "the speculative 
meaning" (die spekulative Bedeutung) of Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre. Baur 
argued that philosophy and theology had so penetrated one another in 
Schleiermacher's thought, that it was no longer possible to separate the one 
from the other.131 
Schleiermacher does, however, display a certain sensitivity to Baur's 
criticism later in the Open Letters; there Schleiermacher claims: 
If I had separated the dangerous Introduction [to the first edition] more 
clearly and sharply from the body of the work, I surely would have 
prevented that most serious and glaring misunderstanding that detects 
in mv Glaubenslehre a speculative tendency and a speculative founda-
tion.132 
How the equally long (revised) Introduction to the second edition reduces 
the "danger" of this misunderstanding remains to be seen. In the German 
version of his inaugural dissertation (1828), F.C. Baur requested "the famous 
author" to explain more definitely and directly, in a possible second edition 
of his Glaubenslehre, in what relation historical and ideal Christianity stand 
to one another, according to his conception (nach seiner Idee).133 Certainly, 
Schleiermacher would have rejected this plea as utterly inappropriate; we, 
however, intend to ask the Introduction what light it can throw on this 
putative relation between the historical and the ideal. 
We now know from Schleiermacher's own writings that the discovery 
of a "speculative basis" upon which his Glaubenslehre is supposed to rest is 
the "worst and most glaring misunderstanding" (das schlimmste und grellste 
Miftverstiindnis) that one can have of his theology. The origin of this false 
impression seems to lie in the Introduction to his Glaubenslehre, and to that 
Introduction we must now turn. If we read the Introduction correctly, we 
shall apparently discover (with Brian Gerrish) that Schleiermacher "held 
dogmatics to be neither speculative nor authoritarian but empirical".134 
How so many of Schleiermacher's critics could have failed to agree to this 
central tenet, about which Schleiermacher is so emphatic, is a question we 
shall want to raise from within the Introduction itself. 
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p.244, lines 9-11: " ... nos non debemus speculari de maiestate divina ... Qui enim 
speculabundus nubes captat, praecipitatur in tartara." 
21. Martin Luther, Tischreden (Volume 5) in WA, 1919. No. 5534: "So ist die menschliche 
natur! Was man vorbeutt, das will sie thun; das ander lest sie wol aussen und kompt 
denn auff das quare, quare, quare! Wenn die philosophia in die theologiam kumbt, so 
gehts also. Da der Teuffel zu der Eua kam mitt dem quare, da wares a us." 
22. This topic receives a comprehensive treatment in E.P. Meijering, Calvin wider die 
Neugierde. Nieuwkoop: B. de Graaf, 1980. See pp. 15-16: "Calvins Theologie kann ... 
als ein GroBangriff auf die theoretische Neugierde und Spekulation bezeichnet 
werden." 
23. See the entry under "Spekulativ" in the Kant-Lexicon, edited by Rudolf Eisler. Hilde-
sheim: GeorgOlms, 1961. p. 504. 
24. Immanuel Kant's Logik: Ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen, edited by G.B. Jasche (1800) in 
Kant's gesammelte Schriften, Volume IX in the edition sponsored by the "Akademie der 
Wissenschaften". Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1923; p. 27: "Die Erkenntnis des Allge-
meinen in abstracto ist spekulative Erkenntnis, die Erkenntnis des Allgemeinen in 
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concreto gemeine Erkenntnis. Philosophische Erkenntnis ist spekulative Erkenntnis 
derVemunft. .. " 
25. The Critique of Pure Reason in the 2nd ed. of 1787 is Volume ill of Kant's gesammelte 
Schriften (1911). I am citing the English Translation by Norman Kemp Smith. London: 
Macmillan, 1929. 
26. The Critique of Practical Reason is to be found in Volume V of Kant's gesammelte Schriften 
(1913). The quotations are taken from l.Teil, 2.Buch, 2.Hauptstiick III: "Von dem 
Primat der reinen praktischen Vemunft in ihrer Verbindung mit der spekulativen", 
pp. 119-121; here p. 121. (English Translation by Lewis W. Beck. Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1956. p. 126.) 
27. iiber die Religion (1799), Zweite Rede in KGA, Volume 1/2, p.209. 
28. Ibid., p. 212: "das notwendige und unentbehrliche Dritte zu jenen heiden". 
29. "Wo ist denn die Einheit in diesem Ganzen? wo liegt das verbindende Prinzip fiir 
diesen ungleichartigen Stoff! Ist es eine eigne anziehende Kraft, so miiBt Ihr gestehen, 
daB Religion das Hochste ist in der Philosophie, und daB Meta physik und Moral nur 
untergeordnete Abteilungen von ihr sind; denn das worin zwei verschiedene aber 
entgegengesetzte Begriffe eins werden, kann nichts anders sein, als das Hohere, unter 
welches sie beide gehoren." iiber die Religion (1799), op. cit., p. 209. 
30. Richard Kroner, Von Kant bis Hegel, Volume 2. Tiibingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1924. pp. 56-57. 
31. Hegel appears to have given up the position outlined here by the end of 1803. See 
H.S. Harris, "Hegel's System of Ethical Life: An Interpretation" in G.W .F. Hegel, System 
of Ethical Life (1802/3) &First Philosophy of Spirit, edited and translated by H.S. Harris 
and T.M. Knox. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979. pp. 3-96; here p. 
6. This outline of Hegel's early "System of Philosophy" is based on the discussion in 
Karl Rosenkranz, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1977. p. 179. The first edition of Rosenkranz's biography appeared 
in Berlin in 1844. 
32. "Gott ist allein im reinen spekulativen Wissen erreichbar, und ist nur in ihm und ist 
nur es selbst, denn er ist der Geist; und dieses spekulative Wissen ist das Wissen der 
offenbaren Religion." G.W .F. Hegel, Phiinomenologie des Geistes, edited by J. Hoffmeis-
ter (PhB, Volume 114). Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1952. p. 530. 
33. "Was Gott als Geist ist, dies richtig und bestimmt im Gedanken zu fassen, dazu wird 
griindliche Spekulation erfordert." G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopiidie der philosophischen 
Wissenschaften (1830): 3.Teil, Die Philosophie des Geistes §564 in Volume 10 of the 
Theorie-Werkausgabe edited by E. Moldenhauer and K.M. Michel and published in 
Frankfurt am Main by Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970; here p. 374. 
34. "In diesem Dialektischen, wie es hier genommen wird, und damit in dem Fassen des 
Entgegengesetzten in seiner Einheit, oder des Positiven im Negativen, besteht das 
Spekulative." From the Introduction to G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik (1832) 
l.Band.Volume21ofGesammelteWerke;editedbyF.HogemannandWalterJaeschke. 
Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1985; pp. 40-41. This definition is unchanged from 
the 1st edition of 1812/13--Volume 11 of Gesammelte Werke (1978), again edited by F. 
Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke-l.Band, p. 27. A. V. Miller's attempt to translate this 
crucial passage can be found in Hegel's Science of Logic. London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1969; p. 56. "It is in this dialectic as it is here understood, that is, in the grasping 
of opposites in their unity or of the positive in the negative, that speculative thought 
consists." The translation "opposite" for "das Entgegengesetzte" misses some of the 
dynamic quality of the German. 
35. " ... das Spekulative oder V ernunftige erfaBt ihre Einheit in ihrer Entgegensetzung oder 
das Positive in der Auflosung und im Obergehen." §12 of ''Philosophische Enzyklo-
padie fiir die Oberklasse (1808ff.)" in G.W.F. Hegel, Nurnberger und Heidelberger 
Schriften (1808-1817). Volume 4 of the Theorie-Werkausgabeedited by E. Moldenhauer 
and K.M. Michel; here p. 12. English Translation by A.V. Miller in G.W.F. Hegel, The 
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Philosophical Propaedeutic, edited by M. George and A. Vincent. Oxford: Basil Black-
well, 1986. p.126. 
36. " ... das eigentlich Spekulative, d. h. die Erkenntnis des Entgegengesetzten in seiner Einheit, 
oder genauer, daB die Entgegengesetzten in ihrer Wahrheit eins sind." Volume 4 of 
the Theorie-Werkausgabe: "Privatgutachten fiir den Koniglich Bayrischen Oberschulrat 
Immanuel Niethammer" (October 23, 1812). pp. 403-416; here p. 415. A translation of 
this document can be found in Hegel: The Letters, translated by Clark Butler and C. 
Seiler. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984. pp. 275-282; here pp. 281-282: 
"the truly speculative form, i.e., knowledge of what is opposed in its very oneness, 
more precisely the knowledge that the opposites are in truth one." 
37. "Das Denken ist iiberhaupt das Auffassen und Zusammmenfassen des Mannigfal-
tigen in der Einheit." §2 of "Logik fiir die Mittelklasse (1810/11)" in Volume 4 of the 
Theorie-Werkausgabe. p. 16. English Translation by A.V. Miller, The Philosophical 
Propaedeutic, op. cit., p. 74. 
38. "Ein durchaus Anderes ist fiir den Geist gar nicht vorhanden." §377 Zusatz of 
Enzyklopiidie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830): 3.Teil, op. cit., p. 10. English 
Translation by William Wallace and A.V. Miller, Hegel's Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1971. p. 1. 
39. Hegel's philosophy is best described as "speculative" rather than "dialectical". Al-
though the two cannot be separated (cf. n. 34 above), in the broadest terms specula-
tion "holds fast" to the contradiction which dialectical thought exposes. Dialectical 
reason is a stage on the way to the speculative philosophy. Wissenschaft der Logik 
(1812/1813) l.Band- Volume 11 of the Gesammelte Werke, op. cit., p. 287: "Das 
spekulative Denken besteht nur darin, daB das Denken den Widerspruch und in ihm 
sich selbst festhiilt ... " The definitions offered in Robert C. Solomon, In the Spirit of 
Hegel: A Study of G. W .F. Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit", Oxford University Pres5, 
1983, are worth consulting. Solomon claims that in Hegel's study of logic, speculation 
is understood as "the total comprehension of the dialectic and the unity of proposi-
tions in their opposition" (p. 284) In this sense speculation is "higher" than dialectic, 
and dialectical thought is a necessary pre- condition for the "speculative philosopher" 
(pp. 277-278). 
40. If dialectic is rightly defined as "a conversation back and forth", as a "process" (Robert 
C. Solomon, op. cit., pp. 277-278), then there will not be much "dialectic" in a theology 
which tells us: "Gott aber sei der ganz Andere, der Fremde und Unbekannte, er bleibe 
in seinem Wesen dem Menschen unzuganglich." So Gerhard Sauter in "Die 'dialekti-
sche Theologie' und das Problem der Dialektik in der Theologie", pp. 887-915 of 
Volume 21 (1968) of Studium Generale. Sauter does not shirk from the unavoidable 
conclusion: 'Theologie, im betonten Sinne dieses Wortes, wird darum zu einer 
unmoglichen Aufgabe ... " (p. 895). 
41. From the Preface to Hegel's Phiinomenologie des Geistes, op. cit., p. 29: "Aber nicht das 
Leben, das sich vor dem Tode scheut und von der Verwiistung rein bewahrt, sondem 
das ihn ertragt und in ihm sich erhalt, ist das Leben des Geistes." I have cited from 
the English Translation by J.B. Baillie, The Phenomenology of Mind. New York: Harper 
& Row, 1967. p. 93. 
42. "Sein Schmerz war die Tiefe der Einheit der gottlichen und menschlichen Natur im 
Leben und Leiden." §207 of ''Philosophische Enzyklopadie fiir die Oberklasse 
(1808ff.)", op. cit., p. 68. English Translation by A.V. Miller, The Philosophical Pro-
paedeutic, op. cit., p. 169. 
43. Cf. §82 Zusatz of G. W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopiidie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830 ): 
l.Teil, Die Wissenschaft der Logik, Volume 8 of the Theorie-Werkausgabe edited by E. 
Moldenhauer and K.M. Michel; here p. 178: "Ein spekulativer Inhalt kann deshalb 
auch nicht in einem einseitigen Satz ausgesprochen werden. Sagen wir z.B., das 
Absolute sei die Einheit des Subjektiven und des Objektiven, so ist dies zwar richtig, 
jedoch insofem einseitig, als hier nur die Einheit ausgesprochen und auf diese der 
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Akzent gelegt wird, wahrend doch in der Tat das Subjekti ve und das Objekti ve nicht 
nur identisch, sondem auch unterschieden sind." 
44. Cf. nn. 5 & 6 above. A full discussion of the term "positive" will be found in Chapter 
Two. 
45. Eberhard Jiingel speaks of Schleiermacher' s "Sprodigkeit gegeniiber der Moglichkeit 
einer theologia crucis" in Gott als Geheimnis der Welt (4th ed.). Tiibingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 
1982. p. 508. Jiingel also refers us to the well-known essay on this subject by Werner 
Schultz, "Die Transforrnierung der theologia crucis bei Hegel und Schleiermacher" 
in Volume 6 (1964) of Neue Zeitschrift fUr Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilo-
sophie, pp. 290-317. 
46. This is the suggestive translation of "irn Leben und Leiden" by A.V. Miller, The 
Philosophical Propaedeutic, p. 169. Seen. 38 above. 
47. "Ihre Hauptbestirnrnung ist, das Individuum zu dern Gedanken Gottes zu erheben, 
seine Einigkeit mit ihrn hervorzubringen und es derselben zu vergewissem." §207 of 
"Philosophische Enzyklopadie fiir die Oberklasse (1808ff.)", op. cit., p. 66. English 
Translation by A.V. Miller, The Philosophical Propaedeutic, p. 168. 
48. "Die Philosophie ist in der Tat selbst Gottesdienst, wie die Religion." From Hegel's 
Introduction to his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion of 1827 (VPR, Teil 1, pp. 
63-64). 
49. In an elucidation to the Second Speech in the 3rd ed. (1821) of the Speeches on Religion, 
Schleiermacher separates the Christian religion from "das hOchste Wissen" and from 
"rnetaphysische Spekulation". See the edition by Piinjer, op. cit., p. 134. 
50. GG, p. 557: "die reine Philosophie, die Spekulation, die Beschaftigung mit der Einheit 
und dernZusarnrnenhang aller Erkenntnisse und mit der Natur des Erkennens selbst 
... es gibt kein wissenschaftlich hervorbringendes Vermogen ohne spekulativen Geist 
... "The keyword "Zusarnrnenhang" will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
51. KD2, §67: "Da die philosophische Theologie eines jeden wesentlich die Prinzipien 
seiner gesarnten theologischen Denkungsart in sich schlieGt ... ";Brief Outline, p. 39. 
52. This is S.W. Sykes' interpretation of the passage from GG, p. 557, cited inn. 50 above. 
See S.W. Sykes, 'Theological Study: The Nineteenth Century and After", op. cit., p. 
105. 
53. "Erlauterungen zur ersten Rede", pp. 29-31 in the edition by Piinjer. Schleiermacher' s 
objections to anthropomorphism are also rehearsed in the famous letter to Jacobi of 
March 30, 1818. See "Der Brief Schleierrnachers an Jacobi" in ZThK, Volume 68 (1971), 
especially p. 210. 
54. "Erlauterungen zur ersten Rede", (No.6) in Piinjer, p. 31: "Auch konnte es ~r ~n 
dieser Stelle nicht darauf ankornrnen, den Prirnat herauszuheben, den rneiner Uber-
zeugung nach Frornrnigkeit und wissenschaftliche Spekulation rniteinander teilen, 
und der heiden urn so rnehr zukornrnt, je inniger sie sich rniteinander verbinden." I 
have consulted the translation by John Oman throughout. In this passage his trans-
lation is not literal, but he has captured Schleierrnacher's sense very well. See On 
Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, op. cit., p. 25. 
55. "Erlauterungen zur zweiten Rede", (No. 1) in Piinjer, p. 134. Schleiermacher is 
comparing the Christian "Vorstellung" of the Trinity with a philosophical account of 
the Trinity; he argues that because this latter is a speculative idea, it must have "an 
einern andem Ort in der Seele ihren Ursprung". Schleierrnacher' s reference to "unsere 
christliche Vorstellung der Dreieinigkeit" is striking, because it once again brings him 
in line with Hegelian terminology. 
56. Letter: Schleierrnacher to Karl Gustav von Brinkmann; December 14, 1803. Briefe, 
Volume N, pp. 86-95; here p. 94: 'Wenn nun aber die strenge Philosophie der 
Gegensatz ist zur Poesie, wie soli man das unstreitig Hohere nennen, was Beide 
verbindet? ... bei uns ist es eben, was Du die Einheit des Lebens nennst, die lebendige 
Pers6nlichkeit, die auch nachbildend jenen Gegensatz in sich zu iiberwinden sucht, 
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wenn dies gleich nie vollig zu Stande kommt. Wer nun aber die Philosophie und das 
Leben so strenge trennt, wie Fichte tut, was kann an dem Gro&!s sein? Ein gro&!r 
einseitiger Virtuose, aber wenig Mensch." Albert L. Blackwell supplies a translation 
of a short passage from this letter in Schleiennacher' s Early Philosophy of Life, op. cit., 
p. 158. He translates "einseitiger Virtuose" as "one-sided virtuosity"; this captures the 
sense well, although the literal translation must be "one-sided virtuoso". For evidence 
of Schlegel's influence, cf. n. 60 to the Introduction. 
57. See David Burrell, "Scholasticism" in A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, edited by 
Alan Richardson and John Bowden. London: SCM Press, 1983. pp. 524-526; here p. 
526. 
58. See Gerhard Sauter, "Historisch-systematische Einleitung" to Theologie als Wissens-
chaft, of which Sauter is the editor. Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1971. pp. 9-72; here 
p. 34: "Glauben und Wissen, Theologie und Philosophie brauchen sich nach seiner 
[Schleiermachers] Konstruktion ... nicht mehr zu storen-sie konnen sich dann aber 
auch nicht fruchtbar storen." 
59. Letter: Schleiermacher to F.S.G. Sack; undated, but presumed to have been written 
in June 1801. Briefe, Volume III, edited by Wilhelm Oil they and Ludwig Jonas. Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1974 (2nd ed.). pp. 280-286; here p. 284: "Mein Endzweck ist 
gewesen, in dem gegenwartigen Sturm philosophischer Meinungen die Unabhiin-
gigkeit der Religion von jeder Meta physik recht darzustellen und zu begriinden." A 
short section of this letter has been translated by J. Wallhausser in Martin Redeker, 
Friedrich Schleiennacher: Life and Thought, op. cit., p. 63. 
60. GlaubenslehreJ., §2. Anm. b; "und daB Philosophisches und Dogmatisches nicht ver-
mischt werden diirfe, ist der Grundgedanke der vorliegenden Bearbeitung." 
61. A.D.C. Twesten, Vorlesungen iiber die Dogmatik der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche: 
Nach dem Compendium des Herrn Dr. W.M.L. de Wette (3rd ed.), Volume I. Hamburg: 
Friedrich Perthes, 1834. p. 195: "durch Schleiennacher ist die eigentiimliche und 
unabhiingige Quelle der Religion im menschlichen Gemiite, und die urspriingliche 
Verschiedenheit von Philosophie und Dogmatik in ein so helles Licht gesetzt, daB 
dadurch den Eingriffen der Einen in das Gebiet der andem hinHinglich gewehrt zu 
sein scheint." It is remarkable to think that E.B. Pusey cited this same passage from 
Twesten in defence of Schleiermacher, "that great man". See Pusey's An Historical 
Enquiry into the Probable Causes of the Rationalist Character lately predominant in the 
Theology of Gennany, Volume I. London: C.&J. Rivington, 1828. p. 115n. 
62. SW, Volume 1/11: Geschichte der christlichen Kirche, p. 471: 'Nach der Reformation 
sehen wir beides deutlich geschieden; das scholastische Zeitalter ist das Einssein von 
diesen heiden, von denen sich das eine nachher als Philosophie, das andere als 
positive Theologie sonderte." 
63. Ibid., p. 493: "Aber in dem hOheren theologischen Wissen tritt die Verwirrung iiberall 
ein, weil das, was Philosophie sein und bleiben sollte und sich auf Spekulation 
griindete, mit dem theologischen, das sich auf die innere Erfahrung griindet, ver-
wechselt wurde." 
64. I have taken this telling illustration from Edward Caird's Hegel, op. cit., p. 135. 
65. Gillian Rose employs this Hegelian phrase in relation to "the state and religion"; see 
Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-Structuralism and Law. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984. p. 5. 
There is no reason it should not be applied with equal appropriateness to philosophy 
and religion. 
66. Wissenschaft der Logik (1812/1813) l.Band, op. cit., p. 287: ''Das spekulative Denken 
besteht nur darin, daB das Denken den Widerspruch und in ihm sich selbst festhiilt 
... "English Translation by A.V. Miller, Hegel's Science of Logic, op. cit., p. 440. 
67. Wissenschaft der Logik (1832) l.Band, op. cit., p. 60: " ... Begriff der Einheit des Seins und 
des Nichtseins,-oder in reflektierterer Form, der Einheit des Unterschieden- und 
des Nichtunterschiedenseins,-oder der Identitat der Identitiit und Nichtidentitiit." 
Translation by A.V. Miller, Hegel's Science of Logic, op. cit., p. 74. 
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68. "Der spekulative Satz"; see G.W.F. Hegel, Phiinomenologie des Geistes, op. cit., p. 51. 
69. "Die Philosophie expliziert nur sich, indem sie die Religion expliziert, und indem sie 
sich expliziert, expliziert sie die Religion. Der denkende Geist ist es, der diesen 
Gegenstand, die Wahrheit, durchdringt, der in dieser Beschliftigung GenuB der 
Wahrheit und Reinigung des subjektiven BewuBtseins ist. So fallen Religion und 
Philosophie in eins zusammen." VPR, Teil 1, p. 63; English Translation in LPR, 
Volume 1, pp. 152-153. 
70. See F.W.J. Schelling, Bruno; oder uber das gottliche und natiirliche Princip der Dinge: Ein 
Gespriich (1802) in Schellings Werke, edited by Manfred Schroter. Volume 3. Munich: 
C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1965 (2nd ed.); p. 127: "Er [der Philosoph) iibt 
also denselben Gottesdienst innerlich aus, den der Hervorbringende iiuBerlich iibt, 
ohne es zu wissen." 
71. So Wilhelm Dilthey in the unfinished portion of his Leben Schleiermachers, Volume 
XIV /2 of his Gesammelte Schriften. This volume is entitled Schleiermachers System als 
Theologie and is edited by Martin Redeker. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1966. p. 531. 
72. "Die Form des Vorstellens"; see G.W.F. Hegel, Phiinomenologie des Geistes, op. cit., p. 
547. 
73. So Bernard M.G. Reardon in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion. London: Macmillan, 1977. 
p.33. 
74. "Worauf es ganz allein ankommt, ist der Unterschied der Formen des spekulativen 
Denkens von den Formen der Vorstellung und des reflektierenden Verstandes." §573 
of Enzyklopiidie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830): 3.Teil, op. cit., p. 379. 
75. "Daher steht nun die Vorstellung in bestiindiger Unruhe zwischen der unmittelbaren 
sinnlichen Anschauungund demeigentlichen Gedanken." Cited from the 2nd edition 
of Hegel's Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der Religion (1840) in VPR, Teil1, p. 150n. 
Similarly Hegel's Lectures of 1824: "Sie [die Vorstellung] steht zwischen der unmit-
telbar sinnlichen Empfindung und dem eigentlichen Gedanken." VPR, Teill, p. 235. 
English Translation in LPR, Volume 1, pp. 241n. and 334. 
76. "Da die Vorstellung diese konkrete Erhebung des Sinnlichen zum Allgemeinen nicht 
ist, so heiBt ihr negatives Verhalten gegen das Sinnliche nichts anderes als: Sie ist von 
demselben nicht wahrhaft befreit, sie ist mit ihm noch wesentlich verwickelt ... " VPR, 
Teil1, p. 150n. The edition of the Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der Religion edited 
by Georg Lasson discusses "Vorstellung" in terms of "eine unreine Vermischung". 
However, Lasson's edition is commonly thought the least reliable. See the edition 
brought out by Felix Meiner Verlag of Hamburg in 1974 (PhB 59: "Begriff der 
Religion", p. 297). Lasson's first edition of this text appeared in 1925. 
77. So Malcolm Clark in Logic and System: A Study of the Transition from "Vorstellung" to 
Thought in the Philosophy of Hegel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971. p. 26. 
78. See Hegel's Review of Aphorismen iiber Nichtwissen und absolutes Wissen im Verhiiltnis 
zur christlichen Glaubenserkenntnis by C.F. GOschel. Published in 1829, it is reprinted 
in G.W.F. Hegel, Berliner Schriften: 1818-1831, edited by J. Hoffmeister (PhB 240). 
Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1956. pp. 295-329; here p. 318: " ... das Heriibergehen 
iiberhaupt von der Vorstellung zum Begriffe und von dem Begriffe zur Vorstellung ... " 
79. Glaubenslehre~., §3. Proposition: "Die Glaubenslehre beruht also auf zweierlei, einmal 
auf dem Bestreben die Erregungen des christlich frommen Gemiites in Lehre darzus-
tellen, und dann auf dem Bestreben, was als Lehre ausgedriickt ist, in genauen 
Zusammenhang zu bringen." 
80. I am alluding to Hegel's "Reinigung des subjektiven BewuBtseins". VPR, Teil1, p. 63; 
see above p. 52. 
81. So, for instance, Martin Redeker in his Friedrich Schleiermacher: Leben und Werk, op. 
cit., p. 178: "Infolge dieser Liiuterung und Reinigung derSchOpfertheologie muB auch 
der Wunderbegrifferneuert werden und von den verfehlten Vorstellungen der supra-
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naturalistischen Metaphysik befreit werden." English Translation by J. Wallhausser, 
Schleiermacher: Life and Thought, op. cit., p. 123. 
82. See Schleiermacher's discussion of this point in Lucke, p. 346: "aber der Schopfungs-
begriff ... wie lange wird er sich noch halten konnen gegen die Gewalt einer aus 
wissenschaftlichen Kombinationen, denen sich niemand entziehen kann, gebildeten 
Weltanschauung?" (English Translation, pp. 60-61.) 
83. Cf. Franz Christ, Menschlich von Gott Reden: Das Problem des Anthropomorphismus bei 
Schleiermacher. Giitersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1982. The concluding section of this exhaus-
tive study is introduced by the following sentence: "Die Vermenschlichung Gottes in 
der Dolmetschung des religiosen Gefiihls bedarf der standigen Reinigung." (p. 225). 
84. §573 of Enzyklopiidie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830): 3.Teil, op. cit., p. 379: 
"Aber die Religionist die Wahrheit fiir aile Menschen ... " (Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, p. 
303). See also Hegel's Preface to the 1827 edition of the Enzyklopiidie; Volume 8 of the 
Theorie-Werkausgabe, op. cit., pp. 13-32; here p. 23: "Die Religionist die Art und Weise 
des BewuBtseins, wie die Wahrheit fiir alle Menschen, fiir die Menschen aller Bildung 
ist ... " 
85. Lucke, pp. 345-346: "Und deshalb will mir nun nichts anderes ahnden, als daiS wir 
werden Iemen miissen uns ohne vieles behelfen, was Viele noch gewohnt sind als 
mit dem Wesen des Christen turns unzertrennlich verbunden zu denken." 
86. See Robert P. Scharlemann, ''The Question of Philosophical Theology" in Being and 
Truth (Festschrift for John Macquarrie), edited by A. Kee and E. T. Long. London: SCM 
Press, 1986. pp. 3-17; here p. 5: " ... Schleiermacher introduced a distinction into 
thinking itself. Religious thinking, in which the 'feeling of absolute dependence' is 
reflected, differs from metaphysical thinking as thinking." 
87. See Alister E. McGrath, Justitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification, 
Volume II. Cambridge University Press, 1986. p. 149. Here McGrath is distinguishing 
Schleiermacher's "religious" account of the Christian faith from a "moral" account. It 
could apply just as well to a distinction from a "philosophical" or "speculative" 
account of the Christian faith. 
88. Psychologie, edited by L. George in SW, Volume III/6, 1862. pp. 13-14: "Es gibt hier 
einen Unterschied ... das ist der des a posteriori und des a priori, des empirischen und 
spekulativen .... Da ist nun die erstere eine Erkenntnis, die von aulSen kommt und ein 
auBerlich gegebenes vorausssetzt, die andere eine rein innerliche, die in dem Akte 
des Denkens selbst ihren Ursprung und zureichenden Grund hat ... " 
89. Schleiermacher lectured on Dialektik six times during his Berlin career: 1811, 
1814/15, 1818/19, 1822, 1828, 1831. The first two seriesoflectures have recently been 
edited by Andreas Arndt, Dialektik (1811) (PhB, Volume 386). Hamburg: Felix Mein~r 
Verlag, 1986. Dialektik(1814/1815) & Einleitung zur Dialektik(1833) (PhB, Volume387). 
Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988. Ludwig Jonas edited these lectures for Friedrich 
Schleiermacher' s siimmtliche Werke (S W, Volume III/ 4-2, 1839). Jonas based his edition 
on the lecture series of 1814/15, and this edition still sets the standard for Schleier-
macher scholarship. The edition by Rudolf Odebrecht, Friedrich Schleiermachers Dia-
lektik, uses the lectures of 1822 as a basis. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1976 (2nd ed.). Originally published in 1942. In Dialektik(ed. Jonas), 
Schleiermacher writes (§3): "Dialektik muB irgend wie die Prinzipien des Philosop-
hierens enthalten." (p. 2). In §132, he writes: "Da nun die Vernunfttatigkeit gegriindet 
ist im idealen, die organische aber als abhangig von den Einwirkungen der Gegen-
stande im realen: so ist das Sein auf ideale Weise eben so gesetzt wie auf reale, und 
ideates und reales laufen parallel neben einander fort als modi des Seins." (pp. 75-76). 
90. F.D.E. Schleiermacher, Ethik (1812/13), edited by Otto Braun and Hans-Joachim 
Birkner (PhB, Voluxne 335). Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1981. p. 8: "Der Gcgcnsatz 
ist uns eingeboren unter der Form von Seele und Leib, Idealem und Real em, Vemunft 
undNatur." 
91. Dialektik (ed. Jonas), §133: "dieser hochste Gegensatz" (p. 76). 
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92. Dialektik (ed. Odebrecht), p. 255: "Diejenige Art des Denkens, welche das Wissen 
iiberwiegend unter der Form des Urteils setzen will, nennen wir das empirische und 
historische Wissen; diejenige Art, welche das Wissen vorwiegend unter der Form des 
Begriffs setzt, nennen wir das spekulative Wissen. 
Beides muB sich nun im Sein ebenso verhalten, d. h. das endliche Sein muB dargestellt 
werden konnen in einem System von Ursache und Wirkung, entsprechen dem Flusse, 
d. h. unter der Form des Urteils; aber auch als Totalitiit der substantiellen Formen, 
entsprechend dem Sichgleichbleibenden, d. h. unter der Form des Begriffs. Das 
endliche Sein muB in beiden aufgehen." 
93. See Gunter Scholtz, Die Philosophie Schleiermachers. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1984. p. 110: "Das spekulative Denken, das primar in der SpontaneWit 
der Vemunft griindet, verfahrt iiberwiegend deduktiv und richtet sich vomehmlich 
auf das bleibende Sein der Dinge; das empirische Denken, das primar in der Rezepti-
vitat der Sinnlichkeit (Organisation) seinen Anfang nimmt, verfahrt iiberwiegend 
induktiv und sucht das Werden, die Veranderung und Mannigfaltigkeit des Seien-
den zu begreifen. Da sich das Denken in beiden Formen sowohl auf das geistige wie 
natiirliche Sein rich ten kann ... " 
94. See Dialektik (ed. Odebrecht), p. 255, cited in n. 92 above. Please take note of 
Schleiermacher's use of the vocabulary of German Idealism. 
95. See Gunter Scholtz, Die Philosophie Schleiermachers, op. cit., p. 110, cited inn. 93 above. 
96. Dialektik (ed. Jonas), §209: 'Nur in unserem Wissen urn die Totalitat des Seins konnte 
eine Identitat des spekulativen und empirischen sein ... " (p. 142). 
97. Dialektik (ed. Jonas), §§140-143, pp. 82-83. §140. Proposition: "Das Urteil setzt seinem 
Wesen nach den Begriff voraus." §142. Proposition: "Der Begriff setzt iiberall das 
Urteil voraus." -
98. See Gunter Scholtz, Die Philosophie Schleiermachers, op. cit., p. 110, cited inn. 93 above: 
"Das spekulative Denken, das primar in der Spontaneitat der Vemunft griindet ... " 
99. See Schleiermacher's statement in Lucke, p. 349: 'Niemals aber werde ich mich dazu 
bekennen kOnnen, daB mein Glaube an Christum von dem Wissen oder der Philos-
ophie her sei ... " Schleiermacher sets his face against all forms of proof and deduction 
in Christian dogmatics. The statement at the beginning of §14.2 of The Christian Faith 
is characteristic: "The attempt has often been made to demonstrate the necessity of 
redemption, but always in vain." 
100. See the extremely useful summary of these matters in Dietz Lange, Historischer Jesus 
oder mythischer Christus: Untersuchungen zu dem Gegensatz zwischen Friedrich Schleier-
macher und David Friedrich Straup. Giitersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1975. The section entitled 
"Die dialektische Grundlegung", pp. 61-63, contains the following assessment: "Urn-
gekehrt erreicht die empirische Erkenntnis auf ihrem induktiven, von Urteilen aus-
gehenden Wege niemals die Ideen." (p. 61). This judgment accords rather well with 
Schleiermacher's statement in §108 of the Dialektik (ed. Jonas): "Die Tatigkeit der 
organischen Funktion ohne aile Vemunfttatigkeit ist noch kein Denken." (p. 57). 
101. Dialektik(ed.Jonas),§210, p.144: "AnstatteinerDurchdringungdesspekulativen und 
empirischen ist uns nur eine begleitende Beziehung des einen auf das andre moglich, 
oder eine wissenschaftliche Kritik." See also KD2, §32: ''Da das eigentiimliche Wesen 
des Christentums sich ebensowenig rein wissenschaftlich konstruieren HiBt, als es 
bloB empirisch aufgefaBt werden kann: so UiBt es sich nur kritisch bestimmen ... " 
102. See Dialektik (ed. Odebrecht), pp. 99ff.: "Zusammenhang zwischen hOherem und 
niederem Wissen". In Schleiermachers Dialektik: Eine kritische Interpretation, Falk Wag-
ner identifies the "higher" knowledge with speculation, and the '1ower" with "reales 
Wissen". Ciitersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1974. p. 55. 
103. Glaubenslehrez, §2.2: ''Das Eigentiimliche der christlichen [Kirche] kann weder rein 
wissenschaftlich begriffen oder abgeleitet noch bloB empirisch aufgefaBt werden. 
Denn keine Wissenschaft kann das lndividuelle durch den bloBen Gedanken erre-
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ichen und hervorbringen ... Wie alle sogenannten Konstruktionen a priori auf dem 
geschichtlichen Gebiet immer an der Aufgabe gescheitert sind ... " CF translates 
"durch den bloBen Gedanken" as 'by means of mere ideas"; properly this should read 
"thought". 
104. Schleiermacher lectured on Asthetik three times during his Berlin career: 1819, 1825, 
1832/33. There are three competing editions of these lectures to choose from. The 
best critical edition of Schleie~cher's manuscript for the lectures in 1819 is pro-
vided by Thomas Lehnerer inAsthetik (1819/25) & Uber den Begriff der Kunst (1831/32). 
Hamburg:FelixMeinerVerlag, 1984(PhB, Volume365).Fullerversionsofhislectures 
on Asthetik have been edited by Rudolf Odebrecht, Friedrich Schleiermachers Asthetik. 
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1931 (this version has as its basis the 1819 manuscript); & 
the edition prepared by Carl Lommatzsch for the Stimmtliche Werke (5 W, III/7, 1842). 
~s version is based on students' lecture notes of the 1832/33 presentation. See 
Asthetik (ed. Lehnerer), p. 7: "A us dem angenommenen Gegensatz gehen die heiden 
Hauptteile hervor; der erste, der mehr spekulative, der es mit der Identitat, der zwei te, 
der mehr empirische, der es mit der Differenz der Kunst zu tun hat." 
105. Asthetik(ed. Lommatzsch), p. 41: "Dieses Aufsteigenoderdiesespekulative Richtung 
wird der erste Teil sein, und sodann nach Feststellung des allgemeinen Begriffs der 
Kunst ... " 
106. Dialektik (ed. Odebrecht), "Friedrich Schleiermachers Einleitung in die Dialektik", 
§1.2, pp. 5-8; here p. 5: "Der Ausdruck reines Denken bestimmt sich in der Unterschei-
dung desselben vom geschaftlichen Denken und vom kiinstlerischen Denken ... " 
107. Ibid., p. 7: "das reine Denken sei das Denken urn des Wissens willen ... " 
108. Ibid.: "das reine Denken als das in sich selbst bleibende und sich uns zur Unverander-
lichkeit und Allgemeinheit steigemde ... "James 0. Duke has discussed these pages 
from Schleiermacher's Dialektik (ed. Odebrecht, pp. 5-8) in his doctoral thesis for 
Vanderbilt University (1975): "The Prospects for Theological Hermeneutics: Hegel 
Versus Schleiermacher?" I have consulted his remarks (pp. 85-92) with profit. 
109. Asthetik(ed. Lehnerer), pp. 22-23: "Die Permanenzdes religiiisen Geftihls istdie Stimmung . 
... Die religiOse Stimmung will auBerlich werden, und das geschieht auf zweifache Art. 
Einmal durch Reflexion im Dogma, und dann durch Darstellung in der religiosen 
Kunst .... Die Gebiete selbst aber sind einander relativ entgegengesetzt. Die Reflexion 
im Dogma nahert das Gefiihl wieder dem Denken, weil sie Denken iiber das Geftihl 
ist. Die Darstellung in der Kunst tritt als freie Produktion dem objektiven Denken am 
meisten gegeniiber ." 
110. "Darstellung"-Hegel would have said "Vorstellung"! In Hegel's Phtinomenologiedes 
Geistes, the revealed religion of Christianity is placed between "the spiritual work of 
art" (das geistige Kunstwerk) and absolute knowledge. 
111. Asthetik (ed. Lommatzsch), p. 34: 'Wir miissen uns nun entscheiden, wie weit wir hier 
abwarts oder aufwarts zu gehen haben; unter dem hinauf verstehe ich das Spekula-
tive, unter dem hinab das Technische." 
112. Lucke, p. 348: "Die groBartigen Satze, auf die es uns hier vorziiglich ankommt, daB 
gottliche und menschliche Natur an sich gar nicht getrennt sind, daB die gottliche 
Natur die Wahrheit der menschlichen Naturist, und die menschliche Natur die 
Wirklichkeit der g6ttlichen Natur ... "(English Translation, p. 62.) 
113. Cf. Lucke, p. 350. (English Translation, p. 64.) 
114. Horst Stephan & Martin Schmidt, Geschichte der evangelischen Theologie in Deutschland 
seit dem Idealismus, 3rd ed., op. cit., p. 237: "Christlicher Glaube und idealistische 
Philosophie waren fiirihn [I.A. Domer] solidarisch, spekulativer Spatidealismus und 
dogmengeschichtlichcs Interesse durchdrangen sich gegenseitig." 
115. Felix Fliickiger, "Die protestantische Theologie des 19. Jahrhunderts" in Die Kirche in 
ihrer Geschichte: Ein Handbuch, edited by Bernd Moeller. Volume IV. GOttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975. p. P44: 'Vermittlungstheologen waren fast aile 
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~geblichen Vertreter der Theologie des 19. Jahrhunderts, so fern man als Anliegen 
dieser Theologie den Ausgleich zwischen Christentum und Kultur, theologischer 
Wissenschaft und zeitgenossischer Philosophie betrachtet." 
116. See Friedrich Schleiennachers Grund rift der philosophischen Ethik, edited by A. Twesten. 
Berlin: G. Reimer, 1841. p. xivn: "Hegel's Phanomenologie, welche die ersten Keime 
seiner Philosophie des Geistes enthielt, die, obwohl in Methode und Resultaten sehr 
verschieden, doch im Allgemeinen der Schleiermacherschen Ethik entspricht ... " 
Twesten provided the second posthumous edition of Schleiermacher's Ethik; A. 
Schweizer provided the first edition for the Siimmtliche Werke in 1835 (Volume III/5). 
The best account of all the various editions of this pivotal group of writings is 
provided by Hans-Joachim Birkner in his Introduction to F.D.E. Schleiermacher, Ethik 
(1812/13): Mit spiiteren Fassungen der Einleitung, Giiterlehre und Pflichtenlehre (PhB, 
Volume 335), op. cit. 
117. Friedrich Mildenberger, Geschichte der deutschen evangelischen Theologie im 19. und 20. 
Jahrhundert. Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1981. p. 87: "Unbestritten will Bieder-
mann als spekulativer Theologe zugleich kirchlich sein." 
118. Adapted from Karl Marx' s essay "Luther als Schiedsrichter zwischen StraufS und 
Feuerbach" (written in 1842). Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Werke, Volume 1. Berlin 
(DDR): Dietz Verlag, 1964. pp. 26-27; here p. 27: "Und es gibt keinen andern Weg fur 
euch zur Wahrheit und Freiheit, als durch den Feuer-bach. Der Feuerbach ist das 
Purgatorium der Gegenwart." English Translation in Writings of the Young Marx on 
Philosophy and Society, edited by L.D. Easton and K.H. Guddat. Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday, 1967. pp. 93-95. 
119. Friedrich Nietzsche, Unzeitgemiifie Betrachtungen; Erstes Stiick: "David Strauss, der 
Bekenner und der Schriftsteller" (1873) in Nietzsche Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 
edited by G. Colli and M. Montinari. Volume III/1. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972. 
p. 187. In the same vein, German students have the slogan "Hegel und andere 
Schleiermacher", an apt motto for this thesis! 
120. From D.F. Strauss, Christian Miirklin: Ein Lebens- und Charakterbild aus der Gegenwart. 
Mannheim: Verlag von Friedrich Bassermann, 1851. pp. 52-53. The relevant passage 
is translated by Horton Harris in David Friedrich Strauss and his Theology. Cambridge 
University Press, 1973. p. 18. "DasStudiumderSchleiermacher'schen Glaubenslehre, 
weit entfemt, uns wissenschaftlich zu beruhigen, gab uns vielmehr doppelten An-
trieb, da weiter vorzudringen, wo der Meister, ziemlich willkiirlich, wie es uns 
vorkommen wollte, Grenzpfahle gesteckt hatte; der ewige Friede, den er zwischen 
Philosophie und Theologie abgeschlossen zu haben sich riihmte, erschien uns nur 
als ein gebrechlicher Waffenstillstand, und wir fanden geraten, uns auf den Kriegsfall 
vorzusehen." 
121. D.F. Strauss, Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet, 1st ed. Volume 11. Tiibingen: C.F. 
Osiander, 1836. p. 729: " ... da der Geist wesentlich dies ist, in der Unterscheidung 
seiner von sich identisch mit sich zu bleiben, im Andern seiner sich selbst zu haben 
... " I have employed the translation of this passage in The Young Hegelians: An 
Anthology, edited by Lawrence S. Stepelevich. Cambridge University Press, 1983. pp. 
21-51; here p. 44. The excerpts in this anthology have the merit of conforming to 
Strauss' 1st edition, and they restore deleted material. The original translation of the 
4th ed. (1840) was by George Eliot, the translation has been revised by Marilyn C. 
Massey. However, I must object to the translation of "im Andern" by "in others"; 
properly speaking, this is singular and should read "in the other". 
122. D.F. Strauss, Das Leben Jesu, 1st ed., Volume 11, op. cit., p. 730: "Sind Gott und Mensch 
an sich Eins, und ist die Religion die menschliche Seite, das werdende BewufStsein 
dieser Einheit: so mufS diese in der Religion auch fiir den Menschen werden, in ihm 
zum Be • · z .. Wirklichkeit kommen." The passage "die menschl'che 
Seite" has been left untranslated for some reason. See The Young Hegelians, op. cit., 
pp. 4445. An earlier revision of George Eliot's translation has been provided by Peter 
C. Hodgson, The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined. London: SCM Press, 1973. While 
Hodgson's revision treats these passages with greater respect, this English version 
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follows the structure of the 4th ed. (1840), so that the section on "The Speculative 
Christology" becomes §150. 
123. D.F. Strauss,Das Lebenfesu, lsted., Volume II, op. cit., p. 731: 'Nein: derGottmensch 
stirbt, und zeigt dadurch, dafS es Gott mit seiner Menschwerdung Ernst ist ... "This 
passage is untranslatable, and so neither Hodgson's revision (p. 778), nor Massey's 
revision (p. 45) tries to incorporate it. Both revisions read: "No: the God-man dies, 
and thus proves that the incarnation of God is real ... " But this emphasis is wrong; 
the death of the God-man proves that the incarnation is real for God-the serious 
consequences of the incarnation are the ones that God must suffer. This is completely 
in line with Hegel's teaching at the Niirnberg Gymnasium: "Sein Schmerz war die 
Tiefe der Einheit der gottlichen und menschlichen Natur im Leben und Lei den." §207 
of "Philosophische Enzyklopadie fiir die Oberklasse (1808ff.)", op. cit., p. 68. 
124. D.F. Strauss, Das Leben fesu, 1st ed. Volume II, op. cit., p. 729; The Young Hegelians, op. 
cit., p. 44. 
125. F.W.J. Schelling, Vorlesungen iiber die Methode des akademischen Studiums, edited by 
Otto Wei15 and Walter E. Ehrhardt (PhB, 275). Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1974. 
The whole passage reads (p. 88): "als ein leidender und den Verhiingnissen der Zeit 
untergeordneter Gott erscheint ... " My italics have been added to the citation in the 
text. 
126. FerdinandChristianBaur,Primaerationalismietsupranaturalismihistoriaecapitapotiora; 
Part 2: "Comparatur Gnosticismus cum Schleiermacherianae theologiae indole". 
Originally published in Tiibingen in 1827, excerpts from this work are most readily 
available in KGA, Volume 1/7, Part iii: Der Christliche Glaube (1821/22): Marginalien 
und Anhang, edited by Ulrich Barth. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984. Here p. 254. Baur 
did publish a German summary of this dissertation in Tiibinger Zeitschrift fiir Theologie 
in 1828. This summary, which is not as complete as the Latin original, also appears 
in KGA, Volume I/7, Part iii. 
127. Lucke, p. 315. (English Translation, p. 37.) The italics are mine. 
128. Carl E. Hester, "Schleiermacher in Tiibingen: A Study in Reaction". Columbia Uni ver-
sity, Ph.D., 1970. pp. 6-7. 
129. Lucke, p. 315. (English Translation, p. 37.) 
130. Lucke, p. 315. See also KGA, Volume 1/7, Part iii, p. 248: "nihil in historica parte esse 
posse, quod non antea fuerit in ideali, sive philosophica." Schleiermacher renders 
this: "es konne nichts in dem historischen Teile, der Glaubenslehre namlich, sein, was 
nicht zuvor in dem idealen oder philosophischen gewesen". The English Translation 
(p. 37) turns this last phrase into "the ideal or philosophical parts". As this conforms 
neither to the Latin nor the German, I have maintained the singular to avoid 
confusion. -
131. Ferdinand Christian Baur, Vorlesungen iiber die christliche Dogmengeschichte, Volume 
III: "Das Dogma der neueren Zeit", edited by F.F. Baur. Leipzig: Fues's Verlag, 1867. 
p. 345: "Hierin liegt die spekulative Bedeutung, die auch der Schleiermacher'schen 
Glaubenslehre zukommt, so sehr Schleiermacher gegen die Voraussetzung protes-
tierte, dafS seiner Glaubenslehre eine bestimmte philosophische Ansicht zu Grunde 
liege. Das Verhiiltnis von Philosophie und Theologie erscheint uns hier schon auf 
dem Punkte, auf welchem beide sich gegenseitig so zur Einheit durchdrungen haben, 
da15 sie nicht mehr von einander getrennt werden konnen." 
132. Lucke, pp. 342: "Hatte nun vollends die gefiihrliche Einleitung noch starker und 
ausdriicklicher von dem Werke selbst gesondert werden konnen: so wiirde dann 
gewifS dem schlimmsten und grellsten MifSverstiindnis, da15 niimlich meine Glauben-
slehre eine spekulative Tendenz habe, und auf einem spekulativen Grunde ruhe, 
moglichst vorgebeugt worden sein." (English Translation, p. 58.) 
133. Ferdinand Christian Baur, "Selbstanzeige von: Primae rationalismi et supranaturalismi 
historiae capita potiora". Originally published in 1828, it is reprinted in KGA, Volume 
I /7, Part iii. Here p. 273: " ... dem beriihmten Verfasser moge es gefallen, in einer ohne 
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Zweifel bald zu erwartenden zweiten Ausgabe iiber das Verhaltnis, in welchem nach 
seiner Idee das historische und ideale Christentum zu einander stehen sollen, sich 
bestimmter und unmittelbarer zu erkliiren, als bisher geschehen ist." 
134. B.A. Gerrish, Review of KGA, Volume 1/7, Parts i-iii; in Religious Studies Review, 
Volume 12,1986. pp. 238-240; here p. 240. 
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Fichte's 
Aphorismen 
Chapter Two: 
Positive Theology: Systematic and Practical 
I n 1790 Johann Gottlieb Fichte composed some fragments which have survived as his "Aphorismen tiber Religion und Deismus". These early 
jottings by the first Professor of Philosophy at the University of Berlin 
(Schleiermacher's colleague until his death in 1814) exude an almost pro-
grammatic authority for the generation of thinkers that was to follow him. 
Among the principles that Fichte's aphorisms lay down, we may discover 
the following: we must imagine a collection of the propositions of the 
Christian religion without even the "slightest admixture of philosophical 
Riisonnement"(§2), so that all investigations into God's objective being are cut 
off from the start. God's being in relationship with man is the only proper 
subject of religion (§3). The fundamental principles of this religion are 
located in sensibilities (Empfindungen) rather than convictions (Uberzeug-
ungen), and so Christianity is destined to be a religion for the heart rather 
than for the understanding (Verstand);1 Christianity will not "obtrude itself" 
through demonstrations (§12). The investigations or "speculations" of a 
purely "deistic system" (i.e., a system based entirely on reason) will pose no 
threat to Christianity, because these speculations will allow it "its complete 
subjective validity".2 And a "deistic system does not falsify" Christianity, 
because there cannot be any place where it comes into "collision" with it 
(§16). 
Fichte's conception here is of a Christianity which respects its own 
boundaries or borders (Grenzen--§ 14); and the only "religious" hope for the 
thinker who is inclined towards deistic "speculations" is to cut off these 
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speculations "beyond the borderline".3 Fichte, however, does express some 
uncertainty about whether the speculative thinker will be able to do that just 
when he wants (§18)- a question we shall want to put to Schleiermacher 
also. The most extraordinary thing about these fragments is that their 
teaching embraces simultaneously the unlettered convictions of the Christian 
apostles of the first century with the philosophical conclusions of "the 
greatest thinker of the eighteenth, Kant"; they draw the boundary for the 
Christian religion in the same place-"with investigation of the objective 
being of God" (§13)! 
Schleiermacher accepts the challenge which these aphorisms lay down. 
He will seek to give an account of the Christian "propositions" (Stitze), which 
will rescue them from any pretence to "demonstration", and which will 
preserve them from any possibility of "collision" with philosophical or 
theological "speculations". But, as always, the fascinating thing is that 
Schleiermacher hopes to travel down both tracks at once. The tracks are 
meant to run parallel to one another, without ever running into each other. 
One doctoral study of Schleiermacher's thought boldly concludes that 
Schleiermacher intended to develop both "a philosophical doctrine of God 
and a dogmatic doctrine of God". These two doctrines are to be "inde-
pendent" of one another, and yet remain in agreement.4 How these two 
doctrines-religious and deistic, if we may speak this way-are to be made 
to stay within their own proper boundaries, without either of them infring-
ing on the territory of the other, is the major question posed by the present 
dissertation. 
Fifty years later the issues raised by Fichte' s Aphorismen were just as 
vibrant as ever. In the final version of Strauss' Life of jesus (the fourth edition 
of 1840), the concluding section (§152) rehearses Schleiermacher's dilemma 
as this can be discovered in his Open Letters of 1829.5 There the possibility is 
mooted of having to choose between scientific criticism and philosophical 
speculation, so that either the mystical aura which surrounds Christian 
h . t '11 h b d d h' . 1 . . . f 'th '11 
__ ls ory WI ave to e surren ere to 1stonca cr1tiosm, or .a1" .. Wlu 
become a kind of "loan" from speculation. It is not incidental that Schleier-
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macher's personal preference would be to pursue the latter course, but it is 
his understanding of himself as a "church theologian", which rescues him 
from following this "esoteric" path. 
In stressing the practical nature of the theological enterprise, Schleier-
macher aligns himself firmly with the Protestant, Reformed tradition which 
turned its back on abstract, useless speculation. In 1602, the Reformed 
philosopher and theologian, Bartholomaus Keckermann, declared that dog-
matics is a "scientia practica", inasmuch as this science has the task of 
"bringing people to salvation".6 Schleiermacher remains equally loyal to his 
own Moravian origins in defining the "positive", practical nature of Chris-
tian theology. Count Zinzendorf's praise for "practical philosophy" com-
bines neatly with the anti-scholastic, anti-speculative stamp of his 
thought7-and the resonance with Schleiermacher is profound. Schleier-
macher would certainly have approved Zinzendorf's struggle to liberate 
religion from the stultifying embrace of men of "intelligence" and persons 
"who have the greatest reason". For Zinzendorf, the universality of religion 
is guaranteed because it "can be grasped without the conclusions of reason"; 
consequently, "religion must be a matter which is able to be grasped through 
experience alone without any concepts". In accordance with this doctrine, 
Zinzendorf posits two kinds of understanding: the understanding which 
arises out of concepts and the understanding "arrived at from experience"-
the former understanding is subject to all manner of change, the latter can 
only be enhanced.8 Here we find in embryonic form Schleiermacher's gr~at 
conviction that the reflective understanding may be of service to religious 
experience without thereby usurping the primacy of that experience. 
Whether there can be an "understanding" without the aid of concepts is 
another matter. 
A turn towards the practical in theology is simultaneously a turn away 
from the speculative. The great scholastic theologies, by which we mean 
Protestant Orthodoxy just as much as the celebrated medieval systems, 
regard speculation as synonymous with contemplation: i.e., speculative 
theology is undertaken for its own sake alone, it has no end outside itself.9 
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At the beginning of his Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas Aquinas asks, 
"Whether sacred doctrine is a practical science?" The answer states that sacra 
doctrina is both speculative and practical (speculativa et practica), but that, in 
virtue of its being a science having to do with God Himself, it is primarily 
speculative.10 
Schleiermacher, the theologian, wants nothing to do with a science that 
treats exclusively, or primarily, of divine things (de rebus divinis), since this 
rarefied, abstract form of theology is detrimental to the life of the Church, 
and "speculative" only in the bad sense of being purely conjectural. In its 
place, he wishes to set the positive science of Christian theology, the precise 
meaning of which it is the further responsibility of this chapter to explore. 
We need to put down three markers before we embark on this essential 
investigation: 
i) Although Schleiermacher is frequently (and justly) spoken of as 
"the father of modern theology", he himself eschewed the termi-
nology by which his discipline is normally identified, viz. syste-
matic theology. While the "systematic" character of his theology 
is never in doubt (it is implied in the science of theology), Schleier-
macher feared that this designation might give over-zealous 
philosophical spirits the misleading impression that theology is 
part of some great "system" of human knowledge,11 and that 
Christianity can be comprehended (and thereby superseded) by 
purely "scientific" means. 
ii) Protestant Orthodoxy made an interesting and important distinc-
tion between theologia catechetica, the instruction required of every 
Christian before baptism and confirmation, and theologia ac-
roamatica, which is a "higher theology"12 reserved for the aca-
demic theologians, and those whom they train at the universities 
and seminaries. While the former can be described as rudior (the 
rougher, the baser, the less cultivated), the latter is understood as 
accuratior (the more accurate, the more exact, the more careful) .13 
What this implies, and Schleiermacher is certainly aware of this 
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practical distinction, is that the "esoteric" character of theological 
study is not expunged by the simple device of banning specula-
tion: there must be a higher theological learning reserved for the 
initiates, even if this higher science has no taint of "speculation".14 
iii) If we continue to use the language of Protestant Orthodoxy, then 
Schleiermacher wishes to restrict the usus philosophiae in theology 
to what they called the usus organicus; philosophy was in this garb 
fundamentally a tool for clarity of concept and argument. Its use 
was thus "instrumental" only}5 without affecting the content of 
what was taught. Whether or not Schleiermacher has succeeded 
in limiting the use of philosophy to this modest ancillary status 
is the question we have undertaken to examine. 
II. In light of Schleiermacher's famous statement of §1 of both editions of his 
Theological Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums (1811 & 1830) that theology is "a 
Encyclopedia 
positive science" (eine positive Wissenschaft),16 we shall need to ask four 
closely related questions: i) What does "positive" signify in this context? 
ii) Why should this term be applied to theology? iii) How does theology 
qualify for the status of a science (eine Wissenschaft)? iv) What makes Schleier-
macher's treatment of the science of theology "encyclopedic"? This last 
question requires a word of explanation: Schleiermacher's Kurze Darstellung 
arises out of an eighteenth-century tradition of "Fachenzyklopadien", a form 
of literature providing handbooks or compendia for students of a particular 
discipline. Significantly, it is Schleiermacher's "positive faculties" (theology, 
jurisprudence and medicine) which lend themselves to this "encyclopedic" 
treatment, and the intention is, of course, to give an "overview" of the subject 
under discussion.17 Schleiermacher explicitly identifies his own Kurze Dar-
stellung as within this genre in §20, which begins, "Die enzyklopadische 
Darstellung, welche hier gegeben werden sol1 ... "18 As the question whether 
Schleiermacher's presentation of the science of theology can justly be re-
garded as ''encyclopedic" is the most comprehensive of the four questions 
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that we have set ourselves above, it would make a systematic beginning to 
our inquiry. 
Obviously the use of the term "encyclopedia" implies some attempt at 
the "totality" of knowledge: the word's Greek etymology suggests a "circle" 
of education or culture.19 But the crucial thing is the way in which this 
totality is conceived, how this circle is to be constructed. The great encyclo-
pedias, those modelled after the extraordinary achievement of Diderot and 
d' Alembert, are organized upon an alphabetical basis. These encyclopedias 
are reference works, which offer the reader competent summaries of discrete 
topics, arranged according to the accident of spelling. This accumulation of 
vast quantities of information under separate headings is very far removed 
from Schleiermacher' s intention in his Kurze Darstellung. Schleiermacher' s 
text is a manual rather than a reference work; its topics are continuous rather 
than discrete; it is comprehensive in a formal rather than a material sense 
(i.e., it is written largely in the form of definitions and propositions)?0 and 
finally it follows a principle of organization that the subject itself demands. 
Its unity is not imposed externally by means of the accidental device of how 
a word or concept happens to be spelt. 
The palpable intention of the more familiar encyclopedias is to provide 
"compendia" of human knowledge,21 where discrete topical discussions do 
not depend upon any context or "Zusammenhang". Hence, alphabetical 
arrangement is strictly a matter of convenience. But the concept of the 
"encyclopedia" is not really fulfilled by such a procedure: there is evidently 
an attempt to be exhaustive as regards content, but the "circularity" of 
education or culture is not really addressed. While the usual encyclopedia 
may be exhaustive with regard to content, the question of method can be left 
aside entirely.22 
Schleiermacher's theological encyclopedia does in one aspect have a 
higher right to use this designation than the more massive works, for the 
simple reason that it has a beginning, a middle and an end, i.e., it has a 
methodical construction. This construction in tum allows us to grasp the 
principle of its organization. Armed with this principle, we are in a position 
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for the first time to judge the comprehensiveness of the work before us-any 
lacunae are exposed when we ourselves apply the same principle to the 
material which is under examination. 
The universality implied in the use of the term "encyclopedia" is only 
partially realized in Schleiermacher's compendium. There is in this sober 
work no flirtation with the "encyclopedistics" of the earlier much admired 
Novalis. In his collected fragments and aphorisms, there is a Romantic 
longing for a "universal method", which will continue the work of transfor-
ming the world in accordance with the Bible; for Novalis, this is the proper 
introduction to a true "encyclopedistics".23 
The notion of a "Fachenzyklopadie", then, turns back on itself in a 
rather paradoxical fashion. For the claim of any particular "encyclopedic 
manual" must be that it is exhaustive, but not universal: there are other 
"circles" beyond its borders. This consideration requires us to bring Hegel's 
"Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences" as an exhibit into our inquiry. 
His "encyclopedia" is a compendium for students of philosophy, in precisely 
the sense in which Schleiermacher's "encyclopedia" is a compendium for 
students of theology. But there is this important qualification, that philo-
sophy is by its nature (wesentlich) "encyclopedic", since the truth can only 
exist in the form of totality.24 Philosophy must employ a universal method, 
if it is to grasp its universal content, and so the philosophical encyclopedia 
overcomes the inadequacies of both the discretely organized reference 
works and the subject compendia. The universality of Hegel's Encyclopedia 
is immediately evident, if one examines its contents: Logic, Nature, Anthro-
pology, Phenomenology, Psychology, Law, Morality, Social Custom, Art, 
Religion and Philosophy.25 
We can now appreciate that the justice of Schleiermacher's claim to 
have written an "encyclopedia" rests on the exhaustive formal treatment of 
his subject, but not on the universality or range of topics, that one might 
discover in the Romantic fragments of either Novalis or Friedrich Schlegel. 
Oddly enough, Hegel's Encyclopedia incorporates both the formal compre-
hensiveness of the "Fachenzyklopadie" and the desire for a universal method 
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and content of the Romantic fragments. 26 We note Schleiermacher' s charac-
teristic endeavour to maintain the treatment of individual subjects in their 
respective spheres (hence his appropriate use of the device of a "Fachenzy-
klopadie"); and we contrast this with Hegel's manipulation of this same 
genre into a kind of "absolute encyclopedia" which, in treating philosophy, 
treats all things. This in turn accords with the great Hegelian principle that 
"the truth is the whole".27 Here, in miniature, we recall the difference 
between Hegel and Schleiermacher, which dominates every section of this 
dissertation. It is fascinating to discover that Hegel has in some sense taken 
up the challenge of those Romantic aphorists, in whose circles Schleier-
macher himself found nourishment. 
III. The question of how theology qualifies as a "science" ( Wissenschaft) develops 
The Science of neatly out of our discussion of the concept of the encyclopedia. Theology is 
Theology 
a science, Schleiermacher explicitly affirms in the opening paragraphs of 
both his Kurze Darstellung and his Glaubenslehre (in both editions respective-
ly). We shall now show that the very method by which we distinguish a 
Fachenzyklopiidie from the massive encyclopedias, which we more commonly 
consult, also enables us to identify the traits of a "science", in the rigorous 
understanding of that word. 
What chiefly characterizes the "scientific" organization of knowledge 
is its antipathy to the (indiscriminate) accumulation of information in the 
form of an aggregate. The kind of heaping up of knowledge, which we 
identify with the massive encyclopedias, is the exact opposite of the scientific 
search for necessity and unity within our knowledge. The French encyclo-
pedistes were not oblivious to the fact that their principle ("mettre la raison 
par 1' alphabete")28 is not the highest expression of rational organization. It 
would certainly not be enough to satisfy any thinker who had fallen under 
the influence of Kant. His pivotal judgement that there is a complete contrast 
between aggregate and Zusammenhang in the presentation of knowledge 
(Erkenntnis)29 is decisive for all subsequent German thinkers. The aggregate 
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has only a contingent, accidental quality, whereas the system hangs together 
"according to necessary laws". 
It is so easy in the various English translations we employ to overlook 
the crucial (and technical) use of the word Zusammenhang, when we read the 
insipid English "connection". Schleiermacher's own usage is certainly in-
formed by this Kantian distinction: in handwritten lecture notes discovered 
in Schleiermacher's own copy of the Glaubenslehre, he indicates that his use 
of the word Zusammenhang is in contradistinction to the "aggregate",30 that 
is, a jumble of accumulated "facts" without apparent scientific order. It is this 
discovery of a "connection" between the parts of the science of theology 
which allows him to write an "encyclopedic" Kurze Darstellung-a sketch of 
the whole of the science. We have, then an essential feature of "Wissen-
schaft", when we insist upon the careful elucidation of the German Zusam-
menhang: in a "science", the information is not presented as an arbitrary 
conglomeration of bits but must be offered to the inquirer according to its 
necessary interconnection. Only with this interconnection explicitly in view 
can the reader possibly decide whether anything is missing-for the second 
crucial characteristic of any "science" is its systematic presentation. 
Again, we must summon the great intellectual influences upon 
Schleiermacher into our discussion. We learn from Kant that a teaching or 
doctrine may be called a "science", if it is submitted in the form of a system. 
This Kant defines as "a whole of knowledge" (ein Ganze[s] der Erkenntni/1), 
ordered according to principles (1786).31 In The Critique of Pure Reason we 
are told that what transforms "ordinary" knowledge into a science is the 
forging of a system out of an aggregate of information. 32 Our reader will not 
be surprised to learn that Fichte takes up this theme in his explanation of 
how philosophy is a "science". He, in turn, declares that a science has 
systematic form: all the propositions in a science "hang together" according 
to a single principle, and they are united through that principle into a 
whole.33 Hegel's assertion that his own philosophical encyclopedia is dis-
tinguished from a "vulgar" encyclopedia by "the science of the necessary 
connection" (Zusammenhang) as this is determined by the concept (Begrif/)34 
86 
...... ,.._,., .. '-"' .& I.UV• 
Positive Theology: Systematic and Practical 
falls fully within Schleiermacher's own Gedankenwelt, the world of ideas in 
which he was formed. 
This coupling of the theory of the system with the definition of "science" 
dovetails neatly with our concerns. If one considers the Greek ancestor of 
our word "system"- <JUCJ'tllj.L<X. means things assembled or collected 
together-it is already apparent that in our precise usage the "collection" 
cannot be in the form of a collage but must rather imitate the college (a body 
of individuals organized by some common purpose).35 In our technical 
understanding of the "system", it will not be enough to have a Zusammen-
stellung. We seek the Zusammenhang, because this alone can explain how the 
parts of the system are dependent upon one another and how they cohere. 
Without the Zusammenhang which binds everything together, Schleier-
macher's Kurze Darstellung might as well be regarded as a loosely connected 
fund of aphorisms. 
Hegel is scathing in his condemnation of "unsystematic philosophiz-
ing", which is at best "arbitrary and fragmentary".36 This type of thought 
cannot accomplish anything "scientific", as it only gives "expression to 
personal peculiarities of mind, and has no principle for the regulation of its 
contents."37 While the common wisdom portrays Schleiermacher as ant-
agonistic to Hegelian formulations, here again we arrive at common ground. 
In Schleiermacher's statement on university education, which anticipated 
the founding of the university in Berlin, he argues that the entire syllabus 
must be based on "das enzyklopadische". This he defines as the general 
overview of the range and the interconnection (Zusammenhang) of the sub-
ject, which is the necessary foundation for all instruction at the university.38 
It is presumably just this "general overview" which his own "theological 
encyclopedia" offers the student in Berlin. Here Schleiermacher takes his 
stand against "unsystematic theologizing". 
How Schleiermacher understands his own dogmatic theology as a 
"science" follows directly from all that has been said above. Kant and Fichte 
decree that a science must have a systematic character, which means that the 
science is organized in the light of some necessary principle (or principles). 
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This explains how the parts of the system inhere and cohere, so that the 
inquirer is obliged to move forwards and backwards from any individual 
proposition. Only in this way will it be possible to understand how each part 
relates to the whole; without this one cannot grasp the context which alone 
does justice to any portion. 
It has been said that there are two species of system; the first is 
constructed as a vertical sequence from "an indubitable first principle". This 
may be the sense in which St. Thomas Aquinas can declare "sacred doctrineH 
to be a science (scientia): it proceeds from principles (principia) revealed by 
God.39 In such a linear system, subsequent propositions receive their auth-
ority from propositions established earlier, "and not conversely".40 The 
second kind of system is called circular, because all propositions are "mu-
tually supporting", and the propositions at the beginning of such a system 
only achieve their authority as the system unfolds. As the system "gains 
weight", so to speak, the tacit implications of the earliest propositions are 
made explicit and elucidated. The supreme instance of this kind of circular 
system is Hegel's philosophy, where the truth can only be known at the end 
as the result of the whole process.41 While a circular system also proceeds 
from one proposition to another, and therefore has a linear presentation, it 
may be profitably compared to a parataxis, as Northrop Frye chooses to 
define this term, viz. 
a linear sequence that accumulates as it goes on and sresents the reader 
with a whole that is more than the sum of its parts. 
We shall try to establish which of these two species of system is more 
adequately the model for Schleiermacher' s Glaubenslehre. The answer to that 
question will reveal a great deal about Schleiermacher' s method. 
In anticipation of our more detailed exposition, it may be useful to state 
that certain problems emerge when we undertake to read Schleiermacher's 
Glaubenslehre "systematically" (as we are presumably required to do if his 
theology is scientific or wissenschaftlich). First we shall have to establish the 
principle by wPJch the system is governed; we shall need to discover by what 
principle the various strands of the argument inhere and cohere. Secondly, 
88 
Chapter Two: 
Positive Theology: Systematic and Practical 
we shall need to see how the system "develops", how it proceeds from its 
beginning through its middle to its end. This journey presents us with a prima 
facie embarrassment. When we arrive at the last pages of the Glaubenslehre, 
and their doctrine of the Trinity, we may find ourselves presented with less 
of a conclusion and more of a conundrum. Indeed, there will be grounds for 
saying that the strands of his system are not tied together by this final series 
of propositions. On the surface, it would seem more reasonable to say that 
the argument simply peters out. It may be that we shall discover in this final 
exposition an example of what makes Schleiermacher so popular with 
modem thinkers, strongly opposed to the "totalizing" demeanour of the 
Hegelian system.43 We may ultimately decide that Schleiermacher has 
constructed a so-called "open system", which does not exclude what it 
cannot consider. Perhaps we shall learn to appreciate the Glaubenslehre as an 
example of the only kind of system that can have a future: a system flexible 
enough to incorporate arguments and experiences which do not form part 
of its immediate frame of reference. Schleiermacher' s concern may be to offer 
an alternative conception of system, one more suitable for the modem 
awareness of individuality and particularity, with the attendant fragmenta-
tion and diversity which this implies. Schleiermacher may yet be seen to 
inherit Schlegel's mantle. Schlegel not only advocated a "system of frag-
ments"44 but also a repudiation of rigidity and finality. The alleged "exclu-
sivity" of the Hegelian system45 would then be overcome by this conception 
of an "open system" which moves towards its completion as a progressus qd 
infinitum.46 For the more rigorous Hegelian understanding of "system", all 
such pliability will tend towards the arbitrary and "unsystematic". 
Having worked our way backwards from a consideration of theologi-
cal encyclopedia to theological science, we are now able finally to tackle our 
initial question of the "positive" nature of this science. A useful point of 
departure is provided by the French philosopher Condillac, whose Treatise 
on Systems (1749) 
distinguished between systems based on speculation ('abstract princi-
ples', 'gratuitous suppositions', 'mere hypotheses') and those based 
upon experience. 47 
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Schleierrnacher's own emphasis on the positive nature of his theology sug-
gests some affinity with this distinction. This impression is reinforced when 
we enlarge the discussion to include the "negative" outcome of Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason: its primary impact is to restrict "speculative reason" 
to the limits of possible experience. This "policing" of speculative reason-so 
that it does not venture "out beyond its proper limits"-has the "positive" 
advantage of removing an "obstacle .. .in the way of the employment of 
practical reason", which in its moral application "inevitably goes beyond the 
limits of sensibility". Since all "possible speculative knowledge of reason" is 
confined to "mere objects of experience", the speculative reason will not have 
grounds to contest the operation of practical reason beyond this boundary. 
This regulation of the speculative reason is vital then, so "that reason may 
not be brought into conflict with itself" (urn nicht in Widerspruch mit sich selbst 
zu geraten).48 While the terms may be changed in Schleiermacher's configu-
ration to dogmatics and philosophy,49 or "christliche Glaubenslehre" and 
speculative philosophy, or "das fromme SelbstbewufStsein" and "das speku-
lati ve BewufStsein", or subjective and objective functions of the human spirit 
(§28.3), the intention is exactly the same: to avoid a contradiction (Wider-
spruch) which would "touch essential human nature".50 
The Glaubenslehre only realizes the negative moment: a form of dog-
matic theology must be found which will not bring it into ruinous conflict 
with speculative philosophy. However, Schleierrnacher knows that this 
cannot be enough. 51 The intellectual (der Wissende) needs to discover th~t 
the two can be brought into "positive" harmony. This is the Zusammenstim-
mung which is suggested in Schleiermacher's famous letter to Jacobi,52 
where he says that his philosophy and his dogmatics are not only firmly 
determined not to contradict each other (sich nicht zu widersprechen), but they 
are constantly in the process of drawing closer together and becoming 
"attuned". We need to underline two points in relation to this mooted 
harmony: first, Schleierrnacher suggests that the harmonization of his philo-
sophy and his doginatics is a never-ending process, so that neither disdpl i.ne 
will ever be brought to a conclusion. 53 This would seem to support the thesis 
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that Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre represents an "open system". Secondly, 
Schleiermacher's own lecture notes to his Glaubenslehremake it clear that the 
"task" of discovering the concordat between speculative consciousness and 
pious self-consciousness, or between speculative philosophy and Glauben-
slehre, is absolutely personai.54 Here we ascertain the full force of Hegel's 
strictures on unsystematic philosophizing. Such rumination can only em-
body a subjective disposition, "personal convictions", sentiments and opi-
nions. 55 We need hardly add that this "absolutely personal" enterprise is not 
what Hegel understands by Wissenschaft; Schleiermacher could hardly dis-
agree. 
This, then, is the heart of Schleiermacher's concern to establish the 
positive science of Christian theology. His theological system will be the 
representation of actual Christian experience (and belief), as this can be 
discovered in the Protestant community of his time. His emphasis upon the 
Church as the locus of this Christian experience is the safeguard against 
extraneous speculative discourse about God which, by definition, exceeds 
actual human experience. This also secures a strongly practical direction for 
his theology, as it is tied to his concept of the Church (Kirchenbegritf> and to 
his understanding of Church government (Kirchenleitung or Kirchenregi-
ment). In his Kurze Darstellung, Schleiermacher makes it clear that theology 
is the special responsibility of those involved in the supervision of the 
Church, and that any knowledge (Kenntnisse) "acquired and possessed" 
without reference to the Kirchenregiment ceases to be theological!56 
This signifies a revolutionary shift in the history of Christian theology. 
His theo-logy does not begin with a concept of God (Gottesbegritf>, because 
as Gerhard Ebeling correctly points out, the concept of God brings with it a 
strongly metaphysical orientation (Ortsbestimmung), which it is the whole 
purpose of his Glaubenslehre to avoid.57 1f his "theology of experience" can 
find its home in the representation of the concrete life of the Protestant 
Christian community, then, apparently, no conflict with philosophical 
~n.:oa,lati'on n4343d c,...,..,,.,. 
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Schleiermacher' s summons to the positive science of Christian theology will 
demand the strict demarcation by which his theology is preserved from all 
"rational theology" and speculative science. In Schleiermacher's words, 
positive theology must be understood as completely different (giinzlich 
verschieden) from these other forms of intellectual activity.58 
The word "positive" is derived from the Latin positus, and the less 
common positivus, and conveys the sense of something having been placed 
or given, of something having been "put there". In more familiar usage, we 
know that "positive law" is contrasted with natural law, natural justice and 
natural rights. 59 The importance of natural law is its universal applicability. 
For example, it has been thought there was some kind of natural taboo 
against incest, and the validity of this universal law does not depend upon 
whether individual communities spell this out in formal statutes or not. The 
appeal to natural justice is based on the view 
that there are certain unchanging laws which pertain to man's nature, 
which can be discovered by reason, and to which man-made laws 
should conform. 60 
The crucial thing about natural law and natural justice is its freedom from 
any particular historical enactment or formulation. It is thus possible to think 
about natural law or natural justice without reference to particular individ-
uals, particular statutes, or even particular societies. Indeed, individual 
positive laws might then be judged by the extent to which they instantiate 
and conform to the natural law which can be discovered by reason, as it 
analyses human nature. Already it will be clear that positive theology, 
mutatis mutandis, must be understood in contrast with the natural theology 
and natural religion which Schleiermacher utterly repudiates. High-falutin 
thinking about religion in general is what Schleiermacher wishes to exorcise 
entirely from his dogmatic theology. 
As the theory of positive law develops, especially in the writings of 
Hans Kelsen, its chief exponent, we learn to distinguish clearly and decisive-
ly between a natural law based on "pure reason"61 or "the nature of man":62 
and positive law which is "always the law of a definite community" .63 
Positive laws are the laws actually "laid down" by monarchs, sovereign 
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bodies or communities of men and women,64 and it is wrong to judge them 
as more or less imperfect copies of a "transcendental idea". Positive law 
refers to the actual, concrete laws established or enacted and understands 
itself as totally distinct from "metaphysical jurisprudence",65 which is based 
on "ideal" or moral considerations at best, and speculation at worst. 
The application of all of this for Schleiermacher' s understanding of 
positive theology is obvious. His theology cannot be concerned with the 
scientific representation of the tenets of natural religion, since there is no 
"natural church'.66 in which such a religion could be anchored. His positive 
theology is entirely concerned with what he calls "bestimmte Religion", the 
definite or particular religion which is concretely historical. 
The beauty of this word "positive" is that it can be understood to have 
so many opposites. In its root sense, the opposite of the positive is the natural. 
But a second form of opposition to the positive is the speculative. This sense 
is nicely conveyed in The Oxford English Dictionary, where an alternative 
definition of the positive is "having relation only to matters of fact. .. actual, 
real; sensible, concrete". What is positive is therefore "practical, realistic; not 
speculative or theoretical".67 This second explanation of the "positive" is a 
suitable complement to Schleiermacher's positive theology. 
But there is a third, related understanding of the positive, whose 
opposite is, of course, the negative. This use of the positive has a striking 
philosophical provenance. Significantly, Friedrich Schelling's formulation 
of his "positive philosophy" is a reaction to what he regards as the emptiness 
of Hegel's concept (Begrifft which excludes all empirical reality.68 Sum-
moned to Berlin in 1841, Schelling was able from Hegel's own chair to 
demonstrate the shortcomings of "negative" idealism. Hegelian logic is only 
able to think about the a priori conditions of existence, it can never make the 
transition to existence itself.69 This "negative" philosophy proceeds entirely 
in the realm of possibility or potentiality (Moglichkeit), and everything is 
known by it in "pure thought", independent of all existence?0 This philo-
sophy is negative because it is "abstract", in the precise sense of that word. 
It "separates out" what is universal from the historically contingent,71 and 
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thereby this philosophy transforms reality into a conceptual possibility.72 
The positive philosophy, by way of contrast, proceeds from existence: it 
begins with what is real. 73 
Hegel's speculations are idle, because they can never become concrete, 
they can never come down to earth. His concept is "negative", because it 
must remain lifeless. This application of positive and negative to philosophy 
is first mooted by Schleiermacher's mentor Jacobi. A famous formula of his 
reads: 
In nature, in reality and truth generally, everything is positive. In 
understanding and its possibilities, everything is negative, for in the 
understanding everythin~ is found in concepts, and the most universal 
are always the emptiest? 
Having enlarged our understanding of "the positive" to include all 
three related opposites, we need to return to the question of "positive law". 
The real issue is the application and interpretation of positive law by the 
judiciary. "Legal positivism" tries to bind the legal community to the law as 
it is, without reference to justice (for Hans Kelsen, "an irrational ideal"75), or 
the law as it ought to be?6 Judgements, then, are to be passed solely on the 
basis of posited law, without reference to ideal or moral considerations. 77 In 
this way, legal positivism shuts the door on any speculative manoeuvres by 
either judges or lawyers, since no revision of the law in the light of some 
higher or deeper insight is possible. In Kelsen' s view, there is no higher court 
of appeal, as "the transcendent" is beyond experience, "unknowable, uncon-
trollable, and therefore a scientifically useless hypothesis". 78 In just the same 
way, positive theology is the endeavour to restrict the discussion of Chris-
tianity to the concrete, historical religion without "speculative" judgements 
as to what it ought to be. 
Contemporaneously with this transformation of theology into a posi-
tive science, a last attempt was being made in Schleiermacher's own univer-
sity to preserve theology for speculative reason. It is therefore not without 
interest that in Hegel's so-called "early theological writings" the "positivity" 
of religion was not embraced enthusiastically. Because "the positive" sug-
gested something laid down, the implication seemed to be that religion was 
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something external and derived exclusively from authority. Thus Jesus 
himself is seen as the foe of the legal "positivity" of the Pharisees. 79 Remem-
ber that the various senses of "the positive" convey something concrete, 
objective, real and fixed. With this in mind, we can see how a distinction 
arises between "a positive religion of the letter-subservience to authority-
and a true religion of the Spirit".80 While Hegel's more mature philosophy 
learned to value the "positive" character of Christianity,81 it is nonetheless 
true that the "speculative" work of the Hegelian system is the transformation 
of the externality of religious content into the inward life of the Spirit.82 
Ironically, here, once again, we discover that Hegel and Schleier-
macher are not so very far apart. Despite Schleiermacher' s firm insistence 
on the "positive" character of his science, it will emerge in our reading of the 
Glaubenslehre that the "positivity" of the Christian tradition is not given 
greater weight than the needs of the contemporary human spirit. Many 
aspects of the historical teaching of the concrete, Christian tradition are 
transformed, in the Glaubenslehre in the light of what Schleiermacher per-
ceives to be the needs of the present. Schleiermacher wants to construct a 
Christian dogmatics which does not offer any scope for a calamitous quarrel 
with contemporary culture.83 When we state this thesis more fully, we shall 
want to return to the question whether Schleiermacher' s science of theology 
is primarily practical or theoretical. 
In a recent study, Hans-Joachim Birkner, the chief editor of Schleier-
macher' s collected works, has asserted that Schleiermacher did not consider 
his dogmatic theology a practical undertaking. The purpose of his Glaubens-
lehre is instead a historical comprehension of the present state of Chris-
tianity. 84 Furthermore, Birkner claims that the Glaubenslehre does not present 
us with "a system of dogmas"; in his Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher "renders 
an account" of the faith,85 as he discovers it. Birkner's article (in which he 
contrasts Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre with the theology of Troeltsch) 
seems to fly in the face of most of what we have been trying to establish in 
this chapter. But we need to ask whether the Glaubenslehre can really be a 
descriptive, historical document. At the very least, Schleiermacher assures 
95 
Chapter Two: 
Positive Theology: Systematic and Practical 
us that the Glaubenslehre is presenting us with a "science", which means the 
historical material must appear in a systematic order (im Zusammenhange 
dargestellt), so that the parts of the discipline properly cohere. The Glaubens-
lehre, then, cannot be purely descriptive. 
Birkner shies away from the practical implications of the Glaubenslehre 
because of his reading of the Kurze Darstellung. In Schleiermacher' s encyclo-
pedia, dogmatic theology is classified as the third instance of historical 
theology; it follows the study of Christian origins ("exegetical theology") and 
church history proper. Historical theology, as a whole, takes its "organiza-
tion" from philosophical theology (the root);86 dogmatic theology (as "the 
knowledge of doctrine that now has currency" in the Protestant Church87) 
forms the immediate bridge to practical theology (the crown).88 Historical 
theology is distinguished from both its antecedent and its successor (logi-
cally speaking), because these divisions of theology are "immediately" con-
cerned with application (Ausiibung); historical theology is "purely" (rein) a 
matter of reflection (Betrachtung).89 -
The "purity" of this reflection (Birkner's careful argument speaks of 
Rechenschaft) is endangered by three considerations; i) Schleiermacher' s 
Kurze Darstellung informs us that there is an ambiguity in the attempt strictly 
to divide the theoretical from the practicai.90 ii) §196 of the theological 
encyclopedia asserts: 
A dogmatic treatment of doctrine is not possible without personal 
conviction [eigne ilberzeugung], nor is it necessary that all treatments 
which relate to the same period of the same Chur~h community [Kir-
chengemeinschaft] should agree among themselves. 1 
To put our objection mildly, this conception of a dogmatic treatment of 
doctrine which depends upon "personal conviction" and can yield "differ-
ent" interpretations "side by side"92 suggests a peculiar, if not idiosyncratic 
understanding of Wissenschaft. iii) The fact that doctrine as a "theological 
discipline" is so absolutely tied to the Christian Church, that it ceases to be 
"theological" without this connection,93 hardly gives us the impression of a 
detached and disinterested scientific scrutiny of Christian doctrine. As 
numerous statements in the Kurze Darstellung confirm, the whole theological 
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enterprise is undertaken with the leadership of the Church in mind.94 
Indeed, Schleiermacher (in his discussion of Church "statistics", the study of 
the social condition of the Church95) will go so far as to say 
A detailed inquiry into the present condition of Christianity that does 
not proceed from ecclesial interest or assume any relation to Church 
leadership could produce only an uncritical collection of information 
[ein unkritisches Sammelwerk], especially if it is also pursued in a non-
scientific spirit. The more scientific its character, however, the more 
sceptical or polemical it would tend to become. 
On account of the nature of the subject, the impetus cannot 
originate from a purely scientific interest.96 
This discussion of Church "statistics"-a companion study to dogmatic 
theology, which also yields "historical knowledge of the present condition 
of Christianity"97-makes it clear that theological "science" has a strongly 
partial origin. There is even a hint there that disinterested observation is 
capable of nothing more disciplined than an "aggregate". The understanding 
of theory implied in these considerations is highly individual. 
In a sense, the object of this dissertaion is the attempt to discover how 
Schleiermacher' s "philosophical dilettantism"98 actually informs his dog-
matic theology, and, specifically, how it informs his Glaubenslehre. Schleier-
macher would question the legitimacy of any such investigation on two 
grounds: first, 
it is neither necessary nor profitable to know which philosophical 
system a theologian adh~res to, so long as his language is correct and 
self-consistently formed. 9 
Secondly, the investigation is irrelevant in Schleiermacher's case, as, what-
ever his philosophical views might be, he has not deviated from his "maxim" 
in the Glaubenslehre-those views have not been allowed to exercise any 
influence over its content.100 
The deft way in which Schleiermacher disarms his critics in advance 
instils admiration. Theology is a discipline which must be referred to the 
Church and its government, and it can only be pursued on the basis of 
personal commitment. Additionally, the question of how theology and 
philosophy might coexist in harmonious relation to one another is "absolute-
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ly personal", and it is therefore presumably not a suitable topic for scientific 
scrutiny. And yet we are unable to ascribe to the "authorized" testimony that 
Schleiermacher's dogmatics had for its stated purpose simply to inter-
rogate and to describe the rel!fiious sensibility common to all devout 
Christians, himself included.1 
Any treatment of Christian dogmatics which can be described as "divinatory 
heterodoxy"102 is not exhaustively summarized by the innocuous word 
"empirical".103 
The real challenge is provided by Schleiermacher's introduction to his 
Glaubenslehre, which certainly troubled his contemporary critics, and which 
was completely rewritten in the second edition to reiterate that his dogmatic 
theology was not a species of philosophy and did not rest upon "a specula-
tive foundation". 104 What the "authorized" interpretation demands is that 
we accept his introduction as nothing more than an "Ortsbesimmung", i.e., 
a purely formal placement of Christianity "among the various possible 
modifications of the religious consciousness".105 This means that proposi-
tions borrowed (A:TUJ.fJ.a'ta)106 from "Ethik", philosophy of religion, and 
apologetics have no material effect on the content of his doctrinal theology. 
"Ethik" would seem to be an absolute pre-condition for Schleiermacher's 
theology, since it provides "the general concept of church" (der allgemeine 
Begriff der Kirche)107 without which his science could not be called theology. 
Indeed, we are told by Hans-Joachim Birkner that "Ethik" is the fundamental 
"speculative" science for all disciplines which deal with human history. As 
"Ethik" is, therefore, also the primary science for theology in all its divi-
sions,108 we discover in it the speculative basis for dogmatic theology's 
empirical activity. 
In his Open Letters, Schleiermacher claims that his new introduction to 
the Glaubenslehre will provide the reader with some precise indication of the 
meaning of his terms.109 Following that lead, we shall now make our own 
attempt to provide a glossary of the designations which identify the assorted 
disciplines surrounding the Glaubenslehre: Dialektik, Ethik, philosophical 
theology and philosophy of religion, Apologetik are all in some sense anterior 
to the Glaubenslehre, as are exegetical theology and church history. Kirchliche 
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Statistik, christliche Sittenlehre, practical theology are in some sense posterior 
disciplines. In a bid to be fair to Schleiermacher, we shall try to clarify this 
bewildering series of disciplines, in order to reveal the Glaubenslehre stand-
ing its own ground, unsullied by the philosophical implications which this 
constellation of disciplines raises. 
Dialektik is one of the three main divisions of philosophy which also include 
Physik and Ethik. But it is the highest of these three disciplines because of its 
endeavour to discuss the transcendental pre-conditions of all knowledge.110 
In Schleiermacher' s own words, Dialektik must contain the principles of 
philosophizing.111 It is his theory of thinking and knowing, and it functions 
as "organon and criterion" for all individual segments of human know-
ledge.112 We note with special interest that Dialektik is to restore the classical 
unity of logic and metaphysics which has been obscured since antiquity.113 
Schleiermacher prepared an introduction to his Dialektikfor publication, and 
there we find this authoritative definition: Dialektik establishes the principles 
for expert (kunstmiiflig) discourse in the realm of pure thought.114 
In the more particular context of the Glaubenslehre, Dialektik refers less 
to principles of philosophy than principles of rhetoric. This makes sense of 
Schleiermacher' s claim to employ Dialektik after the manner of Greek philo-
sophy, i.e., it is a rhetorical discipline. Inasmuch as Dialektik develops "the 
principles and rules" which govern genuine thought (richtiges Denken),115 it 
is a Kunst or a techne or a skill which can be acquired with practice. This is 
neatly conveyed in the manuscript of the lectures for 1811, where we can 
discover the following untranslatable formula: 
Dialektik = Kunst des Gedankenwechsels, Kunst mit einem andem in 
einer regelmaf5igen Construktion der Gedanken zu bleiben, woraus ein 
Wissen hervorgeht.116 
In §16.1 of the Glaubenslehre "dialectical" is understood as equivalent to the 
logical, and in §28, the dialectical character of its language is, with its 
systematic arrangement, one of the two conditions which con.fu-m dogmatic 
theology as a "science". (The language [Sprache] of the Glaubenslehre must be 
dialectically formed [§28.2], and its "dialectical language and systematic 
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arrangement require one another, and ... promote one another".) In my view, 
the discussion of this in Glaubenslehre1 is clearer: one speaks Kunstgerecht 
(according to the rules, i.e., dialectically) in order to express and communi-
cate knowledge.117 
While the division of dogmatic theology from philosophy can never 
extend to the point where exact philosophical language is just abandoned, 
the Glaubenslehre must nonetheless ensure that, in its employment of philo-
sophical language, philosophy does not become the secret mistress and 
judge in matters theological. Theology without Dialektik can at best be the 
popularizing of the conclusions achieved by the science of theology, which 
is identified by its systematic order and exactitude of language. 
VI. Whereas Dialektik offers the formal structure of pure thought without actual 
Physik content, Physik and Ethik are "real sciences" which divide our speculative 
knowledge into a knowledge based on nature (Physik) and a knowledge 
based on reason (Ethik).118 To speak more precisely, the sciences based on 
nature should be divided into a speculative Physik and an empirical natural 
science, and the knowledge based on reason should be divided between a 
speculative Ethik and an empirical historical science. Hans-Joachim Birkner 
speaks here of a quadrant of parallel "real" sciences, humane and natural, 
which in tum are each divided into speculative and empirical compo-
nents.119 
This then is how Schleiermacher appropriates the "classical" divisions 
of philosophy:120 Dialektik treats the "presuppositions, boundaries, struc-
tures" and the possible combinations of pure thought, 121 whereas Physik and 
Ethik operate within the realm of "real" knowledge, 122 albeit in a speculative 
fashion. It is peculiarly characteristic of Schleiermacher that this distinction 
between Physik and Ethik, between the knowledge of nature and reason, 
must not be regarded as absolute, but more exactly as two sides of the same 
coin; this enigmatic formulation is completely typical: ''Und wahrhaft philo-
sophisch ist nur jedes ethische Wissen, insofem es zugleich physisch, und 
jedes physische, insofem es zugleich ethisch ist."123 How are we to under-
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stand this, if not as a kind of residual "scholasticism" governed by the great 
maxim, "distinguish in order to unite"? The philosophical truth is never 
either reason or nature, thought or being, subject or object, but always the 
affirmation of both together (even as we distinguish them). This follows the 
highest principle of "dialectical" thought, that just because we do distinguish 
them, we know that they belong together. All of this somehow points back 
to "der hochste Gegensatz" of Schleiermacher's Dialektik, not the contradic-
tion, but the contradistinction of ideal and real. (We need to understand 
"Gegensatz" in this context as the original difference or distinction.)124 Once 
we have asserted that Physik belongs more to the "real" side and Ethik more 
to the "ideal" side of this equation,125 our discussion of Physik is at an end. 
Schleiermacher did not (again in contrast to Hegel) develop the "philosophy 
of nature" that more precision would require. 
VII. In a letter to Karl Heinrich Sack in March 1816, Schleiermacher suggested 
Ethik that a few years of uninterrupted good health should make possible the 
publication of his Ethik, his dogmatic theology, and his Dialektik in quick 
succession.126 At the end of his life, Schleiermacher still hoped to be able to 
publish his Dialektik and his "christliche Moral" in some form-not now in 
as full a version as his Glaubenslehre, but perhaps in the more propositional 
form of his "encyclopedia".127 His Ethik is not mentioned. Although Schleier-
macher lectured frequently on Ethik throughout his career, it is hard to 
suppress the feeling that his actual doctrine of Ethik never achieved the 
coherence that publication would require.128 Even the name of this disci-
pline is bound to confuse an English reader: variously known as Ethik, 
philosophische Ethik, and Sittenlehre, this discipline is poorly served by the 
usual translation of "ethics". While not totally unrelated to the study of 
"ethics", as we understand it, this designation is too restrictive for what 
Schleiermacher has in mind. 
Let us try to give some flesh to this elusive concept: it is a "Grundwis-
senschaft"-a fundamental or "foundational" science-for all the humane 
sciences.129 It is the "science of the principles of history"130 and therefore 
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essential for dogmatic theology understood as a subsection of "historical 
theology". Although not itself a historical science, Ethik is crucial for the 
study of history, because in it history is understood as the material effect of 
the activity of human reason upon nature.131 Ethik assumes a more familiar 
disposition when in Schleiermacher's writings it divides into his tenets 
concerning the good, virtue and duty.132 Obviously, pride of place goes to 
his doctrine of the highest good (summum bonum)}33 which is the "organic 
connection" of all (lesser) goods, so that the whole of ethical life finds its 
expression under the concept of the good.134 It is exceptionally important 
to note that Schleiermacher' s Giiterlehre cannot be translated as his "doctrine 
of property"135 without severely misleading the reader. This mistranslation 
does, however, have the merit of exposing the confusion which surrounds 
Schleiermacher's Ethikin English-language scholarship. The "goods" which 
Schleiermacher wishes to bring under the purview of the "highest good" are 
all those things which have come to be through "ethical activity"136-that is 
to say, through the action of human reason upon nature. While these goods 
might indeed be "property" (Eigentum), realized through the "productive" 
side of reason's activity, there is also a "creative"137 activity of reason which 
gives rise to language, art and religion. If this production or creation is 
studied in its communal aspect}38 then we see how Schleiermacher's Ethik 
moves to a discussion of family, state, and church. For this reason Stephen 
Sykes has referred to Schleiermacher's Ethik as offering "a particular kind of 
(non-reductive) sociology of religion", when it is read in conjunction with 
his Glaubenslehre.139 This will be a useful tag for our future discussion of the 
use of Ethik in dogmatic theology, as long as the reader is absolutely clear 
that Schleiermacher's Ethik is not a science restricted either to the study of 
religion or institutions. It will by now be evident why the translation "ethics" 
is so misleading: Schleiermacher's Sittenlehre is not a practical doctrine of 
morals, but if anything a speculative teaching about customs (the Latin 
mores) or culture.140 His Ethik does not offer the reader injunctions (Gebote) 
but renders an account of the totality of the real activity of reason upon 
nature.141 
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Schleiermacher's student, friend and successor at the University of 
Berlin, August Twesten, brought out a version of the Ethik in 1841. In the 
introduction to this edition, Twesten suggests that Schleiermacher has suc-
ceeded in giving the concept of "goods" (Guterbegrif/) a completely new 
meaning, whereby legal relationships and communication, language and 
science, religion and art, family, state and church can all be described as 
"goods" realized by the action of human reason.142 In light of this univer-
sality of Schleiermacher's Ethik, it is possible to make sense of Twesten's 
extraordinary comparison of this work (not published by Schleiermacher) 
with Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. 143 And this comparison also has the 
effect of highlighting the "speculative" character of this science: his philos-
ophische Sittenlehre is not about what man ought to do, but rather it is about 
what reason has done. With the help of the Ethik, the student of history will 
be able to see that human progress is not "a play of chance", but that it 
requires the necessary development of institutions (including church com-
munities). Without this insight all possibility of "a science of the spirit" is 
destroyed.144 
Here we encounter a conundrum: Schleiermacher' s philosophische Ethik, 
a speculative knowledge of the effects of reason}45 can provide the theo-
logian with the concept of "church"-one form of reason's self-expression. 
And yet, the common "consciousness" by which the members of a church 
can actually be identified must not be regarded as an expression of this 
selfsame reason. Anything which has its origins in reason or philosophy is 
not suitable material for the Christian theologian: "was aber aus Vernunft 
und Philosophie geschopft ist, kann nicht christliche Theologie sein." 146 This 
leaves us in the odd position of developing the concept of "church" specu-
latively, while we simultaneously affirm that what binds a church together, 
its beliefs and its doctrines (which are reflected forms of those same beliefs) 
is not an "activity of reason". This peculiar conclusion is an excellent illus-
tration of the point of conflict between Hegel and Schleiermacher-a conflict 
which can only intensify when we examine what Schleiermacher means by 
"philosophy of religion" (Religionsphilosophie). 
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VIII. Of no small consequence is the distinction that Schleiermacher makes be-
Religions- tween Religionsphilosophie and philosophical theology (philosophische Theo-
philosophie 
Iogie), which should not be confused and must not be taken as identical. 
Allegedly, philosophical theology, a subdivision of Christian theology, takes 
its orientation from Religionsphilosophie and what it has established about 
Christianity.147 This hierarchy is preserved in the Glaubenslehre, where the 
propositions borrowed from Religionsphilosophie follow directly upon the 
propositions borrowed from Ethik. 
In his Ethik (1812/13), Schleiermacher defines Religionsphilosophie as 
that "critical discipline" which fixes the individual difference of each 
"church" (Kirche) in a comparative framework.148 This relatively straightfor-
ward definition remains intact in the Glaubenslehre and in the Kurze Darstel-
lung}49 except that in §2.2 of the Glaubenslehre, this critical discipline is 
identified as "a special branch of historical science" (wissenschaftliche Ge-
schichtskunde), the principles of which are taken from Ethik.150 The excep-
tionally important function of the Religionsphilosophie is to employ the 
speculative insight gained from Ethik in its understanding of the historical 
appearance of the positive religions. Religionsphilosophie compares the reli-
gions and identifies their differences.151 Sykes has neatly summarized the 
work of Religionsphilosophie as "the categorization according to type of the 
different religions" and has suggested "comparative religion" and "phenom-
enology of religion" as disciplines not unrelated in their intention. Schleier-
macher realizes that this is not how the term Religionsphilosophieis common! y 
understood.152 Indeed, if we emphasize the "historical" nature of this disci-
pline, we might be left to wonder how it is "philosophy" at all. 
While the function of the Religionsphilosophie for the Glaubenslehre is 
clear enough from the preceding, we must not be tempted to skate over what 
Schleiermacher means by calling it a "critical discipline". This, unhappily, is 
more complicated. Critical disciplines [aesthetics is another example men-
tioned in the Ethik (1812/13)153] identify positive phenomena which can 
neither be constructed speculatively (i.e., rein wissenschaftlich)}54 nor can 
they be grasped in a purely empirical manner.155 This is very tidy, because 
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it suggests that in our move from Ethik to Religionsphilosophie we proceed 
from speculation to concrete empirical reality by means of epistemological 
steps: a critical discipline is not yet purely historical. Somehow, critical 
disciplines relate the speculative and the empirical realities, which Schleier-
macher does not regard as simply contiguous.156 Schleiermacher' s untrans-
latable German tells us: "Das untersuchende oder kritische ist die 
weltweisheitliche Beziehung des Beschaulichen und Erfahrungsmaf5igen 
auf einander. "157 ("Das Beschauliche" is obviously a reference to conceptual 
reality, whereas "das Erfahrungsmagige" lies on the side of empirical 
reality.) 
The important thing to note here is how "the critical" is bound up with 
Weltweisheit, a term which is given the uncomplicated translation "philo-
sophy" in The Christian Faith.l58 However, this too has the status of a 
technical term. In the Ethik, 159 the "idea" of Weltweisheit is the complete 
interpenetration of the ethical and the "physical" (des ethischen und physischen 
ordesbeschaulichen undempirischen). And the Dialektik(1814/15) confirms that 
this mutual interpenetration of the speculative and the empirical is "die 
wahre reale Weltweisheit": this makes it the genuine heart of the philosop-
hical enterprise ("der eigentlich gesuchte Begriff von Philosophie").160 The 
representation of this mutual interpenetration is the task of scientific criti-
cism (wissenschaftliche Kritik), and the Ethik adds the clarification that the 
Hellenic name <j)tA.oa<>q,ux applies where the two tracks, the "physical" and 
the ethical, are still being pursued separately-side by side, as it were; by 
contrast, the German Weltweisheit signals the attempt to grasp the world 
through their interpenetration.161 This is characteristic of Schleiermacher: 
Religionsphilosophieproceeds by a critical method in which there is a constant 
back and forth between the empirical reality and its corresponding specu-
lative idea: the comparison of the one to the other, even as they draw closer 
together, supplies this discipline with its distinctive form of knowledge 
(Erkenntnis). 162 Schleiermacher's Ethik is of further assistance in explaining 
that the "critical disciplines" are suspended between history and Ethik, but 
that they are primarily dependent on speculation for their unity, 163 whereas 
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the "technical disciplines" (like pedagogy and practical theology) also float 
between experience and speculation but they receive their unity from the 
practical or empirical.164 
IX. Despite the precision of Schleiermacher's definition of Religionsphilosophie, 
Philosophical it makes no appearance in his published works or unpublished lectures apart 
Theology 
from §§7-10 of the introduction to his Glaubenslehre, and in a certain form in 
the last of his Speeches on Religion.165 In striking contrast, the whole first 
section of the Kurze Darstellung (§§32-68) is devoted to "philosophical theo-
logy", which we know from the first edition to be the root of theology as a 
whole.166 Both editions of Schleiermacher's encyclopedia confirm that 
philosophical theology is the apposite beginning for theological study.167 
Its priority is clearly affirmed in the first edition of the Kurze Darstellung, 
where Schleiermacher avails himself of the troublesome formula that phil-
osophical theology takes its standpoint outside of or above Christianity (iiber 
dem Christentum), whereas historical theology orients itself from within 
Christianity.168 The second edition makes this same point slightly more 
carefully by asserting that philosophical theology takes its point of depar-
ture from above Christianity "in the logical sense of the word" .169 This 
formula will come back to haunt Schleiermacher, and a similar sentiment in the 
first introduction to the Glaubenslehre170 is carefully excised in the second. 
Martin Redeker's comment on this expression is instructive and brings 
us to the very heart of this dissertation. Redeker asserts that the taking of a 
standpoint iiber dem Christentum "in order to define the specifically Chris-
tian" has only "a logical-theoretical meaning" and does not imply "transcend-
ing in the sense of overcoming".171 This is a particularly sensitive issue, 
because with it we again return to a more idealist conception of Religionsphila;ophie, 
and the common accusation that in Hegel's philosophy of religion there is 
an actual "overcoming" or supersession (Aufhebung) of the Christian religion: 
in Hegel's philosophy the standpoint taken "above" Christianity is not just 
"logical" but is one that the philosopher actually presumes to occupy. It is 
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essential to Schleiermacher's credibility, that he not be discovered in the 
same philosophical camp. 
From the perspective of this dissertation, the charge of Hegel's "super-
session" of Christianity is a gross distortion}72 but we remain keen to 
emphasize the extent to which Hegel and Schleiermacher appear to share a 
common methodology. We propose in this thesis to subject to rigorous 
scrutiny the suggestion that it is possible to stand above Christianity in only 
a logical, theoretical sense-without dire "idealist" pretensions. Stephen 
Sykes has attempted to show how this might be possible-in a discussion 
which could as easily apply to Hegel as to Schleiermacher. In reflecting upon 
Schleiermacher's definition of Christianity, Sykes asks: 
But what is a religion? In pressing this question on Schleiermacher ... we 
become aware of an interesting circularity in his argument; Christianity 
is indeed a religion, but religion is something described and perceived 
from the standpoint of Christianity.173 
As we have tried to argue earlier, Hegel's speculation is not an attempt 
"to overcome" Christianity but rather must be seen as the endeavour to be 
true to Christianity in precise, exacting and systematic thought. Should we 
want to make any other claim for Schleiermacher's philosophical theology? 
The problem may be that "in pressing this question upon Schleiermacher" 
(i.e., the precise nature of his philosophical theology), we might discover 
ourselves unable to affirm the empirical character of his Glaubenslehre with 
much conviction. In the division of his sciences, Religionsphilosophie orients 
itself towards the speculative, whereas something called "historical theo-
logy" must fall on the side of the empirical.174 Presumably a discipline 
identified as philosophical theology will also tend towards the speculative, 
and we shall in time come to question the justice of his relegation of the 
Glaubenslehre to a division of historical theology. 
But what exactly is the role of philosophical theology within Schleier-
macher's systematic classification of the theological disciplines? First, we 
know that it provides both exegetical and dogmatic theology with the 
concepts which they need if they are to proceed as sciences.175 More par-
ticularly, its function (of special significance for the Glaubenslehre) is to 
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develop a definition of the "essence of Christianity", and specifically "das 
Wesen des Christen turns, wodurch es eine eigentiimliche Glaubensweise ist, 
zur Darstellung zu bringen".176 Please note the use of the word Darstellung 
here: as it is the job of philosophical theology "das Wesen des Christen turns 
darzustellen", so it is the job of the Glaubenslehre "den christlichen Glauben 
darzustellen". 
Philosophical theology is also a critical discipline, since it hangs sus-
pended between the purely scientific and the strictly empirical: the essence 
of Christianity can neither be deduced speculatively nor comprehended 
empirically.177 Despite what has been mooted above, philosophical theo-
logy is supposedly distinguished from Religionsphilosophie in that it is less 
speculative and more "earthed". In its scientific constitution, it has the 
character of Kritik, but in view of its object (positive, historical Christianity), 
it adopts the mode of "geschichtskundliche Kritik".178 This is a very import-
ant proviso, since Geschichtskunde is yet another Schleiermacherian technic~! 
term: it forms a contrasting pair together with Ethik: whereas Ethik is the 
"science of the principles of history", Geschichtskunde is the actual empirical 
study which we might recognize under the term "history" itself.179 We 
should pay careful attention to Schleiermacher's gradual weakening of the 
philosophical component in both Religionsphilosophie and philosophical 
theology.180 The next proposition of the Kurze Darstellung (§38) shows why 
this is required: as a theological discipline, philosophical theology "must be 
determined by its relation to Church leadership".181 
The cogency of the definition offered is not enhanced by the discovery 
that philosophical theology does in fact stand in the same relation to histori-
cal theology as Ethik does to Geschichtskunde. §65 asserts: 
Die philosophische Theologie setzt zwar den Stoff der historischen als 
bekannt voraus, begriindet aber selbst erst die eigentlich geschichtliche 
Anschauung des Christentums.182 
The Kurze Darstellung next enunciates one of Schleiermacher's most cher-
ished formulas: every theologian must produce a pllilosophical theolog-y for 
him- or herself (ganz filr sich selbst).183 Here we are bound to raise the same 
question that troubled us above (p. 96): what conception of philosophy 
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underlies a philosophical theology which is purely individual, something 
which each person works out for himself or herself? The issue comes to a 
head in this oft-cited §67: each individual's philosophical theology "essen-
tially includes within it the principles" of that individual's "whole theologi-
cal way of thinking" (wesentlich die Prinzipien seiner gesamten theologischen 
Denkungsart in sich schliefit). Can this really be the appropriate foundation 
for a "dogmatic theology" which is supposed to stand on its own "proper 
ground and soil with the same assurance with which philosophy [die 
Weltweisheit] has so long stood upon its own"?184 Surely my readers will 
share my perplexity in discovering that "philosophical theology" is Schleier-
macher' s means of handing on "Luther's legacy of a theological theology" to 
posterity.185 Schleiermacher's "philosophical theology" provides the theo-
logian with the theological, not the philosophical, format of his whole "way of 
thinking". Is this not a most remarkable example of philosophy's status as 
ancilla theologiae? Philosophy and theology are subject to a rigorous bisection 
in Schleiermacher's classification of the sciences, and yet he has here found 
a form of "philosophy" utterly subservient to the needs of the theologian.186 
I do not think it is misguided to speak in terms of Schleiermacher' s attempt 
to establish a "theological theology", but it may be that the crucial difference 
between Luther and Schleiermacher on this matter is that Luther did not in 
any sense produce what we might call a "systematic theology". The issue is 
aptly summarized by Sykes: 
Philosophical theology, in short, is the focus of different interests, which 
may conflict, though it is the duty of the theologian to make them 
harmonize. Phil¥sopher and theologian are here to be unified in the 
systematician.18 
It would not be inappropriate to regard the rest of this dissertation as 
an extended comment on this rather enigmatic unification of philosophy and 
theology. Presumably, "systematician" is a way of designating the "system-
atic theologian", the individual who crafts the interconnected dogmas of the 
Christian religion into a science through the application of the common 
principles of reason, 188 but is it necessary to assume that this "systematic" 
work occurs only on the side of theology? Why may the "systematician" not 
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be a philosopher (someone for whom philosophy is not just a tool) who 
forges the dogmas of the Christian religion into a system "speculatively"-as 
was being done by Schleiermacher's colleagues at the University of Berlin 
(and in his own theological faculty)?189 Schleiermacher's very use of the 
term "philosophical theology" (a kind of oxymoron, if I understand him 
correctly) suggests a deeper puzzle that remains to be explored. 
Whatever "philosophical theology" may turn out to be in the end, we 
must assume from the above that it provides the theologian with the 
principles which govern Christian theology as a science. If some such 
definition is acceptable in a preliminary way, then we might with justice 
regard the whole of Schleiermacher' s Introduction to the Glaubenslehre as a 
work of "philosophical theology"-in essence a "Fundamentaltheologie" 
following the Catholic tradition.190 This conclusion is immediately con-
troversial in the sense that, according to the Glaubenslehre, "philosophical 
theology" is apparently relegated to §§11-14 of the Introduction, and there 
restricted to a discussion of Apologetik (one of the two subdivisions of this 
discipline, along with Polemik). To my mind, it suits Schleiermacher's pur-
poses rather well to suppress the designation "philosophical theology" in his 
Introduction, even if what it represents is still a burning issue. As Hans-
Joachim Birkner rightly suggests: 
Da nun Ethik und Religionsphilosophie in Schleiermachers Wissen-
schaftssystematik als philosophische Disziplinen figurieren, scheint 
sich fiir das Phanomen der Lehnsatze die Formel anzubieten, daG in 
ihnen die Theologie eine philosophische Grundlegung emP.fange. Eine 
solche Formulierung ware jedoch ungenau, ja irrefiihrend.191 
Imagine the potential confusion, if the reader were also to be confronted with 
"philosophical theology" in Schleiermacher's Introduction! Birkner percep-
tively acknowledges Schleiermacher's "quasi privaten Definitionen" of all 
these disciplines and wonders if Schleiermacher has really achieved his 
intention of avoiding misconceptions thereby.192 Personally, I do not find 
Schleiermacher's restriction of "philosophical theology" to tame theological 
uses very convincing.193 And with the speculative tradition, in philosophy 
and theology, I maintain that the "philosophical" implications of this disci-
pline have not been exhausted. As yet we cannot be very sure of the 
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philosophical component in either Religionsphilosophieor "philosophical the-
ology". 
X. According to the Kurze Darstellung, both Apologetik and Polemik are con-
Apologetikund cemed with "an authentic representation [Darstellung] of the essence of 
Polemik 
Christianity" (in its Protestant expression for the benefit of Protestant 
Church leadership).194 They are distinguished by their orientation: the 
outward face of philosophical theology is manifested in Apologetik, while 
Polemik is the same discipline with an internal ecclesiastical function. 195 This 
means that Apologetik is used for the communication (Mitteilung) of the 
essence of Christianity to the community beyond the Church, while Polemik 
enables the Church leadership to bring to light "deviations" from, and 
"diseased" expressions of, this essence: the neglect of these "deviations" 
threatens the bond (die zusammenhaltende Richtung), by which the Church is 
"held together".196 Whereas Apologetik has as its chief object to show how 
the Church maintains "the unity of its essence" in and through historical 
change}97 Polemik has, for the Church leadership, the more immediately 
practical obligation of helping it to recognize and cope with heresy and 
schism, actual and potential. The Church leadership must be able to discover 
those aspects of its doctrine and polity which threaten to contradict or 
dissolve the essence of Christianity, 198 as this is established in "philosophical 
theology". 
The Glaubenslehre does not mention any "borrowed propositions" from 
Polemik, yet they do seem to appear in §§21 & 22 of the introduction, where 
the natural heresies which threaten the "distinctive essence of Chris-
tianity"199 are discussed. This is an anomaly of exceptional significance 
since, to my mind, it puts paid to Schleiermacher's cherished declaration 
that the introduction to the Glaubenslehre is not itself to be confused with 
"dogmatics";200 Schleiermacher's theological ancestors would have been 
surprised to learn that a discussion of the Pelagian heresy was not strictly 
speaking dogmatic theology! In §23 the "polemical" nature of Schleier-
macher's "philosophical theology" is given special prominence, as we are 
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informed that the Glaubenslehre cannot adopt an "indifferent" attitude with 
respect to the fundamental divisions in Christendom, between Greek East 
and Latin West, between Catholic and Reformed Christianity. This is again 
a mark of Schleiermacher' s very peculiar understanding of the philosophical 
component of his "philosophical theology"-whereas the "philosopher" 
strives in principle to see the truth of all positions, irrespective of personal 
commitments, Schleiermacher makes it incumbent upon the "philosophical 
theologian" to advance "the distinction" (Differenz) between Protestant and 
Catholic theology "as still valid", and to "profess" the confessional theology, 
to which any individual's representation (Darstellung) of Christian doctrine 
best conforms. This is apparently required if one wishes to remain "within 
the realm of Dogmatics". 201 The Glaubenslehre cannot proceed "indifferently" 
with respect to the great schism which arises out of the Protestant Reforma-
tion.202 
It is worth remarking that this systematic foundation for the Glaubens-
lehre by way of propositions borrowed from Ethik, Religionsphilosophie, and 
Apologetik reflects the structure and terminology of Schleiermacher' s (heav-
ily revised) Introduction to the second edition. There can be little doubt that 
the chief object of this revision was "to bring out the independence of 
dogmatics in relation to philosophic or other modes of nontheological 
reflection".203 This explains why the epithet "philosophical theology" would 
have been so inconvenient a usage, one which might easily perplex the 
reader. Nonetheless, we wish to maintain that both subdivisions of "philo-
sophical theology" (Apologetik and Polemik) make their appearance in the 
Introduction, and we applaud Professor Gerrish's refusal to adopt Schleier-
macher's legerdemain: Gerrish drops all pretence by speaking matter-of-
factly about "propositions borrowed from philosophical theology".204 
However, we still need to retrieve and reinstate Schleiermacher's use 
of the term Apologetik: if this discipline is really an attempt to discern the 
"continuity of what is essential in Christianity"205 in and through historical 
change, then it would not be misleading to regard the whole of the Glaubens-
lehre (and not just a portion of its Introduction) as a work of Apologetik. 
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Heinrich Scholz makes a suggestion like this when he talks of "die apologe-
tische Hal tung der Glaubenslehre". A necessary element of this "apologetic" 
stance is the critique of dogma (undertaken to root out what is "unclear, 
narrow and impure" in the religious representations [V orstellungen], as these 
have arisen from within Christianity itself).206 
We shall, of course, be returning to this crucial argument later in our 
dissertation; here we need only remark that a certain "philosophical" ele-
ment in Schleiermacher's Apologetik may be becoming discernible. If the 
Glaubenslehre does indeed contain "Kritik des Dogmas", then the purely 
"historical" understanding of theology seems somewhat fanciful. In a pecu-
liar way, Schleiermacher alerts us to the difficulty at his first mention of 
Apologetik (after the proposition to §2 of the Glaubenslehre). There he refers 
the reader to the first five propositions of Karl Heinrich Sack's Christliche 
Dogmatik of 1829. Sack's proposition to §3 announces: 
Die Quellen der Apologetik liegen in derjenigen Aufeinanderbezie-
hung der Philosophie und Geschichte, welche durch das christliche 
Glaubensleben zu bewirken ist. 
And the text of the proposition confirms that philosophy is indispensable 
"zur Erzeugung der Apologetik", since this discipline is supposed to be a 
construction (eine Auffassung) of the essence of the Christian religion. 207 If 
"apologetic" considerations extend into the body of the Glaubenslehre proper, 
then it would seem that the "philosophical" half of philosophical theology 
may yet reappear within the domain of dogmatic theology. In any case, we 
cannot take as settled that we have yet been offered a clear explanation of 
the relation of philosophy to theology within this crucial subspecies known 
as Apologetik. 208 
The transition from Religionsphilosophie and philosophical theology to his-
torical theology should correspond to the descent from Ethik to Geschichts-
kunde, as we now move completely away from the speculative to the 
empirical-apparent! y. The basic partition of historical theology is tripartite, 
where the knowledge of Christian origins is provided by exegetical theo-
logy, and the knowledge of the historical development of Christianity falls 
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under the auspices of what Schleiermacher calls "church history". The 
knowledge of the present state of Christianity is available jointly in the 
Glaubenslehre and Schleiermacher' s "kirchliche Statistik". 209 It is worth inter-
rupting our narrative to underline that, in Schleiermacher's account of 
exegetical theology, the study of the New Testament canon is a highly 
privileged discipline, since it offers "the original, and therefore for all times 
normative, presentation of Christianity".210 It also belongs to the very 
essence of Schleiermacher's continuing appeal that in the critical pursuit of 
this discipline 
the most pure, simple faith, and the keenest investigation are one and 
the same thing, inasmuch as no one can wish to believe illusions, 
whether old or new, whether of others or his own ... 211 
Schleiermacher offers an attractive sequence in which exegetical theo-
logy, church history, and dogmatic theology are made to run a kind of "relay 
race"
212 from primitive Christianity to the present; the sequence appears to 
confirm that Schleiermacher' s Glaubenslehre can be accepted as an empirical 
statement of the present condition of Christianity. Just as church history 
(understood as Geschichtskunde) is a description of the development of the 
church and its doctrine, so Glaubenslehre and kirchliche Statistik together 
provide the relevant contemporary description. As we study the doctrines 
of the past, so we study doctrines in the present. While it might be possible 
to conceive of such a purely descriptive "phenomenology" of the present 
state of doctrine in the church (in the form of a handbook or manual), the 
reader will not be surprised to discover my categorical denial of this apology 
for Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre. Since the rest of this dissertation is about 
the Glaubenslehre understood as "dogmatic theology", the further treatment 
of this matter need not detain us here, once we have noted that not a single 
major German theologian of the nineteenth century followed Schleier-
macher in regarding dogmatic theology as a subdivision of "historical 
theology".213 But we cannot proceed if we do not say at least a brief word 
about the three disciplines which are apparently posterior to dogmatics (in 
the scheme laid down in Schleiermacher's theological encyclopedia). 
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Kirchliche Statistik is another Schleiermacherian benefaction which sug-
gests a kind of ecclesiastical sociology or ecclesiastical polity; it examines a 
church's "inner constitution and its external relations". Among specific items 
mentioned, we find canon law, ecumenism, the relation of the church to the 
state and even the relation of the church to the academy.214 This last field of 
consideration brings kirchliche Statistik into its closest alignment with con-
temporary sociology: the church's relation to the university, the mass media, 
etc. 
In the general framework of Schleiermacher's encyclopedia, christliche Sit-
tenlehre is represented as a subsection of historical theology and as a com-
panion discipline (Nachbardisziplin) to the Glaubenslehre.215 Properly 
speaking, only these two disciplines together can deliver what we know as 
"dogmatic theology". Even so, the sketchy treatment we find in the Kurze 
Darstellung goes little beyond the information that the two disciplines are 
distinguished by the theory and praxis which are appropriate to Christian 
piety:216 as Christian piety generates certain states of consciousness, it 
generates in equal measure certain forms of activity (the proper subject-mat-
ter of christliche Sittenlehre). Schleiermacher is not satisfied that the distinc-
tion between the two forms of dogmatic theology is properly comprehended 
by separating out the theoretical from the practical, but he does concede that 
Glaubenslehre draws its terminology from that metaphysical discipline 
known as "rational theology". By contrast, the fountain-head of the christliche 
Sittenlehre may be discovered in the discussion of duty (Pflichtenlehre) in the 
philosophical Ethik.217 
It is difficult to untangle exactly how these three "posterior" disciplines 
relate to one another. On the one hand, dogmatic theology and kirchliche 
Statistik provide the "historical knowledge of the present condition of Chris-
tianity".218 (Schleiermacher lectured on Statistik in 1826/27, but his further 
reflections on this aspect of the theological syllabus are not available.)219 On 
the other hand, it is only in the confluence of Glaubenslehre and Sittenlehre 
that the discipline he calls "dogmatic theology" receives its proper embodi-
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ment. Hans-Joachim Birkner has rightly referred to the "meagreness" (Karg-
heit) of the discussion of Sittenlehre in the theological encyclopedia,220 but 
we can still proceed in just the way the Schleiermacher does in his Glaubens-
lehre. There (§3.4), he acknowledges the possibility of a pious knowing and 
a pious doing:221 pious self-consciousness has an appropriate form of 
thought and an appropriate form of action, so that Christian affections 
(Gemiitszustiinde) issue in propositions (Siitze) and activity (Tiitigkeit); §26 
makes it clear that the Glaubenslehre will only deal with the former. 
Significant assistance has been provided by Schleiermacher' s epigones, 
who edited his lectures on Sittenlehre and practical theology. The most 
striking feature of these posthumous editions is that they bear the same 
sub-title as that which Schleiermacher gave to his The Christian Faith, viz. 
"N ach den Grundsatzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange 
dargestellt".222 In systematic terms, practical theology is supposed to be the 
"crown"}23 the issue of philosophical theology and historical theology 
(including Glaubenslehre, Sittenlehre, and Statistik). This conclusion certainly 
tallies with the firm orientation of all theological enterprise as being in the 
service of church government, the consistent refrain of the Kurze Darstellung 
from its very first propositions. 
The practical theologian, like Schleiermacher's "prince of the church", unites 
an ecclesiastical interest with a scientific spirit.224 The necessity of this 
scientific spirit is stressed at the end of the Kurze Darstellung, where a 
complete and developed philosophical theology is said to be a pre-condition 
for the right determination of tasks in the field of church government. 225 The 
needs of the church at a local and at a universal level both fall within the 
remit of the practical theologian; the major division between Kirchendienst 
and Kirchenregiment which we find in Schleiermacher' s lectures (Parts I and 
IT) conforms to the separation of these levels.226 As we might expect, 
practical theology is concerned with the cure of souls,227 and the contents 
of this posthumous volume reflect the cure of souls in all its variety-with-
out neglecting the cult: sacraments, feast days, singing, etc. With the whole 
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of the theological undertaking geared in this way towards the practical 
needs and government of the Christian church, we have the ultimate justi-
fication of the first proposition of the Kurze Darstellung. There the positive 
science of Christian theology was taken up for the solution of a practical task: 
the discovery of that secure foundation of praxis in theory which Schleier-
macher proposed for the "positive faculties" at the University of Berlin as 
early as 1808. 
Our extended glossary has been an attempt accurate! y to fix the location of 
dogmatic theology within the whole complex of Schleiermacher's theologi-
cal disciplines, and more particularly to discover its relation to the specula-
tive, non-theological disciplines, viz. Dialektik, Ethik and philosophy 
generally. This effort is justified when we consider the breezy approach 
taken in some of the secondary literature. For instance, we might be told that 
Schleiermacher's philosophical theology is the connecting link (Bindeglied) 
between these two disciplines228-not a statement that this dissertation 
would be inclined to leave as an uncomplicated indicative! 
Our principal dispute with the "reception" of Schleiermacher is neatly 
summarized in the writings of Hans-Joachim Birkner, an outstanding and 
esteemed interpreter. He purports to discover in Schleiermacher's technical 
"nomenclature", that the relationship of philosophy and theology is not 
accorded the status of being a "fundamental" concern for this theologian.229 
In this judgement Birkner has remained perfectly consistent: a decade earlier 
than the statement above, Birkner was arguing that a careful reading of the 
Kurze Darstellung would reveal that the "general" question of the relation of 
philosophy and theology was not pertinent to the "specificity" of Schleier-
macher's position. The "only precise meaning" this question might have is 
in the polarity (das Gegeniiber) of speculation and history, of Ethik and 
Geschichtskunde, of philosophical theology and historical theology.230 A few 
pages later Birkner explains that, in accordance with Schleiermacher's schema 
of the scientific disciplines, dogmatic theology can "only" appear as a 
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"historical", and not as a speculative, discipline.231 Our dispute is not, and 
cannot be, with the ideology, the theory of this assessment; what we dispute 
is the practice,-the concrete realization-of which Schleiermacher's 
Glaubenslehre is the definitive expression. 
Birkner also draws our attention to the "curiosity" (Kuriosum) that 
"ethics" appears twice in the organon of Schleiermacher's theological sci-
ences: first as the philosophische Ethik which is the foundation for philosop-
hical theology and then again as the christliche Sittenlehre which is a 
subdivision of dogmatic theology.232 This is worth pursing, and we are 
fortunate to have the means of doing so. Schleiermacher delivered lectures 
on the Sittenlehre twelve times during his university career,233 and a post-
humous edition of these lectures appeared in 1843. We know that Schleier-
macher actually intended to bring about the publication of the Sittenlehre (as 
a companion to his Glaubenslehre) during his own lifetime, and that shortly 
before his death he commissioned his editor to complete the task. 234 As we 
might expect, Schleiermacher himself takes up the question of the two forms 
of "ethics" in the introduction to these lectures, and what he says there about 
the relation of the philosophical and theological Ethik (as the Sittenlehre is 
sometimes called) is a kind of emblem for the relation of philosophy and 
theology in his thought as a whole. 
Schleiermacher's argument runs like this: either the philosophical and 
theological Ethik are the same (gleich) or they are not. If they are the same in 
content, then one of the two is superfluous, and it would be "unscientific" to 
have two disciplines doing the job that one of them does adequately. But if 
they are genuinely different as regards content, then we are presented with 
the equally unpalatable alternative, that piety and philosophy are at vari-
ance with one another. The consequence would be that either the philosoph-
ical person could not be pious, or the pious individual could not be 
philosophical.235 Schleiermacher's total opposition to such a state of affairs 
is well known to us from his crucial reply to Jacobi in 1818.236 In the same 
vein, Schleiermacher would also reject the prospect suggested by Kant in his 
lectures on "moral philosophy", namely, that an individual might be an 
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atheist in theory (in the realm of pure speculation), but not in practice. 237 
The reader will already know that all such options are anathema to Schleier-
macher. 
If the two forms of Ethik are actually different in their content, then in 
order to maintain piety we shall have to say farewell (Lebewohl) to philo-
sophy. But this would, in fact, be disastrous for piety because it would also 
entail saying farewell to theology: the scientific presentation (die wissen-
schaftliche Darstellung) of theology depends on principles which can only be 
taken over from philosophy. (Schleiermacher is, as always, quick to add that 
this need for philosophical principles applies only to the form of theology's 
presentation, not its content.)238 The actual resolution of this dilemma is 
slightly opaque, even as it epitomizes what is distinctive in Schleiermacher' s 
thought: it is characteristic of both philosophy and religion that throughout 
their respective histories they have-as a plain matter of fact-generated 
their own ethical doctrines, from which we must "assume" that these two 
forms of "ethics" can stand side by side, even if the "how" of this parallel 
development eludes us. 239 Furthermore, it is an article of faith in the 
Schleiermacherian dispensation that these two doctrines, developed inde-
pendently of one another, must "in the end" have the same content, if the 
theologian is not to fall into hopeless self-contradiction-being required to 
perform and not to perform the same ethical action. 240 This is so typical of 
Schleiermacher's whole approach as to attain the rank of a "classical" state-
ment of his ideology. 
Schleiermacher's lectures on the Sittenlehre considerably enhance our 
grasp of this theological discipline: it is the representation (Darstellung) of 
the community with Christ inasmuch as this is the motive for Christian 
actions (Handlungen). It is a description of the mode of acting which arises 
from Christian religious self- consciousness. 241 Whereas the "dogmatic" task 
is the systematic description of religious affections (Gemiitszustlinde), the 
question posed in the Sittenlehre is what the religious self-consciousness 
must become and what must come to be through it.242 But none of this eases 
the conundrum of the two manifestations of the Ethik:243 it is immensely 
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difficult to see how a speculative discipline (which provides the foundation 
for dogmatic theology) can regard an empirical discipline (a subsection of 
dogmatic theology) as its counterpart. 
Martin Redeker would draw our attention to the lapidary assertion of 
1809 that the object of both forms of the Ethik is the same.244 This he explains 
with reference to §46 of the Glaubenslehre, which allows the world to be an 
object of divine creation for the religious self-consciousness, and nature to 
be an object for natural science-both forms of consciousness are trying to 
understand the same phenomenon, without thereby falling into contradic-
tion with one another. Mutatis mutandis, the object of the two forms of Ethik 
is the same, but "the mode of knowing is different": one is based on reason 
(Vernunft), and the other on revelation (Offenbarung).245 But this neat sum-
mary does not really address our overriding difficulty, which is how two 
forms of Wissenschaft, one speculative (as a form of Vernunfttiitigkeit)246, the 
other empirical, can possibly be regarded as equivalent? 
We are, in fact, deeply suspicious of the supposedly "empirical" char-
acter of Schleiermacher' s dogmatic theology. How could an empirical science 
possibly answer the question, what must be and what must come to be 
because of the existence of religious self-consciousnessr47 We also vigor-
ously challenge the supposedly "historical" character of Schleiermacher's 
Glaubenslehre. We shall see that it too has a strong component of what 
Christian dogmatic propositions ought to be and ought to become, if Christian 
self-consciousness is not to fall into ruinous conflict with modem science, 
both humane and natural. And this is how we should understand Schleier-
macher's repeated insistence upon a "divinatory" component in hiS dog-
matic theology. In his Kurze Darstellung, he writes: "A dogmatic presentation 
is the more complete as it possesses alongside its assertory character a 
divinatory character as well."248 If Schleiermacher's theology is to have a 
"prophetic" ingredient,249 then we can begin to see how the speculative can 
begin to "creep"250 its way into this allegedly "empirical" science. 
Wherever we turn in our study of Schleiermacher, we are constantly 
stopped short by his great hallmark: disciplines with quite different methods 
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sharing a common subject-matter, but doing so without coming into conflict 
with one another. Hans-Joachim Birkner confirms that Schleiermacher's 
Sittenlehre has the "whole realm of human activity" as its object, just as the 
philosophical Ethik does. 251 But whereas Schleiermacher ascribes to the Ethik 
"a purely speculative tendency", the Sittenlehre is characterized by a "com-
pletely practical" orientation.252 What undermines their parallelism is that 
the theological Ethik must borrow its categories from the philosophical 
Ethik,253 which suggests a hierarchy and a measure of dependence. We shall 
not forget this conclusion as we continue to probe Schleiermacher's "philo-
sophical theology". 
The whole of this chapter has been an endeavour to draw out the 
implications of Schleiermacher's designation of theology as "a positive 
science" (no doubt intended as an antidote to the suggestion of a "philosoph-
ical theology" as is the case above). Schleiermacher' s most telling discussion 
of this occurs in the introduction to his lectures on "practical theology", 
where the character of the positive is described in the following fashion: 
"scientific elements, which do not belong together in the deliberation [Be-
handlung]" are nonetheless "drawn together in reference to [in Beziehung aufJ 
a specific praxis".254 How the heterogenous elements are actually held 
together is not really clear, especially when they involve both philosophy 
and theology! Stephen Sykes has rightly said: 
The precise nature of the relationship of theology and philosophy is, 
however, for Schleiermacher decisively ~alified by the peculiar char-
acter of theology as a 'positive science'. 
We shall see whether this qualification is able to deliver the freedom from 
"speculative intrusion"256 that Schleiermacher requires for his dogmatic 
theology. 
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1. Hegel and Schleiermacher would both have agreed that religion's only concern is 
God in the relationship that He has established with man; anything else would be an 
abstraction-in the terms of Fichte's Aphorismen, "pure deism".lt is "the union of the 
Divine Essence with human nature" which Schleiermacher makes the subject of his 
Glaubenslehre, not some doctrine of "the being of God per se" (das Sein Gottes an 
sich---§170.1&2). Hegel would also have agreed that religion is not a suitable object 
for the understanding (V erstand). This is not because Christianity has anything to fear 
from the critical understanding, or because Christianity must find its separate place 
in the human heart. For Hegel, the understanding rigidly adheres to concepts in their 
definiteness and distinction from one another: it can never rise to the speculative 
unity-in-difference which is the conceptual basis of all religion. [See §12 of Hegel'"s 
"Philosophische Enzyklopadie fiir die Oberklasse (1808ff.)", op. cit., pp. 11-12.] The 
most dramatic difference between Hegel and Schleiermacher is that, in Hegel's 
account of the matter, God's relationship with man is identical with the forbidden 
"objective being" of God! 
2. "Dieses rein deistische System widerspricht der christlichen Religion nicht, sondem 
la.Bt ihr ihre ganze subjektive Giiltigkeit..." (§16---the italics in the English translation 
are mine.) Fichte's "Aphorismen iiber Religion und Deism us" can be found in Volume 
V of Fichtes Werke in the edition prepared by his son I.H. Fichte, pp. 3-8. This edition 
was reprinted by Walter de Gruyter of Berlin in 1971. 
3. Fichte here (§18) speaks of "Rettungsmittel", which has the sense of "means of rescue" 
or "means of recovery". Garrett Green translates using the word "remedy". I am 
indebted throughout this discussion to the valuable contribution made by Garrett 
Green's Ph.D. dissertation for Yale University (1971), entitled: "Positive Religion in 
the Early Philosophy of the German Idealists". His examination of Fichte' s Aphoris-
men (pp. 113-117) has been consulted at every point. 
4. P.F. Mehl, "Schleiermacher's Mature Doctrine of God: As found in the Dialektik of 
1822 and the Second Edition of The Christian Faith (1830-31)". Columbia University, 
Ph.D., 1961. p.277. 
5. D.F. Strauss, Das Leben Jesu, 4th ed., Volume II. Tiibingen: C.F. Osiander, 1840. pp. 
713ff. English Translation in the revision by Peter C. Hodgson, op. cit., pp. 781ff. 
6. See Gerhard Sauter, "Begriff und Aufgabe der Eschatologie: Theologische und philo-
sophische Oberlegungen" in Neue Zeitschrift fUr systematische Thevlogie und Religions-
philosophie, Volume 30, 1988. pp. 191-208; here p. 194. It must also be said that for 
Keckermann the end for which theology is undertaken <finis thevlogiae) is nothing less 
than God Himself-which is wh~>rP Schle'erw_acher firmly p~ ts c mp ny wi ·s 
R formed tradition. (Keckennann's "practical" theology was understood as a move-
ment towards God-als Bewegung auf Gott zu.) 
7. Ludwig Graf von Zinzendorf (17D0-1760) is discussed by Eilert Herms in Herkunft, 
Entfaltung und erste Gestalt des Systems der Wissenschaften bei Schleiermacher. Giitersloh: 
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Gerd Mohn, 1974. Here we allude to Herms' treatment of Zinzendorf, especially p. 
23. 
8. §§1-4 of Zinzendorf's "Thoughts for the learned and yet good-willed Students of 
Truth" (1732), translated by Peter C. Erb in Pietists: Selected Writings. London: SPCK, 
1983. pp. 291-295; here p. 291. 
9. See the definition under "speculativus" in Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological 
Tenns: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology by Richard A. Muller. 
Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1985. p. 285. 
10. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, Q. 1, a. 4. English Translation published in 
London by Bums Oates & Washboume, 1920 (2nd ed.). Latin Text published by 
Marietti of Rome, 1952; here Volume I. 
11. See Friedrich Schleiermacher's Christliche Sittenlehre: Einleitung (Wintersemester 
1826/27), op. cit., p. 5. In the manuscript prepared by M. Bindemann we read that 
"Schleiermacher aber den Ausdruck systematische Theologie ganz vermieden hat ... " 
See also Die christliche Sitte: Nach den Grundsiitzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusam-
menhange Dargestellt, edited by L. Jonas in SW, Volume 1/12, 1884 (2nd ed.). pp. 7-8: 
"Nennt man also die christliche Lehre in wissenschaftlicher Form Systematische 
Theologie: so wird dadurch die Vorstellung begiinstigt, sie sei ein Teil des Systems 
aller menschlichen Erkenntnis." 
12. See the entries under theologia acroamatica and theologia catechetica in Dictionary of Latin 
and Greek Theological Terms, op. cit., pp. 299-300. 
13. See Heinrich Schmid, Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche; 9th ed. prepared 
by H.G. Pohlmann. Giitersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1979. p. 29. This authoritative textbook 
was first published in 1843. 
14. Edward FarleycriticizesSchleiermacher's "clericalizationoftheology" and sees "the 
modem narrowing of theology" at work here. In Schleiermacher's "clerical para-
digm", theology "as a faculty of science is unified by church leadership as its telos". 
See Farley's contribution to Practical Theology, edited by Don S. Browning. San 
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983. Farley's essay is entitled "Theology and Practice 
Outside the Clerical Paradigm". pp. 21-41; the citations are from pp. 25 and 28. 
15. See the entry under usus philosophiae in Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, 
op. cit., pp. 321-322. The entry under usus rationis (p. 322) should also be consulted. 
In Heinrich Schmid's textbook, op. cit., p. 39, we learn that our reason (ratio) brings 
with it "dialecticam ordinis observationem". Schleiermacher insists upon this use of 
reason in his Glaubenslehre (§28.1). 
16. We have already referred to this famous definition on pp. 24 & 36 above. 
17. An essential study of every aspect of this question is provided by Ulrich Dierse, 
Enzyklopiidie: Zur Geschichte eines philosophischen und wissenschaftstheoretischen Begriffs. 
This was published as Supplementheft 2 of the Archiv fUr Begriffsgeschichte. Bonn: 
Bouvier Verlag, 1977. The discussion of "Fachenzyklopadien" begins on p. 73. Ed-
ward Farley's Theologia: The Fragmentation and Unity of Theological Education (Philad-
elphia: Fortress Press, 1983) should also be consulted, but the discussion of 
"theological encyclopedia" is less detailed that in Dierse. 
18. I hesitate to use T.N. Tice's translation of the Kurze Darstellung entitled Brief Outline 
of Theology as a Field of Study, op. cit. The enormous compression of Schleiermacher' s 
text has forced the translator to take interpretative liberties. This desire to get at the 
"sense" of Schleiermacher's argument may obscure the force of some of Schleier-
macher's actual words. My problems begin with the title: a literal translation would 
read "Brief Representatio_n of Theological Study". The crucial word is "Darstellung", 
a form of which appears in the title of three of Schleiermacher's most important 
theological works, viz. Glaubenslehre, Christliche Sitte, Praktische Theologie. How to 
translate the phrase "im Zusammenhange dargestellt" of these titles is not self-evi-
dent. The important English translation, The Christian Faith, obviates the problem by 
omitting the work's subtitle altogther. Peter C. Hodgson makes the useful suggestion 
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"cohesively set forth" (cf. above, n. 3 of Chapter One). Tice's translation of "outline" 
for "Darstellung" is too free, and completely inapplicable in the context of the other 
titles. It aso makes the adjective ''kurz" of the title redundant-outlines are meant to 
be brief! 
19. The usual Greek derivation is EYKUKA.o<; 1tat&ta; 1tat&ta translates neatly into 
German as "Bildung". (See, for instance, Dierse, op. cit., pp. 2-3.) 
20. KD2 : "Eine solche Darstellung pflegt man eine formate Enzyklopadie zu nennen ... " 
(§20). The "brevity" of the Kurze Darstellung consists in its "formal" character, not in 
its being a 'brief outline". 
21. See the definition of "encyclopedia" in Tom Rockmore, Hegel's Circular Epistemology. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986. p. 83. 
22. S.T. Coleridge-as we might expect-offers an honourable exception. See the Pros-
pectus of the EncyclopaediaMetropolitana, written by Coleridge and Sir John Stoddart. 
This may be consulted in the Appendix to S.T. Coleridge's Treatise on Method: As 
published in the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana, edited by Alice D. Snyder. London: 
Constable, 1934. pp. 71-79,especially§2. 
23. Novalis Schriften, edited by Paul Kluckhohn and Richard Samuel. Darmstadt: Wis-
senschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Volume IV (1975) contains a letter that Novalis wrote 
to Friedrich Schlegel on November 7, 1798. Novalis writes in part: "Dies soU nichts 
anders, als eine Kritik des Bibelprojekts----ein Versuch einer Universalmethode des 
Biblisierens---die Einleitung zu einer echten Enzyklopadistik werden." (pp. 262-264; 
here p. 263.) Novalis' extraordinary proposal arises out of his conviction that the 
Biblical canon is not closed, but is still in the process of growing (and of comprehend-
ing the world). See Novalis Schriften, Volume III (1968) p. 569. However strange this 
may sound, an impeccable modern theologian, George Lindbeck, knows what No-
valis is driving at "Only in some younger theologians does one see the beginnings 
of a desire to renew in a posttraditional and postliberal mode the ancient practice of 
absorbing the universe into the biblical world." The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and 
Theology in a Postliberal Age. London: SPCK, 1984. p. 135. 
24. In the 1st edition of Encyklopiidiederphilosophischen Wissenschaften(1817), Hegel writes 
in §7: "Die Philosophie ist auch wesentlich Enzyklopadie, indem das Wahre nur als 
Totalitat. .. sein kann; sie ist also notwendig System." Heidelberg: August 01Swald. (p. 
9.) 
25. I follow Errol E. Harris in rendering Hegel's "Sittlichkeit" as "social custom". The usual 
English translation of "ethical life" has no roots in English usage. See Errol E. Harris, 
"Hegel's Philosophy of Political Action" in Hegel's Philosophy of Action, edited by 
Lawrence S. Stepelevich and David Lamb. Atlantic Highlands, N.J. :Humanities 
Press, 1983.pp.157-171;herep.165. 
26. As late as 1807, Friedrich Schlegel was describing the "enzyklopadische Streben der 
Deutschen" as "aile Wissenschaften und Kiinste zu einem ganzen System zu verbin-
den und den Geist des Idealismus dariiber zu verbreiten." The reader will by now be 
well aware that we are trying to establish how much Schleiermacher (and his 
theology) have fallen under the spell of the "Geist des Idealismus". This remarkable 
quotation comes from Schlegel's (as yet unpublished) lectures on German language 
and literature held in Cologne. It is cited by Ernst Behler in "Friedrich Schlegels 
Enzyklopadie der literarischen Wissenschaften im Unterschied zu Hegels Enzyklo-
padie der philosophischen Wissenschaften" in Hegel-Studien, Volume 17. Bonn: Bou-
vier Verlag, 1982. pp. 169-202; here p. 200. From this same article, we may learn (p. 
199), that Schleiermacher corresponded with Schlegel about the latter's "Enzyklopa-
dieprojeckt". 
27. Hegel's Phlinomenologie des Geistes, op. cit., p. 21: "Das Wahre ist das Ganze." 
28. Voltaire's gibe is cited by Ernst Behler in "Friedrich Schlegels Enzyklopadie ... ", op. 
cit., p. 176. 
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29. The Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B 673: "Diese Idee postuliert demnach vollstiindige 
Einheit der Verstandeserkenntnis, wodurch diese nicht bloB ein zufalliges Aggregat, 
sondem ein nach notwendigen Gesetzen zusammenhangendes System wird." 
30. Schleiennacher' s handschriftliche Anmerkungen zum ersten Theil der Glaubenslehre, edited 
by C. Thones. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1873. Annotation to §1.1, p. 2: "Elemente. Darstellung 
des Glaubens ist Glaubenslehre. 'Der Zusammenhang' deutet auf den Unterschied 
von Aggregat." 
31. Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Naturwissenschaft in Kant's gesammelte Schriften, Vol-
ume IV (1911). p. 467-565; here p. 467: "Eine jede Lehre, wenn sie ein System, d. i. ein 
nach Prinzipien geordnetes Ganze der ErkenntniB, sein soH, heiBt Wissenschaft ... " 
This specification is taken from Kant's Preface. 
32. The Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B 860: 'Weil die systematische Einheit dasjenige 
ist, was gemeine Erkenntnis allererst zur Wissenschaft, d. i. aus einem bloBen 
Aggregat derselben ein System macht ... " 
33. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, iiber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre oder der sogenannten 
Philosophie, edited by Edmund Braun. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1972. p. 31: "Eine Wissens-
chaft hat systematische Form; alle Satze in ihr hangen in einem einzigen Grundsatze 
zusammen, und vereinigen sich in ihm zu einem Ganzen ... " 
34. §§5 & 6 of "Philosophische Enzyklopadie fiir die Oberklasse (1808ff.)", op. cit. In 
Hegel's distinctive usage, Begriff is more than an "idea"; his understanding of the 
"concept" is dynamic and speculative. In §9 of Enzyklopiidie der philosophischen Wis-
senschaften (1830): 1.Teil, op. cit., Hegel makes it clear that the "speculative" concept 
is not to be confused with the "concepts" of the vernacular. In §159 the concept is 
designated as the truth of being and of essence, and in§ 161 the characteristic motion 
of the concept is identified as "development". 
35. Cf. Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon (9th ed.), op. cit., where "college" is one 
of the senses in which O"'.)(J'tT''~ is employed. The most general definition is a "whole 
compounded of several parts or members". 
36. See Hegel's ''Privatgutachten fur den Koniglich Bayrischen Oberschulrat Immanuel 
Niethammer", op. cit., p. 411: "Das unsystematische Philosophieren ist ein zufiilliges, 
fragmentarisches Denken ... " 
37. § 14 of E nzyklopiidie derphilosophischen Wissenschaften (1830 ): 1. Teil, op. cit. This excep-
tionally free translation is taken from Hegel's Logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. 
(This is the 3rd ed. of the translation by William Wallace.) While this (p.20) is more 
an interpretation than a translation, the sentiment certainly belongs to Hegel. 
38. GG, p. 557: "Auf der Universitat dagegen ist man hierauf so sehr bedacht, daB man 
in jedem Gebiet das enzyklopadische, die allgemeine Obersicht des Umfanges und 
des Zusammenhanges als das Notwendigste voranschickt, und zur Grundlage des 
gesamten Unterrichts macht." 
39. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, Q. 1, a. 2. 
40. See the discussion of this question in Tom Rockmore, Hegel's Circular Epistemology, 
op. cit., especially p. 2. I have also referred to the excellent review of this book by 
Errol E. Harris in the Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, Number 13, 1986. pp. 
29-33. Number 15, 1987, contains a reply by Rockmore, pp. 55-56. 
41. See the Preface to Hegel'sPhiinomenologiedes Geistes, op. cit., p. 21. 
42. This is Northrop Frye's definition of "parataxis" in his review of Paul de Man, The 
Rhetoric of Romanticism. New York: Columbia University Press. The review was 
published in. The Times l.iteranJ Supplement, Janua_ry 17, 1986, pp. 51-52; here p, 51, 
This unusual description of parataxis does not even accord with the definition 
provided in Northrop Frye's own The Harper Handbook to Literature (Sheridan Baker 
and George Perkins are co-authors with Frye). New York: Harper & Row, 1985. There 
parataxis is defined in a more pedestrian way (p. 336): ''The placement of words, 
phrases, clauses, or sentences in coordinate grammatical constructions ... " 
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43. "Totalization" is Sartrean in usage. (See Arthur C. Danto's review of Sartre' s Critique 
de Ia raison dialectique, Volumes I & II in The Times Literary Supplement, July 11, 1986, 
p. 753.) In Sartre' s account of the life of Gustave Flaubert, The Family Idiot (translated 
by Carol Cosman and published by Columbia University Press), we discover the 
following striking formulation: "beauty is the imaginary totalization of the world 
through language ... " (Cited in the review by Julian Symons in The Sunday Times, 
"Books", p. 12 on November 29, 1987.) When George Steiner speaks of Levinas' effort 
to "refute Hegelian 'totality'", he is actually referring to a commonplace in philos-
ophical circles since at least the time of Kierkegaard' s visit to Berlin in 1841. Steiner's 
summary is neat: 'To Levinas, as to Adorno, a totality is, by definition, a falsehood. 
Authentic philosophic investigation and proposal are transcendental precisely in 
their rejection of closure ... " (See Steiner's article "Levinas" in PN Review, Number 74, 
1990, pp. 24-26; here p. 24.) The ubiquity of this "totalizing" charge which has been 
levelled against Hegel can be inferred from the 1986 Conference Report by Nicholas 
Walker in the Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, Number 13, 1986. pp. 8-19. 
Professor C. Menze of Cologne depicted "Hegelian thought as a holism with no 
appreciation for the individual and which sacrifices subjectivity to the claims of the 
universal" (p. 14). Otto Poggeler emphasized "the problem of justifying any all-en-
compassing teleological perspective on world history from an allegedly absolute 
standpoint. .. " (p. 9). This tallies nicely with the conclusion to Poggeler' s essay "G. W .F. 
Hegel: Philosophie als System" in Grundprobleme der groften Philosophen: Philosophie 
der Neuzeit II, 2nd ed., edited by Josef Speck. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1982. pp. 145-183. Poggeler concludes his treatment of Hegel this way (p. 182): "Es ist 
offenkundig geworden, daB wir zwar einzelne Wissenszusammenhlinge systema-
tisch in sich abzuschlieBen vermogen, daB diese Fragmente sich aber nicht in ein 
letztes, allumfassendes System der Philosophie als Wissenschaft integrieren lassen." 
44. Letter: Friedrich Schlegel to his brother A.W. Schlegel; December 18, 1797. Cited by 
Hans Eichner in his Introduction to Volume 2 of the Kritische-Friedrich-Schlegel-Aus-
gabe: Charakteristiken und Kritiken I (1796-1801). Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand SchOn-
ingh, 1967. p xl: "Ich kann von mir, von meinem ganzen Ich gar kein andres 
echantillon geben, als so ein System von Fragmenten, weil ich selbst dergleichen bin." 
45. See Ernst Behler, "Friedrich Schlegels Enzyklopadie der literarischen Wissenschaften 
im Unterschied zu Hegels Enzyklopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften", op. 
cit., p. 201: " ... daB SCHLEGEL nicht, wie Hegel, in Begriffen der AusschlieBlichkeit 
dachte ... " Another calumny against Hegel is contained in the entry under "System" 
in Wlirterbuchderphilosophischen Begriffe,2nd ed., edited by J. Hoffmeister. Hamburg: 
Felix Meiner Verlag, 1955. pp. 598-599: "Das Systemidee kann aber auch sinnwidrig 
werden, ... wenn es zwar denkend erarbeitet ist, aber nicht offenbleibt, sondem sich 
bewuBt sperrt, abriegelt gegen neue, weitere Moglichkeiten, wie beim spateren 
Hegel. .. " Trevor H. Levere suggests much the same sort of thing, when he contrasts 
Hegel (unfavourably) with Coleridge: "The more complete a system is, the more it 
describes and classifies knowledge, and the less it encourages new kinds of inquiry." 
Hegel, we are informed, was "concerned more with the arrangement and organiza-
tion of existing knowledge than with its development." Poetry realized in Nature: 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge and early nineteenth-century Science. Cambridge University 
Press, 1981. p 221. 
46. See Hans-Joachim Heiner, Das Ganzheitsdenken Friedrich Schlegels. Stuttgart: Metzler, 
1971. pp. 21-23 & 30-32. The same Schlegel texts are discussed by Ulrich Dierse, op. 
cit., p. 126. Ernst Behler, op. cit., p. 173, describes Schlegel's concept of the ''Perfekti-
bilitiitscharakter der Philosophie" as "unendlich". 
47. Nicholas Rescher, Cognitive Systematization. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979. p. 7. 
48. All these formulations are taken from The Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B xxiv-xxvi 
(Preface to the Second Edition). 
49. Letter: Schleiermacher to F.H. Jacobi; March 30, 1818. Cordes, op. cit., p. 209. 
50. The Mackintosh/Stewart translation of 'Widerspruch" as "conflict" in this context 
dilutes the sense, if my interpretation has any persuasiveness. 
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51. "Nun ist es auf der einen Seite freilich nicht genug, daG nur ein solcher Widerspruch 
nicht sei, sondern fiir den Wissenden entsteht die Aufgabe, sich der Zusammenstim-
mung beider positiv bewuat zu werden ... " (§28.3). 
52. Cordes, op. cit., p. 209: " .. .immer gegenseitig an einander gestimmt ... " 
53. Ibid., p. 209: ''Meine Philosophie also und meine Dogmatik ... wollen auch beide 
niemals fertig sein ... " 
54. "Diese Aufgabe ist eine schlechthin per50nliche." Schleiermacher' s annotation to the 
passage from §28.3 cited above in n. 51. See C. Thones, op. cit., p. 27. 
55. §14 of Enzyklopiidie der philosaphischen Wissenschaften (1830): 1.Teil, op. cit. Wallace's 
free rendering of "subjektive GewiGheit" as "personal convictions" makes good sense. 
56. KD2., §§3 & 6. "Dieselben Kenntnisse, wenn sie ohne Beziehung auf das Kirchenregi-
ment erworben und besessen werden, horen auf, theologische zu sein ... " (§6). 
57. See Gerhard Ebeling, "Schlechthinniges Abhangigkeitsgefiihl als GottesbewuGtsein" 
in Wort und Glaube, Volume III. Tiibingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1975. pp. 116-136. "Im 
Unterschied zur klassischen Dogmatik beginnt Schleiermacher die Darstellung des 
christlichen Glaubens nicht beim Gottesbegriff und darum nichtmit einer metaphysi-
schen Ortsbestimmung der Rede von Gott." (p. 116.) 
58. KD2., §1. 
59. The entry under "posituus" in the Oxford Latin Dictionary, edited by P.G.W. Glare, 
gives the definition "arbitrarily imposed" and contrasts this with "naturalis". In other 
words, what is "positive" cannot be deduced from nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1968-1982. p. 1409. 
60. See the entry under "natural" in A Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary, Volume, 
II, edited by R.W. Burchfield. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976, p. 1140. 
61. Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, tr. by A. Wedberg. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1949. p. 114: "This consitutes the difference between 
positive law and natural law, which, like morality, is deduced from a presumably 
self-evident basic norm which is considered to be the expression of the 'will of nature' 
or of 'pure reason'." 
62. See the entry under 'Natural law" in The Oxford Companion to Law by David M. 
Walker. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. p. 868. 
63. Hans Kelsen, op. cit., p. xiii. 
64. See the entry under ''Positive law" in The Oxford Companion to Law, op. cit., p 969. 
65. See the entry under "Metaphysical jurisprudence" in The Oxford Companion to iaw, 
op. cit., p. 837. 
66. Glaubenslehrez, §6. Postscript. 
67. See the entry under "positive" in the OED, Volume VII (1933), p. P 1152. 
68. F .W .J. Schelling, "Vorrede zu einer philosophischen Schrift des Herrn Victor Cousin" 
(1834) in Schellings Werke, edited by Manfred Schroter. 4. Ergiinzungsband. Munich: 
C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1971 (2nd ed.). p. 457. 
69. Ibid. 
70. F.W.J. Schelling, Philosaphie der Mythologie, edited by K.F.A. Schelling, Volume I. 
Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976 (2nd ed.). p. 563: "Denn negativ 
ist jene [Philosophie], weil es ihr nur urn die Moglichkeit (das Was) zu tun ist, weil 
sie alles erkennt, wie es unabhangig von a!ler Existenz in reinen Gedanken isL" 
71. See the entry under "abstrahieren" in Duden; Volume 7: Etymologie, op. cit., p. 9: "das 
Allgemeine aus dem zufiilligen Einzelnen begrifflich heraussondern ... " 
72. Wilhelm Anz, "Idealismus und Nachidealismus" in Die Kirche in ihrer Geschichte: Ein 
Handbuch, edited by Bernd Moeller. Volume IV. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ru-
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precht, 1975. p. P132: "Dadurch, daB sie [die Vemunft] das Zufiillige ausscheidet und 
das Allgemeine heraushebt, verwandelt sich ihr Wirklichkeit in Moglichkeit-ge-
nauer, sie stellt das Wirkliche in den apriorischen Zusarnrnenhang der Wesensmog-
lichkeit, den sie in sich hat." 
73. F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophieder Mythologie, op. cit., p. 563: "Positiv dagegen ist diese; 
denn sie geht von der Existenz a us ... " 
74. F.H. Jacobi, Werke, Volume 6. Leipzig, 1825. p. 166. The whole paragraph reads: "In 
der Natur, iiberhaupt in der Wirklichkeit und Wahrheit, ist Alles positiv. Im Ver-
stande und seiner Moglichkeit ist Alles negativ, denn im Verstande steht Alles unter 
Begriffen, und die urnfassendsten sind immer die leersten. Das Weifle, wohin der 
Verstand zielt, das er treffen will, ist das Nichts; oder das All, minus Diversitat, 
Individualitat, Personalitat." This is an important text for understanding the impetus 
of Schleierrnacher's positive theology. 
75. Hans Kelsen, op. cit., p. 13. His actual words: "Justice is an irrational ideal." 
76. See the entry under "Positivism, legal" in A Dictionary of Law, 2nd ed., by L.B. Curzon. 
London: Pitman, 1986. p. 280. See also the discussion of "Rechtspositivismus" in 
Worterbuch der philosophischen Begriffr, op. cit., p. 479. 
77. See the entry under "positivism" in A Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary, 
Volume ill (1982), op. cit., p. 686. 
78. Hans Kelsen, op. cit., p. 433. 
79. G.W.F. Hegel, ''Die Positivitat der christlichen Religion" (1795/1796) in Volume 1 of 
the Theorie-Werkausgabeedited by E. Moldenhauer and K.M. Michel; here pp. 107-108. 
80. So Emil Fackenheim in The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought. Boston, Mass.: 
Beacon Press, 1970. p. 156. Jiirgen Haberrnas offers this useful summary: '"Positiv' 
nennt Hegel Religionen, die allein auf Autoritat griinden und den Wert des Men-
schen nichtin dessen Moral setzen ... " See Derphilosophische Diskurs der Moderne: Zwalf 
Vorlesungen. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkarnp Verlag, 1988, pp. 36-37. Cf. the English 
translation by Frederick Lawrence: The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve 
Lectures. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987. p. 25: "Hegel applied the term 'positive' to 
religions that are based on authority alone and that do not incorporate the value of 
human beings into their morality." 
81. See James Yerkes, The Christology of Hegel. Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1983. p. 18. Hegel revises this inital "negative" assessment of positivity in 
religion, "wenn er jetzt energisch fiir das Recht des 'Positiven' in der Religion eintritt 
und darnit auch seine eigenen Anfange revidiert." So Peter Comehl, Die Zukunft der 
Vers0hnung: Eschatologie und Emaniipation in der Aufkliirung, bei Hegel und in. der 
Hegelschen Schule. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971. p. 131. See also Ignacio 
Escribano-Alberca, Eschatologie: Von der Aufkliirung bis zur Gegenwart. Freiburg: Her-
der, 1987. p. 123. "Revision heifSt neue Wiirdigung der Positivitat des Christentums." 
This volume, which forms part of Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte, edited by Michael 
Schmaus et al., leans heavily on Comehl's earlier analysis. 
82. Every Christian engages in this "speculative" work at the Holy Communion. The 
externality of the host is overcome in its being consumed. Hegel calls this externality 
das Ansichsein: ''Es wird vorgestellt, in dem Sakrament werde Christus ewig geopfert 
und im Herzen sei er auferstehend; dies ist richtig; das ewige Opfer ist dies Sich-
zueigenrnachen des Einzelnen, dies Verge hen des Ansichseins." VPR, Teil3 (Volume 
5 of Vorlesungen: Ausgewiihlte Nachschriften und Manuskripte,edited by Walter Jaeschke, 
1984), p. 166. This extract is taken from the lectures of 1824. 
83. Cf. Liicke, p. 351: "Dies, mein Iieber Freund, ist ganz vorziiglich der Standpunkt 
meiner Glaubenslehre. Wie ich fest davon iiberzeugt bin: so glaubte ich es auch 
darstellen zu miissen nach bestem Vermogen, dafS jedes Dogma, welches wirklich 
ein Element unseres christlichen BewufStseins reprasentiert, auch so gefafSt werden 
kann, dafS es uns unverwickelt lafSt mit der Wissenschaft." 
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84. Hans-Joachim Birkner, "Glaubenslehre und Modemitatserfahrung: Ernest Troeltsch 
als Dogmatiker" in Troeltsch-Studien, Volume IV, edited by H. Renz and F.W. Graf. 
Giitersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1987. pp. 325-337; here p. 337. 
85. Ibid., p. 336: " ... das Verstandnis der Dogmatik nicht als Darlegung eines Systems von 
Dogmen, sondem als Rechenschaft iiber den Glauben." 
86. Kfh §24 & KDt, Einleitung §26: "Die philosophische Theologie ist die Wurzel der 
gesamten Theologie." 
87. l<D2, §195. 
88. l<D2, §85 & KDt, Einleitung §31: "Die praktische Theologie ist die Krone des theologi-
schen Studiums." 
89. KD2, §66. 
90. KD2, §223: 'W eder die Bezeichnungen theoretisch und praktisch, noch die Ausdriicke 
Glaubens- und Sittenlehre sind vollig genau." 
91. KD2, §196 (translated by T.N. Tice in Brief Outline, p. 99). 
92. Ibid. 
93. Glaubenslehm, §2. Proposition & KD2, §6. 
94. l<D2, §§5 & 198: "Die dogmatische Theologie hat fiir die Lei tung der Kirche zunachst 
denNutzen ... " 
95. KD2, §95: "Die Darstellung des gesellschaftlichen Zustandes der Kirche in einem 
gegebenen Moment ist die Aufgabe der kirchlichen Statistik." 
96. l<D2, §247 (translated by T.N. Tice in Brief Outline, p. 125). 
97. KD2, section heading for the second part, third division, which incorporates both 
dogmatic theology and Church "statistics": "Die geschichtliche Kenntnis von dem 
gegenwartigen Zustande des Christentums". See Brief Outline, p. 97. 
98. Lucke, p. 390. 
99. Glaubenslehm, §28.1: " ... wenn nur die Sprache richtig und in sich zusammenhangend 
gebildet ist." (My italics.) 
100. Lucke, p. 390: " ... wiirde meine Maxime doch dieselbe geblieben sein, keinen Einflul.S 
auf den Inhalt der Glaubenslehre gestattet zu haben." 
101. Brian A. Gerrish, "From Calvin to Scheiennacher: The Theme and Shape of Christian 
Dogmatics" in Kongrefl, Teilband 2, pp. 1033-1051; here pp. 1041-1042. (My italics.) 
102. Lucke, p. 334; English Translation, p. 53: "inspired heterodoxy". The English version 
suppresses the "divinatory" aspect, which a literal translation would signal. This is 
surprising, since one of the English translators of the Open Letters also collaborated 
on the English version of Schleiennacher's Henneneutics, op. cit., where "divination" 
and "divinatory" are technical terms. See, for instance, p. 150. 
103. Lucke, p. 324: " ... als ob die in meiner Glaubenslehre aufgestellte Analyse des Selbstbe-
wul.Stseins etwas Anderes sein wollte, als ganz einfach und ehrlich nur empirisch!" 
104. Lucke, pp. 370 & 342. 
105. Lucke, p. 371. See the discussion by Brian A. Gerrish, "Continuity and Change: 
Friedrich Schleiennacher on the Task of Theology" in Tradition and the Modern World: 
Reformed Theology in the Nineteenth Century. University of Chicago Press, 1978. pp. 
13-48; here p. 38. 
106. Scl:-Jei rmach d signal~::. ih~se propositions as "Lehnsatze". See the entry under 
"Lemma" inHistorisches Worterbuch der Philosophie, edited by J. Ritter and K. Grunder. 
Darmstadt: Wissenchaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1980. Volume V,col. 234. 
107. Glaubenslehre, §2.2. 
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108. Hans-Joachim Birkner, Schleiermachers christliche Sittenlehre: Im Zusammehang seines 
philosophisch-theologischen Systems. Berlin: Alfred Topelmann, 1964. p. 36: "Die Ethik 
ist die spekulative Grundwissenschaft fiir aile Disziplinen, die es mit dem mensch-
lich-geschichtlichen Leben zu tun haben. Sie ist damit die Grundwissenschaft auch 
fiir die Theologie in allen ihren Teilen." 
109. Lucke, p. 377; English Translation, p. 80. 
110. Hans-Joachim Birkner, Schleiermachers christliche Sittenlehre, op. cit., p. 31 : "Thema der 
Schleiennacherschen Dialektik ist die Erorterung des Wesens und der transzenden-
talen Voraussetzungen des Wissens." 
111 . Dialektik(ed. Jonas), §3: "Dialektik mutS irgend wie die Prinzipien des Philosophierens 
enthalten." (p. 2.) 
112. Dialektik (ed. Jonas), §230. Rand bern. 2: "Riickblick auf das was die Dialektik sein soli. 
Bedingt durch urspriingliches Wissen und Combinationsregeln soli sie sein Organon 
und Kriterion. Das urspriingliche Wissen sind die heiden Ideen (Gott und Welt). A us 
diesem haben wir nun die Combinationsregeln zu entwickeln. Dann haben wir 
Organon und Kriterion." (p. 173.) Cf. Dialektik (1811), op. cit., p. 6: "Die Dialektik in 
diesem Sinne kann mit Recht das Organon aller Wissenschaft heitSen." See also 
Gunter Scholz, Die Philosophie Schleiermachers, op. cit., pp. 104-105. 
113. Gunter Scholtz, op. cit., p . 105. 
114. Einleitung zur Dialektik(1833), op. cit., p. 117: "Dialektik ist Darlegung der Grundsatze 
fiir die kunstrna1Sige Gesprachsfiihrung im Gebiet des reinen Denkens." This defini-
tion is the first sentence of the introduction and can also be found in Dialektik (ed. 
Jonas), p. 568. 
115. Hans-Joachim Birkner, Schleiermachers christliche Sittenlehre, op. cit., p. 36: "Da 
Schleiennachers Dialektik sich die Aufgabe stellt, Grundsatze und Regeln fiir das 
richtige Denken zu entwickeln, kann sie ebenfalls als Kunstlehre bezeichnet werden." 
See also Dialektik (1811), op. cit., p . 6: "So wird hier die Dialektik besonders a us dem 
Gesichtspunkte der philosophischen Kunstlehre erscheinen." 
116. As available in Dialektik (ed. Jonas), p . 17. 
117. Glaubenslehrtn, §31. Anm.: "Dialektisch ist hier in dem reinen altertiimlichen Sinn 
genommen, in welchem es das kunstgerechte in der Rede bedeutet, sofem sie darauf 
abzweckt, Erkenntnis auszudriicken und mitzuteilen." 
118. See "Einleitung. Letzte Bearbeitung" in Ethik (1812/13): Mit sptiteren Fassungen der 
Einleitung, Giiterlehre und Pflichtenlehre, op. cit., p. 205: here Dialektik is described as 
"das gehaltlose Abbild des hochsten Wissens". See also Hans-Joachim Birkner, 
Schleiermachers christliche Sittenlehre, op. cit., pp. 32-33: "Gegeniiber den 'realen WiS. 
senschaften' der Natur und der Vemunft hat so die Dialektik ein durchaus formales 
Geprage." (p. 32.) 
119. Ibid., p. 33. See also "Einleitung. Letzte Bearbeitung" in Ethik(1812/13), op. cit., p. 203 
(§58): "Die heiden Hauptwissenschaften zerfallen also in ein Zwiefaches, indem die 
Natur sowohl als die Vemunft gewutSt werden kann auf beschauliche Weise und auf 
erfahrungsma.tSige." §59 makes it clear "daiS Wissenschaft mehr das Beschauliche, 
Kunde mehr das ErfahrungsmatSige bezeichnet ... " This represents the distinction 
between speculative and empirical in less exalted terminology. 
120. Dialektik (1811), op. cit., p. 5 
121. Hans-Joachim Birkner, Schleiermachers christliche Sittenlehre, op. cit., p. 33. 
122. Dialektik (1814/15), op. cit., p. 48: "Das Wissen in der Form des Begriffs umfatSt das 
ganze Gerii:;t unseres realen Wissens Ethik und Physik." See also Diaiektik (1811), op. 
cit., p. 34. 
123. "Einleitung. Letzte Bearbeitung" inEthik(1812/13), op. cit., p. 205. See also "Lehnsatze 
a us der Dialektik in der Ethik (1812/13)" in Dialektik (1811), op. cit., p. 81 (Lemma 11): 
"Also in der Vollendung ist Ethik Physik und Physik Ethik." 
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124. See Dialektik (1814/15), op. cit., p. 115 (§ 111): "Das allgemeine Teilungsprinzip ist der 
doppelte Gegensatz des idealen und realen in Vemunft und Natur." §112: "Auf dem 
doppelten flieBenden Gegensatz beruht der relative von spekulativer und empiri-
scher Wissenschaft." See also Thomas Lehnerer, Die Kunsttheorie Friedrich Schleierma-
chers. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987. p. 42n.: '1st hier vom hochsten Gegensatz die 
Rede ... Gemeint ist vielmehr ein hochster Unterschied ... " 
125. Thomas Lehnerer, Die Kunsttheorie Friedrich Schleiennachers, op. cit., p. 49: "Dieses 
Modell (Dialektik: Ideal-Real, Ethik: Ideal, Physik: Real) ... " 
126. Letter: Schleiermacher to K.H. Sack; March 12, 1816. Friedrich Schleiennacher, Briefe 
an einen Freund. Weimar: Verlag Deutsche Christen, 1939. pp. 9-12; here p. 12: 
"Kommen ein paar recht gesunde Jahre: so konnen Ethik Dogmatik und Dialektik 
wohl hinter einander fertig werden ... " 
127. Schleiennacher is reported to have told Ludwig Jonas (the editor of both the Dialektik 
and Die christliche Sitte [SW 1/12]): "lch wollte namlich, wie Du weiBt, meiner 
Dialektik und meiner christlichen Moral die Form geben, welche die Dogmatik hat. 
Das habe ich aber aufgegeben.lch werde eilen, sie etwa in die Gestalt zu bringen, die 
die Enzyklopadie hat." That was on February 4, 1834. Schleiennacher died on 
February 12. Cited by Andreas Arndt in his Introduction to Dialektik (1811), op. cit., 
p. xvi; and by Hans-Joachim Birkner, Schleiermachers christliche Sittenlehre, op. cit., p. 
14. 
128. Schleiennacher lectured on Ethik five times in the faculty of philosophy at the 
University of Berlin [see Hans-Joachim Birkner's introduction to Schleiermacher's 
Brouillon zur Ethik(1805/06), op. cit., pp. xviii-xix]. Alexander Schweizer, who brought 
outthefirstversionofSchleiermacher'sEthikin 1835 (SW, Volume III/5:Entwurfeines 
Systems der Sittenlehre), states in his introduction (pp. vii-viii) that, in his final years, 
Schleiermacher seems to have given up the idea of publishing the Ethik. I am not alone 
in finding the Ethik fragmentary and incomplete: see Trutz Rendtorff, Kirche und 
Theologie: Die systematische Funktion des Kirchenbegriffs in der neueren Theologie, 2nd ed. 
Giitersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1970. p. 144. One friend of Schleiermacher's kindly opined 
that "because of the time and energy ... always devoted to his friends", his ambition to 
publish the Ethik was never realized. (Henriette Herz, as cited by Albert L. Blackwell, 
op. cit., p. 90n.) 
129. Trutz Rendtorff, ''Ethik VII: Neuzeit" in TRE, Volume X, 1982. pp. 481-517; here pp. 
504-505: "Deutlich ist die vorrangige Bedeutung der philosophischen Ethik als 
'Grundwissenschaft' fiir aile Disziplinen, die es mit dem menschlich-geschichtlichen 
Leben zu tun haben." 
130. KD2, §35: "Ethik als Wissenschaft der Geschichtsprinzipien". In one set of notes 
available to Schweizer Ethik is synonymous with "Geschichtswissenschaft" (SW, 
Volume ill/5, p. 35n.). 
131. See "Einleitung. Letzte Bearbeitung" in Ethik (1812/13), op. cit., p. 209 (§80): "Das 
H~deln der Vemunft aber bringt hervor Einheit von Vemunft und Natur ... " a. 
"Ober den Begriff des hochsten Gutes" (Erste Abhandlung) read to the Akademie der 
Wissenschaften in Berlin on May 17, 1827 (SW, Volume III/2, 1838, pp. 446-468; here 
p. 457): " ... das durch die sittliche Tatigkeit hervorgebrachte ... " 
132. See the table of contents to Ethik (1812/13), op. cit., pp. v-via. 
133. The translation ofTrutz Rendtorff, Kirche und Theologie, by Reginald H. Fuller actually 
renders "das Mchste Gut" as summum bonum (Church and Theology: The Systematic 
Function of the Church Concept in Modern Theology. Philadelphia: The Westminster 
Press, 1971. pp. 141-142). This translates Kirche und Theologie, op. cit., pp. 148-149. 
Hans Joachim Birkner, Schleiermachers christliche Sittenlehre. op. cit .• p. 39: " ... so hat 
doch die Giiterlehre eindeutig die Fiihrung." 
134. "Einleitung. Letzte Bearbeitung" in Ethik (1812/13), op. cit., p. 220 (§113): "Hochstes 
Gut ... der organische Zusammenhang aller Giiter, also das ganze sittliche Sein unter 
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dem Begriff des Gutes ausgedriickt." See also Martin Redeker, Friedrich Schleier-
macher, op. cit., p. 233: "das hochste Gut. .. der Vemunftgehalt des gesamten Lebens." 
135. As translated by Reginald H. Fuller in Trutz Rendtorffs Church and Theology, op. cit., 
p.141. 
136. Ethik (1812/13), op. cit., p. 16 (§83): "Jedes sittlich Gewordene ist ein Gut und die 
Totalitiit desselben Eines, also das hochste Gut. Die objektive Darstellung des Ethi-
schen also ist die Darstellung der Idee des hOchsten Gutes." 
137. See "Giiterlehre, Giiterethik" in Volume III of Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie, 
edited by J. Ritter and K. Griinder. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 
1974. cots. 977-980; here col. 977: "Dessen Hervorbringung geschieht durch zwei 
Richtungen der Vemunfttiitigkeit: 'Organisieren' und 'Symbolisieren."' Gunter 
Scholtz, Die Philosophie Schleiermachers, op. cit., deserves to be consulted here (p. 117): 
"Die Vemunft kann und muG die Natur beherrschen und zu ihrem Werkzeug und 
Organ umformen: organisierende (bildende) Tatigkeit; sie kann und muG die Natur 
zu ihrem Zeichen machen und in ihr erkennbar werden: symbolisierende (bezeich-
nende) Tatigkeit." 
138. Hans-Joachim Birkner, Schleiermachers christliche Sittenlehre, op. cit., p. 41. 
139. S.W. Sykes, "Theological Study: The Nineteenth Century and After", op. cit., p. 106. 
140. Martin Redeker, Friedrich Schleiermacher, op. cit., p. 230: "Die Ethik ist daher nicht 
Morallehre im iiberlieferten Sinne, sondem Kultur-, Geschichts- und Sozialphiloso-
phie." 
141. "Einleitung. Letzte Bearbeitung" in Ethik (1812/13), op. cit., p. 213 (§95): "Die Satze der 
Sittenlehre diirfen also nicht Gebote sein ... sondem sofem sie Gesetze sind, miissen 
sie das wirkliche Handeln der Vemunft auf die Natur ausdriicken." 
142. August Twesten's introduction to Friedrich Schleiermachers Grundrift der philosophi-
schen Ethik, op. cit., p. xxxv: "Schleiermacher fand eben in der Erhebung zu einem 
hohem Standpunkte der sittlichen Betrachtung das Mittel, dem Giiterbegriff eine 
ganz neue Bedeutung zu geben, indem sich ihm Recht und Verkehr, Sprache und 
Wissenschaft, Religion und Kunst, Familie, Staat und Kirche auf verschiedene Weise 
als unter demselben enthalten,und in ihrer Gesamtheit denselben erschOpfend dar-
stellen." My own inelegant translation '1egal relationships and communication" only 
hopes to convey the general sense of "Recht und Verkehr". 
143. Ibid., p. xivn. Seen. 116 for Chapter One. 
144. "Uber den Begriff des hOchsten Gutes" (Erste Abhandlung), op. cit., pp. 467-468: 
"ethical" insight avoids the danger "den Gang des menschlichen Geschlechtes au~ 
im gro&n als ein Spiel des Zufalls anzusehen, als wodurch aile Wissenschaft des 
Geistes zerstort wird." This last phrase (employed in 1827) displays Schleiermacher' s 
continuing "idealist" credentials. 
145. Entwurfeines Systemsder Sittenlehre (S W, Volume lll/5, §61. Anmerkung): "Sittenlehre 
istalso spekulatives Wissen urn die Gesamtwirksamkeit der Vemunft auf die Natur." 
(p. 37.) 
146. Glaubenslehre2, §33.3. 
147. I<Dl, §24. 
148. Ethik (1812/13), op. cit., p. 125 (§231): "Es ist die Sache der kritischen Disziplin, die 
man gewohnlich Religionsphilosophie nennt, die individuelle Differenz der einzel-
nen Kirche in comparativer Anschauung zu fixiren ... " 
149. Kih §23. 
150. The use of the word "Geschichtskunde" is familiar from the Ethik [see "Einleitung. 
Letzte Bearbeitung" in Ethik (1812/13), op. cit., p. 217 (§§108 & 109)]. It offers a dear 
signal that here a transition to empirical reality is taking place, and it has the effect 
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of weakening the "philosophical" component in Religionsphilosophie. We shall need to 
look at this conspicuous tenn again. 
151. See the precision of the definition in Dietz Lange, Historischer Jesus oder mythischer 
Christus, op. cit., p. 72: " ... Religionsphilosophie. Diese ist eine kritische Disziplin, 
deren Aufgabe es ist, den zunachst spekulativ gewonnenen Begriff der Frommigkeit 
mit der Empirie zu vermitteln, indem sie die positiven Religionen miteinander 
vergleicht, also ihre individuellen Differenzen erhebt und ihr gegenseitiges Verhalt-
nis anhand des Begriffs der Frommigkeit untersucht." 
152. S.W. Sykes, "Theological Study: The Nineteenth Century and After", op. cit., p. 106. 
153. Ethik (1812/13), op. cit., p. 126 (§232). 
154. Glaubenslehrez, §2.2. 
155. See Hans-Joachim Birkner, Schleiermachers christliche Sittenlehre, op. cit., pp. 34-35: 
"Die spezifische Aufgabe der kritischen Disziplinen ... lhnen allen ist die Aufgabe 
gemeinsam, das Wesen der individuell-konkreten historischen Erscheinungen, das 
weder spekulativ konstruiert noch einfach empirisch aufgefaBt werden kann, im 
kritischen Vergleich zu bestimmen." 
156. Ethik (1816), "Einleitung" in Schleiermachers Werke: Auswahl in vier Biinden, edited by 
Otto Braun and Johannes Bauer. Volume II, p. 505. Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1967 
(reprint of the 1927/28 edition). §91: Da das Spekulative und Empirische im realen 
Wissen wesentlich auBer einander sind ... Also sind auch Ethik und Geschichte auBer 
einander, und es gibt keinen stetigen Obergang vom Gesetz zur Erscheinung." See 
also Eilert Herms, "Die Ethik des Wissens beim spaten Schleiermacher" in ZThK, 
Volume 73,1976. pp. 471-523; here p. 502. 
157. "Einleitung. Letzte Bearbeitung" in Ethik (1812/13), op. cit., p. 217 (§109). 
158. CF, §§12.3, 16. Postscript & 19. Postscript. 
159. Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre (SW, Volume III/5, §61), p. 36. 
160. Dialektik (1814/15), op. cit., §209.1: "Jene Durchdringung ware die wahre reale 
Weltweisheit der eigentlich gesuchte Begriff von Philosophie." 
161. Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre (SW, Volume III/5, §61), p. 36: "Der hellenische 
Name lj)~a bezeichnet mehr, daB dieses nur als Bestreben vorhanden ist, und 
umfaBte gleichermaBen ihre physischen und ihre ethischen Bemiihungen; der deut-
sche Name Weltweisheit bezeichnet mehr, daB nur vennittelst dieser Durchdringung 
alles Wissen Ausdruck der Welt ist." 
162. Fritz Weber, Schleiermachers Wissenschaftsbegriff: Eine Studie aufgrund seiner frUhesten 
Abhandlungen. Gutersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1973. p. 134: "Das fiir Schleiermacher charak-
teristische wissenschaftliche Verfahren wird die 'Kritik' alsdas Ausmitteln zwischen 
einem empirisch Erkannten und der entsprechenden spekulativen Idee, wobei die 
Erkenntnis durch gegenseitige Annaherung fortschreitet." 
163. Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre (SW, Volume III/5, §72.b), p. 70: "Die kritischen 
Disziplinen schweben zwischen der Geschichte und der Ethik, abhangig von dem 
spekulativen; die technischen ebenda, abhangig von dem empirischen. Beide also 
ffillen auf der idealen Seite die Lucke aus zwischen dem spekulativen und empiri-
schen." 
164. Hans-Joachim Birkner, Schleiermachers christliche Sittenlehre, op. cit., p. 35: "Auch in 
dem 'regelgebenden oder technischen Verfahren', welches die technischen Diszi-
plinen oder Kunstlehren konstituiert, werden Spekulation und Erfahrung aufeinan-
der bezogen. Aber die Aufgabe ist hier praktischer Art." 
165. Gunter Scholtz, Die Philosophie Schleiermachers, op. cit., pp. 127-128: "Die Literatur zu 
Schleiermachers Religionsphilosophie ffillt eine halbe Bibliothek .... Um so erstaun-
licher ist es zu erfahren, daB Schleiermacher das, was er selbst 'Religionsphilosophie' 
nannte, nirgends ausgearbeitet oder eigens vorgetragen hat." The terminology "Reli-
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gionsphilosophie" is not employed in the equivalent section of the Introduction to 
Glaubenslehrei (§§14-17). 
166. Seen. 86 above. 
167. KD2, §29; KDt, Einleitung §38 is particularly clear: "Fiir eines jeden theologisches 
Studium miil.ite der philosophische Teil, wenn er schon zur Diziplin ausgebildet 
ware, der erste sein." 
168. KDt, 2.Teil, Schluabetrachtungen §7: "Die philosophische Theologie nimmt ihren Stand-
punkt iiber dem Christentum, die historisiche innerhalb desselben." (Schleiermacher's 
italics.) 
169. Klh, §33: "Die philosophische Theologie kann daher ihren Ausgangspunkt nur tiber 
dem Christentum in dem logischen Sinne des Wortes nehmen ... " 
170. Glaubenslehrei, §6. Proposition: "Umauszumitteln, worindas Wesenderchristlichen 
Frommigkeit bestehe, miissen wir iiber das Christentum hinausgehen, und unseren 
Standpunkt iiber demselben nehmen, urn es mit anderen Glaubensarten zu ver-
gleichen." 
171. Martin Redeker, Friedrich Schleiermacher, op. cit., p. 160: "Der Religionswissenschaftler 
miisse seinen Standpunkt 'iiber' dem Christentum nehmen, urn das spezifisich 
Christliche bestimmen zu kOnnen ... Der Begriff 'iiber' hat nur logisch-theoretischen 
Sinn und bedeutet nicht die Transzendierung im Sinne der Oberwindung." (English 
Translation, p. 111.) 
172. The distortions of Hegel's philosophy of religion are too numerous to mention. We 
might, for instance, be told that "Hegel's philosophical system carried him beyond 
theism" and "that, for Hegel, philosophy takes priority over religion and gives it a 
subordinate place in the development of spirit" (Brian Hebblethwaite, The Problems 
of Theology. Cambridge University Press, 1980. p. 66). Or again: " ... Hegel subsumed 
theology under philosophy, and gave reason the highest place" (Alasdair I. C. Heron, 
A Century of Protestant Theology. Guildford, Surrey: Lutterworth Press, 1980. p. 38). 
Worst of all: 'Thus the Hegelian ontology itself in which everything can be grasped 
by reason because everything is founded on rational necessity is ultimately incom-
patible with Christian faith. Hegel's philosophy is an extra-ordinary transposition 
which 'saves the phenomena' (that is, the dogmas) of Christianity, while abandoning 
its essence" (Charles Taylor, Hegel. Cambridge University Press, 1975. p. 494). All 
these positions derive their authority from Hegel's alleged "conceptual Aufhebung 
(exaltation or nullification) of religion", as we find this formula in the influential 
translation of Karl LOwith's From Hegel to Nietzsche (translated by David E. Green. 
Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1967. p. 24). My own views accord preci~Jy with 
tliose of Professor James Ooull. See, for instance, his reply to Quentin Lauer in Hegel 
and the Philosophy of Religion, edited by Darrel E. Christensen. The Hague: Martin us 
Nijhoff, 1970. pp. 279-283. Doull writes: "Hegel neither reduces religion to philosophy 
nor does he undertake a 'speculative transformation of revealed religion'." (p. 279.) 
173. S.W. Sykes, 'The Essence of Christianity" in Religious Studies, Volume 7, 1971. pp. 
291-305; here p. 301. 
174. See the useful diagram in P.H. Jmgensen's Die Ethik Schleiermachers. Munich: Chr. 
Kaiser Verlag, 1959. p. 34. According to Jmgensen' s chart, Religionsphilosophie belongs 
to the category "spekulativ-kontemplative-allgemein", whereas Theologie is "empi-
risch-wahrnehmend-besonders". In one respect, Jmgensen has made things easy for 
himself: by using the generic term "theology", he avoids the sticky problem of 
determining the most suitable category for "philosophical theology". 
175. KD2, §252: "Denn aile leitenden Begriffe werden in den Untersuchungen, welche die 
philosophische Theoiogie bilden, definitiv bestimmt.'' 
176. KD2, §24. It is interesting to compare this paragraph with its equivalent in KDt, 
Einleitung §25: ''Hieraus das Wesentliche in der gesamten Erscheinung der chris-
tlichen Kirche zu verstehen, ist die Aufgabe des philosophischen Teiles der Theo-
logie." 
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177. KD2, §32: "Da das eigentiimliche Wesen des Christentums sich ebensowenig rein 
wissenschaftlich konstruieren laBt, als es bloG empirisch aufgefaGt werden kann: so 
laBt es sich nur kritisch bestimmen ... " August Domer puts the matter succinctly in 
his foreword (Geleitwort) to Volume I of Schleiermachers Werke: Auswahl in vier Biinden, 
edited by Otto Braun and Johannes Bauer. Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1967 (reprint of the 
1927/28 edition). p. xx: "Schleiermacher ist also der Meinung, daG das Christentum 
weder bloG spekulativ, noch bloG historisch verstanden werden kann." 
178. KD2, §37: " ... so ist diese ihrem wissenschaftlichen Gehalt nach Kritik, und sie gehort 
der Natur ihres Gegenstandes nach der geschichtskundlichen Kritik an." 
179. See "Einleitung. Letzte Bearbeitung" in Ethik (1812/13), op. cit., p. 204 (§60): "Der 
erfahrungsmaBige Ausdruck des endlichen Seins, sofem es Vemunft ist, oder das 
Erkennen des Daseins der Vemunft ist die Geschichtskunde; der beschauliche Aus-
druck desselben Seins, oder das Erkennen des Wesens der Vemunft, ist die Ethik oder 
Sittenlehre." Alsop. 217 (§108): "Sittenlehre und Geschichtskunde bleiben immer fiir 
sich selbst gesondert; fiir einander sind sie die Geschichtskunde das Bilderbuch der 
Sittenlehre, und die Sittenlehre das Formelbuch der Geschichtskunde." 
180. KD2, §24 offers this justification for the use of the terminology "philosophical theo-
logy": "Die Benennung rechtfertigt sich teils a us dem Zusammenhang der Aufgabe 
mit der Ethik, tells a us der Beschaffenheit ihres Inhaltes, indem sie es groGenteils mit 
Begriffsbestimmungen zu tun hat." 
181. Cf. KDt, l.Teil, Einleitung § 17: "Als theologische Disziplin nimmt die philosophische 
Theologie ihre Form von dem Interesse an dem Wohlbefinden und der Fortbildung 
der Kirche." If one wants to minimize philosophy's harmful effects, the best method 
is to redefine philosophy's purposes in line with one's own intentions. In a master-
stroke of disingenuousness, Schleierrnacher acknowledges (in the Open Letters) the 
use his Glaubenslehre makes of Religionsphilosophie, but quickly adds "ein Wort, 
welches Andere anders brauchen" ("although others use that term differently"). See 
Lucke, p. 374 (English Translation, p. 78). A similar tactic has recently been used by 
Richard Rorty in his discussion of Heidegger's flirtation with the Nazis: "a philos-
opher's moral character" does not help one to "evaluate his philosophy ... That name 
[philosopher] has been appropriated for other purposes, to name the people who 
write about, for example, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel, or about the issues these 
men discussed." See Rorty's review of Victor Farias,Heideggeret le Nazisme in The New 
Republic, Aprilll, 1988. pp. 31-34; here pp. 32-33. Tzvetan Todorov has assessed 
Rorty's position in The Times Literary Supplement of June 17-23, 1988 (''NB", pp. 676 & 
684). His summary appears to me correct: "Chess-players and microbiologists are not 
compelled to account for their moral behaviour, says Rorty in substance; why should 
a philosopher-be-treated any differently? His discipline has nothing to do with 
wisdom; he is simply a specialist in Plato or Aristotle, Kant or Hegel." (p. 676.) Some 
of those named would have been surprised to learn that philosophy has nothing to 
do with wisdom, but then "others use the term differently". Rorty's article also has 
the beneficial function of excusing in advance any imperfections in my account of 
Schleierrnacher: " ... the works of anybody whose mind was complex enough to make 
his or her books worth reading will not have an 'essence', ... those books will admit of 
a fruitful diversity of interpretations, ... the quest for 'an authentic reading' is pointless. 
One will assume that the author was as mixed-up as the rest of us ... " Since, according 
to Rorty, I need make no pretence in this dissertation to offer an "authentic interpre-
tation", it should suffice the reader if I manage to pull out "from the tangle we find 
on the pages, some lines of thought that might tum out to be useful for our own 
purposes." (Ibid., p. 34.) My readers may by this point agree that "tangle" is not an 
inappropriate reference to Schleiermacher's constellation of disciplines. I trust that 
my extended treatment of them has exposed some serviceable "lines of thought"! 
182. TN. Tice's translation of KD2, §65: ''Philosophical theology ... lay[s] a foundation for 
the properly historical perspective on Christianity" completely suppresses the Ger-
man "Anschauung", a word which also appears in the equivalent paragraph of KDt 
(l.Teil, Schluabetrachtungen §2). In the Dialetik (ed. Odebrecht, p. 157), Anschauung 
is defined as the equilibrium (Gleichgewicht) between "organische Tatigkeit" 
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( Wahrnehmen) and "intellektuelle Tatigkeit" (Denken im engeren Sinne). "Absolute reine 
Anschauung" (p. 273) would lead us to "das vollstandige Ineinander des Spekula-
tiven und Empirischen". So the critical discipline of philosophical theology brings 
about the "geschlichtliche Anschauung des Christentums" (KDt & KDz). 
183. KDz, §67: "Da die philosophische Theologie eines jeden wesentlich die Prinzipien 
seiner gesamten theologischen Denkungsart in sich schlieGt: so mufS auch jeder 
Theologe sie ganz fiir sich selbst produzieren." Tice carefully renders the pronoun 
"sie" (referring to philosophical theology) by the phrase "this part of his (sic) theo-
logy". Even though we are told just above that each individual's philosophical 
theology contains within itself essentially the whole of an individual's "theological 
way of thinking", is Tice trying to reassure us that philosophical theology need not 
be given too much weight? It is, after all, only a "part" of what a theologian does. 
184. Glaubenslehre2., §16. Postscript. 
185. See Ingolf U. Dalferth, "The Visible and the Invisible: Luther's Legacy of a Theological 
Theology" in England and Germany: Studies in Theological Diplomacy, edited by S.W. 
Sykes. Frankfurt am Main: Peter D. Lang, 1982. pp. 15-44. As Dalferth explains on p. 
38, the phrase "theological theology" is adapted from Gerhard Ebeling, Luther: 
Einfiihrung in sein Denken. Tiibingen: J .C. B. Mohr, 1981 (4th ed.). p. 82. 
186. This ''harmony" of philosophy and theology can be discovered even though "Theo-
logie und Philosophie reprasentieren in der Tat zwei Traditionsstrome grundver-
schiedener Herkunft und Art ... " See Gerhard Ebeling, Luther, op. cit., p. 83. 
187. S.W. Sykes, "Theological Study: The Nineteenth Century and After" op. dt., p. 106. 
188. I admit that "systematic theology" is not preferred Schleiermacherian usage. But 
despite the caveatof§97 (KDz) that this terminology "conceals. .. notonly the historical 
character of the discipline but also its aim in relation to Church leadership", it has 
become so universal as to be almost unavoidable. For Wolfhart Pannenberg, theology 
is "synonymous with systematic theology" as "the history of Christian theology 
is ... essentially the history of the systematic interpretations of Christianity." (Wissens-
chaftstheorieund Theologie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1977. p. 350. English 
Translation by Francis McDonagh: Theology and the Philosophy of Science. London: 
Darton, Longman & Todd, 1976. p. 347.) In the same vein Stephen Sykes concludes 
that "Schleiermacher was an unrepentant systematician." (The Identity of Christianity: 
Theologians and the Essence of Christianity from Schleiermacher to Barth. London: SPCK, 
1984. p. 101.) Schleiermacher's hesitation may be justified when we read of "Die 
Tendenz 'Dogmatik' als Umschreibung fiir den engeren Bereich kirchlich gebun-
dener Lehre, 'Systematische Theologie' dagegen als Begriff fiir das Ganze des 
Glaubens und des Glaubenswissens anzusehen ... " So Gerhard Sauter, "Dogmatik 1", 
op. cit.,-p. 54. 
189. I am thinking especially of Philipp Marheineke, whom Schleiermacher actually 
recruited into the faculty of theology in 1810. (See Max Lenz, Geschichteder Koniglichen 
Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitiit zu Berlin, Volume I, pp. 224-225. Halle: Verlag der 
Buchhandlungdes Waisenhauses, 1910.) In 1827 Marheineke brought out the 2nd ed. 
of his Die Grundlehren der christlichen Dogmatik als Wissenschaft. Berlin: Duncker und 
Humblot. According to Karl Barth, "Die zweite Fassung der Marheinekeschen Dog-
matik ... zeigt uns den Theologen nunmehr in der vollen Sauls-Riistung der Hegel-
schen Philosophie ... " (Die protestantische Theologie im 19. fahrhundert: Ihre Vorgeschichte 
und ihre Geschichte. Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 1981 [4th ed.], p. 447.) §105 (p. 60) 
of this 2nd ed. is typical: "Allein an und fiir sich liegen diese Glaubenswahrheiten der 
Schrift und Kirche tiefer, als die Vorstellung geht, sie sind spekulativ, und haben 
ihren Ursprung im absoluten Wissen." 
190. "Die FundamentaJtheologie erarbeitet Voraussetzungen und Grundlagen der ka-
tholischen Theologie ... wodurch das Wort 'Apologetik' meist durch 'Fundamental-
theologie' ersetzt wurde." (See the entry in Volume II of Historisches Worterbuch der 
Philosophie, edited by J. Ritter and K. Griinder. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buch-
gesellschaft, 1972. cols. 1135-1136; here col. 1135.) Pannenberg makes this identifica-
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tion of "philosophical theology" with Fundamentaltheologie in Wissenschaftstheorie und 
Theologie, op. cit., p. 328. The most ambitious identification of this sort has been 
undertaken by Michael Eckert, in Gott- Glauben und Wissen: Friedrich Schleiermachers 
PhilosophischeTheologie. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987. The following statement (p. 
29) is representative: "In Schleiermachers Konzept der Philosophischen Theologie 
fallt die wissenschafts-theoretische und sachlich-inhaltliche Obereinstimmung mit 
Ansatzen katholischer Fundamentaltheologie ganz unmittelbar auf." 
191. Hans-Joachim Birkner, Theologie und Philosophie, op. cit., p. 33. 
192. Ibid., p. 34n. 
193. Michael Eckert is very useful on this point: "In der Frage nach dem Wesen des 
christlichen Glaubens bestimmt Schleiermacher die Philosophische Theologie wis-
senschaftstheoretisch nicht als philosophische, sondem als theologische Grunddis-
ziplin, d.h. als allgemeine theologische Prinzipienlehre." (Gott--Glauben und Wissen, op. 
cit., p. 25.) Eckert confirms our view that philosophical theology gives the theologian 
his theological principles. 
194. Klh, §§39 & 40. 
195. l<D2, §41. 
196. l<D2, §§39 & 40. 
197. l<D2, §47. This discussion is consistent with the definition of Apologetik provided in 
Glaubenslehre2, §2.2, although there explicit reference is made to Apologetik as proceed-
ing out of Religionsphilosophie. Hence the emphasis upon the "description of the 
peculiar essence of Christianity and its relation to other 'Churches'." This aspect is 
not neglected in KD2 (see §43). The summary by August Domer in his Geleitwort to 
Volume I of Schleiermachers Werke, op. cit., pp. xix-xx, is very helpful: "Die Apologetik, 
als ein Teil der philosophischen Theologie, hat dann das empirische Christentum 
seinem eigentiimlichen Wesen nach im Verhiiltnis zu den anderen Religionen mit 
Hilfe der a us der Ethik gewonnenen Gesichtspunkte zu fixieren, und die Polemik hat 
die diesem Wesen widersprechenden Seiten der empirischen Ausgestaltung des 
Christentums kritisch zu beleuchten." 
198. Klh, §§58 & 60. Michael Eckert, Gott--Glauben und Wissen, op. cit., p. 21, supports our 
interpretation: '1st die 'Apologetik' nach aufSen gerichtet, so fallt der 'Polemik' die 
Aufgabe zu, in der Kirchengemeinschaft auftretende Kontroversen iiber das eigent-
lich Christliche klaren zu helfen." 
199. Glaubenslehre'l, §22.2. 
200. In Lucke, Schleiermacher complains that K.H. Sack has confused the task of the 
Introduction and-dogmatics proper (p. 374), and that he has not tal<en sufficiently 
seriously "the distinction between Introduction and the work of dogmatics itself' (p. 
376): "Habe ich also nicht Grund genug zu glauben, daa auch hier der Unterschied 
zwischen der Einleitung und dem Werke selbst nicht scharf genug gefaat worden 
ist?" (English Translation, pp. 78 & 79). Hans-Joachim Birkner takes up this point 
(Theologie und Philosophie, op. cit., p. 33n.) in discussing the substantial revision of the 
Introduction in the 2nd ed. of the Glaubenslehr~ "Schleiermachers Begriindung fiir 
die Neugestaltung der Einleitung nennt die Absicht, den Unterschied zwischen 
Dogmatik und Einleitung deutlicher zu markieren ... " Michael Eckert (Gott--Glauben 
und Wissen, op. cit, p. 11) makes the same observation: "Seine strukturell-formale 
Umgestaltung der 'Einleitung' der zweiten Auflage gegeniiber der ersten Auflage 
begriindet Schleiermacher mit dem Hinweis, daa Dogmatik und 'Einleitung' deut-
lich voneinander abzuheben seien ... " The shortcomings of Sack's interpretation do 
not prevent Schleiermacher from referring readers to Sack's Christliche Apologetik: 
V ersuch eines Handbuches (Hamburg: Friedrich Perthes, 1829) in §2 of Glaubenslehm .. 
While Sack, in tum, acknowledges his debt to Schleiermacher (Vorrede, p. x), I would 
have thought there was some danger in Sack's desire for German theology, "daa die 
spekulativen und die historischen Forschungen in Bezug auf das Fundament des 
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Christentums inniger vereinigt, gleichsam naher zusammengeriickt wiirden, als 
bisher geschehen ... " (p. viii). 
201. Glaubenslehre'l, §23.3: " ... wenn er innerhalb des Gebiets der Dogmatik stehenbleibt ... " 
This is an exceptionally important proviso, since it prescribes a "partial" methodology 
(in both senses of the word). Richard Kroner has said, " ... daiS der Philosoph erst dann 
seinen Beruf ganz erfiillt, wenn er nicht nur scheidet, sondern das Geschiedene auch 
wiedervereinigt." (Von Kant bisHegel, Volume 2, op. cit., p. 46.) It is hard to imagine 
that a philosopher could ever be satisfied with just one side of a two-sided coin, not 
least because "men are mostly right in what they affirm and wrong in what they 
deny": division of the confessional sort requires both affirmation and denial. This 
maxim is employed by F.D. Maurice and ascribed variously to Coleridge (by A.R. 
Vidler, The Church in an Age of Revolution: 1789 to the Present Day. London: Hodder 
and Stoughton, 1962. p. 84) and Leibniz. Presumably the task of the philosopher is to 
rise above all partiality. In a paradoxical sense, Schleiermacher' s insistence on sharp-
ening the distinction between the branches of Christianity must ultimately bring into 
clearer focus the inadequacies of any particular, segregated position. Schleiermacher 
seems to hint at something of this sort in §23.2, without saying so explicitly. Again, 
one is reminded of the Scholastic tag: "distinguish in order to unite"! (Seep. 48 above.) 
202. Glaubenslehrt:l, §23. Proposition: " ... nicht gleichgiiltig verhalten ... " The problem of 
Indifferentismus is defined in §56 (KDz) as "Gleichgiltkeit (sic) in Bezug auf das 
eigentiimliche Geprage der christlichen Frommigkeit ... " 
203. So Richard Crouter, ''Rhetoric and Substance in Schleiermacher's Revision of The 
Christian Faith (1821-1822)" in The Journal of Religion, Volume 60 (1980). pp. 285-306; 
here p. 294. An extensive study of the relation of the two Introductions was under-
taken by Chang Kyun Mock in his Ph.D. dissertation for Drew University (1986): "The 
Development of Schleiermacher's Doctrine of God: A Comparative Study of the 
Introduction and Part 1 of the First and Second Editions of Schleiermacher' s Glauben-
slehre". Mock (p. 64) agrees with Crouter that "in the revision of the Glaubenslehre he 
[Schleiermacher] tried to bring out the independence of dogmatics from speculative 
reflection." 
204. See Brian A. Gerrish, "Friedrich Schleiermacher", op. cit., p. 131. 
205. KDz, §47: "die Stetigkeit des Wesentlichen im Christentume ... " 
206. Heinrich Scholz, Christentum und Wissenschaft in Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre: Ein 
Beitrag zum V erstiindnis der Schleiermacherschen Theologie. Berlin: Arthur Glaue Verlag, 
1909. My reference is to the title of Scholz's 3rd Chapter. Scholz incorporates a 
quotation from Anmerkung 21 to the Second Speech (iiber die Religion, ed. Piinjer, p. 
145) in this important conclusion: "Man darf geradezu sagen, daiS Schleiermacher die 
apologetisehe A.ufgabe, 5oweit sie sich aufdie unmittelbare Verteidigung desChrist-
entums bezieht, durcheine fortgesetzt nach innen gewendete Polemik gegen unklare, 
'beschrankte und im tiefsten Grunde unreine Vorstellungen', wie sie sich innerhalb 
des Christentums selbst erzeugt haben, zur Durchfiihrung gebracht hat." Note 
Scholz's subtle conjunction of Apologetik and Polemik in this assessment (pp. 121-122). 
207. Seen. 200 above. Karl Heinrich Sack, Christliche Apologetik, op. cit., p. 5: "Philosophie 
wird unentbehrlich sein zur Erzeugung der Apologetik, denn da diese eine Auffas-
sung des Wesens der christlichen Religion sein soli ... " (§3). 
208. Michael Eckert's summary of his theme in Gott-Glauben und Wissen, op. cit., p. 33, 
could just as well serve as a statement of the task we have set for ourselves in this 
dissertation: ''Die Frage nach dem Verhaltnis von Philosophie und Theologie in 
Schleiermachers Werk, der das Hauptinteresse der Interpretationsgeschichte gilt, 
stellt sich in der vorliegenden Arbeit als die Frage nach dem Verhaltnis von Philoso-
phie und Theologie in Schleiermachers Philosophischer Theologie dar." 
209. KD2, §§85 & 195. 
210. KDz, §103: "fiir aile Zeiten normalen Darstellung des Christentums ... " 
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211. See the Vorrede to Schleiermacher's "Ueber die Schriften des Lukas, ein kritischer 
Versuch" in SW, Volume 1/2 (1836), pp. xiii-xiv: "die kritisiche Bearbeitung der 
heiligen Biicher ... der reinste einfaltigste Glaube und die scharfste Priifung eins und 
dasselbe sind ... " This Preface was written in 1817 and was translated by Connop 
Thirlwall in A Critical Essay on the Gospel of St. Luke. London: John Taylor, 1825. p. iv. 
212. See Nicholas Lash, 'What might martyrdom mean?" in Suffering and Martyrdom in the 
New Testament, edited by William Horbury and Brian McNeil. Cambridge University 
Press, 1981. pp. 183-198; here p. 187. 
213. See Hans-Joachim Birkner, Schleiermachers christliche Sittenlehre, op. cit., p. 58. 
214. Klh §§232, 238,239 & 241. 
215. Hans-Joachim Birkner, Schleiermachers christliche Sittenlehre, op. cit., p. 66. 
216. KD2, §223. 
217. KD2, §226: " ... so riihrt doch die Terminologie der eigentlichen Glaubenslehre grolSen-
teils aus der philosophischen Wissenschaft her, die unter dem Namen rationaler 
Theologie ihren Ort in der Meta physik hatte ... " 
218. Title for 2.Teil, 3.Abschnitt of KD2-immediately preceding §195. 
219. See the editorial note to §95 of Brief Outline, p. 54. 
220. Hans-Joachim Birkner, Schleiermachers christliche Sittenlehre, op. cit., p. 67. 
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I. In his lectures on philosophical theology, delivered in the early 1780s, 
Enlightenment Kant provided his students with this definition: "theology ... is the system 
Theology 
of our knowledge of the highest being." As Kant's lectures make clear, this 
system of knowledge is not an aggregate "in which one thing is placed next 
to another", but a knowledge in which the "idea of the whole rules 
throughout". This telling discussion 1 of "systematic theology" is followed in 
Kant's lectures by a reference to theologia archetypa and theologia ectypa, the 
division of theology into the knowledge of His own being that only God can 
have (archetypa), and the knowledge that human beings can have of God 
("was von Gott in der menschlichen Natur lieget"- ectypa). Kant has taken 
over this theological distinction from Protestant orthodoxy, as we might find 
it, for instance, in the great theological textbook by J.A. Quenstedt, which 
Schleiermacher also consulted in the preparation of his own dogmatic 
2 theology. 
For Quenstedt, theology is the teaching about God and divine things 
(sermo de Deo et rebus divinis),3 and he, in his tum, cites a beloved tag by St. 
Thomas Aquinas, which says that "theology is taught by God, teaches God, 
and leads to God". 4 Quenstedt then distinguishes between theologia archetypa 
("that very same infinite wisdom of God by which God knows Himself in 
Himself")5 and theologia ectypa, which is a communicated knowledge (scientia 
communicata)6 - finite and created7 - and a kind of emanation or image of 
the knowledge that God has of Himself.8 
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This now largely unfamiliar distinction continues to have an important 
Nachleben, even in our own day and especially with respect to Schleier-
macher. In a justly celebrated article on "Schleiermacher's Doctrine of the 
Divine Attributes", Gerhard Ebeling claims that the old bifurcation of theo-
logia and oikonomia must be transcended.9 In this context, theologia is under-
stood as "metaphysical" assertions about the divine nature, and oikonomia is 
a largely historical account of the traces of the divine in the world, i.e. the 
knowledge that we can have of God through his revelation of Himself in 
historical time and activity. Broadly speaking, this "false" distinction con-
forms to the earlier one above, and we note that in Schleiermacher' s "histori-
cal theology" there is no room for any metaphysical assertion about God. If 
speculative thinkers must talk about the highest reality, it would be as well 
for them to speak of "the supreme being", so that their concept cannot be 
confused with the "God", who is the object of religious consciousness.10 It 
will be one of our main aims to discover in what sense (if any) Schleier-
macher' sown understanding of theology transcends this ancient distinction 
-an unfriendly assessment might speak more readily of a "suppression" 
than a transcendence. 
In Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology there is no theologia archetypa, 
as this surpasses any knowledge of God that we might possibly possess. 
Since we have no access to that knowledge which only God has of Himself, 
it is impossible for us to speak about it.11 Just at this point, we can anticipate 
the-enormous difficulty that Schleiermacher-had in formulating any coher-
ent doctrine of the Trinity at the end of his Glaubenslehre, since such a 
doctrine, by its very nature, must be an endeavour to say something about 
the inner divine life. As LA. Domer correctly argues in his System der 
christlichen Glaubenslehre, theology cannot rest with an "economic"12 discus-
sion of the Trinity cut loose from God's actual being.13 Theologia ectypa is 
either an actual trace of the divine life as it is in itself or it is not.14 If it is not 
an actual trace, theology in any form ceases to tell us much about God, its 
putative object. 
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This, of course, touches the nerve of Hegel's great dispute with 
Schleiermacher. The scandal of modern theology in Hegel's view was its 
inability actually to tell us anything about God, the supposed subject of the 
discipline. Given the temerity of his theological colleagues at the University 
of Berlin, Hegel invited students of Christian theology to attend lectures in 
the philosophical faculty, where the traditional content of the Christian faith 
was still taken seriously.15 For Hegel, Schleiermacher was a representative 
of "die unbefriedigte AufkHirung", 16 a form of consciousness best described 
in Nietzsche's pithy assertion that modem philosophy has successfully 
brought us to the point where we can know with absolute certainty that we 
cannot know the thing we most want to know.17 In defiant contrast to 
Schleiermacher, Hegel asserts that his lectures on the philosophy of religion 
have no other object than the knowledge of God (Gott zu erkennen).18 In this, 
Hegel understands himself as completely out of step with "the modem 
standpoint".19 
The undisputed embodiment of the modern standpoint is, of course, 
the Kantian philosophy. In Kant's lectures on moral philosophy, he is 
reported to have said, "Religion has no need of any speculative knowledge 
of God". 20 The whole of Schleiermacher' s Glaubenslehre is an attempt to show 
how this can be true. In Kant's Critique of Judgement, we may find a further 
principle to which the Glaubenslehre conforms. There, Kant speculates that 
even if a religion could be constructed along theoretical lines, it would be 
wholly different from one based on "disposition" or "sentiment"21 (Gesin-
nung- wherein the essence of religion lies).22 This accords perfectly with 
Schleiermacher's "theoretical" admission of a speculative - "dialectical" 
would conform more closely to his own usage- knowledge of God, which 
would, paradoxically enough, have nothing to do with "religion". Apart 
from Schleiermacher' swell-attested desire not to have religion reduced to a 
theoretical underpinning for morality,23 he would also dispute Kant's asser-
tion that it is possible for the same individual to be an atheist in the realm 
of speculation; but a theist (or theologian!) in practice, i.e. one who honours 
God (see pp. 118-119 above). The reader now knows very well that this state 
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of affairs would be typical of the divided consciousness which Schleier-
macher rejected in his correspondence with Jacobi. There is in Schleier-
macher a genuine attempt to move beyond the "divided consciousness" 
which is the legacy of the Enlightenment.24 But in contrast to Hegel, this is 
achieved by moving down the strictly divided tracks of speculation and 
religious consciousness simultaneously.25 For the engine to advance, both 
tracks must be travelled together (and in the same direction), although the 
tracks always remain divided in this life. 
It is of considerable interest to learn from Schleiermacher that the Reforma-
tion itself puts down the tracks along which modem scholarship may in 
future travel. In his Open Letters, he assures his readership that the aim of 
the Reformation must be seen to be the drawing up of a lasting "contract" 
between 
the living Christian faith and completely free, independent scientific 
inquiry, so that faith does not hinder science and science does not 
exclude faith ... 26 
However difficult this view may be to reconcile with actual Reformation 
sentiments like those Luther expressed concerning the "independent scien-
tific inquiry" of an Aristotle ("the very devil himself") ,27 it further underlines 
the strongly confessional understanding of Christianity which this armistice 
and concordat presupposes. It is presumably the Reformation's emphasis 
on "justification -by faith alone" whi<?h gives other forms -of human activity 
free rein. If justification by faith establishes the independence of religion 
from the prevailing cultural milieu,28 it cannot then prevent the inde-
pendence of our common culture from the prevailing religious milieu. But 
here we have no more than the conditions which obtain during a "cold war"; 
we do not yet have the circumstances which make possible the "parallel" 
development presupposed by Schleiermacher's detente. 
It is as Protestants, then, that we may proceed down our dual carriage-
way of religious and philosophical consciousness with complete integrity 
and with a clear conscience! This rather allegorical journey may acquire a 
human face if we, as Protestant "systematic theologians" (seep. 109 above), 
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attempt to travel down the paths that Hegel and Schleiermacher simulta-
neously laid for future generations-after all, we are the heirs of both! 
Although we have recently been told that "their systems were completely 
different", this apparently has not prevented "modern liberal theology" from 
combining them!29 We know that the tracks must be parallel and that the 
wheels for our journey must run in tandem (otherwise human consciousness 
will become hopelessly divided), yet this can only be possible if each track 
continually influences the other's direction of travel. We need to discover 
how the tracks may be divided and yet united at one and the same time. In 
the first instance, the question must be directed towards two forms of 
consciousness, objective and subjective, but there are compelling reasons to 
identify these forms of consciousness with the names of Hegel and Schleier-
macher (just as the first generation of their common heirs in fact did),30 to 
see whether they do exhibit features of a parallel development, and whether 
they can actually be made to run in tandem. 
The place to begin, as we have already clearly suggested, is with the 
discipline of "philosophical theology", where we may find united that which 
in principle is meantto be distinct. It has been rightly said that this discipline, 
which acts as a kind of "fuse" between the conceptual and the empirical, 
between the speculative and the positive, still awaits its detailed explica-
tion31 in Schleiermacher's great system of the disciplines. Yet the necessity 
of some de facto meeting of what is notionally distinct has been established. 
I have spoken of its- being a "fuse" quite deliberately: it establishes the 
principle of a union, while building in a safeguard against illegimate traffic. 
(Schleiermacher would, of course, want to protect his dogmatic theology 
against the intrusion of "alien" speculative elements. Any unwarranted 
overloading would "blow" the fuse.) 
From the insinuations offered above, it cannot be a matter of indif-
ference to this dissertation that philosophical theology and dogmatic theo-
logy (or Glaubenslehre) find a common home32 in the Introduction to 
Schleiermacher's The Christian Faith (as they do also in a very sketchy form 
in the introductory material to his lectures on church history).33 How well 
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this discipline actually functions as a "fuse" is in effect our central question. 
(It would be churlish even at this late stage not to acknowledge that, 
according to the "authorized" Schleiermacher tradition, there is no "dog-
matic theology" as such to be found in the Introduction to his Glaubenslehre. 34 
Nonetheless, they are still two types of theology, in some state of interdepend-
ence, and it seems that one cannot get going without the other. Schleier-
macher may be right that "philosophical theology" must not be confused 
with "dogmatic theology", but apparently a Glaubenslehre cannot be written 
at all until philosophical theology has made the Procrustean bed into which 
it will fit. German scholars nowadays prefer to speak of a Rahmen or a Raster 
within which "dogmatic theology" may properly be located.35 The latter 
term suggests a "grid" or "screen" where this theological discipline may find 
itself welcome, just because it cannot now exceed its limits. 
III. A very different kind of correlation has been proposed by Ingolf Dalferth of 
Perspectival Tiibingen. He suggests that the two forms of consciousness are best port-
Theology 
rayed as complementary (or "competing"!) perspectives. These are the inter-
nal and external perspectives, which reflect whether one is standing inside 
or outside the community of faith. The distinction recognizes the subject's 
self-understanding within the faith, and the understanding others may have 
of the subject (from outside the faith). This leads Dalferth to formulate the 
principle of the double description (Prinzip der doppelten Beschreibung):36 
there is then the inner perspective of llie participants and the external 
perspective of the spectators. For the Christian there is the perspective of 
faith, yet for those outside the community of faith, the phenomenon of faith 
still exists from the perspective of the world at large. 
My immediate problem with this "perspectival" language is that one 
might be lulled into thinking that a rough equivalence obtains between these 
two perspectives. Everything has this inner and outer quality, and descrip-
tion occurs according to where one stands. While it is certainly true that there 
is a community of faith, and also a body of individuals who firmly situate 
themselves outside that community's life, where are we to place individuals 
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whom the community of faith may repulse, but who nevertheless under-
stand themselves as within its portals? Where, for instance, would we locate 
Hegel's perspective? Is his perspective internal or external?37 (And what 
would this perspectival language be able to tell us about D.P. Strauss?) 
But the more serious difficulty occurs when we jump to the so-called 
Weltperspektive. Are we seriously to entertain the possibility of an external 
perspective with relation to it? As every one of us is a citizen of the world, 
presumably we must all hold this Weltperspektive internally! And what 
would be implied by the notion of holding an external relation to philosophy, 
for example? In Schleiermacher's own language, presumably, Weltperspek-
tive finds its closest affinity to Weltweisheit (seep. 105 above). Could the man 
of faith formulate a persuasive account of it from an "external" perspective? 
Dalferth's handy analysis of "the principle of double description" may 
be a useful diagnostic tool when discussing faith, but it is hardly capable of 
the universal application for which the author gives it credit. One function 
of this "principle" is to demonstrate that a faith-and its theological expres-
sion-which ignores the external perspective will be the weaker for it, and 
to that extent the "principle" helps to highlight one of Schleiermacher's very 
great strengths. Not only did Schleiermacher endorse the everlasting "con-
tract" between "living Christian faith" and modern scientific research (in the 
sense of Wissenschaft), but he was himself party to both sides of the contract 
to a singular degree.38 Furthermore, Dalferth's principle rightly reminds us 
that the whole organization of Schleiermacher's theological and extra-theo-
logical disciplines has about it this sense of a movement from external to 
internal. If the reader recalls the movement from Ethik, Religionsphilosophie, 
philosophical theology to dogmatic theology, it is instructive to think of this 
as a movement from what is external to what is internal. But this can also be 
misleading, because again I doubt whether the movement can be reversed. 
Is it really possible to think of moving from practical theology to historical 
theology to philosophical theology to Religionsphilosophie to Ethik? The 
movement as it is laid out for us is from the root to the crown,39 from the 
general to the particular, not vice versa. Certainly, as Schleiermacher pres-
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ents his Glaubenslehre, the theological principles cannot be worked out 
inductively as one goes along.40 
Stephen Sykes makes an opportune allusion to Schleiermacher's 
"double-sided" theory of Christianity. This theory, as Schleiermacher devel-
ops it "critically", is neither purely external and speculative-as speculation 
can only proceed in abstraction from the concrete givenness of piety-nor 
is it simply the empirical (presumably internal) "reading off of the essence of 
Christianity directly from its history". Sykes concludes that the critical 
method employed in Schleiermacher' s philosophical theology (in so far as 
that discipline really comes to life in any of Schleiermacher' s publications or 
lectures) is a via media,41 in which the speculative and empirical are played 
off against one another and provide the necessary "checks and balances" for 
one another. 
In Dalferth's discussion of inner and outer perspectives we have not 
yet escaped the necessity of developing a Metaperspektive, in which the 
internal and the external can be reintegrated theologically.42 If this is 
possible anywhere in Schleiermacher's thought, it can only occur in his 
philosophical theology (this Bindeglied)43 with its finely tuned balance of 
speculation and Empirie. While Schleiermacher 
insisted that Christian theology must be developed from the standpoint 
of Faith ... the external perspective of Reason is the necessary correlate 
of the internal perspective of Faith. He therefore proposed to integrate 
the internal and external perspectives on faith ... in a carefully balanced 
way. Although irreducibly~different because of their different starting 
points and contexts of plausibility, theology and philosophy perfectly 
correspond to each other. 44 
With this convenient conclusion we seem to have arrived back at our starting 
point on a dual carriageway of Weltweisheit and faith, philosophy and 
theology, running their parallel courses, separate but united. However, we 
must not ignore the determination that Dalferth finds in both Luther and 
Barth to have a truly "theological theology".45 As far as I understand this 
notion, this seems to be what Schleiermacher is also seeking in his dogmatic 
or historical theology-a theoiogy free of all alien speculative ingredients 
and distractions.46 However, there cannot be any dogmatic theology with-
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out philosophical theology at its foundation.47 We know from Schleier-
macher's own writings that philosophy and theology cannot be kept strictly 
separated, and we shall in time be led to query whether the highest forms 
of subjective and objective consciousness (Glaubenslehrez §28.3) can really 
maintain a relation of stable equilibrium. With the great F.C. Baur, we shall 
be forced to ask whether subjective consciousness-initshighestexpression-
must not ultimately transform itself into that objective consciousness-
which alone is able to provide the unity of internal and external 
perspectives.48 
IV. Schleiermacher, as we know, prepared his public for the second edition of 
Two Open his Glaubenslehre by publishing two "open letters" as a general statement of 
Letters 
intent. I should like to provide my readers with two items of background 
information which might serve the same purpose. It is not incidental to this 
debate that Schleiermacher retained for himself the right to give university 
lectures widely beyond the confines of the Faculty of Theology, in virtue of 
his membership of the Prussian Academy of Sciences.49 Nor is it without 
signifcance that Schleiermacher effectively barred Hegel from membership 
in the Academy, nearly to the end of his life. 5° The Academy was founded 
in Berlin in 1700 by Leibniz, so that it both considerably predated the 
University and also provided a basis upon which the University of Berlin 
might be built. Prussia had suffered a crushing defeat by the Napoleonic 
forces and the explicit intention in the founding of the University was that 
(in the King's words) the state was to make good by means of spiritual 
energy (geistige Kriifte), what had been lost materially.51 The Academy had 
one outstanding feature which distinguished it from all the other academies 
dotted around Europe, viz. its section devoted to speculative philosophy 
(Klasse fiir spekulative Philosophie), established in the Academy during its 
reorganization under Friedrich the Great in 1744-1746.52 It was only fitting 
that Germany's greatest speculative philosophers (Fichte and Hegel) should 
have been the first two occupants of the chair of philosophy in Berlin. But it 
is surely a supreme irony that Berlin possessed this unique forum for 
150 
Chapter Three 
Schleiermacher' s Rational Theology 
speculative philosophy a) of which Schleiermacher was the most famous 
member53 -of which, indeed, he became the secretary; b) from which Hegel 
was excluded; and c) of which Schleiermacher managed to engineer the 
dissolution in 1828.54 These historical rivalries convey very well with what 
zeal Schleierrnacher, philosopher and theologian, sought to keep the specu-
lative philosophy (endemic to Berlin) firmly in its place. 
Berlin, then, had won for itself an international distinction as a city 
which advanced the cause of speculative philosophy, and the city was in 
due course rewarded by becoming the venue for the greatest lectures ever 
given in the subject. Schleiermacher, who drank deeply at this well, charac-
teristically struck out on his own independent course by pursuing the 
speculative in philosophy and the empirical in theology,55 with an integrity 
no one has ever matched before or since. Hans-Joachim Birkner perfectly 
captures the spirit of the man: 
Sein Lebenswerk ist gekennzeichnet durch eine Universalitat und in ihr 
durch eine V erbindung von philosophischer und theologischer Arbeit, 
die ungewohnlich, ja einzigartig anmutet .. . Man kann dieses Neben-
einander, diese 'Symbiose' geradezu als eine durchgangige Signatur 
seines Werdens und seines Wirkens ansehen.56 
Our second point relates directly to this "symbiosis", which we may 
regard as Schleierrnacher' s trademark. What can this imply but that-what-
ever he says to the contrary-Schleiermacher's theology is inevitably pol-
luted by the great speculative spirit of the age? And so his own 
contemporaries thought. One of the most interesting passages in his Open 
Letters is the acknowledgement that some of Schleiermacher's readers have 
claimed to see him on the high road of the speculative theology. This 
theology has its similarities to the Ebionite heresy, where the historical 
uniqueness of Christ the redeemer is softened, presumably to make room 
for some abstract and general philosophical account concerning the essential 
relation of God and man. The philosophical trappings make this road a 
"highway" which looks down upon the crudities of the Ebionite position: it 
is on that xaltPd path hat Schleiermac.l-ter is supposed to have been seen. 
He assures us, however, that this could only have been his phantom, his 
Doppelganger. 57 
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At its most primitive, this striking image conjures up no more than a 
case of mistaken identity through a physical resemblance. In this sense, 
many dogmatic propositions in the Glaubenslehre will have their "doubles" 
in the speculative theologies of Schleiermacher's colleagues.58 But this 
primitive sense of Doppelganger was being made to give way to a deeper, 
more psychological interpretation by the Romantic authors who were 
Schleiermacher' s contemporaries. First in Jean Paul's Siebenkiis (1795) ,59 and 
then in the novels and short stories of E. T.A. Hoffmann,60 Doppelganger came 
to refer to the self-projection of the dark, hidden, unresolved side of a human 
personality. Under Hoffmann's skilful artistry, the Doppelganger appears 
over and over to confront the original with the concrete actualization of inner 
hidden longings and most secret thoughts. The Doppelganger then is the one 
"who walks always beside",61 and it is to that shadowy figure that this thesis 
is dedicated. Our subject claims not to recognize the Schleiermacher with 
whom his critics are locked in combat:62 they have confused the authentic 
theologian with his "double". Our aim is to untangle the confusion; we 
believe there to be a case to answer. 
Schleiermacher has already told us that a great deal of the responsi-
bility for the appearance of this phantom hangs upon the "dangerous 
Introduction" to his Glaubenslehre which needs "more clearly and sharply" 
to be separated from the body of the work.63 It is in the less empirical aspects 
of the Introduction that shadows cast by the Doppelganger have their origin. 
F.C. Baur certainly believed that the "speculative" principles of Schleter-
macher's Introduction governed everything that followed in the body of the 
work.64 With "misunderstandings" of this sort in mind, the Introduction to 
the second edition is apparently "structurally recast in order to bring out the 
independence of dogmatics in relation to philosophic or other modes of 
nontheological reflection".65 The haunting figure of the Doppelganger sug-
gests that this independence is not yet complete. One of the problems with 
establishing your independence from "modes of non theological reflection" 
is that you have be sure exactly what they are, and so the necessity for an 
Introduction cannot be obviated. At the very least the properly theological 
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and the genuinely "non theological" have to be distinguished, so that no illicit 
traffic occurs between them. In what form of reflection is it possible to 
distinguish the theological and the non theological from one another? Pres-
umably this involves some kind of "metaperspective" which can do justice 
to both sides of the equation. To free yourself of all philosophical influences, 
you have to know precisely what they are, and to that extent you remain 
dependent on the very discipline from which you seek your independence! 
You must know the enemy's exact location, if you are to avoid stumbling 
into the opposition camp unwittingly. 
The position is, of course, drastically complicated by the fundamental 
article of Schleierrnacher studies, which can be stated just as baldly as this: 
"Ein Gegensatz zwischen Philosophie und christlicher Theologie findet in 
Schleiermachers System nicht statt."66 This principle cannot be articulated 
solely or simply from a theological perspective; it will be necessary to ask 
the philosophers what they think as well. Only when we know the actual 
content of relevant philosophical propositions shall we be in a position to 
judge their indifference to, their compatibility with, or their contradiction of 
our cherished theological propositions. A notorious recent novel has de-
scribed a revenant ghost as "unfinished business":67 it is the spectre of 
Schleiermacher's dependent independence of speculative propositions that 
has me in thrall. 
Schleierrnacher himself recognized the problems created in this regard 
by the non-dogmatic Introduction to-his Glaubenslehre, which also contained 
"modes of non theological reflection". This required two immediate respon-
ses both of which are suggested in Schleierrnacher' s Open Letters: i) a dearly 
visible crevice or chasm (Kluft)68 must be established between the Introduc-
tion and the body of the work, the dogmatic theology. This would minimize 
the dependence of the latter on the former. ii) We have to learn to view the 
Introduction to the Glaubenslehre as a particular kind of theological disci-
pline,69 something it must be, of course, if philosophical theology is properly 
located there, Michael Eckert's summary of these two points cannot be 
paraphrased: 
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Seine strukturell-formale Umgestaltung der 'Einleitung' der zweiten 
Auflage gegeniiber der ersten Auflage begriindet Schleiermacher mit 
dem Hinweis, daB Dogmatik und 'Einleitung' deutlich voneinander 
abzuheben seien, da die 'Einleitung' als 'besondere theologische Disziplin 
mit denjenigen allgemeinen Wissenschaften, an welche sie sich ihrer 
wissenschaftlichen Form we,en vorzuglich zu halten hat' auf spezifi-
sche Weise zusammenhangt. 0 
The difficulty here, as we have been repeating ad nauseam, is not how 
philosophical theology relates to the other sciences, of which there is no 
doubt; the difficulty is how philosophical theology relates to the Glaubens-
lehre-how it can "govem"71 dogmatic theology without introducing specu-
lation into dogmatic theology. 
The dilemma we are confronting here goes right back to "first begin-
nings" of the Reformation,72 where the ground work for the "eternal contract" 
was laid. Luther articulates the principles very clearly: philosophy and 
theology are differene3 and they must be carefully distinguished from one 
another. 74 But the speculativa vita is not on this account to be discarded: 
Christus non potest condpi, spectari nisi ratione, intellectu. Das ist vere 
speculativa vita. [1531] ... Et illa apprehensio Christi per fidem proprie 
est Speculativa vita ... Et ilia speculatio qua Christus apprehenditur ... 
est Theologica ... [153Sf5 
Schleiermacher himself never abandoned the speculative life (except appar-
ently in theology). It may be that a life devoted to "the apprehension of Christ 
through faith" need not be locked in mortal combat with speculation?6 
V. One of Schleiermacher' s most successful passages in the Open letters is 
Ortsbestimmungformulated in direct opposition to F.C. Baur. The claim is that the Introduc-
tion to the Glaubenslehre has nothing to do with any a priori demonstration 
of Christianity: the propositions of the Introduction are intended "only" to 
enable "the specification of the place of Christianity"(" ... in den Satzen der 
Einleitung ... nur die Ortsbestimmung ... dafS es hier nur darauf ankomme, 
dem Christentum seinen Ort zu bestimmen").77 As Brian Gerrish explains 
this rather obscure concept of "placement", the work of the Introduction is 
actualiy twofold: i) to find the place of piety "among the various functions 
of the human spirit"; and then ii) to find the place of Christianity (ultimately 
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in its specifically Protestant manifestation) "among the various possible 
modifications of the religious consciousness".78 We must assume that it is 
the task of Ethik to secure the former, and the task of Religionsphilosophie and 
philosophical theology to bring the latter into scientific focus?9 It follows 
automatically from the above (if this summary is correct) that "not even a 
single properly dogmatic proposition" is to be found in the whole of the 
Introduction.80 In this sense, then, the Introduction is only a formal frame-
work in which dogmatic theology will be embedded.81 As we are now in a 
position to know very well, this work of "location" is speculative as well as 
empirical, and we shall still want to ask whether this (partly) speculative 
procedure will prove a genial "introduction" to a "wholly" empirical theo-
logy.82 What cannot be legitimate is Gerhard Ebeling's neat evasion of the 
problem by this simple declaration: 
Fiir SCHLEIERMACHER ist aber philosophische Theologie nicht eine philo-
sophische, sondem eine spezifisch theologische Disziplin, partiz\Eiert 
also an den Merkmalen der Theologie als positiver Wissenschaft. 
Presumably Ebeling would call §24 of the Kurze Darstellung into the discus-
sion as evidence. There Schleiermacher explicitly classifies philosophical 
theology as a "division" (Teil) of Christian theology. Nonetheless it is "built 
up" from the principles of Religionsphilosophie (von diesen Grundlagen aus), 
principles which, by definition, reach beyond the confines of a Christian 
discipline. §24 also makes clear that the two primary functions of philosoph-
ical theology are i) the fixing of concepts (Begriffsbestimmungen) and ii) the 
task of organizing the theological sciences.84 We do, of course, agree that 
both activities have positive, practical consequences, but surely the "philo-
sophical" element in the title is more than just a (misleading) convention.85 
The organization of theological disciplines has a "scientific" as well as a 
"positive" necessity; the science which undertakes this organization is 
formed from two directions-external and internal, if you will-and there-
fore "philosophical theology" is no misnomer. 
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The same dynamic applies to dogmatic theology, as is rather well 
illustrated in §4.1 of the first edition of the Glaubenslehre: the ecclesiastical 
worth of a section of the Glaubenslehre is determined by the fullness, the 
exhaustiveness of the treatment.86 The versatility (Vielseitigkeit) with which 
these sections actually lead into one another establishes their scientific 
worth. Each section must in its scientific mode be able to point backwards 
and forwards at once (§4.2), because the discipline becomes a science, as we 
know, only through the principle of Zusammenhang.87 Nothing can stand in 
the Glaubenslehre just for the sake of systematic coherence (des Zusammen-
hangs willens), each proposition must represent positive pious emotion.88 On 
the other hand, propositions which are unable to contribute to this system-
atic coherence should only be regarded as preliminary; these propositions 
are ripe for either revision or excision (§4.3). In this way the demands of both 
perspectives, internal and external, are catered for at the same time. 
It is worth consulting the final paragraph of the equivalent section of 
the second edition (§17.3), since this makes clear that propositions concern-
ing the faith only become "dogmatic" with reference to their "scientific" 
character. Then Schleierrnacher concludes the section with a truly subtle 
distinction, which indicates that the ecclesiastical utility of dogmatic proposi-
tions increases in proportion to their "Wissenschaftlichkeit". Equally, those 
propositions attain their fullest stature, as their scientific content (der wis-
senschaftliche Gehalt) can be seen as !!bearing-traces" of an origin partial to the 
church's requirements.89 This deftly unites the ecclesiastical partiality with 
the scientific necessity and does begin to indicate how the discipline of 
dogmatic theology can-from an internal, ecclesiastical perspective-ap-
propriate the scientific tools it needs to carry out its work. The "positive" 
internal perspective can in this way bring the method (acquired externally) 
into alignment. Ironically enough, the more definite the ecclesiastical com-
mitment governing the discipline, the less likely it is that dogmatic theo-
logy-and Glaubenslehre-can be seen to be "ganz einfach und ehrlich nur 
empirisch!" 
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VI. No better summary of the complex issues raised above can be given than in 
Introduction this instructive catalogue provided by Gerhard Ebeling (and cited in full): 
and 
Glaubenslehre 
Es war die Leistung Schleiermachers, in enger Nachbarschaft zur ideal-
istischen Philosophie eine Konzeption theologischer Enzyklopadie zu 
entwerfen, die den Charakter der Theologie als positiver Wissenschaft 
entschieden bejaht, sie also nicht spekulativ in der Idee der Wissen-
schaft begriindet sein la.Gt und dennoch mit vorbildlicher Strenge an 
der Aufgabe einer formalen Enzyklopadie festhalt, einer Rechenschaft 
uber die Wissenschaftlichkeit und inn ere Organisation derTheologie. 90 
While Ebeling's obvious concern here is with the notion of the theological 
encylopedia, we do no great violence to Ebeling's conclusions by substitut-
ing the term "philosophical theology" ("the principles of one's whole theo-
logical way of thinking")91 in its place. In accord with this line of argument, 
Schleiermacher's philosophical theology was being worked out in a "specu-
lative climate", without losing its "positive" origins, and without simply 
grounding the discipline in speculation. Furthermore, philosophical theo-
logy is concerned with "Wissenschaftlichkeit" and the organization of the 
theological sciences.92 Ebeling's summary occasions two further observa-
tions: i) it appears as if the theological encyclopedia can only be constructed 
from within the discipline of philosophical theology (drawing upon the 
sciences external to theology as it sees fit). ii) As philosophical theology 
provides a Rechenschaft of the sGience of theology in general, dogmatic 
theology's brief is to provide a Rechenschaft of the Christian faith (in its 
present manifestation) in particular. The term Rechenschaft has attained the 
status of a shibboleth in contemporary Schleiermacher studies,93 because a 
Rechenschaft, which is descriptive, guarantees the positive (and therefore 
non-speculative) intent of the theological method. 
Ebeling's account is in complete harmony with the principles which 
Schleiermacher enunciated consistently throughout his life. Schleier-
macher' s first address to the Berlin Academy of Sciences (after being elected 
to membership in 1810) acknowledges that the Germans have the highest 
concept of philosophy and the deepest respect for it as a subject;94 nonethe-
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less the only appropriate treatment of the subject in the philosophical section 
of the Academy is by way of a "historical and critical" method. The Acad-
emy's work is apparently less suitable for those philosophers who are 
establishing or perfecting new "systems", which might lead the Academy 
into conflict with itself. 95 This is of considerable interest on two counts: i) it 
explains that Schleiermacher's hostility to Hegel's membership of the 
Academy is based on objective grounds, as well as personal hostility. The 
dissolution of the division for speculative philosophy into a "philosophisch-
historische Klasse" (1828) therefore realizes a principle that Schleiermacher 
first enunciated in 1810! ii) Schleiermacher's suggestion of how philosophy 
should be treated-so apparently out of step with a "division for speculative 
philosophy"-is perfectly consonant with his insistence that dogmatic the-
ology is a historical discipline, the correct treatment of which requires 
"theological reflection" as well as historisch-kritische Wissenschaft.96 
In discussing the address to the Academy in 1810, Richard Crouter 
states that Schleiermacher "formally disassociated himself from speculative 
philosophy".97 Although Schleiermacher does not directly allude to specu-
lative philosophy in the course of the address, it is true that Schleiermacher 
modestly suggests that he has not and will not produce a new system of 
philosophy.98 This statement stands in so far as Schleiermacher did not 
manage to publish his Dialektik in his lifetime. But in these unpublished 
lectures, he typically struck out on an individual course (which attracted 
considerable-attention at the Univetsify),99 and- wnich subsequent gener-
ations have come to regard as a salutary antidote to the Hegelian dialectic, 
which supposedly suppresses both individuality and difference.100 
Schleiermacher's humble disclaimer must not, however, obscure the 
fact that in his secular embodiment he was seeking a Weltweisheit, in which 
the speculative and the empirical would find the mutual inter-penetration 
they need in order to provide "der eigentlich gesuchte Begriff von Philoso-
phie".101 It does not do justice to Schleiermacher's notion simply to equate 
lAfeltweisheit ;vi.th philosophy (as Crouter does)}02 since this actually sup-
presses the important role given to speculation not only in Dialektik, but also 
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in establishing the theological disciplines. The speculative mode of thought 
is active and spontaneous and proceeds deductively in its attempt to grasp 
the phenomena in their essences. The empirical mode of reflection is more 
readily allied to a passive receptivity; it proceeds inductively, and grasps 
the phenomena as manifold, changeable, and in the process of becoming.103 
The significance of this interpenetration for the science of theology is ob-
vious: as philosophical theology, the science seeks the abiding essence of 
Christianity; as dogmatic theology it seeks to discover the manifold express-
ion of that essence (phenomenologically) in the historical doctrines of Chris-
tianity, as these may be discerned in the Church's contemporary life. It goes 
without saying that these doctrines are subject to variation, alteration and 
even abolition.104 
This is how Schleiermacher proposed to neutralize the speculative 
challenge he faced in nineteenth-century Berlin (first from Fichte, and then 
from Hegel). His insistence on a "positive" orientation was to be the bulwark 
against speculation in the dogmatic theology, just as his insistence on 
historical-critical method would prove the defence against the "despotism" 
of the Hegelian philosophy in the Academy.105 But we need to be clear that 
the problem is not with speculation as such, but more correctly with a 
speculative reason which usurps the prerogative properly reserved for 
empirical reflection. 
It must have been with a heavy heart, then, that Schleiermacher noted 
the-degree to whieh the first edition-of his Glaubenslehrehad been misunder-
stood-especially with the extensive references to the "speculative" nature 
of his dogmatic theology.106 The strong insistence on a "chasm" between the 
Introduction and the system of doctrines (the Glaubenslehre proper) is an 
attempt to redress this misunderstanding, so that no one will again be able 
to conclude that there is in the Glaubenslehre any attempt "to demonstrate or 
deduce Christianity"-the identifying characteristics of a speculative 
method. The Introduction, which is only intended as "a preliminary orien-
tation": and is not properly speaking dogmatic theolog'J at all,107 has been 
mistaken as the heart of the matter.108 
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It is highly instructive in this regard that §6 of the first edition is 
dropped in the revision of the Glaubenslehre. This section contains the 
notorious remark that we have "to proceed beyond Christianity and take our 
standpoint above it", in order to be able to compare it with other forms of 
faith. Richard Crouter gives this sympathetic interpretation of what Schleier-
macher intended by this proposition: 
In order to get started, dogmatics is dependent on a frame of reference 
that lies beyond the dogmatic and confessional perspective pure and 
simple. The problem of determining the essence of Christianity and 'the 
nature of Christian piety' must be settled before dogmatics proper can 
get started.109 
This is by now very familiar: the talk of "frame of reference" must be allied 
with something we can only acquire "externally"-always with the positive 
service of Christian theology in mind. In order to get started, we shall need 
the services of philosophical theology, which provides each one of us with 
"die Prinzipien seiner gesamten theologischen Denkungsart."110 It would 
then be quite absurd to argue that philosophy has been totally banished from 
the Glaubenslehre. But it must be shown that its influence has been restricted 
to certain clearly defined portions of a theological introduction. Under no 
circumstances must traces of this philosophical theology be discovered in 
the body of the text. 
VII. In a famous letter in which Schleiermacher mentions the revision of his 
The Revision Glaubenslehre, he informs his friend (J. Chr. GaB), that although everything 
of the 
Glaubrnslehre is being rewritten, the contents of his dogmatic theology remain completely 
the same.111 This assessment of the revision has not received universal 
support. Surely the most radical dissenting voice is that of Eric von der Luft, 
who regards the two editions of the Glaubenslehre as so different in style and 
substance that the later version should have been retitled; the Glaubenslehre 
was rewritten "from scratch".112 Martin Redeker's own introduction to the 
second edition assesses the situation more moderately: the later edition, of 
course, ::~ s · .to account comm~mts and criticisms from friends and oppo-
nents alike. As a consequence, the first edition is less inhibited and more 
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immediately expresses Schleiermacher's intention. Even so, despite all the 
differences between the two editions, the material dissimilarity (just as 
Schleiermacher himself indicated) is not overwhelming.113 
But we shall need to take particular account of the argument that in the 
second edition of the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher's Introduction is "struc-
turally recast in order to bring out the independence of dogmatics in relation 
to philosophic or other modes of nontheological reflection".114 The same 
point may be extracted from the marginalia to Schleiermacher' s own copy 
of the first edition. The note in question alludes to the hostile review of the 
Glaubenslehre, which appeared in Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung (1823). This 
review not surprisingly accuses Schleiermacher of cultivating a kind of 
philosophy of religion and theological speculation, about which he does not 
want to be completely open.115 The marginal comment states explicitly that 
dogmatic theology's Wissenschaftlichkeit is strictly a matter of form, i.e., it 
does not impinge upon the content.116 The refrain is taken up in the Open 
Letters, where Schleiermacher assures his readers that he will not allow his 
"philosophical dilettantism" to exercise any influence on the "content of the 
Glaubenslehre".117 This argument that "the scientific character of dogmatics 
was related to its form only" occasions real difficulties. First, it does not tally 
at all with §17.3 of Glaubenslehrf'l, where the fullness of dogmatic proposi-
tions is related to their "scientific content", as this "bears traces" of their 
ecclesiastical origin. Secondly, the marginal note is set beside §1.2 (Glauben-
slehre1), in which Schleiermacher argues that it is only-the-demand for the 
"wissenschaftlicher Zusammmenhang" which separates dogmatic theology 
from more popular forms of church instruction, such as catechism. These 
are not wholly bereft of Zusammenhang either, but as popular forms of 
instruction, they do not require the scholarship or the systematic arrange-
ment which we expect of dogmatic theology .118 If this is to be taken serious-
ly, we should then expect to find in the Glaubenslehre an account of Christian 
faith fully consonant with popular catechetical teaching: its substantial 
cli~ti'n01ul'~hina rhar~r+o,.;~.,;,.. nrtill bo the n'gour of l·t~ prosontat•on Thic;, +oo 
...,_ ,_. .. -"'o· ..... ····o -...L .......... "',...&. • ..., ....... '"' vv ... """" ... .J "'" ""' .. ... ... ...,, "' ' 
accords with Schleiermacher' s testimony in the Vorrede to Glaubenslehrfo2: the 
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originality of his dogmatic theology is confined to the systematic order in 
which it is presented, and to some of the terminology. There are therefore 
no grounds for placing Schleiermacher at the head of a new school of 
theology.119 This modest disclaimer is so far removed from the actual 
reception of Schleiermacher's work that it is hard to believe the author is 
not, in this matter, dissembling. 
Even Schleiermacher' s erstwhile colleague and lifelong champion, 
W.M.L. de Wette, would have found it difficult to support the diffidence 
expressed in the Preface. Initially, de Wette had suspected Schleiermacher, 
the preacher, of masking the real import of his theology, but was persuaded 
to give up this view by the same Friedrich Lucke, to whom the exceptionally 
important Open Letters are addressed: Lucke argued that Schleiermacher 
was neither "two-faced" as a preacher or as a theologian, nor was he subject 
to a divided consciousness.120 De Wette paid Schleiermacher the extreme 
compliment at the end of his career of writing a dogmatic theology, which 
reflected the very essence of the master's method. The title of this work alone 
shows the extent of the debt to Schleiermacher, viz. Das Wesen des christ lichen 
Glaubens vom Standpunkte des Glaubens (1846).121 It is, therefore, of great 
interest to read de Wette's assessment of the first edition, which he regarded 
as unquestionably the "first genuine systematic theology" since Calvin. He 
acknowledges that Schleiermacher excludes any philosophical treatment of 
the Trinity, but declares firmly that the first part of the Glaubenslehre is 
essentially philosophical or universally applicable-to humanity.l£2 
In the Open Letters, Schleiermacher is forced to acknowledge that it is 
not only the Introduction but also the first part of the Glaubenslehre ("ein 
bioSes AuBenwerk") which have caused misunderstandings as to the real 
intention of his "system of doctrines" .123 Schleiermacher discusses the possi-
bility of reversing the order of dogmatic presentation, so that the "natural 
attributes of God" would follow the sections on Christology, redemption 
and the kingdom of God. If we honestly accept this line of reasoning, we are 
approaching the point where nearly half of the Glaubenslehre can be said to 
be leading readers away from its real intention! The dilemma is com-
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pounded when we learn that Schleiermacher would have preferred to revise 
the Glaubenslehre by dispensing with all the propositions concerning at-
tributes of God and "characteristics of the world" (Beschaffenheiten der Welt): 
these propositions are incidental (Nebenformen) and do not affirm anything 
essential that is not already contained in the fundamental form (Grundform) 
of dogmatic proposition, i.e., descriptions of human states.124 It must there-
fore be possible to establish all dogmatic propositions as formulae for 
definite states of mind.125 The secondary forms (Nebenformen) of dogmatic 
proposition were only left in the first edition, because without them the 
Glaubenslehre would lose its "proper historical position and so its ecclesiast-
ical character". Nonetheless, they could have been dispensed with (sokiinnen 
jene heiden anderen ja gemiflt werden), and sooner or later our (sic) Glaubenslehre 
will indeed learn to manage without them.126 
The second edition is not quite so forthright; in principle, a theological 
reduction to propositions characteristic of the Grundformen is the only means 
of preventing the unwelcome intrusion of alien, "purely scientific proposi-
tions" into the Glaubenslehre. The other two forms of dogmatic statement 
would, from the point of view of this reduction, be superfluous. However 
such consistency in Schleiermacher' s presentation of Christian doctrine 
would be unzeitgemiifl, i.e., inopportune, because such a dogmatic theology 
would be without historical anchorage (ohne alle geschichtliche Haltung) and 
consequently it would be without a properly ecclesiastical character. Hence, 
a dogmatic-theology strictly adhering to the principles ofSchleiermacher' s 
Glaubenslehre "konnte auch, wie vollkommen treu es immer den Inhalt der 
christlichen Lehre wiedergabe, doch den eigentlichen Zweck aller Dogmatik 
nicht erfiillen."127 Is it any wonder then that F.C. Baur complained of "ein 
unstetes Hin- und Herschwanken aber zwischen verschiedenartigen Prin-
zipien", and asks Schleiermacher "sich bestimmter und unmittelbarer zu 
erkHiren, als bisher geschehen ist".128 
To summarize what Schleiermacher has told us: i) the Introduction to 
the Glaubenslehre is not the real begh'>lning of the work;129 it is a form of 
theological discipline, but it must be radically separated from the actual 
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dogmatic theology; it is the source of massive misinterpretation as to the real 
intention of the Glaubenslehre. ii) The first part of the Glaubenslehre is only an 
outstation (Auflenwerk) on the way to the heart of the matter; the doctrines 
developed in the first part could have been articulated after Christology and 
ecclesiology, and if this had been done they would have been seen "in a 
properly Christian light"; the Introduction and the first part together have 
duped the unwary as to the true nature of Schleiermacher's dogmatic 
theology. iii) The real purpose of the whole enterprise is "die Darstellung 
des eigentiimlich christlichen BewufStseins"; indeed the fundamental form 
of dogmatic proposition is the unmediated description130 of human relig-
ious consciousness; this tenacious link with "the realm of inner experi-
ence"131 is the only guarantee against the insinuation of "purely scientific 
propositions" into the Glaubenslehre; the other two forms of dogmatic prop-
osition are incidental (Nebenformen) and must be referred back to the Grund-
form; it is not possible at present to write a dogmatic theology which adheres 
strictly to the Grundform, because such a Glaubenslehre a) would be isolated 
from the contemporary Church, and ~) would therefore be unable to "fulfil 
the real purpose of all Dogmatics". As set out, Schleiermacher' s Glaubenslehre 
may be misleading its readers, but a more consistent treatment of the 
subject-matter, viz. "the description of the consciousness distinctive to Chris-
tianity" would be unecclesiastical, and hence in Schleiermacher's sense 
undogmatic. What can we conclude, then, but that we are left with a 
theological work which, by its-very construction, obscures its real intention 
just as much as it clarifies it? 
VIII. Schleiermacher's dogmatic method is dedicated to the divorce of christliche 
The Language Glaubenslehre from speculation}32 but, by its very nature as a "science", 
of Dogmatic 
Theology dogmatic theology cannot avoid some interaction with contemporary philo-
sophy. The central discussion of this point occurs in §31 of Glaubenslehret, 
and this may be usefully contrasted with the equivalent section of the second 
edition (§28). Both versions agree that "scientific" structure (wissenschaftliche 
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Gestaltung) is essential (wesentlich) to dogmatic theology. This defining 
quality is achieved by means of the "dialectical character of the language and 
the systematic arrangement". Presumably the latter requirement is realized 
in each (ecclesiastical) systematician's "philosophical theology";133 the for-
mer, "the suitable management of language in dogmatic presentation"134 is, 
however, fraught with difficulties. Dogmatic theology has no option but to 
employ the terminology it finds available in the world of science, scholarship 
and research, but just for that reason the greatest caution is required. 
The language which the church employs in any dogmatic theology is 
as much a given and ready-to-hand as the faith which it will be the duty of 
that language to describe. As Schleiermacher admits, a theologian's vocabu-
lary must be chosen from a bewildering variety of ages and systems (§28.1); 
nevertheless through a skilfully selected glossary it should be possible for 
such a theologian to devise adequate linguistic tools for dogmatic usage. 
Schleiermacher's perfectly consistent conclusion is that in this way "the 
danger of an influence hurtful to the interests of Christian piety completely 
disappears".135 It is very much the task of this dissertation to throw such a 
convenient conclusion into doubt. 
A timely rejoinder to the above is Walter Kasper's (self-evident) con-
cession that the church cannot be "Herr <;fer Begriffsgeschichte"136-the 
concepts and technical vocabulary without which Christian piety would 
remain speechless come to have a life of their own, quite apart from their 
ecclesiastkal- utility (or otherwise). The most obvious- il-lustration of-this 
point is provided by the central Christian mystery with its talk of one God 
and three persons, or indeed one substance and three persons. The Greek 
concept of the hypostasis has been replaced by the Latin persona, 137 and as 
this fateful transfer of concepts has helped us to develop our Latin Christian 
understanding of the nature of personhood, so in turn the implications of 
divine personhood are drawn by the advance of the philosophical concept. 
That is the actual "dialectical" nature of human language: we adopt certain 
terms in order to describe a subject; in time those sa..T.e terms help us to 
discover what the subject really is. However unpalatable this conclusion is 
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in the present context, Schleiermacher understands how language works 
very well: in his seminal address on translation (before the Berlin Academy 
in 1813), he describes this "dialectical" process with real precision and 
insight: 
In diesem System der Sprache muB die Weisheit eines jeden aufgehen. 
J eder schopft a us dem vorhandenen{~eder hilft das nicht vorhandene 
aber vorgebildete ans Licht bringen. 
IX. Surely the most memorable entry in Schleiermacher's theological thesaurus 
The Feeling must be "das schlechthinnige Abhangigkeitsgefiihl", the seminal topic of §4 
of Absolute 
Dependence of the Introduction.139 Hans-Joachim Birkner has described this exposition 
as the "Lei tbegriff" of Schleiermacher' s theory of religion; it is a "Wesensbe-
stimmung" of religion, and provides the foundation both for Schleier-
macher's theory of Christianity and his interpretation of the tradition of 
Christian doctrine.140 According to Schleiermacher' s division of the text, this 
section on "the feeling of absolute dependence" falls within his attempt to 
define the cultural phenomenon of "church" and belongs beside those prop-
ositions borrowed from the speculative science that Schleiermacher calls 
Ethik.141 If we can accept the rough definition of Ethik as "Schleiermacher's 
equivalent of social science",142 then it might not be too great an imper-
tinence to suggest that while the definition of a community like "church" is 
properly a topic for the science called Ethik, the definition of Abhiingigkeits-
gefilhl as the essence of religion finds a more appropriate home in Schleier-
rriacher' s Dialeftik-where indeed Geftihl is defined- as "unmittelbares 
SelbstbewuBtsein" or "immediate self-consciousness".143 
This is not a negligible qualification, as this dissertation would tend to 
view Schleiermacher's "feeling of absolute dependence" as the speculative 
bedrock of the whole of Schleiermacher's "philosophy of religion" or, if one 
prefers, his philosophical theology. This more philosophical account of 
Schleiermacher's Leitbegriffis in no way diminished by the injunction not to 
translate schlechthinnig by the philosophical sounding word "absolute". 
Claude Welch suggests we substitute the more neutral terms "utter" or 
"unqualified".144 But in doing so, he ignores Schleiermacher's own stated 
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equation of schlechthinnig with absolut, as we may discover from Schleier-
macher's lecture notes for the Glaubenslehre. 145 The difficulty in finding the 
correct interpretation of Schleiermacher' s dogmatic theology begins right 
here in these opening propositions of the introduction: "the piety which 
forms the basis of all ecclesiastical communions is ... neither a knowing nor 
a doing", but, as the feeling of absolute dependence, it is a consciousness of 
being "in relation with God" (Beziehung mit Gott),146 the "Whence of our 
receptive and active existence"-as the English translation expresses it.147 
The translators, finding an easy equivalence in "active", do not linger over 
the prefix in the word "selbsttatig", nor do they bother to translate the word 
mitgesetzt in the crucial phrase "das in diesem SelbstbewuiStsein mitgesetzte 
Woher". As Schleierm.acher explains in his appended lecture notes, the word 
God designates precisely this "in dem urspriinglichen, schlechthinnigen 
Abhangigkeitsgefiihl Mitgesetzte."148 This is not a trifling editorial 
omission: only if we give this term mitgesetzt its proper due, can we grasp 
how "God is given to us in feeling in an original way". This feeling, which 
is the basic type (Grundform) of all piety, has God as its co-determinant 
(Mitbestimmende). Alongside the "absolute dependence ... there is given to 
man the immediate self-consciousness of it, which becomes a consciousness 
ofGod".149 Thisisthe"originalrevelationofGodtomanorinman"bymeans 
of which it is possible to launch this work of theology, this Glaubenslehre. 
It is ironic that this severely compressed discussion of Schleiermacher' s 
daunting argument can be perfectly summarized in this way: "Thus to kncrw 
oneself to be absolutely dependent and to be conscious of God is one and 
the same thing."150 The irony is that if the feeling of absolute dependence has 
any distinct function in this analysis it must be to get us away from the notion 
that dogmatic theology begins with God as "a rationally established idea",151 
something conceivable in itself, but of no concern in a work dedicated to 
Glaubenslehre, the explication of Christian piety. With perfect consistency, 
Schleiermacher concedes that such an original knowledge of God is entirely 
possible, but of no interest here, since there is no necessa•·y correlation of 
knowledge with piety-and here the subject-matter is piety. This neatly 
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confirms the position that he adopted in his Open Letters, viz. it is possible 
to drain the chalice of speculation, without discovering piety at the bot-
tom.152 And yet even in the pithy summary offered above, it is impossible 
to get away from the sense of "knowing" something in one's self- conscious-
ness. We may feel ourselves to be absolutely dependent, but we are made 
conscious of our "being in relation with God". 
To avoid entanglement with "rationally established" ideas, it is abso-
lutely imperative that Schleiermacher do away with any impious explanation 
of this feeling (unfromme Erkliirung dieses Gefiihls)}53 where "impious" is 
understood as any philosophical interpretation of this same consciousness 
which is "an und fiir sich ein Mitgesetztsein Gottes in SelbstbewuBtsein" 
(§30.1).154 It may then distress some to discover that the terminology of 
Abhiingigkeitsgefiihl has a venerable provenance in Fichte' s Wissenschaftslehre: 
a very early reference occurs in Fichte' s Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschafts-
lehre of 1794. There Fichte alludes to "das Gefiihl der Abhangigkeit unsers 
lch"}55 but this idea is considerably enhanced in the context of Fichte's 
Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre (1801/1802), where there are repeated 
references to "das unmittelbare Gefiihl der Gewiflheit (d.i. Absolutheit, 
Unerschiitterlichkeit, Unveranderlichkeit des Wissens)" .156 Emanuel Hirsch 
claims that it is impossible for anyone to deny that "Schleiermachers Lehre 
vom religiosen Gefiihl in dem entscheidenden Punkte erkenntnistheore-
tisch-formal hier vorgebildet ist" .157 The legion of theological commentators 
who have discussed this Leitbegriff hardly ever recognize or discuss tJ:lJs 
anomaly.158 Once this "coincidence" of Schleiermacher's Leitbegriff with 
Fichte's speculative concept is acknowledged, it will never be possible-in 
my opinion-to go back to a cosy description of the feeling of absolute 
dependence as "the preliminary, quasi-scientific yet common-sensical" sys-
tematic principle which governs the Glaubenslehre.159 
We cannot leave this patently inadequate discussion of pious feeling 
(properly a dissertation topic in itself) without reference to Hegel's infamous 
attack on ScJ:>Jciermacher in his introdu lion to Hinridu;' Religionsphilosophie 
(1822).160 This notoriously bad-tempered passage argues that if Schleier-
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macher intends us to take him seriously, then we are forced to conclude that 
of all God's creatures the dog must prove to be the best Christian, since the 
dog has this feeling of dependence pre-eminently. And for good measure 
Hegel cannot resist adding to the dog's other virtues the feelings of redemp-
tion (Erlosungsgefiihle) the animal experiences when it is offered a bone. This 
violent criticism did little to improve the already strained relations between 
these two great professors at the University of Berlin, butthere is much more 
at issue here than the convenient assertion that Hegel simply misunderstood 
what Schleiermacher meant by "feeling".161 At a superficial level, Hegel is 
only echoing the sentiment of Professor Baumgarten-Crusius, whom 
Schleiermacher cites in the first edition of the Glaubenslehre: "Das Gefiihl 
wird niemand zum Grund der Religion machen, der sich selbst versteht ... !" 
(§8. Anmerkung). The bitterness of Hegel's polemic indicates the gravity of 
what he thinks is at stake. 
In the second edition of the Glaubenslehre (i.e., published long after the 
appearance of the Hinrichs' Preface), Schleiermacher characterizes absolute 
dependence as that quality which adheres to all of finite existence, man 
differing only in possessing it as a matter of "immediate self-conscious-
ness".162 My sympathies are with Hegel in not understanding why this form 
of self-consciousness should be identified as a type of "feeling", unless, of 
course, the whole point is to put the "co-determinant" of this feeling beyond 
the reach of what Hegel would call "die denkende Vemunft".163 The real 
question that Hegel is posing-is whether any theology can-actually be con• 
structed from this foundation in feeling. Hegel suggests in the Preface that 
the essential legacy of the Kantian philosophy is a 
God deprived of all definite character, predicates and properties, lifted 
into a beyond where we cannot know Him, or rather reduced to an 
abstraction void of all content.164 
Hegel suspects that from this starting point in feeling all that the modern 
theologian will be able to discover is the "caput mortuum of a merely abstract 
Being", so that the Enlightenment leaves the Christian religion bereft of its 
crown jewels: "a truth that is known, an objective content, a doctrinal theo-
logy".165 
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The real vehemence of Hegel's remarks in this Preface can be attributed 
to both aspects of Schleiermacher's Leitbegriff. Hegel objects as much to the 
notion of "dependence" in religion, as he does to establishing a theological 
system upon the basis of "feeling". As Walter Jaeschke explains, this talk of 
Abhiingigkeit is (for Hegel) really a sign that the theologian is "hanging onto" 
the moment of finitude in religion,166 the exact opposite of what the coming 
of the Son of God is meant to accomplish: the breaking down of the dividing 
wall between God and man, between the infinite and the finite.167 With this 
reflection we have arrived at the nub of the conflict between these two great 
intellects: Schleiermacher refuses to draw the consequences of the "Mensch-
werdung Gottes": 
Diese Bestimmung, dag Gott Mensch wird, damit der endliche Geist 
das Bewtilltsein Gottes im Endlichen selbst habe, ist das schwerste 
Moment in der Religion.168 
Schleiermacher certainly does teach "that finite spirit has the consciousness 
of God within the finite itself"169-the feeling of absolute dependence is his 
means of affirming this-but Hegel condemns Schleiermacher' s squeamish-
ness in refusing to draw the consequences in a robust statement of Christian 
theology. Hegel alludes to Schleiermacher's theology in a letter to Hinrichs, 
and, clearly in some anger, denounces the first published volume of the 
Glaubenslehre: Hegel is aghast at the suggestion that this could claim to 
represent the theology of the (not yet) united branches of Lutheran and 
Reform~d Protestantism. He regards what is_ presented there asarroganta~d 
insipid.l70 Hegel cannot reconcile himself to this elevation of Abhlingigkeit, 
which he can only regard as a refusal to take seriously the freedom of the 
spirit which every Christian is offered. These words follow directly upon 
the infamous passage which extols the pious virtues of the dog: 
Der Geist hat aber in der Religion vielmehr seine Befreiung und das 
Gefiihl seiner gottlichen Freiheit; nur der freie Geist hat Religion, und 
kann Religion haben; was gebunden wird in der Religion, ist das 
natiirliche Gefiihl des Herzens, die besondere Subjektivitat; was in ihr 
frei wird, und eben damit wird, ist der Geist.171 
Jaeschke rightly concludes from passages like these, that there is more at 
work here than just a bad-tempered squabble with an unpopular colleague: 
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what is really at issue is "eine prinzipielle Kontroverse urn den Gottes- und 
Religionsbegriff".172 To complete this discussion it is only necessary to add 
that the controversy applies with equal force to the "Begriff der Theologie". 
One is entitled to ask the question how a theology is actually to be 
constructed from such an unpromising point of departure as that offered by 
the feeling of absolute dependence. Erik Schmidt suggests that Schleier-
macher' s Glaubenslehre is able to offer the reader more than a psychology of 
the religious consciousness just because those illicit and unwarranted "meta-
physical" elements (supposedly banished from the work in principle) are 
readmitted "through the back door", as it were. Schmidt is sure that, in the 
event, Schleiermacher proceeds to interpret the feeling of absolute depend-
ence as "geistiges Gefiihl",173 where Geist has to be understood in the same 
untranslatable sense that it carries in Hegel's Phiinomenologie des Geistes. 
It has been said in praise of Schleiermacher that his towering stature 
in Protestant theology derives from the fact that he was the first to recognize 
the need for, and was the first theologian to formulate, "dogmatics without 
dogmas".174 While finding this formula quite incomprehensible, Hegel 
would certainly be the first to agree that this is what Schleiermacher has 
presented us with. This naturally led to further conflicts. 
We know that Hegel probably decided to lecture on the philosophy of 
religion for the first time in 1821 because of the impending publication of 
the first volume of the Glaubenslehre}75 but the crossfire with Schleier-
macher's dogmatic theology continued unabated- until Hegel~s criticism 
achieved its "canonical" form in lectures given in 1827: Hegel laments the 
demise of doctrines like the Trinity and the miracles, which have been put 
in the shade by theology itself, with the ironic consequence that "much more 
of dogmatics has been preserved in philosophy than in dogmatics or in 
theology itself as such."176 Hegel identifies the source of this irony in "the 
finite thinking" of the theologians; that is, they continue to hang onto that 
finitude in thought and being which Hegel regards as incompatible with 
Christianity and which renders them incapable of comprehending the di-
vine. Hegel now reverses the common judgment which casts philosophy in 
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the role of the "spoiler" of faith: it is the contingent, finite thinking charac-
teristic of modem theology which places the eternal verities of the Christian 
religion in jeopardy: 
As a result of such a finite thinking and comprehending of the divine, 
or of what is in and for itself, as a result of this finite thinking of the 
absolute content, the fundamental doctrines of Christianity have for the 
most part disappeared from dogmatics. Philosophy is preeminently, 
though not exclusively, what is at present essentially orthodox; the 
propositions that have always been valid, the basic truths of Chris-
tianity, are maintained and preserved by it.177 
X. As we know, heterodoxy has a systematic function in Schleiermacher's 
Hetercxioxy Glaubenslehre (see page 98). His conviction that the "divinatory heterodoxy" 
at the heart of his theological method will provide the "orthodoxy" of future 
generations178 is the central "speculative" tenet of this whole enterprise. If 
speculation can be defined as investing in the future, as investing against 
the prevailing market sentiment or as "betting on an idea"} 79 then it is 
perfectly proper to award Schleiermacher the accolade of "speculative the-
ologian" par excellence. Surely, no one will be able at this stage to argue that 
a theology with this "divination" as its mainspring is "ganz einfach und 
ehrlich nur empirisch"! An evident occasion for our scepticism is provided 
by Schleiermacher's distinctive introduction of a bewildering variety of 
preparatory and proto-theological disciplines. Schleiermacher himself says 
of their first appearance in the Kurze Darstellung that these newcomers may 
be re~koned as "Gespenster ... theologische Disziplinen, die es nie gegeben 
habe und nie geben werde" .180 
The real dialectical subtlety of Schleiermacher's thought can here be 
given its full due. In a marginal note to the first edition of his Glaubenslehre, 
his summary of the function of heterodoxy is masterful: "Die Dogmatik ist 
vorziiglich durch das haretische entwickelt worden ist sie aber gebildet, so 
muB sie die Entstehung des haretischen verhindem ... "181 This may be 
understood in two complementary senses: the first incorporates the old saw 
that the impetus for the development of church doctrine was provided by 
the trinitarian and Christological heresies of the Church's first five cen-
turies.182 Edmund Burke's formula puts this most succinctly: "Our antagon-
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ist is our helper."183 But Schleiermacher also recognizes that element of 
"perpetual revolution" which Protestantism requires; the principle ecclesia 
semper reformanda est184 applies just as forcefully to the doctrinal life of 
"reformed" Christianity. Schleiermacher's remarks here on the "oriental" 
Christianity (der morgenliindischen Kirche) need to be given their full weight: 
its doctrinal development has come to an end, frozen, as it were, into an 
authentic example of "historical theology", and incapable of any genuine 
conversation "in den Zusammenhang des geistigen Weltverkehrs" (§23.1). 
It is just this attempt to grapple with the aporiai thrown up by modern secular 
consciousness which is a signal of the context within which the doctrinal 
"conversation" is taking place. If the context is to be provided by the Weltgeist 
and the Zeitgeist, then it is not so difficult to see how today's heterodoxy may 
become tomorrow's orthodoxy, and why we may have to learn "to do 
without" what to this point we have been "accustomed to regard as insep-
arably bound to the essence of Christianity".185 
There is a double challenge here: i) to retain the reforming instinct for 
Reinigung (Proposition to §24), the cleansing of Christian doctrine from the 
corruptions of scholasticism & ii) to respond (in part) to the heterodoxy of 
the present age by showing how Christianity might relate to religious 
positions at "different stages of development" (Proposition to §7} and sub-
ordinate levels of religious consciousness (which by an inner logic strive for 
the "purest form of monotheism" in Christianity).186 Schleiermacher's Reli-
gionsphilosophie-(a fragment-of a discipline in §§7;-10)-exhibits-an- extraordi-
nary affinity with the Hegelian dialectic, and we note with interest that once 
"the absolute standpoint" is attained in Christianity, no "wholesale relapse" 
is envisaged, nor will there occur any retreat into prior stages of religious 
consciousness-except as expressions of individual pathology: "Einzelne 
Ausnahmen werden immer mit krankhaften GemiitszusHinde zusammen-
hangen ... "!187 Christianity, it turns out in this phenomenological account, is 
"in der Tat die vollkommenste unter den am meisten entwickelten Religions-
formen" (§8.4).188 
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But the really important dialectical insight embedded in Schleier-
macher' s Religionsphilosophieis the notion that Christianity cannot be content 
to relate to prior or divergent forms of religious consciousness, as if they 
were nothing more than aberrations, just false forms of piety by contrast 
with the truth of Christianity. As Schleiermacher rightly explains (§7.3), all 
these positions contain elements of truth, and all represent stages on the way 
to "the purest form of monotheism". From this (dare I say) speculative 
perspective, all forms of religious consciousness make their peculiar con-
tribution towards the highest expression of that consciousness, and none of 
these prior forms can rest content until they see the justice of their claims 
realized in the form that makes sense of them all. I am convinced that this 
dialectical programme which Schleiermacher adopts with reference to relig-
ious consciousness must be allowed to shed light on his attitude towards the 
prevailing Weltweisheit and Weltverkehr-with which all instances of contem-
porary religion have a certain traffic, and which cannot (from the principles 
just enunciated) ever be considered (in a smug, uncomplicated way) simply 
as false forms of consciousness (or as Sartre would have said "bad faith"). 
This I take to be the sense of Schleiermacher' s approval of ancient Rome in 
his Speeches on Religion: 
Das neue Rom, das gottlose aber konsequente schleudert Bannstrahlen 
und stoBt Ketzer aus; das alte, wahrhaft fromm und religios im hohen 
Styl war gastfrei gegen jeden Gott, und so wurde es der Gotter voll.189 
In just this_~ wen~ to gnd~r_~tand Schleiermacher's attempt ."to 
rehabilitate" the concept ofheresy:190 Rome's ancient piety was "hospit~ble 
to every god". 
Now to return to Schleiermacher's marginal notation as cited above, 
we still need to retrieve the other side of his proposition: once heterodoxy 
has helped the religious consciousness to establish its orthodoxy, the aim of 
further theological effort must be to prevent doctrinal decay back into 
heterodox positions. Here again, Schleiermacher provides us with a scheme 
of things which is unusually subtle. His own treatment of "natural heresies" 
in the Introduction to the Glaubenslehre is both well known and justly 
praised. Having established (§22.2) 
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the distinctive essence of Christianity ... in the fact that in it all religious 
emotions [aile frommen Erregungen] are related to the redemption 
wrought by Jesus of Nazareth ... 
Schleiermacher can with little effort develop a schema whereby the "natural" 
Christian heresies are ones in which either the Redeemer cannot accomplish 
redemption (Docetism and Ebionism), or human nature is understood as not 
requiring redemption (Pelagianism) or as incapable of receiving it (Mani-
chaeism). To any untrained eye a great deal of what has been said above 
might be mistaken for dogmatic theology, even though we have not yet 
emerged from the Introduction. However, Schleiermacher assures us that 
his definition of the essence of Christianity is established "as it were by way 
of experiment" (als geschiihe es versuchsweise)}91 and the elaboration of the 
same has its proper home within the narrower orbit of the Glaubenslehre.192 
Stephen Sykes calls the theological activity outlined above an "experimental 
inquiry";193 we might be inclined (with less deference to Schleiermacher's 
sensibilities) to refer to it as a piece of theological speculation! 
One of Schleiermacher's great nineteenth-century successors at the Univer-
sity of Berlin, I.A. Domer (1809-1884), has pointed out that these polar 
heresies, which neatly encapsulate the parameters of Christian orthodoxy, 
are restricted to anthropological and Christological doctrine without mak-
ing any reference to the properly theological doctrine which concerns the 
actual nature of God-surely not a matter of indifference to that religious 
- -
seff-con5dousness which forms the subject-matter of the Glaubenslehre. Dor-
ner suggests that a suitable pair of theological heresies would be pantheism 
and deism, where pantheism would align itself with Manichaeism and 
Docetism, and deism would align itself with the other pair of Pelagianism 
and Ebionism. Domer understands Schleiermacher' s reluctance to widen 
the discussion in this way, since both pantheism and deism could be 
regarded as purely philosophical conceptions,194 and therefore should not 
arise within the circle of piety. As philosophical constructions, these addi-
tional"polar heresies" are of no concern to Christian self-consciousness, since 
they could never-presumably unlike the other heresies catalogued above-
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give rise to ecclesiastical communities. Here the strength and weakness of 
Schleiermacher's position come into view at once: he is undoubtedly right 
that it is hard to conceive of religious communities forming themselves 
around pantheism and deism (the freemasons being the exception who 
prove the rule!), yet Dorner is also quite correct in observing that these 
heresies, inasmuch as they endanger the Christian understanding of God, 
do have "a religious, nay, a fundamental importance" .195 Schleiermacher has 
dedicated his whole dogmatic effort towards showing it is possible for a 
theologian to avoid the confusion (Verwechselung) and the mingling (Mis-
chung) of dogmatic and speculative propositions (§16. Postscript)-but Dor-
ner now makes us acutely aware of the cost. Domer puts the matter 
succinct! y; he thinks he has uncovered "ein folgenreicher Mangel in Schleier-
machers System. Er hat keine ausgebildete Gotteslehre."196 
This is no incidental consequence of Schleiermacher' s method, but goes 
to the heart of the whole enterprise. What makes Schleiermacher' s theology 
"rational" rather than speculative is its restriction of dogmatic labour to 
theologia ectypa (correctly, precisely and fatefully) defined as "was von Gott 
in der menschlichen Natur lieget" (seep. 142 above). And, of course, this in 
turn explains the priority of "descriptions of human states" (Beschreibungen 
menschlicher Lebenszusttinde) as the "fundamental dogmatic form". 197 As we 
know from Schleiermacher's Open Letters, in principle, it should be possible 
to dispense with the other two "historical" forms of dogmatic proposition 
altogether-H~e., attributes-of God-and- characteristics of the world)~198 That 
Schleiermacher has not done so, is strictly a matter of convenience; the time 
is not ripe.199 The extraordinary existential quality of this work is now 
coming properly into view: indeed, it must be set down to Schleiermacher' s 
everlasting credit, that a full decade before Kierkegaard attended lectures in 
Berlin, he was able to describe the religious feelings, which are the stuff of 
the Glaubenslehre, in this way: 
was ich unter dem frommen Gefiihl verstehe, gar nicht von der Vorstel-
lung ausgeht, sondern die ursnn1ngliche Aussage ist uber ein unmit-
telbares Existentialverhaltnis ... 200 
176 
\...IIUf'lc;f j flfc;c; 
Schleiermacher' s Rational Theology 
It is no exaggeration to speak of Schleiermacher's initiative here as "bahn-
brechend";201 he was anticipating theological positions which would not 
come into their own for another century. 
What we cannot do is to share Schleiermacher's confidence that what 
he has been laying down as the proper procedure for theology, has just as a 
matter of course been the case right from the start: his bald assertion that 
in the dogmatic developments of the earliest centuries, if we discount 
the quite unecclesiastical Gnostic schools, the influence of speculation 
upon the content of dogmatic propositions may be placed at zero. (§16. 
Postscript.) 
is simply breathtaking in its ingenuousness. It also appears to be contra-
dicted by a later assertion in the Glaubenslehre that the ruinous "confusion" 
(V erwechselung) of dogmatic theology with philosophy is a nasty hangover 
we inherited from Patristic times.202 
It can hardly be the object of this dissertation to remind the reader that 
any religion which identifies its sole avatar as the Logos- in the best known 
passage of its sacred Scripture-must be thought to have more than a 
passing relation with Hellenistic philosophical culture. 203 The few awkward 
references made to the Greek A.o)'Qc; which occur in the first edition of the 
Glaubenslehre, seem to have been reduced to a single reference by the time 
we get to the second edition.204 In fact the Prologue to John's Gospel gets 
rather short shrift in the Glaubenslehre altogether. According to Martin 
Redeker's index of Biblical references, it is only accorded five passing 
references in the whole of the Glaubenslehre.205 
It has been said of Schleiermacher's Introduction to the Glaubenslehre, 
that in it we are provided with the concept (Begrift> and the structure (A ufbau) 
of Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology.206 As an "empirical" science, this 
dogmatic theology interprets the data furnished by Scripture (especially the 
New Testament), Confessions (especially of the Reformation era) and the 
historic doctrines which express the "common piety" of the Church in its 
public life (in den offentlichen Verhandlungen) .207 Dogmatic theology achieves 
"scientific" status by th systematic st ·ctu giv~n to thi:; data, which means 
concretely, "daB sie [die Dogmatik] die vorgegebene Lehre kritisch darstellt 
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als .Augerung des christlichen Bewugtseins."208 It is at least possible to ask 
whether this "critical" (see pp. 104-105) transformation of Christian doctrine 
into an expression of Christian self-consciousness will not be providing it 
with a "speculative" gridiron uncongenial to at least some of the data. 
The Introduction is quite clear about Schleiermacher' s "agenda": i) "the 
feeling of absolute dependence" which is "a co-existence of God in the 
self-consciousness" (§30.1) is the conceptual bedrock of the whole theolo-
gical enterprise. ii) If we hold fast to this Mitgesetztsein Gottes im Selbstbewufit-
sein, we shall have no trouble understanding why "descriptions of human 
states" (Lebenszusttinde) are the fundamental dogmatic form. iii) If we can 
resist the temptation to move away from this first and fundamental dog-
matic form, we shall at last free Christian theology from the danger of 
"spekulative Uberfremdung",209 by which the independent existence of 
subjective, pious self-consciousness is completely submerged. iv) This Intro-
duction to the Glaubenslehre finally offers the means by which we can realize 
the principle consistently enunciated by Schleiermacher from the first edi-
tion of his Speeches on Religion: "dag auch Religion nur durch sich selbst 
verstanden werden kann".210 v) Heterodoxy has a systematic function with-
in this elaboration of Christian doctrine: it sustains the flexibility of "the 
conception of doctrine" (den Lehrbegriff beweglich zu erhalten) and makes room 
for other means of receiving its data (und anderen Auffassungsweisen Raum zu 
machen).211 Whatever else can be said aboutSchleiermacher's Glaubenslehre, 
it is surely not possible to-deny that it is-"h-eterodox" in precisely this sense: 
it brings a whole new Auffassungsweise to bear on the work of Christian 
doctrine. 
In the first edition of the Kurze Darstellung, this need for heterodoxy is 
worded rather more exactly: 
Jedes Element, welches in dem Sinne konstruiert ist, den Lehrbegriff 
beweglich zu erhalten und neue Darstellungen von dem Wesen des 
Christen turns zu eroffnen, ist heterodox. 212 
Schleiermacher is quite right here as well: his heterodoxy cannot be assessed 
as doing anything less than equipping us with eine neue Darstellung of the 
essence of Christianity. In Schleiermacher' s dogmatic theology, the mobility 
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of the letter (Beweglichkeit des Buchstaben)213 cannot be in any question either; 
and I have no doubt that this dialectic of heterodoxy and orthodoxy, this 
dynamic of spirit and letter, and this constant renewal of Christianity's 
dogmatic forms is the justification for Schleiermacher's calling Christianity 
the most "completely idealized" (vollkommen idealisiert) of religions.214 
179 
Chapter Three: 
Footnotes 
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ily vague. 
39. see KDl, Eiiileitung §26: ''Die philosophische Theologie ist die Wurzel der gesamten 
Theologie." §31 states: "Die praktische Theologie ist die Krone des theologischen 
Studiums." 
40. In his Open Letters, Schleiermacher suggests that the characteristically "Christian 
perspective" (im eigentiimlich christlichen Licht) of his Glaubenslehre would have been 
more obvious if i) "the dangerous Introduction" (die gefiihrliche Einleitung) had been 
"more clearly and sharply" separated "from the body of the work", and ii) "if the 
propositions now in the first part ... were to follow the Christology". He claims that 
he was and remains "fondly attached to this alternative arrangement"! The reader 
will already know that I am deeply suspicious whether any such alternative arrange-
ment is actually possible. Schleiermacher offers two reasons for not pursuing the 
alternative: whim and inability (eineGrille & eine Unfiihiglceit). Our critical reading will 
certainly assume the latter. Also we shall need to examine in what sense the proposi-
tions of the first part can really be described as ein blofles Auflenwerk to the true aim 
(der eigentiiche Zweck) of his Glaubenslehre: "the description [Darstellung] of the con-
sciousness distinctive to Christianity". See Liicke, pp. 342-344 (English Translation, 
pp.58&59). 
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41. S. W. Sykes, "Schleiermacher and Barth on the Essence of Christianity -an Instructive 
Disagreement" in Barth and Schleiennacher: Beyond the Impasse? edited by James 0. 
Duke and Robert F. Streetman. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988. pp. 88-107; here p. 
94. 
42. See Ingolf U. Dalferth, "Theologischer Realismus und realistische Theologie bei Karl 
Barth", op. cit., p. 416. Dalferth showed quite clearly how the "Metaperspective" is 
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Barth's Eschatological Realism" given at the University of Durham on May 7th, 1986. 
The argument runs along these lines: for an "internal" Barthian perspective the 
language of "religion" is the language of unbelief. From an external perspective, 
where Christianity is treated phenomenologically, it can only be understood as a 
"religion". From a "metaperspective", Christianity "as a religion" could become a 
useful tool for piety. 
43. Hartmut Burbach, op. cit., p. 26. See also n. 228 of Chapter Two above. 
44. Ingolf U. Dalferth, Theology and Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988. pp. 100-101. 
See also 'Theologischer Realism us und realistische Theologie bei Karl Barth", p. 416: 
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45. Ingolf U. Dalferth, "Theologischer Realismus und realistische Theologie bei Karl 
Barth", p. 416: ''Beide [Luther & Barth] haben ... fiir eine theologische Theologie 
pUidiert." See also Dalferth's essay "The Visible and the Invisible: Luther's Legacy of 
a Theological Theology" & n. 185 of Chapter Two above. 
46. Schleiermacher refers to that "most serious and glaring misunderstanding that de-
tects in my Glaubenslehrea speculative tendency and a speculative foundation".See 
Lucke, p. 342 (English Translation, p. 58). 
47. See, forinstance,Hans-JoachimBirkner, Theologieund Philosophie,op. cit., p. 27: "Diese 
Philosophische Theologie hat unverkennbar die Funktion der theologischen Grund-
disziplin. Sie ist, wenn man so will, Fundamentaltheologie." See also the "Einleitung" 
to Michael Eckert, Gott- Glauben und Wissen, op. cit., passim. 
48. See Ferdinand Christian Baur, Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Mensch-
werdung Gottes in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung; 3. Teil. Tiibingen: C.F. Osiander, 
1843. pp. 885-886: " ... um so beachtenswerter ist aber, wie die Glaubenslehre, indem 
sie die religiose Gemeinschaft, das Gesamtleben, das den Einzelnen tragt und halt, 
zur Voraussetzung des subjektiven BewuBtseins macht, doch wieder die wesent-
lichen Momente enthalt, von welchen aus die Subjektivitat ihres Standpunkts zur 
Objektivitat hiniiberstrebt .... die Frage ist nur, wie der a1s Prinzip in der Menschheit 
wirkende Geist;in-die-Mensctmeit selosrheteingelWmmen iSt?eineFrage, die. sicn 
auf dem Boden der Schleiermacher'schen Glaubenslehre nicht mehr beantworten 
laBt, deren Beantwortung aber gleichwohl in ihr so vorbereitet ist, daB sie mit innerer 
Notwendigkeit iiber sich hinausfiihrt." It is with these words that Baur introduces 
his discussion of Hegel's treatment of this doctrine. 
49. See, for instance, Hans-Joachim Birkner, Theologie und Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 10-11. 
Schleiermacher lectured in both faculties, Philosophy and Theology, and covered all 
aspects of Theology except the Old Testament. Schleiermacher's philosophische Kollegs 
included Dialektik, Ethik, Pedagogy, Aesthetics, Psychology, History of Philosophy 
and Politics! See also Hermann Peiter, "Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834)" in 
Klassiker der Theologie, edited by Heinrich Fries and Georg :Kretschmar. Volume II. 
Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1983. pp. 74-88; here p. 75. 
50. The best source for the history of the Prussian Academy of Sciences is Adolf Harnack, 
Geschichte der Kiiniglich Preussischen Akmlemie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Volume I. 
Parts 1 & 2. Berlin: Reichsdruckerei, 1900. The Academy finally agreed to Hegel's 
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185 
Chapter Three 
Schleiennacher' s Rational Thrology 
51. K. Kupisch, "Berlin, Universitiif' in Volume I of the 3rd ed. of RGG (1957). cols. 
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Aarsleff, "The Berlin Academy under Frederick the Great" in History of the Human 
Sciences, Volume 11/2, June 1989. pp. 193-206; here p. 196. 
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Klasse" in 1828. In vain did Altenstein, the Minister responsible for bringing Hegel 
to Berlin, write to the Academy (September 3, 1819): 'Wie soli man die philosophische 
Klasse aufheben, da doch LEIBNIZ der erste Prasident der Akademie war?" Adolf 
Harnack, op. cit., pp. 663 & 708. See also "Akademie, akademisch" in Volume I of 
Historisches Worterbuch der Philosaphie, edited by J. Ritter. Darmstadt: Wissenschaft-
liche Buchgesellschaft, 1971. cots. 121-124; here col. 123. 
55. Lucke, p. 324: "Doch was soli ich noch Einzelnes anfiihren, wo mir zuletzt ein so 
allgemeines MiBverstandnis entgegentritt, als ob die in meiner Glaubenslehre auf-
gestellte Analyse des Selbstbewu6tseins, etwas Anderes sein wollte, als ganz einfach 
und ehrlich nur empirisch!" (My italics.) This uncompromising statement of principle 
leaves us gasping. I find it hard to believe that Schleiermacher could expect anyone 
to take this at face value. 
56. Hans-Joachim Birkner, Thrologie und Philosaphie, op. cit., p. 9. 
57. Liicke, p. 348: " ... er ist viel hoher angelegt, und so stattlich, daB man von da aus auf 
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herabschauen kann. Das ist eben der, Iieber Freund, auf dem ich auch gesehen 
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meine die spekulative Theologie." 
58. Glaubenslehre2, §16. Zusatz: ''Denn ein Satz, welcher etwa von_ 9~r_ ~~k~<~tiven 
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59. See Uwe Schweikert, Jean Paul. Stuttgart: Metzler, 1970. pp. 31-32. 
60. See, for instance, G. Wittkop-Menardeau, E.T.A. Hoffmann: In Selbstzeugnissen und 
Bilddokumenten, tr. by J.F. Wittkop. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1966; esp. pp. 
36-38. 
61. With apologies to the last section of T.S. Eliot's "The Waste Land" (1922): 
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62. Lucke, p. 315: " ... so kann ich gar keinen Beruf fiihlen, mich in den Streit zu mengen, 
den diese Herren mit einem Schleiermacher fiihren, in dem ich mich gar nicht wieder 
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63. Ibid., p. 342: "Hatte nun vollends die gefahrliche Einleitung noch starker und aus-
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historischen Teile, der Glaubenslehre namlich, sein, was nicht zuvor in dem idealen 
oder philosophischen gewesen". This reading of the first edition of Schleiermacher's 
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65. Richard Crouter, ''Rhetoric and Substance in Schleiermacher's Revision of The Chris-
tian Faith (1821-1822)", op. cit., p. 294. 
66. Eilert Herms, Herkunft, Entfaltung und erste Gestalt des Systems der Wissenschaften bei 
Schleiermacher, op. cit., p. 268n. 
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69. Lucke, p. 377. 
70. Michael Eckert, Gott- Glauben und Wissen, op. cit., p. 11. 
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74. "lnepistolamS. PauliadGalatasCommentarius"in WA, Volume40/i (1911), p.410, 
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Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung einer neuen Systematischen Theologie. Wiesbaden: 
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77. Lucke, p. 371 (English Translation, pp. 76-77). 
78. B.A. Gerrish, "Continuity and Change: Friedrich Schleiermacher on the Task of 
Theology", op. dt., p. 38. 
79. See the useful summary by S.W. Sykes in "Schleiermacher and Barth on the Essence 
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81. Seen. 35, above. 
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also states: "Dogmatische Satze haben einen zweifachen Wert, einen kirchlichen und 
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[der dogmatische Satz] auf andere verwandete hinweist". 
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Cf. Dietz Lange, 'Neugestaltung christlicher Glaubenslehre" in Friedrich Schleier-
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Berliner Schriften: 1818-1831, op. cit., pp. 745 & 747. Crouter's citation of these figures 
. . te "H 1 ..a c hl . h t Be •· " ·• p •1 - ~ ts maccura . £ege anu ::x: etermac ,era r.m , op. Q(., • '*t,n. '· 
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ganized, "Keiner hiitte dann verkennen konnen, daB die Darstellung des 
eigentiimlich christlichen BewuBtseins wahrhaft und wirklich der eigentliche Zweck 
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tigeTheologieheraus. Als ich-ihmeFklarte1da8·mirdieser·zwiespaltige,verhiillenc;ie 
Schleiermacher weder auf der I<anzel, noch in seinen theologischen Schriften er-
schienen sei . . ." I am indebted to Professor John Rogerson of the University of 
Sheffield for bringing this remarkable passage to my attention. 
121. W.M.L. de Wette, Das Wesen des christlichen Glaubens vom Standpunkte des Glaubens. 
Basel: Schweighauser'sche Buchhandlung, 1846. The last section of this work (§100) 
is a discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity. (De Wette died in 1849.) 
122. Letter: W.M.L. de Wette to Schleiermacher; June 11, 1823. Briefe, Volume N, pp. 
312-313; here p. 313: ''Die Glaubenslehre ist unstreitig nach Calvin die erste wahrhaft 
systematische Dogmati.k ... Dein erster Teil ist doch eigentlich philosophisch oder 
allgemein menschlich." This letter is a reply to the famous letter in which Schleier-
macher mentions Hegel's attack upon him in the introduction to Hinrichs' Religions-
philosophie (ibid., pp. 309-312). 
123. For this discussion, see Liicke, pp. 342-345. 
124. For this discussion in Likke, see pp. 361-362. Glaubenslehret identifies the dogmatic 
Grundform as "Beschreibungen menschlicher Zustinde" (§34. Proposition). In 
Glaubenslehre2. this becomes ''Beschreibungen menschlicher Lebenszustiinde" (§30. 
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Proposition). The Mackintosh/Steward translation renders "Beschaffenheiten der 
Welt" as "constitution of the world" CF, p. 125). I prefer this vocabulary, but it has the 
disadvantage of suppressing the plural. Reluctantly, I have decided to go along with 
the now more common usage. See Open Letters, p. 70 and B.A. Gerrish, "Friedrich 
Schleiermacher", op. cit., p. 133.) To give this abstract notion some flesh, d. Glaubens-
lehrt!2, §90.1. The subject here is redemption, and Schleiermacher shows how difficult 
it is to draw a distinction between "the first, or the direct [unmittelbare] description of 
the gracious state of the redeemed, and the second, or the description of what has 
come into the world through redemption", viz. "the corporate life founded by Christ" 
[das durch Christum gestiftete Gesamtleben]. Although these "two spheres seem to be 
exactly the same", it is when it is "considered as, an organization" that "it belongs to 
the second form of presentation." Its significance for the world is "only through its 
organization". 
125. Glaubenslehrez, §30.1: "eine Formel fiir einen bestimmten Gemiitszustand". 
126. Liicke, pp. 361-362 (English Translation, pp. 70-71); here pp. 362 and 71, respectively: 
" ... die rechte geschichtliche Hal tung und also sein kirchlicher Charakter fehlen 
wiirde." Cf. Glaubenslehret, §34.3. 
127. Glaubenslehrt!2, §30.3: " ... wenn man vor dem Einschleichen fremdartiger rein 
wissenschaftlicher 5atze sicher sein will ... 
128. F.C. Baur, "Selbstanzeige" in KGA, Volume I/7-iii, p. 273. 
129. Liicke, pp. 341-342. Cf. Glaubenslehrez, §1.1: "Es kann nur dann iiberfliissig sein, die 
Behandlung einer Disziplin mit einer ErkHirung derselben anzufangen, wenn ein 
vollkommnes Einverstandnis dariiber mit Sicherheit vorausgesetzt werden kann." 
Given this proviso, Schleiermacher's Introduction to the Glaubenslehrecould not be 
regarded as an "optional" extra! 
130. Cf. Glaubenslehrez, §90.1: "die unmittelbare Beschreibung". 
131. Glaubenslehrez, §30.2: " ... so ist klar, daB Beschreibungen menschlicher Gemiitszu-
stande dieses Inhaltes nur aus dem Gebiet der innern Erfahrung hergenommen 
werden konnen ... " 
132. Glaubenslehret, §111.1: " ... wird beabsichtigt die Trennung der christ lichen Glaubens-
lehre von der Spekulation einen Schritt weiter zu fiihren." 
133. See S.W. Sykes, ''Theological Study: The Nineteenth Century and After", op. cit., p. 
106. 
134. Glaubenslehret, §31.4: " ... ist die zweckmaSige Handhabung der Sprache fiir die 
dogmatische Darstellung eine der schwierigsten Aufgaben." The wording of 
Glaubenslehrez,-§28.1-is.almost-identical. 
135. Glaubenslehrez, §28.1: " ... wobei die Gefahr eines der Sache der christlichen Frommig-
keit verderblichen Einflusses ganz verschwindet ... " 
136. Walter Kasper, DerGott fesu Christi. Mainz: Matthias-Grunewald-Verlag, 1982. p. 349: 
"Da die Kirche nicht Herr der Begriffsgeschichte ist, da sie aber in eine konkrete, ihr 
vorgegebene sprachliche Situation hineinsprechen und sich in ihr verstandlich 
machen muG ... " 
137. See St. Augustine's de Trinitate, V. x.: "Dictum est tamen: Tres personae, non ut illud 
diceretur, sed ne taceretur." As the translation of this text in Volume 15 of Oeuvres de 
Saint Augustine, edited by M. Mellet and Th. Camelot, confirms, we adopt the 
language of "trois personnes ... pour ne pas rester sans rien dire". Paris: Desclee De 
Brouwer, 1955. pp. 448-449. 
138. "Ueber die verschiedenen Methoden des Uebersezens", SWill/2, p. 239. 
139. This precise designation in Glaubenslehrez, 4.4. 
140. See Hans-Joachim Birkner, "Gefiihl schlechthinniger Abhmgigkeit" in Volume III of 
Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie, op. cit., col. 98: "Der von SCHLEIERMACHER 
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gebildete Ausdruck ist Leitbegriff seiner Theorie der Religion ... Diese Wesensbe-
stimmung bildet die Grundlage fiir Schleiennachers Theorie des Christen turns und 
fiir seine Interpretation der christlichen Lehriiberlieferung." 
141. See Glaubenslehrez, p. 14. 
142. See Hans Frei, "Barth and Schleiennacher: Divergence and Convergence" in Barth and 
Schleiermacher: Beyond the Impasse? edited by James 0. Duke and Robert F. Streetman, 
op. cit., pp. 65-87; here p. 80. 
143. Dialektik(ed. Odebrecht), pp. 288 & 291; cf. Glaubenslehrez, §3. Proposition. 
144. Claude Welch, Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Volume I (1799-1870), op. 
cit., p. 6Sn. John E. Theil, God and World in Schleiermacher's "Dialektik" and "Glaubens-
lehre ", op. cit., p. 138, n. 64, sees Welch's al temative translations as a way of avoiding 
"any philosophical connotation in the expression of what Schleiennacher considered 
to be religious experience and the object of dogmatics." 
145. Schleiermacher' s handschriftliche Anmerkungen zum erst en Theil der Glaubenslehre, op. cit. 
Annotation to §4: "Schlechthinnig gleicht absolut." 
146. Glaubenslehrez, §§3 & 4. Propositions. 
147. Glaubenslehrez, §4.4. 
148. Schleiermacher'shandschriftlicheAnmerkungen zum ersten Theil derGlaubenslehre, op. cit. 
Annotation to §4.4: "Das Wort 'Gott' wird hierdargestelltals in unserem Sprachgebiet 
nichts anderes bedeutend, als das in dem urspriinglichen, schlechthinnigen A~ 
hangigkeitsgefiihl Mitgesetzte." 
149. Glaubenslehrez, §4.4. " ... das zum GottesbewuBtsein werdende unmittelbare Selbstbe-
wuBtsein ... " 
150. SeeS. W. Sykes, "Absolute Dependence" in A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, op. 
cit., pp. 1-2; here p. 2. (My emphasis.) 
151. See Brian A. Gerrish, "Friedrich Schleiennacher" in Nineteenth Century Religious 
Thought in the West, Volume I, op. cit., p. 136. 
152. Liicke, p. 389: " ... daB Mancher den Becher der Spekulation ganz kann geleert haben, 
ohne daB er die Frommigkeit auf dem Boden gefunden." 
153. Glaubenslehret, §36.2. 
154. The English editors' reluctance to translate mitgesetzt in the first instance has them in 
difficulties here. CF reads "a co-existence of God in the self-consciousness". I prefer 
John Wallhausser's formula "the co-presence of God in self-consciousness". See his 
tr~tio_!t of }fartin Redeker's Schleiemr~hl!r;_Lifeand_Thought,_op. cit., p. 115. . 
155. See Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre: ALs Handschrift 
fur seine Zuhiirer (1794) (PhB 246). Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988. p. 42. 
156. See Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre: Aus den Jahren 1801/02, 
edited by Reinhard Lauth and P.K. Schneider (PhB 302). Hamburg: Felix Meiner 
Verlag, 1977. pp. 60,75-76, 79. 
157. Emanuel Hirsch: Geschichte der Neuern Evangelischen Theologie: Im Zusammenhang mit 
den allgemeinen Bewegungen des europiiischen Denkens, 4th ed., Volume N. Giitersloh: 
Gerd Mohn, 1968. p. 564. 
158. Friedrich Wilhelm Graf provides an honorable exception. See his "Urspriingliches 
Gefiihl unmittelbarer I<oinzidenz des Differenten: Zur Modifikation des Religions-
begriffs in den verschieden Auflagen von Schleiermachers 'Reden uber die Religion"' 
inZThK, Volume75, 1978. pp. 147-186. GrafdiscussesHirschon pp. 155-156. 
159. See Hans Frei, "Barth and Schleiennacher: Divergence and Convergence", op. cit., p. 
82. 
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160. Hegel's Vorwort to Hinrichs' Religionsphilosophie, op. cit., p. 137. Two English trans-
lations of this important text have been undertaken. i) A.V. Miller's translation in 
Beyond Epistemology: New Studies in the Philosophy of Hegel, edited by F.G. Weiss. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974. pp. 227-244. ii) The translation by Eric von der Luft 
in his Hegel, Hinrichs, and Schleiermacher on Feeling and Reason in Religion, op. cit., pp. 
245-268. I prefer the translation by A.V. Miller. 
161. Hegel's comments here are often called a caricature: see, e.g., Robert R. Williams, "A 
Scholarly Note?", op, cit., p. 10. Also Alasdair I.C. Heron, A Century of Protestant 
Theology, op. cit., p. 26: "Obedient passivity and emotional dependence are not at all 
what Schleiermacher was talking about, though some of his language, taken out of 
context, could give that impression." Erik Schmidt's comments in Hegels System der 
Theologie are highly recommended. He suggests that Hegel has not really done 
Schleiermacher justice (Schleiermacher darum nicht ganz gerecht wurde). Berlin: Walter 
deGruyter, 1974. p.10. 
162. GlaubenslehrQ, §4.4: " ... daG dem Menschen mit der allem endlichen Sein nicht minder 
als ihm anhaftenden schlechthinnigen Abhangigkeit ... " 
163. Hegel's Vorwort to Hinrichs' Religionsphilosophie, op. cit., p. 132:" ... die Philosophie 
... die Wissenschaft der denkenden Vernunft ... " 
164. Ibid., p. 133: " ... Gott bestimmungslos, ohne aile Pradikate und Eigenschaften, in das 
Jenseits des Wissens hinaufgesetzt, oder vielmehr zur Inhaltslosigkeit herabgesetzt." 
(A.V. Miller's translation of Hegel's Vorwort, op. cit., p. 235.) 
165. Ibid., pp. 130 &: 131: "Nach dem Gesagten bestimmt sich das Obel, in welches die 
Aufklarung die Religion und die Theologie gebracht hat, als der Mangel an gewuflter 
Wahrheit, einem objelctiven lnhalt, einer Glaubenslehre." Notice Hegel's use of the word 
Glaubenslehre (p. 131) in this context." (A. V. Miller, p. 233.) 
166. See Walter Jaeschke, "Schleiermacher und Hegel: Neue Ausgaben und alte Fragen", 
his review of KGA, in Hegel-Studien, Volume 23. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1988. pp. 
327-341; here p. 336. 
167. See G.W.F. Hegel, Einleitung in der Geschichte der Philosophie, 3rd ed., edited by J. 
Hoffmeister&: F. Nicolin (PhB 166}. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1959. pp. 245-246: 
"Naher liegt dieses Prinzip darin, daG die christliche Religion das Dogma, die 
Anschauung von der Einheit der gottlichen und der menschlichen Natur enthalt. 
Dies ist den Menschen durch Christus geoffenbart worden. Mensch und Gott, die 
subjektive Idee und die objektive Idee sind hier Eines. Dies ist das germanische 
Prinzip, diese Vereinigung der Objektivitat und der Subjektivitat." 
168. VPR, Teil3, p. 236n. 
169. LPR, Volume 3(the last volume of Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, edited 
by Peter C. Hodgson. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 315n. 
170. Letter: Hegel to H.F.W. Hinrichs, April4, 1822. Briefe von und an Hegel, Volume 2 
(1813-1822}, edited by J. Hoffmeister (PhB 236). Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1953. 
pp. 303-304: "ob denn das die Dogmatik der unierten evangelischen Kirche sei, was 
man uns,-freilich nur in einem erst ersten Teile, ... - als solche zu bieten die 
Unverschamtheit und Plattheit gehabt hat." Schleiermacherindicates that he has tried 
"das Wesen der evangelischen Glaubens- und Lebensansicht in seinen eigentiim-
lichen Grenzen als in heiden Confessionen dasselbe darzusteUen ... " (GlaubenslehreJ., 
Vorrede, p. 6). He returns to the same point in Glaubenslehre2., Vorrede, p. 4. I do not 
believe that J-{egel was disturbed by the "superficiality" of Schleiermacher's Glaubens-
lehre-how could one call a work of this density and length superficial?-! think he 
objected to its "banality", which is how I choose to translate ''Plattheit" (pace Hegel: 
The Letters, op. cit., p. 486}. 
171. Hegel's Vorwort to Hinrichs' Religionsphilosophie, op. cit., p. 137. 
172. Walter Jaeschke, "Schleiermacher und Hegel: Neue Ausgaben und alte Fragen", op. 
cit., p. 336. . 
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173. Erik Schmidt, op. cit., p. 10, deserves to be cited in full: "Eine Theologie ist auf diesem 
Standpunkt eigentlich nicht moglich; Schleiermacher konnte nur darum eine 
Glaubenslehre schreiben, die mehr als Psychologie des religiosen BewuiStseins war, 
sondem auch Meta physik enthielt, weil er den Begriff des 'Gefiihls' nicht eindeutig 
psychologisch faiSte, sondem im Sinne eines 'geistigen' Gefiihls deutete." 
174. See Brian A. Gerrish, Review of KGA, Volume I/7-1, 2 & 3, op. cit., p. 240: "The 
Glaubenslehre of 1821-22 attempted for the first time a dogmatics without dogmas." 
175. Walter Jaeschke reiterates the comments he made in his Vorworl to VPR, Teil1, pp. 
x-xii, in "Paralipomena Hegeliana zur Wirkungsgeschichte Schleierrnachers" in Kon-
gref3, Teilband 2, pp. 1157-1169 (here p. 1160), and in "Schleierrnacher und Hegel: 
Neue Ausgaben und alte Fragen", op. cit., pp. 335-336: Hegel's decision to lecture on 
the philosophy of religion was a "prenatal" influence exerted by Schleiermacher's 
Glaubenslehre. 
176. LPR, Volume 1, p. 168; VPR, Teil 1, p. 78: " ... solche Dogmen, wie die von der 
Dreieinigkeit, den Wundem, sind von der Theologie selbst in Schatten gestellt 
worden .... und so ist in der Philosophie viel mehr von Dogmatik enthalten als in der 
Dogmatik, der Theologie selbst als solcher." 
177. LPR, Volume3, pp.261-262;in VPR, Teil3, thisextraordinarypassagefrom 1827reads 
(p. 188): "Durch solch endliches Denken und Erfassen des Gottlichen, dessen, was an 
und fiir sich ist, durch dies endliche Denken des absoluten Inhalts ist es geschehen, 
daiS die Grundlehren des Christentums aus der Dogmatik groiStenteils verschwun-
den sind. Nicht allein, aber doch vomehmlich die Philosophie ist es, die jetzt wesent-
lich orthodox ist; die Satze, die immer gegolten haben, die Grundwahrheiten des 
Christentums werden von ihr erhalten und aufbewahrt." 
178. Liicke, pp. 334. 
179. See Reuven Brenner and Gabrielle A. Brenner, Gambling and Speculation: A Theory, a 
History, and a Future of Some Human Decisions. Cambridge University Press, 1990. pp. 
90-91. 
180. Letter: Schleiermacher to J.C. GaiS; December 29, 1810. Fr. Schleiermacher's Briefwechsel 
mit J.Chr. Gap, op. cit., pp. 86-88; here p . 87: "Die theologische Enzyklopadie ist nun 
endlich fertig geworden, und ich bin neugierig, ob sie eine neue Quelle von Verket-
zerungen werden wird. Mir sind die Sachen nun durch die vielfache Bearbeitung so 
familiar geworden, daiS ich nichts darin finde, was AnlaiS dazu geben konnte. Nur 
daiS viel Gespenster darin seien, werden die Leute sagen, theologische Disziplinen, 
die es nie gegeben habe und nie geben werde." 
181. KGA, Volume I/7-iii, p . 82. 
182. See, for instance, the entry under "Heresy" in The Oxford Dictionary of the Christiiln 
Church, 2nd ed., edited by F.L. Cro and E.A. Livingstone. Oxford University Press, 
1988. p. 639: " ... the need to rebut heresy has stimulated the fonnation of orthodox 
Christian doctrine." 
183. I know of this maxim from Salman Rushdie' s "Is Nothing Sacred?" (The Herbert Read 
Memorial Lecture, 6 February, 1990), as published by Granta, p. 14. 
184. See Bernard M.G. Reardon, "Hegel and Christianity'' in Religion in the Age of Roman-
ticism: Studies in Early Nineteenth Century Thought. Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
pp. 59-87; here p. 78. 
185. Liicke, pp. 345-346. (English Translation, p. 60.) 
186. Glaubenslehre2., §8.4: "Das Christentum ... behauptet sich als die reinste in der Ge-
schichte hervorgetretene Gestaltung des Monotheismus." I am sure that the cleansing 
of Christian d~ ~ eve:ryt...lling ode ~Nith !reeping thi!: Gestdtung "pure". 
187. The English word "relapse" is made to express two different Schleiermacherian terms: 
Riicktritt and Riickfrlll (CF, §8.4); and Gemiitszusttinde is rather inexactly rendered as 
"states of mind". 
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188. There is a hint of Hegelian terminology here. Hegel also speaks of "die vollkommene 
Religion" [see his Vorlesungsmanuskripte I (1816-1831), op. cit., p. 83], although his 
preferred usage is "die vollendete Religion" (cf. VPR, Teil 3: Die vollendete Religion 
passim). 
189. See KGA, Volume 1/2, p. 217. There is merit in consulting the new translation of the 
1st edition of Schleiermacher's Speeches on Religion (1799) undertaken by Richard 
Crouter: On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers. Cambridge University Press, 
1988. (The title is literally translated, the subtitle is not.) Mysteriously, John Oman 
does not choose to translate the phrase "und so wurde es der Gotter voll" (p. 55), a 
liberty which the Crouter translation (p. 108) does not appear to regard as justified. 
190. This is an addition to the 2nd edition of the Speeches on Religion (1806) and is difficult 
to translate; see Piinjer, op. cit., p. 257: "urn ein Wort zu gebrauchen, das wieder so lite 
zu Ehren gebracht werden, eine Haresis ... " John Oman's literal translation of this 
passage (p. 223) is eclipsed by the superior interpretative skills of Peter L. Berger, to 
whom I owe the excellent notion of "rehabilitation"; this captures the sense exactly. 
See Berger's The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Affirmation. 
London: Collins, 1980. p. 132. 
191. Glaubenslehre2, §11.5. 
192. Glaubenslehre2, §11.4: "Die nahere Entwicklung dieses Satzes, wie namlich durch 
Jesum die Erlosung bewirkt wird und in der christlichen Gemeinschaft zum BewuBt-
sein kommt, fallt der Glaubenslehre selbst anheim ... " 
193. S.W. Sykes, The Identity of Christianity, op. cit., p. 92. 
194. See I.A. Domer, Geschichte derprotestantischen Theologie: Besonders in Deutschland, nach 
ihrer principiellen Bewegung und im Zusammenhang mit dem religiosen, sittlichen und 
intellectuellen Leben betrachtet. Munich: J.G. Cotta, 1867. pp. 808-809. 
195. Cf.I.A. Domer, History of Protestant Theology particularly in Germany: Viewed according 
to its Fundamental Movement and in Connection with the religious, moral and intellectual 
Life, tr. by G. Robson and S. Taylor. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1871. p. 389. 
196. I.A. Domer, Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie, op. cit., p. 809. 
197. Glaubenslehre2, §30. Proposition; cf. §30.2: "Daher miissen wir die Beschreibung 
menschlicher Zustiinde fiir die dogmatische Grundform erkHiren ... " 
198. Glaubenslehre2, §30.2: "Aussagen von Beschaffenheiten der Welt". This terminology is 
not perhaps the clearest way of referring to a whole host of doctrines beginning with 
"the original perfection of the world" (§59), moving through evil (§75), and ending 
with doctrines of redemption and ecclesiology (§§113ff.). An elegant account of the 
structure of the Glaubenslehre is provided by Horst Stephan and Martin Schmidt_in 
Geschichte der evangelischen Theologie in Deutschland seit dem Idealismus, op. cit., p . 125. 
199. This wholly unconvincing argument is presented in Lucke, pp. 361-362: "Und das ist 
auch in der Tat meine Oberzeugung ... daB unsere Glaubenslehre einmallemen wird, 
sich ohne sie zu behelfen .... daB, ohnerachtet die beiden letzten Formen, streng 
genommen, eigentlich iiberfliissig waren, doch einem Lehrgebaude, welches sie 
iibergehen wollte, die rechte geschichtliche Haltung und also sein kirchlicher Cha-
rakter fehlen wiirde." F.C. Baur makes this astute comment about this passage: 
"Bilden nur solche Satze den eigentlichen Inhalt der christlichen Dogmatik, welche 
die innem Gemiitszustande beschreiben, und aus dem unmittelbaren SelbstbewuBt-
sein genommen sind, so ist der historische und kirchlicheCharakter wenigstens keine 
wesentliche und notwendige Eigenschaft der Glaubensleh.re." ("Selbstanzeige" in 
KGA, Volume 1/7 -iii, p. 269 .) Baur always suspected Schleiennacher of dissembling. 
Cf. Geschichte derchristlichen Kirche, 2nd ed., Volume V. Leipzig: Fues's Verlag, 1877. 
"Oft genug kann man. bei der l!ar zu eToGen V()rskht, !J'Ii welr ie Sc!lJeier-
macher'sche Glau nslehre den Widerspruch mit der Kirchenlehre so viel moglich 
zu umgehen und zu mildem sucht, und bei der gesuchten Kiinstlichkeit, mit welcher 
sie die kirchlichen Lehrsatze und Formeln in einem Sinne deutet, welchen Schleier-
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macher unmoglich fiir den wahren und eigentlichen halten konnte, den Gedanken 
an eine absichtliche Tauschung nicht unterdriicken." (p. 216.) 
200. LUcke, p. 318. 
201. Wolfhart Pannenberg, SystematischeTheologie, Volume I. GOttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1988. p. 50: "An dieser Stelle nun hat Schleiermacher bahnbrechend ge-
wirkt, indem er die Orientierung am Religionsbegriff mit dem Kri terium der subjek-
tiven Erfahrung verband." Cf. Gerhard Ebeling, DogmaHk des christlichen Glaubens, 
Volume 1. Tiibingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1979. Ebeling also says Schleiermacher's DogmaHk 
is "bahnbrechend neu" and accords it "epochale Bedeutung" (p. 61). 
202. Glaubenslehre:z, §33.3. Here Schleiermacher cites with disapproval from St. Augus-
tine's De vera religione: "Sic enim creditur et docetur, quod est humanae salutis caput, 
non aliam esse philosophiam, id est sapientiae studium, et aliam religionem." This 
quotation from Augustine should really be the motto of this dissertation: 'Wir 
Christen glauben und lehren ja, und unser Heil hangt daran, daG Philosophie, das 
heiGt Weisheitsstreben, und Religion nicht voneinander verschieden sind." (Literally: 
"that it is not the case that philosophy is one thing and religion another".) See De vera 
religione, edited and tr. by W. Thimrne. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1983. pp. 18-19. 
203. See, just as one brief illustration, the discussion of Justin Martyr (a second-century 
Apologist) in the entry under Logos im Alten und Neuen Testament by J.-A. Biihner in 
Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie, Volume V, op. cit., cols. 499-502; here col. 501: 
"Justin versucht damit, die stoische Logos-Lehre mit der biblischen zu harmoni-
sieren." 
204. The instances from Glaubenslehret, §§117.3 & 119. Postscript 3 appear to have van-
ished, but Glaubenslehrl!l adds a cursory reference in §13.2. Despite the fact that 
Schleiermacher declares John 1:14 to be "der Grund text der ganzen Dogmatik" (LUcke, 
p. 343), I feel relatively secure in suggesting that the "Logologie des Johannes" 
(Glaubenslehret, §187.4) hardly qualifies as the central concept of the Glaubenslehre. 
(Cf. Glaubenslehrl!l, §170.2.) 
205. See Glaubenslehrl!l, Volume 2, "Verzeichnis der Bibelstellen", p. 567. 
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One of the really remarkable documents extant from this monumental 
chapter of German intellectual history is Hegel's extracts from and marginal 
notations to the second volume of Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre (as pub-
lished in 1822). Hegel's notations to the conclusion of the first edition 
("SchluB: Von der gottlichen Dreiheit") make for provocative reading. The 
general thrust of Hegel's remarks is that Schleiermacher operates with a 
"dialectic of the understanding", which is dry, hollow and barren, 1 that is to 
say, his theology is governed by a decidedly non- speculative, finite thinking 
(purer, ideenloser Verstand),2 which rigorously separates the Glaubenslehreoff 
from any speculative intuition.3 As a direct consequence, there is hardly 
anything that could be identified as a doctrine of the Trinity to be found in 
it, a fact the more remarkable as this dogmatic theology is supposed to be 
an empirical, descriptive account of the actual content of Christian faith. As 
Hegel notes in exasperation, the Trinity has a central role to play in the whole 
ecclesiastical history of-Ghristian-piety,-4-but by the time-we get to the-end-of 
the Glaubenslehre, there doesn't seem to be any room at the inn! 
Schleiermacher's treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity at the conclu-
sion of his Glaubenslehre constitutes the rigorous and systematic application 
of Schleiermacher's theological principles to the outstanding Christian 
teaching about the nature of God. Schleiermacher has already made it clear 
that he is turning his face against any philosophical or metaphysical- and 
therefore abstract-treatise de Deo, of which the doctrine of the Trinity could 
be counted the chief ex~mple. Schleiermacher wants his Glaubenslehre to be 
the doctrinal exposition of pious self-consciousness, which can be called 
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theology, only because God is the co-determinate of the feeling of absolute 
dependence. God is co-present (mitgesetzt) in religious self-consciousness, 
which is why mcin can be endowed with actual Gottesbewuj3tsein, i.e., "das 
Sein Gottes in dem Menschen".5 
We need to elaborate this point in two directions: i) Christ apparently 
possesses a "unique and archetypal God-consciousness",6 which is why the 
Glaubenslehre can speak of "ein eigentliches Sein Gottes in ihm" (§94. Prop-
osition). Christ is distinguished from the rest of us by "die stetige Kraftigkeit 
seines GottesbewuBtseins" ,7 which is unimpaired by sin and contagion. His 
God-consciousness is never submerged (as it is in us) by what Schleier-
macher calls sinnliches Selbstbewuj3tsein (§94.2) and by what Paul would have 
called "the flesh".8 Schleiermacher's conclusion reads that the ascription to 
Christ of "ein schlechthin kraftiges GottesbewufStsein" and "ein Sein Gottes 
in ihm" are one and the same thing.9 Redemption therefore occurs through 
the communication of this God-consciousness to the faithful. In a striking 
phrase, Schleiermacher describes this "implanting" (einpflanzen) of "das kraf-
tige GottesbewufStsein" as "only the continuation of the creative divine 
activity out of which the Person of Christ arose".10 (The formulation of this 
same theme in the first edition is even more dramatic.)11 Some of us may, 
however, be disappointed to learn that Christ's redemptive activity has been 
compared to 
a process substantially analagous to the formation of a human society 
around a charismatic leader, who unites them by his vision of their 
future-state.12 -
One immediate consequence of this understanding of Christology is that 
Christ's passion is appropriated by this doctrinal system as an "element of 
the second order", and the peak (Gipfel) of his suffering is understood as 
"sympathy with misery".13 Christ's passion now becomes an expression of 
solidarity (§104.4)! Werner Schultz extends our discussion by pointing out 
that Schleiermacher's Passiontide sermons all display a tendency to strip the 
bitterness from Christ's sorrow and passion.14 
ii) Schleiennacher emphatically denies that "GottesbewuiStsein" can be 
understood as God Himself, anymore than "WeltbewufStsein" should be 
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understood as the world itself.15 God-consciousness, as has been explained 
above, is "das Sein Gottes in dem Menschen", and doctrinal theology is 
therefore very precisely concerned with God as He is known in our human 
God-consciousness.16 Now if we couple this qualification with the highly 
potent Proposition to §SO, it should be fairly clear why a doctrine of the 
Trinity in the traditional sense can hardly be on the agenda in a work called 
Glaubenslehre. The Proposition reads: 
All attributes which we ascribe to God are to be taken as denoting not 
something special in God, but only something special in the manner in 
which the feeling of absolute dependence is to be related to Him.17 
The concrete, empirical character of the Glaubenslehreis here allowed to come 
into its own. All talk of God "as He is in Himself", as He might exist apart 
from our relation to Him, is banished. That would be to deal in pure 
abstraction, "to speculate" in a region unknowable and unknown. Schleier-
macher pushes the argument further: Christian speculation-for Schleier-
macher an oxymoron--on the essence of God 18 can only ascertain 
generalities, such as God is "das urspriinglich Seiende und das absolut 
Gute" (§51.1). For the Word to become flesh, Christian theology must 
represent (in systematic, dialectical language) 19 the God present to our pious 
self-consciousness. 
In just this sense, Dilthey is right to bestow upon Schleiermacher the 
accolade of "the Kant of Protestant theology".20 The distinction between the 
phenom~~on and the noul!!enon21 ~ow goyerns ~h!eiei'l!_lacher's "critical" 
theology just as surely as it governs the critical philosophy. But not all 
theologians have been happily reconciled to the cost. We have already 
mentioned the severe reservations expressed by I.A. Domer. In our century, 
Karl Barth has been the most influential critic. He regards Schleiermacher's 
distinction between "Gott, wie er ist ... [und] Gott, wie er erscheint" as a 
disaster for Christian doctrine: this way of doing theology leaves the im-
pression that the phenomenal reality with which the Glaubenslehre is con-
cerned is the screen behind which another, higher divinity is concealed. Are 
we not then forced to accept Barth's lament that-from this perspective-
"Gott in seiner Offenbarung nicht eigentlich Gott ist. "22 
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Hegel is, of course, lurking in the background of this discussion. He 
would naturally agree that to speak of a God apart from revelation, apart 
from what we can know about Him, is nothing but an abstraction. But he 
would argue with conviction that it is equally abstract to posit such a divine 
noumenon in the first place.23 This is not a distinction evident in "the nature 
of things", but a distinction for mind; it is a distinction in and for conscious-
ness, and as such, neither absolute nor final.24 Hegel solves this dilemma in 
quite another way. He agrees that we are only in a position to speak of God 
because we stand in a spiritual relation to Him. However, our God-con-
sciousness, our spiritual life, is also a consciousness which God has of 
Himself-precisely in and through our consciousness of Him. Consequent-
ly, there is no God lying hidden behind our God-consciousness-in our 
God-consciousness we are united with God's consciousness of Himself. This 
is exactly how he defines "the consummate religion", Christianity: 
Die Religion namlich ist Wissen des Geistes von sich als Geist ... Wir 
haben die Religion naher bestimmt als SelbstbewufStsein Gottes ... Das 
endliche BewufStsein weiB Gott nur insofern als Gott sich in ihm weiB 
.. 25 
Hegel makes the same point forcefully at the conclusion of his Encyclopedia 
of the Philosophical Sciences (§564): 
God is God only so far as he knows himself: his self-knowledge is, 
further, a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of God, 
which proceeds to man's self-knowledge in God.26 
Hegel is ready to ~S_!ee ~-th B~rth that Schleiermacher has constructed_ a 
Bewufltseinstheologie,l7 but he would also say that this "theology" has not yet 
speculatively grasped its own principle:28 Schleiermacher's Bewuf3tseins-
theologie rests in a "rational" distinction of finite mind; it does not make the 
imaginative, speculative step into the centre of the Christian religion, the 
unity forged between God and man in Jesus Christ. 29 
The two directions we took above in analysing Schleiermacher's con-
cept of God-consciousness now begin to merge. This can be seen very clearly 
in §97.2, where Schleiermacher argues that Christological doctrines should 
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be developed quite independently of any doctrine of the Trinity.30 At this 
stage (§99.1), we cannot really go further than to assert that 
the redeeming efficacy of Christ depends upon the being of God in Him, 
and faith in Him is grounded upon the impression that such a being of 
God indwells Him ... "31 
where this impression (Eindruck) becomes quite detached from the facts 
(Tatsachen) of the resurrection, ascension and the return in judgment of 
Christ, since the disciples could not have known of these when they first 
gained their impression of Him. Schleiermacher does not suppress the 
historical prominence of these doctrines (he cites their inclusion in the 
Nicene Creed),32 but he does relegate them to the status of a second order 
of doctrine: they do not represent an "immediate utterance of Christian 
self-consciousness" (§170. Proposition). The doctrine of the Trinity, like the 
doctrines of the resurrection and ascension of Christ, is in some sense 
"optional". It is not a Glaubenslehre at all, 
in the really original and proper sense of that phrase ... our faith in Christ 
and our living fellowship with Him would be the same although we 
had no knowledge of any such transcendent fact, or although the fact 
itself were different .... Hence it is important to make the point that the 
main pivots of the ecclesiastical doctrine-the being of God in Christ 
and the Christian Church-are independent of the doctrine of the 
Trinity.J3 
Schleiermacher's use of the phrase "kirchliche Lehre" in this context cannot 
go unremarked. Certainly those who were accustomed to use the so-called 
Athanasi~ creed as a test of Chri~~an ortl!_odoxy-awarde<:f sufficie~t 
authority by Schleiermacher to be placed at the beginning of his treatment 
of the doctrine of the Trinity34-would have been unhappy to discover that 
the essential truths of the Christian faith can be had without reference to this 
doctrine. Nor did they understand the phrase fides catholica as expressing 
something other than "ecclesiastical doctrine"! 
Schleiermacher's opposition in principle to the doctrine of the Trinity 
is now able to emerge more clearly: any instance of this doctrine requires 
some kind of statement about the divine essence, a form of doctrine which 
is (by definition) ultra vires in a work dedicated to the systematic repre-
sentation of the God-consciousness in finite human beings. There is then 
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considerable sense in asking the question: "Inwiefem gehort die TrinWit-
slehre noch in die Glaubenslehre?" The one unambiguous answer to the 
question reads: certainly not in its "ecclesiastical" expression!35 As Schleier-
macher himself acknowledges in the Glaubenslehre of 1822, the doctrine 
assumes a place "fast au.Berhalb des eigentlichen Korpers der Lehre".36 Its 
only justification for being mentioned at all is that it is apparently a combi-
nation of several immediate utterances of the pious self-consciousness (V er-
kniipfung mehrer solcher)37-in virtue of which the doctrine may be regarded 
as "(der wahre) Schlu.Bstein der christlichen Lehre".38 With considerable skill 
our English translation of the Glaubenslehre has chosen to render this phrase 
as the "coping-stone" rather than the "keystone" of Christian doctrine; even 
though either term might offer an acceptable translation, they are not 
synonyms. Whereas coping-stone (or cope-stone) derives its status from the 
cope of a wall (which is its top), the keystone is the stone placed "at the 
summit of an arch, which being the last put in, is looked upon as locking the 
whole together".39 This means that the "coping-stone" may be considered-as 
the crown or completion of an edifice, but it need not carry any stronger 
sense than "finishing touch".40 The keystone has a more decidedly architec-
tonic function: by analogy, it becomes "the central principle of a system ... 
upon which all the rest depends".41 The translators were right to steer us 
away from this sense of Schluf3stein; as we have explained above, the doctrine 
of the Trinity should be considered independently of Gottesbewuf3tsein, and 
only appears in the Glaubenslehre at all for two reasons (apart from _the 
important one of convention). 
i) It remains (in however imperfect a form) the fundamental ecclesiast-
ical expression of 
the doctrine of the union ofthe Divine Essence with human nature, both 
in the personality of Christ and in the common Spirit of the Church, 
with which the whole v~w of Christianity set forth in our Church 
teaching stands and falls. 
ii) Its treatment at the conclusion of Schleiermacher' s Glaubenslehre is under-
al · ,.. · f ' d · · ,. · ·u · · 43 a· t 'en m tue mtert::s'ts o u e octnne· s transrormation l mgestaltung), an 
reconstruction (Umbildung), a process which is given firm impetus by 
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Schleiermacher's "thoroughgoing criticism"44 of all aspects of its dogmatic 
terminology.45 This terminology is too prone to "philosophemes"46 and to 
scholastic speculation. If there is one single polemical purpose for which 
Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology is designed, it is that "die Glauben-
slehre sich vom Scholastischen immer mehr reinigen soli", and what he 
proposes to this end is "einen wissenschaftlichen Ausdruck zu organi-
sieren",47 which will finally secure for Christian theology that doctrinal 
expression of its essence without any admixture of "alien" speculation.48 
This leaves the conclusion of Schleiermacher's G!Jlubenslehre peculiarly 
"up in the air". On the one hand, Schleiermacher wishes to affirm as 
fervently as any believer that, with the coming of Christ, "das hochste Wesen 
war in den Menschen hereinversetzt";49 on the other hand, the adequate 
doctrinal expression of this fact has somehow eluded the Church over 
centuries, and the whole thrust of his Glaubenslehre is to "deconstruct" the 
classical statements of how this could be so. To sort out this dilemma we 
need to call to our assistance one of Schleiermacher's additions to the 1821 
edition of his Speeches on Religion. There he tackles the question whether 
Christianity would have been in any way impoverished if theologians had 
never come upon the idea "die christlichen Vorstellungen in einem gesch-
lossenen Zusammenhange darzustellen". 50 He has not, he claims, in his later 
years betrayed the anti-systematic rhetoric of the Speeches;51 he continues to 
oppose that "system-mania" which repudiates anything foreign, anything 
tha_t_might endanger __ the system's-preconceived harmony.52 His own syste-
matic work is carefully governed by two key principles: i) not to treat either 
Vorstellung or Begriff as what is constitutive and original in the repre-
sentation of religion, because as we know in this sphere (auf diesem Gebiet) 
"Gefiihl" is primary; ii) to build into the "letter" of the system ali ving mobility 
(die lebendige Beweglichkeit),53 so that the spirit continues to animate the 
system and the letter does not become just a fossil or a relic. 
This ties in rather directly with what has been called "die apologetische 
Hal tung der Glaubenslehre" (see page 113, above). This apologetic stance is 
in its tum realized in two moments: a) the attempt to discover the essential 
continuity of Christianity in and through historical change; and ~) the 
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critique of dogma so as to expel what is "unclear, narrow and impure". If we 
were to apply this apologetic stance to the conclusion of Schleiermacher's 
Glaubenslehre, we should have no trouble locating the critique of dogma this 
implies, but, I would suggest, considerable difficulty in identifying much 
continuity with tradition in the discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity-a 
doctrine which can hardly come to life if the divine essence is declared 
beyond the competence of Christian theology. Further, the systematic integ-
rity of the Glaubenslehre is placed in very great doubt by this open-ended 
conclusion. We have indicated (see page 89, above) that there is merit in the 
notion of an "open system", a system which not only tolerates difference but 
makes it a constitutive element54-but we need to be convinced that 
Schleiermacher has actually achieved his aim. It is one thing to be open to 
the future and quite another to peter out inadvertently. If there is any merit 
in the suggestion that the conclusion of a system provides coherence for the 
whole, 55 then very grave misgivings must attend these final paragraphs of 
the Glaubenslehre. In no sense do they provide the "keystone" which assures 
the stability of the arch. They constitute no more than vague critical sugges-
tions, the precise merit of which has been under discussion ever since. 
As for the beginning of the Glaubenslehre, many of the same reserva-
tions apply. It is impossible for me to understand that the concept of Gefiihl 
and schlechthinniges AbhiingigkeitsgejUhl, which form the basis for Schleier-
macher's "theory of Christianity" (see page 166), does not fall under the 
categories of V orstellung and Begriff. For Hegel, what all of the above dem-
onstrates is a) Schleiermacher has not grasped the speculative nature of his 
own entry into dogmatic theology; ~) die bewegliche Lebendigkeit which 
Schleiermacher requires of the system is only possible through dialectic--of 
which there is no evidence at all in the concluding paragraphs of the 
Glaubenslehre; andy) the only condition under which a doctrine of the Trinity 
is conceptually possible is in and through speculation 56-not an alien intru-
sion into Christian life, but the only form under which the truth can be had 
in thought. 
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Despite Schleiermacher's constant opposition to the scholastic confu-
sion of philosophy and theology, in one point, at least, he would have 
found a considerable ally in St. Thomas Aquinas. The question that 
Thomas poses is whether the relation between God and man, between 
creature and creator, can be said to be a reality in God. Thomas denies 
this. The reality of the relation rests entirely in the creature since "all 
creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely". God is no more 
affected by our relation to Him than the pillar is by the fact that we 
move from its left to its right. Thomas holds rigorously to the conclu-
sion that the relationship of effect to cause, of creature to creator-by 
which finite mind is able to come to a knowledge of the divine es-
sence-is no real relationship to God;57 despite the relativity of these 
terms to one another, it is only to the creature that they are posited 
really (secundum rem);58 in God their occurrence is strictly logical 
(secundum rationem).59 However unfamiliar the vocabulary, Schleier-
macher's introduction to the discussion of the divine attributes (in the 
Proposition to §50) is just the modern form of this same argument: 
All attributes which we ascribe to God are to be taken as denoting 
not something special in God, but only something special in the 
manner in which the feeling of absolute dependence is to be 
related to Him. 
This division between reality and idea60 appears to be absolute, but as 
Hegel never tires of pointing out, the distinction between what is 
secundum rationem and what is secundum rem is a distinction known to 
mind and and made by mind: if it were an absolute distinction mind 
could not articulate its content. 
The peculiar irony of this situation is elegantly summarized by 
Harnack's epigram "'Nicht zu spekulieren' fiihrt unter Umstanden 
auch zu einer Metaphysik":61 what begins as the (apparently) strictly 
enforced avoidance of speculation is achieved only by positing specu-
lative or metaphysical distinctions in and for mind. The effort to escape 
the fantasies of speculation is achieved in the metaphysical distinction 
of phenomenon and noumenon, an order of reality secundum rem and 
secundum rationem. 
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The essential problem with this crypto-metaphysical division of 
the order of reality is that by it God is destined to lose his infinite and 
absolute character-now apparently standing outside of and apart 
from a whole order of reality to which he cannot be related. One striking 
consequence of this-as it happens-metaphysical distinction is that 
the being of God in man (since it is not to be referred back to the 
unknowable essence of God) can only enter the finite sphere in and 
through the world. I.A. Domer finds the foundation for this entry in 
"der eigentiimlichen Empfanglichkeit der Menschheit Jesu",62 which 
means that we find here the same "idealist" elevation of humanity 
through Gottesbewufitsein which we identify with Hegel, except that 
(because of the strictures of Schleiermacher's theological method) the 
agency of that elevation is now the human rather than the divine! To 
maintain the proper economy of salvation (and the priority of the 
divine), this characteristic idealism must be inverted. We follow F.C. 
Baur in declaring that the human subject can only be conscious of God 
(or the Absolute), "because it is essential to the Absolute itself to give 
this consciousness". The crucial point that Schleiermacher's theology 
is unable to appropriate (since this is a speculative insight) is that the 
Absolute cannot realize its own nature unless it is "the Absolute for 
subjective consciousness as well".63 
Hegel then establishes the soundness of his own position in a 
confident interpretation of St. Athanasius' famous dictum that the 
Word "became man that we might become divine". 64 In similar fashion 
he intends to keep to a faithful and strict interpretation of Thomas' 
gtiiamg principle ladopted from Aristotle) that God "knows things · 
other than Himself by His essence" .65 Again Hegel would understand 
this as a characteristically speculative insight and will seek to interpret 
it by means of speculative reason. J.N. Findlay is able to spell out the 
ultimate implication: he says of Eriguena that he "anticipates Spinoza 
and Hegel in making man's knowledge of God be God's self-revelation 
in them, thereby giving man a theological function".66 In just this sense 
man becomes a true instrument of the divine will. 
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II. It will by now be quite evident why, from this perspective, religious devo-
A Priesthood tion is treated as a kind of speculation and why speculation is treated as a 
Apart 
kind of religious devotion. Philosophical speculation has bound itself to the 
Christian dispensation, whose chief doctrine is the unity of the divine and 
human natures as revealed in the person of Jesus Christ. Hegel summarizes 
the speculative character of this doctrine in the following formula: "Mensch 
und Gott, die subjektive Idee und die objektive Idee sind hier Eines". If the 
modern German Idealist philosophy67 (in which Hegel and Schleiermacher 
were equal participants)68 has one single central principle it is this unifica-
tion of subjectivity and objectivity.69 For Hegel, there is no truth in religion 
if God is not understood as Geist, as that absolute first principle which relates 
its own identity in otherness, in the negative, in the contradiction and in the 
division of the world?0 Therefore, as he says, if the word Geist is to have any 
content at all, God must be grasped as the Trinity,71 the God who can 
experience the extremes of alienation, suffering and death. n It is the genius 
of the Christian religion that God condescends to become a man, even 
becoming a slave to men?3 this is what God vouchsafes to do in man and 
for man and, in recognition of this condescension, God demands that we 
acknowledge, worship and honour Him. It follows that it can only be the 
greatest absurdity-Hegel uses the term ungereimt-to say from within 
Christianity, "daB sich Gott geoffenbart habe und daB er das offenbart habe, 
daB er sich dem Menschen nicht offenbare".74 
We have been trying_ throughout this dissertation to argue th~t 
Schleiermacher's claim to have written a Glaubenslehre free of speculative 
influence is incoherent. In seeking to avoid philosophy,75 it actually makes 
metaphysical claims; in establishing a concept of Gefti.hl and schlechthinniges 
Abhiingigkeitsgefilhl as the bedrock of Christian theology, it takes a specula-
tive, not an empirical stance. But in the highest, final and profoundest sense, 
it is perfectly true to say that the Glaubenslehreis not speculative, because it 
shies away from, avoids and refuses to grasp the central speculative Chris-
tian idea of God's maintaining Himself and His own nature in the extremity 
of otherness, even to the point of death-that central fact of Christian 
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revelation which Hegel in no sense deserts; he turns around to embrace it. 
Unlike Schleiermacher, who sought to avoid the apparent vanities of ab-
stract speculation, Hegel's speculative method is dedicated to the proclama-
tion of the concrete truth of the indissoluble unity of God and man. 
Schleiermacher's opposition to speculative religion is clearly laid out 
in his Open Letters. He fears the development of an esoteric Christianity, a 
gnostic religion, a hierarchy of intellectual culture and "a priesthood of 
speculation". 76 (I leave aside the intriguing question of any possible relation 
Christian piety might have to a work as abstract, dry and abstruse as 
Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre!)77 Hegel nowhere pretends that the specu-
lative appropriation of Christianity is a requirement for ordinary Christian 
consciousness. Far from it! Religion is the form of consciousness in which 
the truth can be known by every human being. But this religious conscious-
ness does not yet have, in the form of image and cultic elaboration, the form 
truly adequate to its own content. It is not yet in this form science (Wissen-
schaft) and does not in this form have the persuasive coherence of a system-
something it must acquire in order to assert its truth in the face of a dominant 
secular and intellectual culture. 78 Hegel offers his own potent metaphor: the 
content is the same for the ordinary believer and the speculative philosopher 
or theologian, what differs is only the form-just as in Homer's Iliad, some 
objects have two names, one name in the language of the Gods and another 
in the language of ephemeral mankind. 79 In the same way there are two 
l~guag~ for this Christian content: the language of Vorstellung and _the 
language of Begriff. All theology (including Schleiermacher's)80 makes the 
transition from one to the other. 
It is another irony of considerable interest, that there is at least one 
aspect of Schleiermacher' s Glaubenslehre which is more "speculative" than 
Hegel's philosophy. Hegel is absolutely clear that philosophy has nothing 
whatsoever to do with predicting the future; its only object is to grasp 
conceptually that which has actually appeared historically and that which 
can be known as material or spiritual fact.81 Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre, 
by way of contrast, is addressed to the future Gestalt of Christianity: it is a 
tentative suggestion of how Christian theology should be constructed in 
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order to maintain its integral truths in a secular culture increasingly hostile 
to its claims. From this perspective, much of what actual Christian piety takes 
to be a necessary expression of its content82 is best described as ballast, soon 
to be jettisoned in order to keep the ship of faith afloat. In this precise sense, 
and all appearances to the contrary, Schleiermacher's theology is less con-
crete and empirical than abstract and speculative.83 
I suspect that Hegel would have accepted the opprobrium of "a priest-
hood of speculation" with considerable pride. In the conclusion to his first 
series of lectures on the philosophy of religion (1821), he suggested that it 
might be necessary for philosophers to establish "an isolated order of priests" 
or a "priesthood apart",84 and that to maintain its truth, religion must now 
flee into philosophy's concept.85 Philosophy has no particular insight into 
the future course of the world, but philosophers like Hegel were able to see 
with their own eyes the vacuity of contemporary Christian theology and the 
evaporation of Christianity's central doctrines under the pressure of modern 
secularity. (Nothing illustrates this point better that Schleiermacher's vapid 
treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity at the conclusion of the Glaubenslehre.) 
For Hegel, the truths of Christianity do represent a Heiligtum,86 and if the 
theologians are incapable of the speculative insight necessary to keep watch 
over this "hallowed ground", then let its preservation fall to the philoso-
phers. As Hegel famously concludes "How things turn out" in the end cannot 
be the concern of philosophy.87 
In his brief account of t_he history of ph~psophy (in the Metaphysir:s), 
Aristotle explains that the study of philosophy is a function of leisure, and 
that the priestly caste in Egypt were the inventors of mathematics,88 because 
they alone had the leisure and independence to undertake this esoteric 
pastime. Hegel cites this remark in the second preface (1831) to his Science 
of Logic,89 just as in the first preface of 1812, he talks of 
the strange spectacle of a cultured nation without metaphysics-like a 
temple richly ornamented in other respects but without a holy of holies. 
Theology, which in former times was the guardian of the speculative 
mysteries and of metaphysics (although this was subordinate to it) had 
given up this science in exchange for feel~s, for what was popularly 
matter-of-fact, and for historical erudition. 
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In these tragic (or absurd) circumstances, where "the salt has lost its flavour", 
Hegel sees no alternative but that the philosophers will be forced to provide 
the refuge to keep the speculative truths of the Christian religion alive, until 
such time as help comes from on high.91 When this may be is not for 
philosophy to determine. 
Schleiermacher's solution to the contemporary crisis of Christianity is 
completely different. He requires that modern Christian souls learn to live 
with two forms of consciousness side by side: the subjective and the objec-
tive, where dialectical philosophy is the supreme instance of the latter, and 
Glaubenslehre is the highest expression of the former. This is not actually a 
new solution: its most famous articulation occurred in the thirteenth cen-
tury, where religious thought was also threatened by the scepticism of a new 
secular philosophical freedom. This double consciousness makes extreme 
demands upon religion by forcing it to excise all aspects of Christian faith 
which cannot be bome92 by the subjective consciousness alone.93 Theolo-
gians are required to be equally at home in both spheres, Christianity and 
science, theology and philosophy. Theologians are left in the peculiar situ-
ation of having to become experts in the very modes of thought from which 
they are trying to extricate the Christian religion!94 Unless they are com-
pletely familiar with these modes of thought, they will be incapable of the 
reconnaissance which the defence of religious consciousness requires. 
The reader will not be surprised to learn that, in my view, Schleier-
macher's refusal to grasp the speculative nettle means that his position 
ultimately collapses into incoherence. This demand that we live in "two 
cultures", in two kingdoms, with two truths, each fully justified within its 
own sphere of competence begs the question of how we are to find their 
relation.95 Is the Hegelian standpoint not more coherent in suggesting that 
theology and philosophy, doctrine and speculation 
do not merely exist alongside each other, but stand in so essentially 
internal a relation that they can be conceived only in terms of each other, 
or only as parts of one and the same whole.96 
Schleiermacher' s "philosophical theology" suggests that he understands the 
intimacy of this relationship very well. Even the apparently simple attempt 
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to provide a rigorous statement that theology is not philosophy inevitably 
directs the attention towards their (in this case only negative) relation. But 
they do have a relation, and sooner or later consciousness will want to know 
what it is. It is not credible that we shall be able to hold these two forms of 
consciousness in perfect parallel construction for ever. To mix these forms 
of consciousness and to combine philosophy and theology may expose 
religion to hidden dangers, but there is no evidence that individuals have 
shied away from this course for the simple reason that, whatever the 
consequences, no one (not even Faust)97 can rest in a divided consciousness. 
The logic of Schleiermacher's own position carries the argument forward.98 
Hegel repeatedly claimed that philosophy is divine service,99 a form 
of worship. This seeming impiety results from Hegel's conviction that the 
central Christian truth is the dialectical overcoming of all forms of divided 
consciousness, subjective and objective, religious and speculative, theologi-
cal and philosophical, even human and divine. The conclusion of Hegel's 
lecture notes for 1821 contain the abbreviated formula: "Statt Vemunft und 
Religion sich widersprechen ... Versohnung in der Philosophie" .100 It is re-
markable here that Hegel speaks of V ersohnung: this is not just "reconcilia-
tion"101 but implies atonement as well. Where, for whatever reason, this 
truth cannot be comprehended, it is the task of a philosophical priesthood 
to keep this final speculative intuition alive, until men and women are once 
again able to hear and apprehend a truth "which passeth all understanding". 
One ofSchleiermacher' s mostdogged-crities, D.F. Strauss,-insisted-th~t 
the task of theological speculation was far from exhausted by the merely 
formal ordering of the theological material. It was also necessary, he main-
tained, "den theologischen Stoff ... begreifend zu durchdringen" .102 Schleier-
macher's skill with respect to the first dogmatic task cannot be in any doubt; 
but as to the the second, die spelculative und begriffliche Durchdringung, this is 
less in evidence, and least of all in Schleiermacher' s account of the doctrine 
of the Trinity. While this may be the Christian doctrine par excellence, 103 it is 
not clear whether in Schleiermacher it even rises to the level of a doctrine. It 
must be one of the great historical ironies that Schleiermacher's own theo-
logical faculty at the University of Berlin was hardly unanimous in accepting 
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his account of Christian dogmatics. In fact, the very conflict of perspectives 
with which we have been concerned was being played out by Schleier-
macher's theological colleagues. A famous student of theology in Berlin at 
this time sent a revealing letter to his brother about the divisions in the 
faculty of theology, which he described as the Hegel-Marheineke adherents 
on one side, and the majority, clustered around Schleiermacher, on the other. 
Von Altenstein, the Minister responsible for education, had become in-
volved in the dispute, and as the letter says: 
Schleiermacher hat man wissen lassen, er solle nicht immer philoso-
phische von den theologischen Collegia gesondert, sondern philoso-
phisch-theologische halten, worauf er geantwortet hat, solches nicht zu 
verstehen.104 
While Schleiermacher may not have understood what the Minister meant 
by this request, I hope my readers will by now recognize the perspective 
from which it originates. 
The end of a dissertation is a good place in which to acknowledge the 
port and starboard lights which have allowed this vessel to keep a straight 
course and to dock safely in the port. On the one hand, I have yet to be 
convinced that anyone, in the whole history of the interpretation of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre, read that work more carefully than F.C. 
Baur. Baur read the first edition of the Glaubenslehre in the summer of 1823 
(long before he was acquainted with Hegel!), and wrote a famous letter to 
his brother giving a preliminary analysis and first impressions; 105 these 
were later to be developed into Baur's inaugural dissertation for the Univer-
sity of Tiibingen (see p. 63), and in due course elicited an (unfriendly) 
response from Schleiermacher in his Open Letters. To that penetrating criti-
cism Baur eventually added a firm Hegelian perspective, according to which 
"philosophy and theology are similar modes of consciousness, expressed, 
however, in different forms".106 And from this standpoint he came to the 
conclusion that: 
the relation of the two disciplines-the history of Christian dogma and 
the history of philosophy- has take1 sl p ece tly iii such a way that 
a history of Christian dogma which was not at the same time essentially 
a history of speculative thinking in relation to religion and theology 
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woul0d7be in contradiction with the whole scientific consciousness of the age.1 
It is on! y necessary to remove the word "history" from the assessment offered 
above, and Baur's proposition offers the appropriate summary of our thesis. 
In other words, Schleiermacher's concern with the clear delineation of 
doctrine and speculation reflects "the moving principle" of the age; but as 
Schleiermacher refuses to grasp their relation, the Spirit is unable to rest in 
the divided consciousness that results. 
On the other hand, I must here redeem a debt to a great teacher of 
philosophy, ancient and modem, who set the initial compass bearing for the 
whole voyage. Without there being any explicit reference to Schleiermacher, 
the following remark of his is none the less of immediate application and 
relevance: 
For the subjective reconciliation of Protestant faith can only become 
objective when religion again becomes speculative as in medieval 
Catholicism.108 
I hope that my dissertation may come to be seen as an extended commentary 
on this advice. 
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Gottes ... " The translation of this passage in LPR, Volume 3, p. 78, is helpful: "God is 
spirit-that which we call the triune God, a purely speculative content, i.e., the mystery 
of God." Cf. VPR, Teil1, p. 43: 'Wenn Geist nicht ein leeres Wort ist, so mua Gott mit 
dieser Bestimmung [gefaat werden], wie vormals in der Kirchentheologie der 
dreieinige Gott genannt wurde. Dies ist dasjenige, wodurch die Natur des Geistes 
expliziert ist." 
57. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, Q. 13, a. 7, Respondeo: "sed in Deo non: est 
aliqua realis relatio eius ad creaturas ... " 
58. There is a passing reference to this equivocation in Peter C. Hodgson, God in History: 
Shapes of Freedom. Nashville, Tennessee: Abingdon Press, 1989. Seep. 68: "Thus the 
task of a speculative doctrine of the trinity is to destroy, that is, deconstruct, the 
childlike (kindlich), figurative (bildlich) forms-the 'persons' of 'Father', 'Son' and 
'Holy Spirit'-in which the doctrine has been representationally expressed. This is 
necessary in order to release and retrieve the truth of the doctrine, which concerns 
God's 'real relations', not just internally (as Thomas maintained) but externally as 
well." By my reading of Hegel's philosophy of religion, he would have found the 
notion that he was "destroying" or "deconstructing" religious Vorstellung totally 
abhorrent: he did not come to destroy religious thought, but to fulfil it! Hodgson's 
use of quotation marks suggests that the religious language concerning God's nature 
ha9v~ryli!tl~~uthQrityfo_rHegel;_this_ishar:dly_evidence,since_weare_pr_o_yided with 
nothing more than a rhetorical device, which has not risen to the level of a -real 
argument. 
59. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Potentia, Q. 7, a. 10, Respondeo, & Ad 12. (Latin text in 
Quaestiones Disputatae, 8th ed., Volume II. Rome: Marietti, 1949. English Translation 
in the 3rd Book of On the Power of God. London: Burns Oates & Washboume, 1934. 
pp.59&62.) 
60. This is how the English Translation undertakes to render secundum rem and secundum 
rationem. See, for instance, Summa Theologiae I, Q. 13, a. 7, Ad 4. 
61. See Adolf Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 4th ed., Volume III. Tiibingen: 
J.C.B. Mohr, 1910. p. 510. 
62. I.A. Domer, §100.1 of System der Christlichen Glaubenslehre, Volume 11/1, op. cit., p. 
390. 
63. F.C. Baur, Vorlesungen uber die christliche Dogmengeschichte, Volume I, edited by F.F. 
Baur. Leipzig: Fues's Verlag, 1865. See p. 136: "Es ist das Absolute selbst, das auch 
das Wissen des Absoluten sein muG, weil es nicht das Absolute ware, wenn es nicht 
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das Absolute auch fiir das subjektive BewuBtsein ware ... Nur von dem spekulativen 
Standpunkt aus, auf welchem es urn das BewuBtsein des Absoluten zu tun ist, das 
Subjekt aber des Absoluten nur darum sich bewuBt sein kann, weil es dem Absoluten 
selbst wesentlich ist, sich dieses BewuBtsein zu geben ... " Baur' s Introduction to these 
lectures has been translated by Peter C. Hodgson in Ferdinand Christian Baur on the 
Writing of Church History. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. pp. 261-366; here 
p. 364. The reader will note Baur's definition that "the speculative standpoint is 
concerned with the consciousness of the Absolute"; in this sense it is right to treat 
Schleiennacher under the rubric of "doctrine and speculation". Hodgson's excellent 
"General Introduction" (pp. 3-40) should not be overlooked. 
64. Athanasius, Contra Gentes & De lncarnatione, tr. and edited by Robert W. Thomson. 
Oxford, Oarendon Press, 1971. (De lncarnatione, §54: am~ "r'lP £V11V9PC01t'I1CJEV. tva 
11J.1£1.~ 9E01tOt119CllJ.LEV. See pp. 268-269. 
65. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, Q. 14, a. 11, Respondeo: "Cum enim sciat alia 
a se per essentiam suam ... " In this discussion I must acknowledge my debt to the 
illuminating paper by J. Patrick Atherton, 'The Validity of Thomas' Interpretation of 
NOHDI. NOHI.EOI." in Tommaso D' Aquino, Nella Storia del Pensiero I. Naples: 
Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, 1975. pp. 156-162. 
66. J.N. Findlay, Plato: The Written and Unwritten Doctrines. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1974. p. 387. 
67. Hegel's Einleitung in der Geschichte der Philosophie, op. cit., p. 246. Hegel calls this "das 
germanische Prinzip, diese Vereinigung der Objektivitat und der Subjektivitat". This 
is not meant in any crudely nationalistic sense, but is a catch-all term for post-classical 
Western Europe, just as one might speak of Indo-Germanic tribes and languages. See 
G.W.F. Hegel, Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, Volume I of Vorlesungen Uber die Philo-
sophie der Weltgeschichte, 5th ed., edited by J. Hoffmeister (PhB 171a). Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner Verlag, 1980. See, for instance, p. 62: "Erst die germanischen Nationen sind im 
Christentum zum BewuBtsein gekommen, daB der Mensch als Mensch frei ist, die 
Freiheit des Geistes seine eigenste Natur ausmacht Dies BewuBtsein ist zuerst in der 
Religion, in der innersten Region des Geistes aufgegangen ... " It is, of course, the 
argument of this entire dissertation that Hegel has made this same principle the 
central idea of his whole philosophy. 
68. I particularly like the following statement (p. 228) from Otto Paggeler's doctoral 
dissertation for the University of Bonn; it was published in 1956 and entitled "Hegels 
Kritik der Romantik": " ... aus dieser Generation wares zwei Mannem, Hegel und 
Schleiennacher, vergannt, ihre geistige Arbeit zur Systematik zu lautern und-so 
tiber alle Romantik hinauswachsend-machtig den Zeitgeist zu bewegen." 
69. It ~Q_uld bebal'd_to_ improve onJ~eterSzondi~s-elegantsummary: "Grob lieBesidl 
sagen, daB die Philosophen des Deutschen Idealismus auf spekulativem Wege 
zuriickzugewinnen trachten, was Kants Kritizismus preisgeben muBte: die Einheit 
von Subjekt und Objekt, von Geist und Natur." See Poetik und Geschichtsphilosophie, 
Volume I, edited by Senta Metz and Hans-Hagen Hildebrandt. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974. p. 221. 
70. See Enzyklopiidie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830): 3. Teil, §382. Zusatz: "Das 
Andere, das Negative, der Widerspruch, die Entzweiung gehort also zur Natur des 
Geistes. In dieser Entzweiung liegt die Maglichkeit des Schmerzes. Der Schmerz ist 
daher nicht von auBen an den Geist gekommen ... Der Geist aber hat die K~~ft, sich 
im Widerspruche, folglich im Schmerz (sowohl tiber das BOse wie iiber das Uble) zu 
erhalten." (pp. 26-27.) 
71. See n. 56, above. 
72. Enzyklopiidie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830): 3. Teil, §382: "Das Wesen des 
Geistes ... er kann die Negation seiner individuellen Unmittelbarkeit, den unend-
lichen Schmerz ertragen, d.i. in dieser Negativitat affinnativ sich erhalten und ident-
isch fiir sich sein." (pp. 25-26.) 
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73. See Vorlesungen uber die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes (1829), op. cit., p. 47: "die christliche 
Religion lehrt, daB Gott sich zu dem Menschen herabgelassen habe bis zur Knecht-
schaft, daB er sich dem Menschen geoffenbart habe ... " 
74. Ibid., p. 48. 0. Hegel's plain-speaking in Volume I of Vorlesungen uberdie Philosophie 
der Weltgeschichte, op. cit., p. 46: "Die christliche Religion ist diejenige, die den 
Menschen die Natur und das Wesen Gottes manifestiert hat. So wissen wir als 
Christen, was Gott ist; jetzt ist Gott nicht mehr ein Unbekanntes: behaupten wir dies 
noch, so sind wir nicht Christen." 
75. The Levinas Reader (p. 167), edited by Sean Hand, offers the tag, 'Not to philosophize 
is still to philosophize." Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. This is the marker that we are 
trying to pin on Schleiermacher. 
76. See Lucke, p. 319: "eine Hierarchie der intellektuellen Bildung, ein Priestertum der 
~pekulation" & p. 350: "Kurz die spekulative Theologie bedroht uns mit einem den 
AuBerungen Christi, welcher will, sie sollen Aile von Gott gelehrt sein [John 6:45], 
gar nicht gemaBen Gegensatz esoterischer und exoterischer Lehre; die Wissenden 
haben allein den Grund des Glaubens, die Nichtwissenden haben nur den Glauben 
und erhalten ihn daher wahl nur auf dem Wege der Oberlieferung. UiBt hingegen 
jene ebionitische Ansicht nur wenig von Christo ubrig: so istdoch dieses wenige allen 
gleich zuganglich und erreichbar, und wir bleiben dabei bewahrt vor jeder immer 
doch ins Romische hinuber spielenden Hierarchie der Spekulation." Even the 
Ebionite heresy is preferable to any position of intellectual privilege, which would 
set Schleiermacher the (speculative) theologian over and above "thousands", who do 
not possess this ground of faith! (English Translation, pp. 63-64.) 
77. Hegel offers an interesting comment on this in lectures he gave at the beginning of 
his career in Berlin: "Die Universitiitsbildung der Geistlichen ist selbst groBenteils 
von der Art, daB die Lehrer der Religion mehr gelehrt reden, als fahig sind, zum 
Herzen zu sprechen und das lnnere zu offenbaren." See Die Philosophie des Rechts: Die 
Vorlesung von 1819/20 in einer Nachschrift, edited by Dieter Henrich. Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983. p. 194. 
78. At the time of writing, the newly installed Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. George 
Carey, weighed into our debate with views expressed in the journal Reader's Digest-
of indubitable exoteric pedigree! Dr. Carey is reported as saying, "The Church is more 
likely to die of intellectualism than of simplicity." (The Independent, February 28, 1991, 
p. 28.) While Schleiermacher would undoubtedly find the sentiment attractive (see 
n. 76 above), we should not be tempted to forget the extent to which the whole 
Schleiermacherian project from the Speeches on Religion to the Glaubenslehre is an 
attempt to find a form of Christian apologetic which will see it through "the impend-
ing crisis" occasioned by the modem, secular Wissenschaft, which Schleiermacher had 
no intention of-excluding-from his-life. <see-r.;acke,-p.-349-&q5. 63 of the Engli'h 
Translation.) While many churches, sects and denominations may be sustained (and 
grow) in the simplicity of their convictions, it can at least be argued that what gets 
lost is the Ouistianity! Simplicity might just serve as a euphemism for fanaticism, 
and the antonym for fanaticism should not be "restraint"; it should be "moderation" 
or "compromise". As Hegel also says with great perspicacity, the incorporation of the 
Christian principle into secular existence is only possible by way of "a long and 
arduous" intellectual exertion. (" .. .aber dies Prinzip auch in das weltliche Wesen 
einzubilden, dies war eine weitere Aufgabe, welche zu losen und auszufiihren eine 
schwere, lange Arbeit der Bildung erfordert." See Volume I of Vorlesungen iiber die 
Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, op. cit., p. 62. I have consulted the translation of this text 
by H.B. Nisbet Lectures on the Philosophy of World History (Introduction: Reason in 
History). Cambridge University Press, 1975. p. 54. a owe the contrast between 
"fanaticism" and "compromise" to Georges Roditi, The Spirit of Perfection. London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 1988. p. 5.) 
79. See Hegel's Vorrede to the 2nd ed. (1827) of his Enzyklopitdie der philosophischen 
Wissenschaften: as reprinted in Volume 8 of the Theorie-Werklmsgabe, op. cit., pp. 13-32; 
here pp. 23-24: "Die Religionist die Art und Weise des BewuBtseins, wie die Wahrheit 
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fiir aile Menschen, fiir die Menschen aller Bildung ist; die wissenschaftliche Erkennt-
nis der Wahrheit aber ist eine besondere Art ihres BewuBtseins, deren Arbeit sich 
nicht aile, vielmehr nur wenige unterziehen. Der Gehalt ist derselbe, aber wie Homer 
von einigen Dingen sagt, daB sie zwei Namen haben, den einen in der Sprache der 
Cotter, den anderen in der Sprache der tibertagigen Menschen, so gibt es fiir jenen 
Gehalt zwei Sprachen, die eine des Geftihls, der Vorstellung und des verstandigen, 
in endlichen Kategorien und einseitigen Abstraktionen nistenden Denkens, die 
andere des konkreten Begriffs." For examples of this dual naming, see Alfred Heu-
beck, "Die homerische Gottersprache" in Wiirzburger Jahrbiicher fiir die Altertumswis-
senschaft, Volume 4 (1949-1950), pp. 197-218; esp. p. 197. 
80. Cf. Glaubenslehrez, §17.2: "Es ist aber der dogmatischen Begriffsbildung nicht gelun-
gen, ja man diirfte wohl sagen, es kann ihr auch des Gegenstandes wegen nicht 
gelingen, den eigentlichen Ausdruck tiberall an die Stelle des bildlichen zu setzen; 
und der wissenschaftliche Wert dogmatischer Satze beruht also von dieser Seite 
groBtenteils nur auf der moglichst genauen und bestimmten Erklarung der vorkom-
menden bildlichen Ausdriicke." Even though the "figurative" expression is the ori-
ginal one (and therefore cannot be eliminated), the intent of dogmatic theology is to 
"substitute" den eigentlichen Ausdruck for the figurative one, in order to achieve 
precision and to avoid contradiction. 
81. See the famous passage from Hegel's Vorrede to Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. 
Volume 7 of the Theorie-Werkausgabeedited by E. Moldenhauer and K.M.Michel; here 
pp. 27-28: "Um noch iiber das Belehren, wie die Welt sein soU, ein Wort zu sagen, so 
kommt dazu ohnehin die Philosophie immer zu spat. Als der Gedanke der Welt 
erscheint sie erst in der Zeit, nachdem die Wirklichkeit ihren BildungsprozeB vollen-
det und sich fertig gemacht hat." Cf. p. 26: 'Was das Individuum betrifft, so ist 
ohnehin jedes ein Sohn seiner Zeit; so ist auch die Philosophie ihre Zeit in Gedanken 
erfafJt. Es ist ebenso toricht zu wahnen, irgendeine Philosophie gehe tiber ihre 
gegenwartige Welt hinaus, als, ein Individuum iiberspringe seine Zeit, springe tiber 
Rhodus hinaus." 
82. See Liicke, pp. 345-346. 
83. In his New Year's Day address for 1991, Vaclav Havel points out how (under 
communist dictatorship) "the people" were always being required to sacrifice (real) 
present benefits and freedoms "for the abstract future of a utopian ideology." The 
translation of Havel's speech by Paul Wilson is available in The New York Review of 
Books, March 7, 1991, pp. 19-20; here p. 20. 
84. The cryptic conclusion to the manuscript for the lectures of 1821 reads: ''Religion in 
die Philosophie sich fliichten ... Aber Philosophie partiell-Priesterstand isoliert-
Heiligtum-Unbekiimmert wie es der Welt gehen mag-~Uhr nicht zusam-
mengel'ie~DiesesBeSitzturriaer Wahrheif-Wie slch-gestalte ist nicht unsre Saehe". 
See Vorlesungsmanuskripte I (1816-1831), op. cit., p. 300. The succinct expression of a 
"priesthood apart" was suggested by John McCumber, "Hegel on Habit" in The Owl 
of Minerva, Volume21/2 (Spring 1990), pp. 155-165; here p. 163. 
85. Friedrich Wilhelm Graf and Falk Wagner have edited a book on this theme entitled, 
Die Flucht in den Begriff: Materialien zu Hegels Religionsphilosophie. Stuttgart: Klett-
Cotta, 1982. 
86. See n. 84 above. 
87. LPR, Volume 3, p. 162. 
88. The Works of Aristotle, edited bl David Ross. Volume Vlll: Metaphysica. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1928. Here 981 : 'This is why the mathematical arts were founded 
in Egypt; for there the priestly caste was allowed to be at leisure." 
89. See Wissenschaft der Logik (1832); L Band, op. cit., p. 12. 
90. Ibid., p. 6: "das sonderbare Schauspiel ... ein gebildetes Volk ohne Metaphysik zu sehen ... 
Die Theologie, welche in friihem Zeiten die Bewahrerin der spekulativen Myste-
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rien ... war, hatte diese Wissenschaft gegen Gefi.ihle ... aufgegeben." Hegel's Science of 
Logic, op. cit., pp. 25- 26. 
91. Hegel's Vorredeto Grundlinien der Philosophiedes Rechts, op. cit., p. 24. Cf. p. 10. of the 
English Translation by T.M. Knox of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Oxford University 
Press, 1967. 
92. Cf. Heinrich Scholz, Christentum und Wissenschaft in Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre, op. 
cit., p. 198: "Der Glaube scheidet alles a us, was er nicht selber tragen kann." 
93. See WalterSparn, "Doppelte Wahrheit? ErinnerungenzurtheologischenStrukturdes 
Problems der Einheit des Denkens" in Zugang zur Theologie: Fundamentaltheologische 
Beitriige, edited by Friedrich Mildenberger and Joachim Track. Gottingen: Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 1979. pp. 53-78; here p. 76: "Die neuere Theologie befindet sich 
hier in einer Situation, die in bestimmter Hinsicht der Zeit vergleichbar scheint, in 
der die These der doppelten Wahrheit gefordert war .... Daran ist zweifellos so viel 
richtig, da8 die neuere protestantische Theologie im allgemeinen ihre Aufgabe darin 
sieht, die theologische Wahrheit als die Wahrheit des Subjektiven zu erkHiren; so 
unterschiedliche theologische Entwiirfe wie die von F. Schleiermacher, S. Kierke-
gaard oder A. Ritschl stimmen hierin tiberein." 
94. See this excellent summary by Heinrich Scholz, Christentum und Wissenschaft in 
Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre, op. cit., pp. 2()(}201: "Der Dogmatiker mua in heiden 
Welten zu Hause sein: Christentum und Wissenschaft, Theologie und Philosophie 
miissen sich ihm erschlossen haben; er mu8 die treibenden Krafte kennen, die hier 
und dort am Werke sind, er mua ein sicheres Auge haben fiir das, was sich versch-
melzen Hi8t, und das, was nur nebeneinander bestehen kann." 
95. Cf. Walter Sparn, "Doppelte Wahrheit?", op. cit., p. 55: "Allein die Aussage, es gebe 
zweierlei Wahrheit, verkniipfte unvermeidlicherweise seiher, was sie fiir nicht ver-
kniipfbar ausgab." 
96. Ferdinand Christian Baur on the Writing of Church History, op. cit., p. 319. While Baur is 
actually talking about "the relation of the history of dogma to the history of philos-
ophy" the same applies, mutatis mutandis, for dogma and philosophy: "The history of 
dogma has a very close relation to the history of philosophy, one that includes the 
relation of philosophy to religion and theology." Cf. F.C. Baur, Vorlesungen iiber die 
christlicheDogmengeschichte, Volume I, op. cit., p. 78: "ZurGeschichte der Philosophie 
steht die Dogmengeschichte in einer sehr nahen Beziehung, wie dies das Verhiiltnis 
der Philosophie zur Religion und Theologie von selbst mit sich bringt." 
97. Goethe's Faust, Part I, lines 1112-1113: 
"Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust, 
Die eine will sich von der andem trennen ... " 
- --
98. Ferdinand Christian Baur, Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte, 3rd ed. (1867). 
Darmstadt Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1979. p. 354: ''In der SCHLEIER-
MACHER' schen Theologie ... sie hat, was sie besonders charakterisiert, in ihrem chris-
t lichen Bewu8tsein als Prinzip erfa8t, was Hingst, nur noch nicht mit dieser 
allgemeinen Verstindlichkeit ausgesprochen, der tiefere Gedanke der Zeit war, die 
lnnerlichkeitdes Christen turns, oder das Christliche alsein wesentliches Element des 
Bewu8tseins selbst; aber sie ist auf einem Punkt stehen geblieben, auf welchem die 
Bewegung, deren Produkt sie selbst ist, nicht ruhen kann, sondem durch die innere 
Macht der Konsequenz weiter getrieben wird." For a similar discussion, see Baur's 
Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieiniglceit und Menschwerdung Gottes in ihrer geschicht-
lichen Entwicklung, 3. Teil, op. cit., pp. 885-886. 
99. A particularly poignant example is taken from Hegel's Vorlesungen uber die Asthetik, 
1. Teil. Volume 13 of the Theorie-Werkausgabe edited by E. Moldenhauer and K.M. 
Michel; here p. 139: " Denn auch die Philosophie hat keinen anderen Gegenstand als 
Gott und ist so wesentlich rationelle Theologie und als im Dienste der Wahrheit 
fortdauemderGottesdienst." Cf. esp. VPR, Teil1., pp. 63-64. 
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100. Vorlesungsmanuskriptel (1816-1831), op. cit., p. 300. The whole of this passage is of 
considerable interest: "Statt Vernunft und Religion sich widersprechen--1-iiesen Mis-
ton auflosen auf diese Weise fiir uns--Vers6hnung in der Philosophie-Wie sich die 
zeitliche Gegenwart herausfindet, ist ihr zu iiberlassen-In der Philosophie selbst 
partiell-hiezu die Anleitung zu geben, ist was diese Vorlesungen versucht haben." 
101. LPR, Volume3, p. 161. 
102. See the section under "Rosenkranz" in David Friedrich StrauB, Charakteristiken und 
Kritiken. Leipzig, Otto Wigand, 1839. p. 217. 
103. F .C. Baur, Lehrbuch der christ lichen Dogmengeschichte, op. cit., p. 355:" 1st der Inhalt des 
Christen turns wesentlich die Lehre von dem dreieinigen Gott, so ist die Dreieinigkei t, 
als das Wesen Gottes, das Wesen des Geistes selbst. .. " 
104. Letter: Wilhelm Vatke to his brother Georg, September 1828. Hegel in Berichten seiner 
Zeitgenossen (PhB 245), ed. byGiinther Nicolin. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1970. 
pp. 388-389: " ... das Ministerium und die Fakultat dariiber in Streit sind ... Das 
Ministerium ist niimlich durch Altenstein auf der Hegei-Marheinekeschen Seite, die 
Fakultat aber durch die Mehrzahl auf der Neander-Schleiennacher-Straufjschen, d.h. 
der einfachen Glaubensseite ... Schleiermacher hat man wissen lassen ... " 
105. Letter: F.C. Baur to his brother Friedrich August; July 26, 1823. Reproduced in Heinz 
Liebing, "Ferdinand Christian Baurs Kritik an Schleiennachers Glaubenslehre" in 
ZThK, Volume 54, 1957. pp. 225- 243. The letter comprises pp. 238-243. A portion of 
this letter has been translated by Horton Harris in his The Tiibingen School. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1975. See pp. 147-149. Probably Baur did not begin to read Hegel 
seriously until nearly a decade later. See Peter C. Hodgson's "General Introduction" 
to Ferdinand Christian Baur on the Writing of Church History, op. cit., p. 4-Sn. 
106. See Ferdinand Christian Baur on the Writing of Church History, op. cit., p. 332. Cf. 
Vorlesungen uber die christliche Dogmengeschichte, Volume I, op. cit., p. 97. 
107. Ferdinand Christian Baur on the Writing of Church History, op. cit, p. 334. Cf. Vorlesungen 
uber die christliche Dogmengeschichte, Volume I, op. cit., p. 99-100: " ... hat sich daher in 
der neuesten Zeit so gestaltet, dafj eine christliche Dogmengeschichte, welche nicht 
in ihrem wesentlichen Inhalt zugleich eine Geschichte des auf Religion und Theologie 
sich beziehenden spekulativen Denkens ware, mit dem ganzen wissenschaftlichen 
Bewufjtsein der Zeit in Widerspruch kommen miifjte." 
108. James Doull, "Comment on Fackenheim's 'Hegel and Judaism'" in The Legacy of Hegel: 
Proceedings of the Marquette Hegel Symposium, 1970, ed. by J.J. O'Malley et al. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. pp. 186-195; here p. 191. 
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"Die Abgrenzung zwischen Kultur und Technik ist, ahnlich wie jene 
zwischen Glauben und Wissen, eine Voraussetzung der geistigen 
Sauberkeit. Ohne sie wird das Leben zum Trauerspiel." 
Ernst Junger, Die Schere, 1990: Aperqu 65. 
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Appendix A: 
Hegel and Schleiermacher 
on the Concept of Polarity 
S chleiermacher's reference to the "galvanic pile" in his celebrated letter to Jacobi in 1818 deserves some detailed consideration. Schleiermacher 
is obviously attracted to this recent scientific discovery because the "pile" or 
battery is taken to be an illustration of the kind of "polar oscillation" which 
occurs between feeling and understanding, or between faith and knowledge 
(Glauben und Wissen). John Clayton, in an article of special relevance for this 
discussion, argues that the metaphor of "polar oscillation" runs throughout 
all of Schleiermacher' s writings, philosophical as well as theological.1 It 
would then be instructive to discover just how the galvanic pile or battery 
(invented by Volta) functions in reality. 
In modem terms, Volta created the first electrochemical cell by allow-
ing two dissimilar metals (like zinc and silver or zinc and copper) to come 
into contact in a sali!le sol~_tjon. S~lt (as an electtQlyte) heightens the con-
ductivity of the current. (Even the hands of the human body may become 
the conducting agency, as the salt and moisture of human hands is sufficient 
to make the transfer of an electrical charge possible.) In the event, Volta 
placed pads moistened with salt water between the pairs of metals. 
The real interest in examining the operation of a "galvanic pile", or this 
electrochemical cell, is the discovery that the electrical current is in fact 
produced by the corrosion of one metal, and the "anti- corrosion" of the other. 
The transfer of ions that takes place in the cell is the same as that which occurs 
in the process we know as "rusting". Indeed were there sufficient solution 
available, one of the two metals would, over time, corrode completely-it 
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would fully dissolve in the solution-and the effectiveness of the cell would 
altogether cease. While we have no interest in censuring Schleiermacher for 
failing to possess an exhaustive understanding of electrical currents, we may 
nonetheless muse over the implications of this account of the "pile" or the 
battery for the polar relation which is thought to exist between under-
standing and feeling. If these two faculties are to be seen as equivalent to the 
two metals, then the current between them is not in fact produced by their 
being held in balance, but actually by the corrosion of one of the pair and 
the "strengthening" of the other. In terms of our argument, of course, feeling 
moves in the direction of its comprehension, but the opposite movement can 
also be envisaged: understanding sacrificed in the interests of feeling. 
Modem industry has found remarkable applications for these charac-
teristics of the "bimetallic couple", and the "galvanic corrosion" which occurs 
when two dissimilar metals are placed together in solution. The most 
dramatic application now occurs, for instance, on oil rigs located in the 
North Sea. There zinc anodes are attached to the legs of the platform and 
these rust or corrode "sacrificially"; their corrosion leaves the main structure 
unaffected.2 One metal is literally spared from corrosion by the sacrificial 
rusting of the other. Of course, given the vastness of the sea, these zinc 
anodes must from time to time be renewed. The same principles lie behind 
the process known as "galvanizing": here iron or steel is dipped in molten 
zinc in order that a thin layer of zinc will protect the metal underneath from 
corrosion. In essence, this means that even 
if the zinc layer is scratched, the iron does not rust because zinc ions are 
formed in solution in preference to iron ions. 3 
In effect then, the "galvanic pile" is probably a very poor illustration of 
the kind of "polar oscillation" or "polar reciprocity" which Schleiermacher 
was advocating in his letter to Jacobi. In fact, if the pile teaches us anything, 
it may be the opposite of what Schleiermacher intended: brought to its 
natural conclusion, the pile would, in the end, effect the complete dissolution 
of one of the ~ .... o metals which constitute its dynamic productivit"j. The 
movement of the ions is from one metal to the other; while one metal 
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corrodes, the other metal undergoes the exactly opposite process. This may, 
in fact, accord with our common sense understanding of the matter; we may 
suspect that understanding and feeling, or faith and knowledge, cannot 
actually be held in perfect balance: while one increases, the other dim-
inishes.4 Faith may seek understanding, or understanding may seek faith; 
whichever alternative one pursues, the movement is always from one to the 
other. Of course, the enormous interest of Schleiermacher's efforts rests 
precisely here: in total contrast to the above, Schleiermacher argues that, in 
their reciprocal relation to one another, each strengthens the other, neither 
usurping the unique place of the other. We are well acquainted with this 
argument from the body of our dissertation. 
While we have now said enough about the actual operation of the 
"galvanic pile", we still need to explore more adequately that notion of 
"polarity" of which the pile was supposed to be an illustration. And here 
Hegel's comments once again prove of considerable interest. In his Philo-
sophy of Nature, Hegel argues correctly that the galvanic circuit is not 
occasioned simply by the contact of two dissimilar metals, but only by their 
contact within a solution-the opposites are connected "by a third, a solvent, 
neutral substance in which the difference can enter into existence ... "5 And 
here we hit upon a fundamental disjunction in the way in which "galvanism" 
is systematically appropriated by Hegel and Schleiermacher. "Galvanism" 
is the term used to describe the electricity produced by a primary battery;6 
and a primary battery, like that first discovered by Volta, is one in which the 
chemical reaction is irreversible. In other words, the battery can only be 
restored by a fresh supply of metal and/ or solution? In their respective 
discussions of "galvanism", we are offered a touchstone for comprehending 
the basis of the disagreement between Hegel and Schleiermacher. 
Years earlier than any of the writings under discussion here, Novalis 
defined "galvanism" as "Wechselvernehmungheterogener Klirper"8-and this 
understanding of the galvanic process is still very much in the background 
f te·ermacher's allusion to the "galvanic pile". 0~"1ers have shoVv-n how, 
for the Romantic school to which Schleiermacher belonged, the whole age 
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around 1800 could be described as "ein chemisches Zeitalter"9 and how 
chemical "Mischung und Scheidung" are the essential forces which make 
this notion intelligible.10 Here Schleiermacher has remained true to his roots, 
for he wishes to demonstrate that feeling and understanding, Glauben und 
Wissen, are both in essence separate and united, discrete and continuous. In 
Novalis' terms, they are heterogeneous, yet capable of a reciprocal relation. 
For Hegel, there is a fundamental incoherence in this Romantic account 
of the relationship between heterogeneous elements-were they strictly 
heterogeneous, there would be no justification in placing them side by side. 
They would have nothing more in common than a square and a circle, and 
we could no more discover their unity than we could imagine a square circle: 
the terms would simply exclude each other.11 And, of course, Schleier-
macher does not just see them (faith and understanding) as heterogeneous: 
he might agree that, however heterogeneous they are in form, they have the 
same final object in view.12 Hence his insistence that, even though they 
cannot ever be united, neither can they ultimately fall into contradiction. 
As we have shown above, the "galvanic pile" might not be the best 
illustration of the kind of polarity that Schleiermacher seems to be advocat-
ing. Galvanic electricity is only possible by means of the solvent "in which 
the difference can enter into existence", an assertion in which the familiar 
Hegelian logic is already at work. Towards the beginning of his Philosophy 
of Nature, Hegel makes this logic explicit: 
There has been a lot of talk in physics about polarity. This concept is a 
great advance in the metaphysics of the science; for the concept of 
polarity is simply nothing else but the specific relation of necessity 
between two different terms which are one, in that when one is given, 
the other is also given. But this polarity is restricted to the opposition. 
However, through the opposition there is also given the return of the 
opposition into unity, and this is the third term which the necessity of 
the Notion [die Notwendigkeit des Begritfs] has over and above polarity.1 
Hegel also took up the theme of polarity earlier in his Encyclopedia of 
the Philosophical Sciences, and from this discussion it emerges that a purer 
statement of "polarity", in Schleiermacher's terms, might have been realized 
if he had used the magnet to illustrate his point. There we have the two 
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opposites inextricably bound together, and even if we were to cut a magnet 
"in two", we would not then have "a north pole in one piece, and a south 
pole in the other".14 But if we substitute the magnet for the "galvanic pile" 
as a more successful instance of polarity, this in no way diminishes the 
opposition between Hegel and Schleiermacher; on the contrary, it makes it 
even clearer. As Hegel says: "In opposition, the different is not confronted 
by any other, but by its other".15 He goes on to say quite explicitly that 
the aim of philosophy is to banish indifference, and to ascertain the 
necessity of things ... all true thinking, we have already said, is a 
thinking of necessity."16 
Hegel's intention is to discover the necessity of the relationship that is 
established between faith and reason, not simply to assert their polarity. 
What is it about them that enables them to undergo this polar oscillation? 
The bare determination of their heterogeneity does not take us very far in 
understanding their relationship to one another. 
Hegel is certainly able to praise Schleiermacher because he is not 
caught within the logic of the "abstract understanding": Schleiermacher is 
not content with the bald "either-or" which the understanding demands, and 
which reaches its purest statement in the Law of the Excluded Middle.17 
Schleiermacher, we might say, is dedicated to the discovery of the "middle", 
the "mediation", 18 which obtains between feeling and understanding, be-
tween Glauben und Wissen: this mediation is implied in and through the 
reciprocity of their "polar oscillation" (Novalis' "Wechselnehmung hetero-
gener Korper") . But in Hegelian terms, Schleiermacher is unable to rise to the 
higher insight of their essential unity, that is to say, 
the specific relation of necessity between two different ~erms which are 
one, in that when one is given, the other is also given.1 
Hegel pushes this argument to the limit in his discussion of magnetism: for 
him, the magnet actually displays in "simple, na1ve fashion" the concept 
(Begritf> at the heart of his system. Viewed philosophically, the poles of the 
magnet surrender their "sensible, ech . ·cal reality" and adopt instead ~'1 
"ideal" one: the poles of the magnet are "absolutely inseparable" (sie sind 
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schlechthin untrennbar).20 And it is precisely in their "ideal" inseparability 
that the magnetic poles illustrate the true relation of Glauben und Wissen. 
In conclusion, it may be instructive to see how ordinary dictionaries 
actually define the word "polarity". In German, "Polaritat" can be succinctly 
defined as "Gegensatzlichkeit bei wesenhafter Zusammengehorigkeit".21 
This definition provides in a shorthand form the conceptual thrust of the 
whole preceding argument; according to this definition, polar opposition 
presupposes an "essential" underlying unity: in their opposition to one 
another, the poles are bound together. The Oxford English Dictionary also 
offers us a tiny nugget: among the references provided we find S.T. Cole-
ridge's contribution to the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana.22 Coleridge's state-
ment that the law of polarity is the "manifestation of one power by opposite 
forces" inevitably requires us to ask after the nature of that "one power". 
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Footnotes 
1. John Clayton, "Theologie als Vermittlung-Das Beispiel Schleiermachers" in Kongrefl, 
Teilband 2, pp. 899-915; here p. 905: "Der metaphorische Gebrauch von polarer 
Oszillation durchzieht fast das Ganze von Schleiermachers Schriften, sowohl das der 
philosophischen als auch das der theologischen." Any discussion of a '"Vertrag' 
zwischen Glauben und Wissen" (ibid.) places us firmly within the perspective from 
which this dissertation is being written. Hegel's early study Glauben und Wissen 
(1802), op. cit., mentions Schleiermacher's Speeches on Religion in his discussion of 
Jacobi's philosophy. 
2. See The Times, June 1, 1987, p. 21: 'New N Sea platorm suffers severe damage". 
3. See the entries under "galvanized iron" and "sacrificial protection" in Concise Science 
Dictionary, edited by A. Isaacs et al. Oxford University Press, 1987. pp. 287 and 611. 
4. The letter to Jacobi does mention a form of "equilibrium", which involves an alternate 
lifting and sinking; this is in reference to Jacobi's original communication (Cordes, 
op. cit.,p. 209). John Clayton (op. cit., p. 909) describes this "Wechselbeziehung" as 
follows:" ... wenn die eine Seite zunimmt, die andere notwendigerweise abnimmt." 
However well this form of "equilibrium" accords with our argument, this can hardly 
be the kind of reciprocity that Schleiermacher had in mind for the twin foci of his 
own ellipse! 
5. "Da dieeinfache galvanische Kette nur iiberhaupt die Verbindung Entgegengesetzter 
durch ein Drittes, auflosliches Neutrales ist, an dem die Differenz in die Existenz 
treten kann ... " G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopiidie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830): 
2.Teil,DieNaturphilosophie,§330ZusatzofVo1ume9oftheTheorie-Werkausgabeedited 
by E.-Moldenhauerand-K-;M. Michel;herep;3l2; English-Translation-by A:V:Miller 
in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970. p. 252. See also Dietrich 
von Engelhardt, Hegel und die Chemie, op. cit., p. 107: "DerGalvanismus ist nach Hegel 
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daB die in ihm reagierenden Metalle noch nicht von sich 
aus den chemischen ProzeB auslosen konnen, sondem dazu der Dissoziation des 
Wassers bediirfen; die wissenschaftliche Chemie vertritt die gleiche Ansicht." 
6. See the entry under "galvanism" in The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 
edited by J.B. Sykes. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976 (6th ed.). p. 435: "electridty from 
a primary battery". 
7. See the entry under "Battery" in the 14th ed. of Encyclopaedia Britannica. London, 1953. 
Volume3, p. 214. 
8. Navalis Schriften, op. cit., Volume III, p. 600, §283: "ErkUirung der galv[anischen] 
Action-der Wechselvernehmung heterogener Ktirper." 
9. Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, Volume 2: Charakteristiken und Kritiken I (1796-
1801), op. cit., p. 248, §426: "Das Zeitalter ist gleichfalls ein chemisches Zeitalter." 
10. On this point, see the exhaustive study by Peter Kapitza, Die friihromantische Theorie 
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der Mischung: iiber den Zusammenhang von romantischer Dichtungstheorie und zeitgenas- . 
sischer Chemie. Munich: Max Hueber, 1968. 
11. I owe this telling observation to John Caird's discussion of the incarnation in his 
Gifford Lectures: The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity. Glasgow: James MacLehose 
and Sons, 1899. Volume II, p. 105: "If our notions of divinity and humanity contain 
heterogeneous or contradictory elements, it is a truism to say that we can no more 
combine them in the conception of one and the same personality than we can think 
of a square circle, or a quadrilateral triangle, or a straight curve." 
12. This somewhat Hegelian formulation is taken from Peter Kapitza, Die frUhromantische 
Theorie der Mischung, op. cit., p. 64: The affinity of poetry and philosophy is said to 
rest upon a heterogeneity of form "bei gleichem Ziel". 
13. §248 Zusatz of Enzyklopiidie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830): 2. Teil, op. cit., p. 
30. Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, p. 19. 
14. §119.1 of Enzyklopiidiederphilosophischen Wissenschaften (1830): 1.Teil, op. cit., p. 246. 
English Translation by William Wallace in Hegel's Logic, op. cit., p. 173: 'The north 
pole of the magnet cannot be without the south pole, and vice versa." 
15. "In der Entgegensetzung hat iiberhaupt das Unterschiedene nicht nur ein Anderes, 
sondem sein Anderes sich gegeniiber." (Ibid.) 
16. Ibid.; Hegel's Logic, p. 174. 
17. § 119 .2, ibid.: The German formulation is very clear; the Law is referred to as "der Satz 
des ausgeschlossenen Dritten". 
18. John Gayton, op. cit., p. 902: " ... seine [Schleiermachers] Suche nach einer 'wahren 
Vermittlung' zwischen Glauben und Wissen, zwischen Christentum und Kultur· ... " 
19. §248 Zusatz of Enzyklopiidieder philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830): 2.Teil, op. cit., p. 
30. Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, p. 19. 
20. §312, ibid., p. 203. Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, p. 163. 
21. Duden: Das grope Worterbuch der deutschen Sprache, Volume 5, p. 2015. Mannheim: 
Bibliographisches lnstitut, 1980. 
22. OED, Volume VII (1933), p. P1063. The original context can be examined in S.T. 
Coleridge's Treatise on Method: As published in the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana, op. cit., 
p.18. 
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Chronology 
1768 F.D.E. Schleiermacher, born 21. XI. 1768, Breslau 
1770 G.W.F. Hegel, born 27. VIII. 1770, Stuttgart 
1781 Kant's Kritik der reinen V ernunft (1st ed.) 
1785 Jacobi's iiber die l.ehre des Spinoza (1st ed.) 
1787 Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft (2nd ed.) 
1789 Storming of the Bastille (14. VII) 
1790 Fichte's "Aphorismen fiber Religion und Deismus" 
1794 Fichte's Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre 
1799 Schleiermacher's Reden (1st ed.) 
1800 Notification of Volta's Battery 
1802 Hegel's Glauben und Wissen 
1803 Schelling: Vorlesungen uber die Methode des akademischen Studiums 
1804 Schleiermacher appointed to University of Halle 
1806 Battle of Jena; Halle closed; Reden (2nd ed.) 
1807 Hegel's Phiinomenologie des Geistes 
1808 Schleiermacher's "Gelegentliche Gedanken" 
1810 Foundation-University of Berlin 
1811 Schleiermacher's Kurze Darstellung (1st ed.) 
1812 Hegel's Wissenschaftder Logik 
1813 Schleiermacher's lecture on translation (24. VI) 
1814 Death of Fichte (27. I) 
1818 Hegel Professor of Philosophy in Berlin; Schleiermacher to Jacobi 
1821 { Glaubenslehre } Hegel's 1st Religionsphilosophie; Reden (3rd ed.) 
1822 1st ed., 2 Vols. Preface to Hinrichs: Die Religion 
1824 Hegel's 2nd Religionsphilosophie 
1827 Hegel's 3rd Religionsphilosophie; Beethoven's Missa Solemnis, Op. 123 
F.C. Baur's Antrittsprogramm 
1828 Closure: Philosophische Klasse, Akademie der Wissenschaften 
1829 Schleiermacher to Lucke 
1830 {Glaubenslehre } Kurze Darstellung (2nd ed.) 
1831 2nd ed., 2 Vols_, Hegel~s lastReligionsphilosophie&. dies 14. XI 
1832 Religionsphilosophie (1st ed. by Marheineke); Death of Goethe 
1834 Death of Schleiennacher (12.11) 
1835 {F.D. Strauss: Das Leben Jesu} F.C. Baur's Die christliche Gnosis 
1836 1st ed., 2 Vols. 
1840 Religionsphilosophie (2nd ed. by Bruno Bauer) 
1841 Kierkegaard attends Schelling's lectures in Berlin 
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